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ABSTRACT
Since work by Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Paul Ricoeur, there has 
been sustained interest among philosophers in the view that narrative plays an essential 
role in how we understand our lives and selves or—more radically—in how we constitute 
ourselves as full persons.  At one extreme, MacIntyre and Taylor argue that our desires 
and commitments are hierarchically organized, in the best case unifying our lives into 
narrative quests.  At the other extreme, Galen Strawson has attacked narrativity as far 
from universal, as well as spurious when taken as an ideal.  Thinkers such as Marya 
Schechtman, Peter Goldie, Daniel Dennett, and David Velleman defend conceptions 
between these extremes.  After examining this background in detail, my dissertation 
offers an interpretation of Heidegger that supports a revised conception of narrative's role 
in self-understanding.  Whereas existing theories are driven by master metaphors of the 
self as author, the self as a character, or of lives as stories, I argue that the relationship 
between the self and narrative is better understood through a notion of reading.
Heidegger scholars disagree as to whether the notions of authenticity and 
historicality put forward in Being and Time support a narrative conception of the self.  In 
my view, Heideggerian “everydayness”—how we are, prior to any reckoning with 
authenticity—amounts already to a version of the narrative self.  Just as readers mid-story 
understand characters by projecting where they are going, we understand who we are by 
v
projecting provisional plotlines for our futures.  Such understanding is made explicit in 
textual narratives, which preserve the structure of lived experience better than any other 
form of description.  Literary narratives, especially certain kinds of experimental rather 
than “realist” ones, most accurately represent the structure of existential possibilities.  
Heidegger's notion of truth as disclosing provides a frame which makes the anti-naturalist 
implications of narrativity more coherent.  By bracketing Heidegger's controversial 
notion of authenticity, conversation with recent work in Anglo-American philosophy on 
narrative and the self is facilitated.  My revised conception of the narrative self 
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If serious reading dwindles to near nothingness, it will probably mean that 
the thing we're talking about when we use the word “identity” has reached 
an end.
Don DeLillo
And in one of those apparently random and abstract thoughts that so often 
assumed importance in his life, it struck him that when one is overburdened 
and dreams of simplifying one's life, the basic law of this life, the life one 
longs for, is nothing other than that of narrative order, the simple order that 
enables one to say: “First this happened and then that happened....”  It is the 
simple sequence of events in which the overwhelmingly manifold nature of 
things is represented in a unidimensional order, as a mathematician would 
say, stringing all that has occurred in space and time on a single thread, 
which calms us; that celebrated “thread of the story,” which is, it seems, the 
thread of life itself.  Lucky the man who can say “when,” “before,” and 
“after”!  Terrible things may have happened to him, he may have writhed in 
pain, but as soon as he can tell what happened in chronological order, he 
feels as contented as if the sun were warming his belly.  This is the trick the 
novel artificially turns to account: Whether the wanderer is riding on the 
highway in pouring rain or crunching through snow and ice at ten below 
zero, the reader feels a cozy glow, and this would be hard to understand if 
this eternally dependable narrative device, which even nursemaids can rely 
on to keep their little charges quiet, this tried-and-true “foreshortening of 
the mind's perspective,” were not already part and parcel of life itself.  Most 
people relate to themselves as storytellers.  They usually have no use for 
poems, and although the occasional “because” or “in order that” get knotted 
into the thread of life, they generally detest any brooding that goes beyond 
that; they love the orderly sequence of facts because it has the look of 
necessity, and the impression that their life has a “course” is somehow their 
refuge from chaos.  It now came to Ulrich that he had lost this elementary, 
narrative mode of thought to which private life still clings, even though 
everything in public life has already ceased to be narrative and no longer 
follows a thread, but instead spreads out as an infinitely interwoven surface.




Figure 1: Randall Munroe, xkcd #904, “Sports”1
Michael Lewis's 2003 bestseller Moneyball tells the story of the Oakland Athletics 
and their surprising ability, in the early 2000s, to compete against much wealthier teams.  
In 2002, the A's tied the Yankees for the most wins in the regular season, 103; the A's had 
a payroll of only about $40 million, one of the lowest in Major League Baseball, whereas 
the Yankees had the highest, at about $120 million.  “[H]ow,” Lewis asks, “did one of the 
poorest teams in baseball […] win so many games?” (xi).  His answer is that Oakland's 
front office, led by General Manager Billy Beane, was able to harness the emerging 
science of sabermetrics, see generations of baseball common sense as actually false, and 
take advantage of inefficiencies in the way baseball players' values were measured.  Some 
of baseball's most prized statistics—batting average, runs batted in—are revealed by 
analysis to be glaringly imperfect as measures of a player's ability to help teams score 
runs.  Sabermetricians (the name comes from the acronym for the Society for American 
1 http://xkcd.com/904 (accessed April 2014).  Reprinted in accordance with a Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License (see http://www.xkcd.com/license.html for details).
2Baseball Research) like Bill James relied upon (and created) alternative statistics like 
OBP (on-base percentage), OPS (on-base plus slugging percentage), FIP (fielding 
independent pitching), and WAR (wins above replacement) to more accurately measure 
players' values.  While fans, arm-chair hobbyists, and fantasy baseball players studied 
such statistics, the actual General Managers of MLB by and large ignored them.  Worse 
still, in deciding which high school and college players to scout and draft, teams 
downplayed the significance of even misleading objective statistics in favor of the 
judgment of seasoned scouts who had seen prospective players and imagined what they 
might become: “Some of the scouts still believed they could tell by the structure of a 
young man's face not only his character but his future in pro ball” (7).  Moneyball relates 
the fight of Beane and his Harvard-educated, laptop-bearing assistant Paul DePodesta 
against the calcified wisdom of these salty scouts: “In the scouts' view, you found a big 
league ballplayer by driving sixty thousand miles, staying in a hundred crappy motels, 
and eating god knows how many meals at Denny's all so you could watch 200 high 
school and college ball games” (37).  Beane and DePodesta thought that these scouts 
overvalued whether prospects looked like their idea of a great athlete.  “This guy may be 
the best body in the draft,” the scouts say (31).  “We're not selling jeans here,” Beane 
retorts (31).  Lewis quotes Bill James: “One absolutely cannot tell, by watching, the 
difference between a .300 hitter and a .275 hitter.  The difference is one hit every two 
weeks” (68).  The scouts value what they can see, but one can't see what a team needs to 
value.
Moneyball thus stages the fight between two worldviews, two methods for 
predicting the success of baseball players.  Traditionally, baseball looked for “five-tool 
players”: players who could run, throw, field, hit for average, and hit for power (3).  But 
even when these tools are measurable, baseball organizations might be measuring them 
incorrectly.  And all too often, scouts were looking instead for the players who best 
3matched their imagined ideal of The Five-Tool Player.  Doing so put them in the thrall of 
story.  The Five-Tool Player has a certain attitude, carries himself a certain way, dates a 
certain kind of girl, leads a certain kind of life.  Applying the insights of sabermetrics, the 
A's were able to more objectively see what a player was worth, then exploit inefficiencies 
in the marketplace for players, thus allowing them to spend their money more effectively 
and compete with richer teams.  At the time, OBP was worth more than teams realized, so 
the A's bought up players able to get on base.  Speed was overvalued, so the A's ignored 
base-stealers.  And players who didn't look like professional baseball players—because 
they were too fat, or old, or threw funny—were dismissed by other teams, no matter what 
their statistics said.  Beane was especially drawn to players where these trends converged: 
players who didn't look the part and might not measure up by traditional statistical 
measures, but got on base better than those who do.  Or, at the very least, Lewis is drawn 
to such players in his selective telling of the A's history.  Moneyball revisionists are quick 
to point out that the A's success during this era had a lot to do with pitchers like Barry 
Zito, Mark Mulder, and Tim Hudson, largely absent from Lewis's account, as well as 
hitters like eventual league MVP Miguel Tejada, whom any team would covet.
As an account of how to best predict prospective players' success, Moneyball's 
championing of statistical analysis and the exploitation of market inefficiencies is 
convincing.  Its legacy has been rather more extravagant, however.  A traditionalist holds 
that we watch sports for their drama: the characters involved, the plots they play out.  
According to such a conception, contemporary athletes are continuous with Homeric 
heroes.  But consider now the cartoon pictured above, the joke of which is possible only 
because of the success of Moneyball.  It goes beyond a claim about how to best predict 
uncertain behavior.  It claims, in effect, that athletes are weighted random number 
generators.  A great baseball player gets on base forty percent of the time (has an OBP 
of .400).  The cartoon proposes that an athlete essentially just is such statistical 
4dispositions.  Watching a bunch of statistical dispositions play out is uninteresting, 
however.  Thus sportscasters are tasked with turning random events into a coherent story, 
one with suspense and emotional developments, something that fans will tune in for.  But 
notice the jump, from epistemology to ontology, that has been made.  In an 
epistemological register, sabermetrics says: the best way to predict the ability to score 
runs—and thus win your fantasy league or, if you're the A's, the American League West—
is to look at the hard data.  In an ontological register, the cartoon implies: an athlete just 
is his or her hard data.  The stuff of character, personality, and story is an illusion cast to 
fill seats.  Here again, we have a clash of worldviews, but one less easily refereed.  The 
fight between Billy Beane and his scouts is played out against an agreed-upon standard of 
success: scoring runs, winning games.  By what metric are we to decide what an athlete 
is?
Robert Coover's 1968 novel The Universal Baseball Association, Inc., J. Henry 
Waugh, Prop. prefigures, in many ways, the current obsession with fantasy sports.  It 
opens on a day at the ballpark: “Bottom half of the seventh, Brock's boy had made it 
through another inning unscratched, one! two! three!  Twenty-one down and just six outs 
to go!” (3).  Damon Rutherford, rookie pitcher and son of hall-of-famer Brock 
Rutherford, is approaching a perfect game.  Henry Waugh, the novel's protagonist, is 
caught up in the moment: his “heart was racing, he was sweating with relief and tension 
all at once, unable to sit, unable to think, in there, with them!” (3).  Already on the next 
page, however, the alert reader notices that something is awry.  Henry “squint[s] at the 
sun high over the Pioneer Park” and then looks “at his watch: nearly eleven, Diskin's 
closing hours” (4).  Henry is not at the ballpark at all.  He is huddled over his kitchen 
table, late at night, rolling dice and imagining a baseball game.  And he needs to get some 
sandwiches and beer from the corner deli before they close for the night.
Henry has created an entire imaginary baseball league, the Universal Baseball 
5Association, composed of teams like the Pioneers, Pastime Club, and Bridegrooms and 
populated by absurdly named players such as Swanee Law, Holly Tidbit, Chadbourne 
Collins, and Toothbrush Terrigan.  The names are essential: “they were what gave the 
league its sense of fulfillment and failure, its emotion” (46-47).  As proprietor of the 
league, Henry has simulated over 50 seasons of its play by rolling dice:
Henry had spent the better part of two months just working with the problem of odds and 
equilibrium points in an effort to approximate [the complexity of real baseball].  Two dice had not 
done it.  He'd tried three, each a different color, and the 216 different combinations had provided 
the complexity, all right, but he'd nearly gone blind trying to sort the colors on each throw.  
Finally, he'd compromised, keeping the three dice, but all white, reducing the total number of 
combinations to 56, though of course the odds were still based on 216.  To restore—and, in fact, to 
intensify—the complexity of the multicolored model, he'd allowed triple ones and sixes—1-1-1 
and 6-6-6—to trigger the more spectacular events, by referring the following dice throw to what 
he called his Stress Chart, also a three-dice chart, but far more dramatic in nature than the basic 
ones.  Two successive throws of triple ones and sixes were exceedingly rare—only about three 
times in every two entire seasons of play on the average—but when it happened, the next throw 
was referred, finally, to the Chart of Extraordinary Occurrences, where just about anything from 
fistfights to fixed ball games could happen.  These two charts were what gave the game its special 
quality, making it much more than just a series of hits and walks and outs.  Besides these, he also 
had special strategy charts for hit-and-run plays, attempted stolen bases, sacrifice bunts, and 
squeeze plays, still others for deciding the ages of rookies when they came up, for providing 
details of injuries and errors, and for determining who, each year, must die. (19-20)
This last comment will prove prescient.  Henry is obsessed to the point of keeping track 
of his players into retirement—some stay in the league as managers, others become 
members of competing political parties (the Legalists, Universalists, Guildsmen) behind 
the association, one former player runs a bar which Henry confuses with his own local—
and he has a chart to determine when they finally die.  Occasionally, an active player's 
death is decided by the chart during the offseason (“Last year a young fellow, just thirty, 
had a bad season and got sent back to the minors. […] Sensitive boy who took it too 
much to heart.  On the way, he drove his car off a cliff”; 28).  A player can even die 
during a game: “if a pitcher throws two straight triple ones or sixes and brings on an 
Extraordinary Occurrence, a third set of ones is a bean ball that kills the batter, while 
triple sixes again is a line drive that kills the pitcher” (28).
Henry's league is a baroque version of Strat-O-Matic Baseball, the tabletop game 
created in the early 1960s.  Much of Strat-O-Matic Baseball's appeal was in its use of 
6actual Major League players.  Simulating a game between the Cardinals and Reds of 
1968, one could “watch” Bob Gibson pitch to Pete Rose, tapping into one's familiarity 
with and fandom of such players.  Or, alternatively and anachronistically, one might 
simulate a game between World Series champions from different decades to settle a 
speculative disagreement.  With the rise of real-time statistical accounting and, especially, 
the internet, fantasy baseball has largely replaced tabletop simulations.  Fantasy 
participants draft real Major League players at the start of a season, set their lineups, 
make trades, drop players, and pick up free agents.  They compete against other teams in 
various statistical categories (originally, ones like batting average, RBI, and wins, though 
the rise of sabermetrics has led to alternative leagues based in newer stats), according to 
how real players fare on the field.
Fantasy baseball thus involves a fair amount of strategy, but little imagination.  If 
a participant owns, say, both Matt Holliday and David Ortiz, she never simulates and 
imagines them hitting in the same lineup.  She just waits to see what each will do in their 
real games, and their statistics are automatically tabulated.  Fantasy baseball, like the 
sabermetric analyses featured in Moneyball (and statistics generally), is objectifying.  
From the complexity of the world, it abstracts objective metrics.  Strat-O-Matic Baseball 
and Henry's Universal Baseball Association run in the opposite direction.  They use the 
random roll of dice to generate raw stuff for the imagination.  Henry rolls dice and 
consults charts.  A roll dictating a routine ground-out to third becomes: “Hard John 
Horvath took a cut at Rutherford's second pitch, a letter-high inside curve, pulled it down 
the third-base line: Hatrick Hines took it backhanded, paused one mighty spellbinding 
moment—then fired across the diamond to Goodman James, and Horvath was out” (16).  
The game comes alive in his mind's eye.
To much too great an extent, as it turns out.  Henry not only simulates each game, 
monitoring players' statistics as they accrue, he also maintains “the Book,” an official 
7archive of the league running “to some forty volumes,” for which he writes newspaper 
articles and essays, interviews with players and obituaries (55).  On the night the novel 
opens, Damon Rutherford completes his perfect game, only the third in league history 
and the first by a rookie, and Henry becomes obsessed with him.  Henry realizes his 
obsession is a problem (“Rutherford meant more to him than any player should”; 38) but 
can do nothing about it.  He imagines a personality and backstory for the player, has 
conversations about him, and pays less and less attention to his real work as an 
accountant.  He stays up late the next night, working his way through a full slate of 
games so that he can watch the rookie pitch again.  Henry would never cheat (“Even 
though he'd set his own rules, his own limits, […] nevertheless he and his players were 
committed to the turns of the mindless and unpredictable—one might even say, 
irresponsible—dice”; 40), yet amazing drama develops once again.  Damon Rutherford 
has another perfect game going.  And then, as foreshadowed, the chart of Extraordinary 
Occurrences comes into play.  Rutherford is up to bat and, “one chance in 216,” a third 
set of triple ones is rolled: “Batter struck fatally by bean ball” (70).  The favored rookie is 
dead.
Henry's grasp on reality, already tenuous, is lost: “The Proprietor of the Universal 
Baseball Association, utterly brought down, brought utterly to grief, buried his face in the 
heap of papers on his kitchen table and cried for a long bad time” (76).  He loses himself 
in the world he has created.  He seems to think that he is Rag Rooney, manager of the 
Haymakers, and he attends Damon Rutherford's official wake, as well as the unofficial 
one at Jake's Bar.  Eventually, Henry breaks his rules and manipulates the dice at a key 
moment in an attempt to restore order.  The pitcher who fatally hit Rutherford is himself 
struck dead by a line drive later in the season: “[Henry] picked up the dice, shook them.  
'I'm sorry, boy,' he whispered, and then, holding the dice in his left palm, he set them 
down carefully with his right.  One by one.  Six.  Six.  Six” (202).  It's not enough, 
8however.  By the end of the novel, the two worlds, real and imagined, have reversed.  We 
gather that Henry has lost his job and now spends all of his time inside the Universal 
Baseball Association.  But we no longer see Henry imagining his way into games.  
Instead, as Brian McHale writes, “the world-within-a-world of Waugh's baseball game 
acquires independent reality, even a history, becoming in effect a free-standing world of 
its own” (20).  The players themselves meditate on whether they are free or if their 
behavior is determined by unseen forces.
The Universal Baseball Association, like Moneyball, poses the question: what is 
an athlete?  In both, the way to predict behavior is through cold statistics.  In Coover's 
novel, rookies, normal players, stars, and aces receive different weightings, and rolls of 
the dice determine actual events.  In Moneyball's story, the Oakland A's realize that they 
should care less about how a player looks, less about what kind of future scouts can 
imagine for him, and more about hard data.  Yet Moneyball, as a book, succeeds for the 
most traditional of reasons.  As Lewis himself states, “I wrote this book because I fell in 
love with a story” (xi).  That story revolves around enthralling characters: Billy Beane, 
one-time top prospect, failed player, now General Manager of the A's, who knows, based 
on his own failure, not to judge prospects in the same way he was judged; Paul 
DePodesta, Harvard-graduate with his laptop, pushing back against the calcified 
“wisdom” of veteran scouts; Scott Hatteberg, unable to throw after injury, saved by the 
A's from washing out of the league, converted from a catcher to a first baseman and a 
valuable member of the team; Chad Bradford, pitcher who throws so funny his arm angle 
is not just sidearm but “submarine,” his knuckles occasionally scraping the dirt as he 
delivers to the plate.  Moneyball was made into a successful film in 2011, overcoming the 
misguided worry that, being about statistics, it couldn't be made interesting to a general 
audience.  In fact, it's a book about underdogs, the most classic of all sports-movie tropes.  
But what is the status of such story-stuff?  Is it, as Randall Munroe's xkcd cartoon 
9suggests, epiphenomenal?  Are such meanings merely imagined, whereas a baseball 
player's real ontological make-up resides in his statistics?  Does Coover's novel show us 
the level of obsession it takes to make random dice rolls meaningful?  Or does it show us 
why we care about sports in the first place?
Such questions are easier to pose within a restricted context.  What is an athlete is 
a stand-in for a more general question, however.  What is a person?  What is the 
ontological status of the stories we find ourselves within?  Of the character that we reveal
—or make—through our actions in them?  Just as one is tempted to reduce a baseball 
player to objective metrics and dispositional states (gets on base thirty-eight percent of 
the time, hits a home run once every five fly balls), one might be tempted to reduce a 
person to a set of weightings and dispositions, given to us in our DNA and modified 
through contingent circumstance.  Are our stories part of who we are, or merely desperate 
attempts to make meaning adhere to cold reality?
We have a myriad number of names available for talking about ourselves: 
persons, people, humans, human beings, human animals, rational animals, self-
interpreting animals, agents, subjects, selves.  This list could be extended.2  “Selves,” 
which are said to belong to us—“our selves”— is only one of them, but perhaps the 
hardest to get in our grasp.  When one leaves a space between “our” and “selves,” the 
reflexive, “ourselves,” often little more than a grammatical placeholder or means of 
emphasis, becomes substantive, weighty, philosophical: the self.  These various concepts 
encode different accounts of what we are, sometimes compatible, sometimes competing, 
sometimes based on incommensurable assumptions about what would even count as an 
answer to the question in the first place.  They are at home in different contexts, but those 
contexts mix, messily, in everyday language.  In philosophy (and other disciplines), we 
develop technical vocabularies to domesticate this burly terrain.  But if we mean to honor 
2 See too A. Rorty, 301-323; Eakin, 9-10.
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the weight of the original, essential questions—What are we? Who are we?—we have to 
return to everyday language in the end.
I'm interested here in how one goes about answering the question “Who am I?,” 
and in the general question of what we are such that each of us can raise this question.  
But, as Hannah Arendt writes,
The moment we want to say who somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying 
what he is [….] This frustration has the closest affinity with the well-known philosophical 
impossibility to arrive at a definition of man, all definitions being determinations or interpretations 
of what man is, of qualities, therefore, which he could possibly share with other living beings, 
whereas his specific difference would be found in a determination of what kind of “who” he is. 
(1998, 181)
Who am I?  This is the original, weighty, first-personal question, all too easily shunted 
into related but specialized areas.  Many of our terms of self-description belong to such 
specialized realms; because of this, they can be more strictly defined, but at the expense 
of losing any grip on the “who.”  “Subject” is a term of epistemology.  As a subject I'm 
set against an object, and we then ask what I know.  “Agent” is a term of action theory 
and, relatedly, ethics.  As an agent, things don't just happen, I do them: I choose, I'm 
responsible.  As “human,” I'm not merely an animal.  So too with “human animal,” 
though then the underlying continuity is emphasized.  “Person” when it's pluralized as 
“persons” is a legalistic term.  Persons have rights.  “Person” when it's pluralized as 
“people” is the most generic term, that which best catches all the others in its net, but 
only by remaining vague.
All of these terms are important and useful.  But all fail to articulate the question 
“Who am I?” by too quickly encoding assumptions about what counts as an answer.  
“Who am I?” and “What am I, as a subject?” are not the same questions.  “What kind of a 
person am I?” is closer to “Who am I?,” though it reroutes the first-personal question 
through more publicly accessible, objective data.  An answer to the question “What kind 
of person am I?” will naturally include reference to and comparison with other people, 
perhaps organized typologically, in a way that an answer to the question “Who am I?” 
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might not.  To ask “Who am I?” is to turn inward and rely on one's self-understanding.  
It's thus “self,” a term of phenomenology, that best captures the weight of the original 
question.
To ask what the self is, in these terms, is to ask what our different answers to the 
question “Who am I?” have in common.  I pursue the hypothesis here that the self is 
found in narrative.  As Arendt writes, “Who somebody is or was we can know only by 
knowing the story of which he is himself the hero—his biography, in other words; 
everything else we know of him, including the work he may have produced and left 
behind, tells us only what he is or was” (1998, 186).  As we'll see, the notion that the self, 
or our self-understanding, is narrative in form has been pursued by many philosophers, 
especially in recent years.  Do I have to understand my life as a story to understand who I 
am?  Or, more radically: Do I have to understand my life as story to be a self, or achieve 
full personhood, at all?  These are the questions that guide “narrativists” like Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Paul Ricoeur, and Marya Schechtman.  I won't attempt to 
exhaust the vast literature on this topic, but I have carefully chosen to treat those 
narrativists and their critics who offer the best, most distinctive, most influential, or most 
provocative accounts of the self's underlying narrativity.
That the self is narrative, or even temporal, in form will seem immediately wrong 
from the standpoint of a certain philosophical use of “self,” where it is a term not of 
phenomenology, but metaphysics.  By this way of thinking, the self is already implicitly 
taken as a thing, object, or entity in the broadest sense possible, one implying no 
commitment to materialism.  To ask what the self is in the framework of metaphysics is 
to ask what kind of thing it is—physical, mental, composite, abstract?  The idea that the 
self is a thing will emerge as the chief enemy of my account.  In the second part of the 
dissertation, I offer a revised account of the self's narrativity through an interpretation of 
Heidegger.  “[T]he substance of man is existence,” he writes (SZ, 212).  “The 'essence' of 
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Dasein lies in its existence” (SZ, 42).  Or, as Sartre puts it even more famously, 
“Existence comes before essence” (1973, 26).  For both Heidegger and Sartre, who we 
are is determined only through our existence in time.  Guided by the thought that 
narrative is our way of making sense of time, narrativists take this claim a step further: 
our understanding of ourselves is not just temporal, but narrative in its most basic form.
Because I think that most of the parts of a narrativist account of the self need to be 
revised—sometimes slightly, sometimes substantially—in order to come to a coherent 
and compelling account, there are many moving parts in what follows.  A brief preview 
of my arguments and their order will, I hope, help the reader keep the big picture in mind.
In chapter one, I consider Alasdair MacIntyre's and Charles Taylor's arguments in 
favor of narrative self-understanding.  Along with Paul Ricoeur (who I consider later), 
they set the stage for subsequent philosophical work on narrative and the self.  In 
developing their claims about narrative, much of this later work has left aside their ethical 
concerns without seeing that some of their assumptions can also be abandoned.  In 
particular, I criticize MacIntyre's and Taylor's emphasis on unity.  This prefigures my 
claim, in part two, that our self-understanding is narrative in form, but not necessarily 
unified like a traditional story.
In chapter two, I carefully consider—and reject—Galen Strawson's arguments 
“Against Narrativity” (the title of his influential 2004 essay).  Most of Strawson's claims 
concern subjects, an abstraction of epistemology, not selves or persons.  He is thus left 
talking past his narrativist opponents.  I argue that Strawson's “episodic,” someone 
lacking narrative self-understanding, is a mere philosophical fiction, not recognizable as a 
self or person.  Criticizing Strawson's co-option of the term “phenomenology” also 
allows me to clarify what I mean by it.
In chapter three, I offer a baseline characterization of the term “narrative.”  I 
criticize Noël Carroll's emphasis on causality, and David Velleman's on the enactment of 
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typical emotional arcs, toward the end of offering a more inclusive account.  Narrative 
typically concerns the (re)presentation of temporal human events, I argue.  Attempts at 
more strict definition fail, and this characterization is specific enough to make use of 
going forward, as I apply the term narrative to the form of our self-understanding and 
lives.
In chapter four, I ask what exactly, as more than a metaphor, the claim that our 
lives are stories might mean.  I consider Marya Schechtman's and MacIntyre's accounts in 
detail, and Dan Dennett's, David Velleman's, and Ricoeur's more briefly.  I propose an 
argumentative dilemma: If the narratives of our lives include every last detail of them, 
then it is unclear how such an account has sufficient structure to deserve the name 
“narrative.”  If the narratives of our lives don't include every last detail of them, then it 
would seem that such narratives are dependent on some more basic layer and needn't be 
central to who we are.  Narrativity must turn to ontology and offer an account of how we 
exist in order to reject this dilemma.  Part one of the dissertation, chiefly concerned with 
recent Anglo-American philosophy, thus ends in an aporia.  In the second part, I turn to 
continental thinkers—Heidegger and Sartre—and literary theory for resources that allow 
us to move forward.
In chapter five, I offer a reading of Sartre's novel Nausea.  I reject the orthodox 
interpretation, according to which Sartre—and the novel—think narrative self-
understanding is inauthentic and falsifying.  I argue that the novel allows us to begin to 
reframe narrativity, motivating my revised, Heideggerian account.
In chapter six, I present Heidegger's notion of “thrown projection” and his claim 
that we exist most fundamentally in possibilities as the central pieces of a revised theory 
of the narrative self.  We interpret our ongoing existence in the same way that a reader 
understands a story while in the middle of reading it, provisionally projecting a whole 
that explains the meaning of where we are now.  Problems with the analogies between 
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selves and authors, selves and characters, and lives as stories can be set aside; the 
fundamental link between the self and narrative is the isomorphism of these readerly 
hermeneutic stances.
In chapter seven, I consider Saul Morson's and Michael Bernstein's concept of 
“sideshadowing.”  Stories that involve foreshadowing are untrue to life, since 
foreshadowing is possible only when the future has already been determined.  Stories that 
involve sideshadows, glimpses of alternative possibilities, overcome this problem.  I 
consider Heidegger's claim that our understanding is worked out explicitly in 
interpretation, and defend so-called “forking path” narratives as offering the best model 
of what our understanding looks like when realized in explicit textual form.
Having defended narrative possibilities as constitutive of our self-understanding, 
in chapter eight I look at Heidegger's and Sartre's accounts of how we domesticate or 
repress possibilities in favor of simple actualities—by way of das Man, falling, and bad 
faith.  The self is narrative in form.  But understanding one's life as a traditional story 
covers over its complexity.
Finally, in my conclusion, I return to the question of how to reject the 
argumentative dilemma from the end of part one.  I return as well to the issue of whether 
we understand ourselves in narrative, or if the self is actually constituted by this 
understanding.  I consider Peter Goldie's more restrained account of the narrative sense of
the self, and defend, via Heidegger's notions of truth as disclosing and reality as a 
derivative phenomenon, the self's most basic being in narrative.
My thesis or, better, hypothesis is that the way we are revealed to ourselves as 
selves is narrative in form, because we are situated in our ongoing temporal experience in 
the same way that a reader of a story is situated in his or her ongoing interpretation of that 
story.  I do not claim that all of our experience is narrative in form.  My focus is on the 
self, though some, but not all, other experiences are narratively structured as well.  Nor 
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do I claim that one needs to be fully aware of the narrative structure of one's self-
understanding, much less that one must use narrative terminology in one's self 
descriptions.  Just as a reader's interpretive exceptions often remain implicit yet effective, 
so too our narrative understanding of ourselves.  Finally, I'm also not claiming that we 
can't think of ourselves outside of narrative.  Doing so is, however, derivative of our more 
basic narrative self-understanding, or carried out in abstract theoretical contexts where 
the goal is an account of what, rather than who, we are.
My hope is that the account I offer here can answer the criticisms of Strawson and 
other skeptics and also offer grounds for developing a fuller theory of how we organize 
our lives in time.  I call my claim a hypothesis, rather than a thesis, because I don't think 
there are any definitive proofs to be had when we try to honor the weight of a question, 
drawn from ordinary experience, like “Who am I?”  I present a set of arguments and ways 
of talking about the self and narrative that I hope are revealing and hang together 
coherently.  With Ricoeur (and Heidegger), “the fundamental experience of being-in-the-
world is posited as the ultimate reference of every particular experience capable of 
standing out against this background” (2005, 58).  But this means giving up on secure 
foundations: “It is first of all a proposition that one is asked to accept, a test, an attempt, a 
hypothesis.  The Annahme und Versuch are justified only by the research program that 
they open. [… A] philosophy of being-in-the-world can only be problematic [….] Having 
begun as a test, this philosophy will always remain one” (2005, 58).
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Chapter One
Life Stories, Master Narratives, and the Rise of the Everyday:
The Founding Arguments of MacIntyre and Taylor
I cannot tell my story without reaching a long way back.  If it were possible I would reach 
back farther still—into the very first years of my childhood, and beyond them into distant ancestral 
past.
Novelists when they write novels tend to take an almost godlike attitude toward their 
subject, pretending to a total comprehension of the story, a man's life, which they can therefore 
recount as God Himself might, nothing standing between them and the naked truth, the entire story 
meaningful in every detail.  I am as little able to do this as the novelist is, even though my story is 
more important to me than any novelist's is to him—for this is my story; it is the story of a man, 
not of an invented, or possible, or idealized, or otherwise absent figure, but of a unique being of 
flesh and blood.  Yet, what a real living human being is made of seems to be less understood today 
than at any time before [….]
I do not consider myself less ignorant than most people.  I have been and still am a 
seeker, but I have ceased to question stars and books; I have begun to listen to the teaching my 
blood whispers to me.  My story is not a pleasant one; it is neither sweet nor harmonious, as 
invented stories are; it has the taste of nonsense and chaos, of madness and dreams—like the lives 
of all men who stop deceiving themselves.
Each man's life represents a road toward himself, an attempt at such a road, the intimation 
of a path.  No man has ever been entirely and completely himself.  Yet each one strives to become 
that—one in an awkward, the other in a more intelligent way, each as best he can.  Each man 
carries the vestiges of birth—the slime and eggshells of his primeval past—with him to the end of 
his days.  Some never become human, remaining frog, lizard, ant.  Some are human above the 
waist, fish below.  Each represents a gamble on the part of nature in creation of the human.  We all 
share the same origin, our mothers; all of us come in at the same door.  But each of us—
experiments of the depths—strives toward his own destiny.  We can understand one another; but 
each of us is able to interpret himself to himself alone.
Hermann Hesse, Demian (1-2)
“Life is a story”: as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson comment, “This is a 
metaphor rooted deep in our culture.  It is assumed that everyone's life is structured like a 
story, and the entire biographical and autobiographical tradition is based on this 
assumption.  Suppose someone asks you to tell your life story.  What do you do?  You 
construct a coherent narrative that starts early in your life and continues up to the 
present” (172).  Less conventional, but not unfamiliar, they add, is the contrasting 
metaphor that “Life's … a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing” 
(174).  Even when coherence and significance are lacking (above, Hesse's narrator 
describes his story as “having the taste of nonsense and chaos”), life is still said to be a 
story,1 so deeply ingrained is this trope in our ways of thinking about ourselves.2
1 That incoherent narratives are still narratives, perhaps just bad or unconventional ones (according to 
certain standards), is something I will stress repeatedly against contrary accounts.
2 As Taylor writes, “The really difficult thing is distinguishing the human universals from the historical 
constellations and not eliding the second into the first so that our particular way seems somehow 
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 When one begins to think more carefully about what the trope of lives as stories 
might mean, differences and—subsequently—puzzles emerge.  Stories have authors; do 
lives?  Stories are textual, or at least discursive, made of words written or spoken; are 
lives?  Stories are usually told, retold, remembered, and written down because they are 
somehow noteworthy, un-routine, remarkable; most lives (mine included) are not.  The 
task of this first chapter is to examine how and why describing lives as stories came to 
have philosophical plausibility, appeal even when such formulations are scrutinized and 
stripped of their more accidental and metaphorical content.  My focus in this chapter is 
the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor.  First, I provide a brief history of 
how these ideas emerged, in philosophical form, in the course of their thinking about 
ethics and the self.  Second, I look more carefully at what I think deserves to be called the 
founding argument of narrativity, from MacIntyre's After Virtue, in which he claims that 
narrative plays a necessary role in our self-understanding (Taylor makes an analogous 
argument, which I examine here as well).  Finally, I attempt to characterize MacIntyre's 
and Taylor's tone.  I argue that it is neither simply descriptive of how we do understand 
ourselves, nor normative in defending a particular approach to how we should, but 
redescriptive in attempting to inaugurate new vocabularies of self-understanding.
I. Proximate History
MacIntyre begins his 1981 book After Virtue with a story:
Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe.  A series of 
environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on the scientists.  Widespread riots 
occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments are destroyed.  
Finally a Know-Nothing political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science 
inescapable for humans as such, as we are always tempted to do.  I can't pretend to have a general 
formula for making this distinction.  If I did, I would have solved the greatest intellectual problem of 
human culture” (SS, 112).  I will regularly use the pronoun “we” and formulations like “the form of our 
self-understanding.”  As we'll see, I think the idea that all human beings view their lives as one 
particular kind of story (e.g., a quest, or a nineteenth-century Bildungsroman) is implausible.  My 
inclusive characterization of narrative and the resulting, more abstract account of the narrativity of the 
self aspire to philosophical generalizability while trying to avoid doing violence to cultural and 
historical difference.
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teaching in schools and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists. (AV, 1)
MacIntyre asks us to suppose further that a scientific revival eventually occurs.  
Fragments of theories, experiments, and textbooks resurface and scientific terms reenter 
the vocabulary.  Divorced from their original, systematic contexts, they would no longer 
be understood, however: “many of the beliefs presupposed by the use of these 
expressions would have been lost and there would appear to be an element of 
arbitrariness and even choice in their application” (AV, 1).  Revivalists might “argue with 
each other about the respective merits of relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and 
phlogiston theory,” even though they were meant to explain non-overlapping phenomena 
and arose at different times in the now lost history of science (AV, 1).  Such is 
approximately the plot of Walter M. Miller, Jr.'s 1959 science fiction novel A Canticle for 
Leibowitz.3  MacIntyre proposes that this condition is in fact ours, but not with respect to 
the vocabularies of science and technology.  “The hypothesis I wish to advance,” he 
writes, “is that in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the 
same state of grave disorder” (AV, 2).4
It is not merely our moral vocabulary, narrowly construed as discourse concerning 
our duties, that MacIntyre thinks is fractured and confused.  Rather, our ways of thinking 
and speaking about ourselves as ethical beings, as selves and persons capable of decision 
and action, are in this sorry state.  After Virtue was a central text in the revival in the latter 
half of the twentieth century of an Aristotelian virtue ethics, and it is a large part of why, 
in the broadest, Philosophy-101 strokes, we currently think of there as being at the very 
least three major possibilities in ethical theory—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue 
3 In the novel, circuitry diagrams, for example—neither originally significant nor now understood—are 
venerated as relics by monks in a post-apocalyptic monastery.  MacIntyre confirms, in the prologue to 
the third edition (2007, xv), that this is the particular work to which he was alluding.  More recently, 
Neal Stephenson's 2008 novel Anathem, greatly influenced by Miller, handles a similar plot.
4 As will become clear, I'm particularly drawn to this story because I think that, when we speak 
philosophically, especially about the self, we all too often rehearse familiar phrases that fail to capture 
our actual experiences.  Hence the conception of phenomenology that I defend in the next chapter.
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ethics.5  At the same time, MacIntyre's particular arguments against the then current 
thinking on morality and in defense of his own views (examined below) stimulated a 
generation of thinking on the relation between narrative and the self.  There's no real 
possibility of handling moral philosophy in separation from issues of the self; our 
thinking fails, according to MacIntyre, if it understands the self as atomistic, rather than 
nested always within a particular history and set of traditions, which have to be 
understood through narrative.
His aim is thus ambitious: “nothing less than a rejection of a large part of [the 
ethos of the distinctively modern and modernizing world] will provide us with a 
rationally and morally defensible standpoint from which to judge and to act” (AV, x).  
Within the argumentative contours of After Virtue, MacIntyre's foremost opponent is the 
thought that moral philosophy can be pursued without a treatment (or even in ignorance) 
of its own history and the history of those societies in which differing philosophies 
emerged: “We all too often treat the moral philosophers of the past as contributors to a 
single debate with a relatively unvarying subject-matter, treating Plato and Hume and 
Mill as contemporaries both of ourselves and each other” (AV, 11).  Though not my 
focus, here is one manner in which narrative is invoked by MacIntyre: in order to partake 
in moral philosophy in the present, we have to understand the narrative history that leads 
from the past to our current situation and conception of the self.
On the contemporary scene, MacIntyre identifies two major opponents, each a-
historical in its approach and an embodiment of the modern ethos.  One is found 
primarily in analytic philosophy, the other in sociology and existentialism.  “The former,” 
he writes, “is the tendency to think atomistically about human action and to analyze 
complex actions and transactions in terms of simple components” (AV, 204).  He most 
5 Seeing these as three options alongside one another, divorced from their historical places, would mean 
MacIntyre has lost his larger fight (AV, 11).
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explicitly identifies this mode of analysis with behaviorism.6  Of his second contemporary 
opponent MacIntyre writes: “Equally the unity of human life becomes invisible to us 
when a sharp separation is made either between the individual and the roles that he or she 
plays [...] or between the different role—and quasi-role—enactments of an individual life 
so that life comes to appear as nothing but a series of unconnected episodes” (AV, 204).  
Here the self becomes either a Sartrean nothingness opposed to its inauthentic roles, or a 
mere placeholder, a grammatical or logical peg on which to hang a succession of masks 
(AV, 32).  Either way, it is insufficiently robust to have a stable character through time.
MacIntyre identifies a methodological similarity which unites these two 
opponents.  “[T]he techniques of analytical philosophy are essentially descriptive and 
descriptive of the language of the present,” he writes, leaving them ill-equipped to 
discern—and do something about—the disorder of our moral thinking (AV, 2).  So too for 
phenomenology and existentialism: “All the structures of intentionality would be what 
they are now. [...] A Husserl or a Merleau-Ponty would be as deceived as a [P. F.] 
Strawson or a Quine” (AV, 2).7  One might question both of these characterizations, and 
I'll defend a different conception of phenomenology in the next chapter.  I mention  
MacIntyre's dismissal of contemporary philosophical methodology as merely descriptive, 
however, as I will go on to characterize his own methodology as redescriptive.
In Charles Taylor's work, we see the evolution of these opponents.  He writes, in 
1985, that “it seems almost unbelievable that anyone ever could have taken a theory like 
behaviourism seriously” (5).  Behaviorism was by then well on the wane, but he thinks 
that later views that develop out of it are not that different.  All of these Taylor collects 
under the heading of “naturalism,” which he characterizes as “not just the view that man 
can be seen as part of nature—in one sense or other this would surely be accepted by 
6 He names B. F. Skinner in particular (AV, 208).  He would undoubtedly find later, related views over the 
latter half of the twentieth century, in functionalism and beyond, equally problematic.
7 He draws parallels between what he sees as both positions' failures.  See too, e.g., AV, 21, 217.
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everyone—but that the nature of which he is a part is to be understood according to the 
canons which emerged in the seventeenth-century revolution in natural science” (1985, 
2).  So subjective or anthropocentric properties can at best have secondary status, and the 
self is objectified and to be described in neutral, absolute terms (1985, 2ff).  Taylor argues 
that naturalism is categorically unable to deal with the manner in which we all construct 
hierarchies of goods, hierarchies which constitute our moral identities (more on this 
below).  Values aren't part of the fabric of reality itself, according to naturalism, but 
anthropocentric projections in need of reduction.  And if naturalism is thus ill-equipped to 
explain the role of values in our everyday thinking, according to Taylor, it is even more 
incapable of understanding the ways in which values can come into conflict and the way 
that we hold some qualitatively higher than others.
Whereas MacIntyre routinely invokes Sartre and existentialism generally8 as an 
opponent, Taylor attacks more recent French thought: “The need for an escape from the 
restrictions of the unitary self has [...] become an important recurring theme in this 
century, and all the more so in what is sometimes referred to as 'post-modernism', as we 
see in one way in Foucault's attack on the disciplinary or the confessing self, and in 
another way in the work of Lyotard” (SS, 463).  Naturalism is, for Taylor, unable to 
explain the hierarchies by which we craft our identities; thinkers like Derrida, Lyotard, 
and Foucault adopt a stance of neutrality outside such hierarchies, refusing to affirm any 
good.  Taylor describes the “poverty” of Derrida's position and characterizes Lyotard as 
merely prolonging “the least impressive side of modernism” (SS, 489).  He is more 
admiring of Foucault, but only because he “seems to have dropped the stance of 
neutrality at the end of his life” (SS, 489).9  More harshly, he writes that post-
structuralists who discuss “the end of subjectivity and the impossibility of lucid self-
8 In a more charitable moment, he refers to “the misreading of some existentialist texts” (AV, 5).  
Remarkably, given the breadth of his reference, Taylor almost never mentions Sartre.
9 See too “Overcoming Epistemology” in 1995, 15-19 especially.
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conscious […] fundamentally misunderstand the nature of language” (SS, 524n8).  My 
aim here is not to engage with any of these feuds, only to make clear the currents in 
which Taylor takes himself to stand—and to fight against.10
MacIntyre and Taylor were writing at a time when, from two different extremes, 
the most recent theories of what we are put pressure on the traditional notion of the self 
as a unified site of thought and action (or, at the very least, that's the way they read the 
zeitgeist).  On the one hand, behaviorism, in attempting to subject the study of human 
action to a verificationist scientific method, does away with any notion of interiority, and 
thus any appeal to an agent's beliefs or intentions.  Similarly for Taylor, any sort of 
naturalism relies ultimately on the ability to reduce the phenomena of subjectivity and 
interiority to objective scientific concepts.  On the other hand, a kind of postmodernized 
existentialism does away with the concept of a unified and persisting self; each of us is 
instead an accidental nexus of cultural forces beyond our control.  At the extreme, the 
traditional notion of the self is read as hegemonic, deserving of our resistance.
Against this background, it is worth noticing that neither MacIntyre nor Taylor 
raise the notion of narrative in response to the metaphysical problem of whether there is 
such a thing as the self, or what—in one of the central problems of personal identity—
makes it identical through time.  Instead, MacIntyre introduces narrative in the context of 
moral philosophy.  Inasmuch as narrativity is now tied to overtly metaphysical concerns, 
it has moved some distance from its original purposes in his work.  Narrative is invoked 
in opposition to the a-historical approach of contemporary moral philosophy.  Once 
MacIntyre presents his own history of the virtues in Homeric, Athenian, and medieval 
society, he invokes it again in his thesis that “Every particular view of the virtues is 
linked to some particular notion of the narrative structure or structures of human life” 
10 See Taylor's The Ethics of Authenticity, a book adapted from a series of radio lectures in Canada—
which says something about how culturally prominent these views had become.
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(AV, 174).  Thus, MacIntyre claims, “Heroic social structure is enacted epic narrative,” 
whereas later “the difference between the heroic account of the virtues and the 
Sophoclean amounts precisely to a difference over what narrative form captures best the 
central characteristics of human life and agency,” and finally “in the high medieval 
scheme a central genre is the tale of a quest or journey” (AV, 129, 144, 174).  This use of 
narrative is not my focus either, so I only want to say enough about it to make the 
background of MacIntyre's project clear.
MacIntyre claims that different narrative genres (epic, tragedy, the quest) capture 
different conceptions of the virtues (Homeric, Sophoclean, medieval).  He explains that 
the fundamental structure of ethics is tripartite, and that different accounts of these three 
parts—beginning, middle, and end—amount to different kinds of stories.  First there is a 
conception of “untutored human nature.”  Second, an account of “the precepts of rational 
ethics.”  Third, a conception of corrected human nature, “man-as-he-could-be-if-he-
realized-his-essential-nature” or -telos (AV, 52-53).  It is thus the sort of story that links 
uncorrected human nature to our telos that captures the virtues in a given society, 
according to MacIntyre.  If one thinks our ultimate purpose is to achieve honor, then one 
will think a very different set of virtues is necessary for success than if one thinks that our 
purpose can be achieved only in an afterlife, after suffering persecution and martyrdom in 
this one.  This scheme breaks down if we lose even one part of it—thus our contemporary 
confusion, according to MacIntyre.  Without a conception of untutored human nature, we 
couldn't understand what virtues would compensate for our flaws.  Without a conception 
of the virtues, we would have only conceptions of ourselves as we are and as we hope to 
be, staring at each other across the void.  Most importantly, if we lack a conception of our
telos, then we can't understand what the virtues are supposed to accomplish.  This, 
MacIntyre claims, is the particular plight of modernity (AV, 54f).  We may have a 
conception of human nature, and various remnants of moral theories (whose content was 
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determined originally by a telos), but we've rejected the idea of any essential human 
purpose.  With only fragments from various moral systems, we have no way of deciding 
between competing moral injunctions, nor any way of rationally constructing a system 
from scratch, unguided by some telos.11  How, then, to move forward?
Famously, MacIntyre uses the concept of the quest to explain how we can find 
unity in our lives, which would in turn ground a human telos and allow us to recover a 
coherent conception of ethics.  “The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative 
quest,” he writes (AV, 219).  This is not to impose a particular quest on each of us, as “A 
quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-
knowledge” (AV, 219).  But, in order to restore a telos and the coherence of ethics, “Some 
conception of the good for man is required” (AV, 219).  MacIntyre's somewhat 
disappointing conclusion is that “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the 
good life for man” (AV, 219).12  This final invocation of narrative—as capable of unifying 
the self and enabling self-understanding—is the most important.  It is the Archimedian 
point on which MacIntyre will found his account of ethics and which, divorced from 
ethical inquiry, founds what we might call the philosophical subfield of narrativity.13  
Before turning to it in detail in the next section, there is a bit more background to be put 
in place, however.
MacIntyre ends by coming full circle and again alluding to A Canticle for 
Leibowitz.  Any society, such as ours, that lacks a common conception of justice “lack[s] 
the necessary basis for political community” (AV, 244).  Government has become merely 
11 Again, I'm aiming only to present an outline of MacIntyre's argument here, not evaluate it.
12 In fairness, MacIntyre defers his own positive account of reason and the virtues to his later work (see 
AV, 260).  If a philosopher were ever to suggest that the good life in no way resembled the life of the 
philosopher, wouldn't he or she gain a great deal of credibility, at least at first blush?
13 As important as narrative is as a concept in After Virtue, it is employed unselfconsciously.  That is, 
MacIntyre never pauses to try to define it, and—strikingly—it's not to be found in the title of a single 
chapter.  This, it seems to me, is among the clearest evidence that narrativity, as a sort of professional 
sub-discipline, begins with MacIntyre.  Thinkers that he himself quotes and engages with on the topic of 
narrative are clearly writing in other fields—historiography or literary criticism, e.g.—whereas he 
founds a new one.  In the collection On Narrative (Mitchell, ed.), which grew out of a 1979 conference, 
one can begin to see the sub-field coalescing. 
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“a set of institutional arrangements for imposing a bureaucratized unity on a society 
which lacks genuine moral consensus” (AV, 254).  Like Miller's fictional monks who 
preserve scraps of science and technology in the hopes of a second coming of 
enlightenment, “What matters at this state is the construction of local forms of 
community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained 
through the new dark ages which are already upon us” (AV, 263).  MacIntyre's rejection 
of the modern conception of the self is but one part of an even grander—and bleaker—
vision.
Characteristically, Taylor is more measured in his judgment: “I find myself 
dissatisfied with the views on [identity and modernity] which are now current.  Some are 
upbeat, and see us as having climbed to a higher plateau; others show a picture of decline, 
of loss, of forgetfulness.  Neither sort seems to me right” (SS, ix).14  He is less quick to 
call for the wholesale rejection of our modern conception of the self, but he too thinks it 
can't be understood in isolation from a historical account of its development: “We have 
yet to capture, I think, the unique combination of greatness and danger […] which 
characterizes the modern age. […] But I don't think we can grasp this richness and 
complexity unless we see how the modern understanding of the self developed out of 
earlier pictures of human identity” (SS, ix-x).  He echoes MacIntyre on the need to 
approach morality as concerning more than duty: “selfhood and morality” are 
“inextricably intertwined themes,” yet “moral philosophy has tended to focus on what it 
is right to do rather than on what it is good to be, on defining the content of obligation 
rather than the nature of the good life” (SS, 3).  As a result, he like MacIntyre thinks 
we've become “inarticulate” concerning matters of morality and the self (SS, 53ff).15  
14 He names MacIntyre in the previous paragraph.
15 Our “inarticulacy” on moral matters isn't as straightforwardly negative for Taylor as it is for MacIntyre, 
however.  Taylor thinks even those with a coherent morality won't necessarily be able to put into words 
why it bears on them, and he sees this in part as evidence for a discontinuity between moral and 
naturalistic thinking (SS, 91).
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Much of his project is one of overcoming “our temptations to suppress” and of 
“retrieving modes of thought and description which have misguidedly been made to seem 
problematic” (SS, 10, 3).  At times, Taylor seems to fully sanction MacIntyre's approach 
to such a project of retrieval.  He writes that “we must inescapably understand our lives 
in narrative form, as a 'quest'” (SS, 52).  At other times, he seems less certain of this 
notion.  Writing not of “we,” but now “they,” he describes “They [who] are on a 'quest', 
in Alasdair MacIntyre's apt phrase,” as only tentatively, provisionally, or uncertainly 
affiliating themselves with a “spiritual source,” in contrast to other types: “For some it 
may mean holding a definite traditionally defined view. […] Others may hold the view 
but with a pluralist sense that it is one among others” (SS, 17).  Here only some are 
described as embracing a quest, and it sounds optional rather than inescapable.
Perhaps we can begin to make sense of Taylor's hesitation by noting the growing 
role that everydayness plays in his work, as compared to in MacIntyre's.  MacIntyre's 
history of the virtues ends, in large part, in the medieval period, given his final embrace 
of the notion of the quest.  He goes on to tell the tale of the enlightenment, the rise of 
disengaged reason, and a quite specific story about utilitarianism, Henry Sidgwick, G. E. 
Moore, Bloomsbury, and emotivism.  But this is no longer a story about the virtues, 
because they've been abandoned by modernity.  He does write briefly about Benjamin 
Franklin's and Jane Austen's conceptions of the virtues.  In Franklin virtue has decayed 
(according to MacIntyre's analysis) to something like “that which has utility” (and 
specifically in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania), however (AV, 185).  More approvingly, 
he describes Austen as “the last great representative of the classical tradition of the 
virtues” (AV, 243).  She could no longer consider society as a whole, however, but had to 
try “to discover enclaves for the life of the virtues within it” (AV, 238).  Unfortunately, “It 
has proved easy for later generations not to understand her importance as a moralist 
because she is after all a novelist.  And to them she has often appeared not merely 'only' a 
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writer of fiction, but a writer of fiction concerned with a very restricted social world” (AV, 
243).  According to MacIntyre's description, Austen still has that which we moderns lack: 
a telos.  “[S]he is a Christian,” he writes, “and she sees the telos of human life implicit in 
its everyday form” (AV, 243).  In one sense, MacIntyre's history of the virtues ends in the 
medieval period; in another sense, it ends here with Austen, the virtues no longer heroic, 
but found in everyday life.  MacIntyre makes much of the first strand, in embracing the 
quintessentially medieval notion of the quest.  Where he seems to drop this second strand, 
Taylor picks it up, in developing the notion of everydayness.
Taylor places everydayness at the center of his history of the self.  He writes, “I 
believe that this affirmation of ordinary life […] has become one of the most powerful 
ideas in modern civilization.  It [...] along with its corollary about the importance of 
suffering, colours our whole understanding of what it is truly to respect human life and 
integrity” (SS, 14).16  He's thus much more hesitant than MacIntyre is to simply deride 
that which comes with and after the enlightenment—Homeric, Sophoclean, and medieval 
society weren't much concerned with lessening suffering and cruelty, and Taylor makes a 
greater point of celebrating what is gained in moving beyond them.  He ties “the 
affirmation of ordinary life” closely to the rise of the novel, which not only takes up the 
middle class as its subject, but no longer draws a genre distinction between how one 
writes of high and low characters (previously in tragedy and comedy, respectively; SS, 
286-287).17  The novel also delves like no previous literary form into particularity: “It 
departs from traditional plots and archetypical stories and breaks with the classical 
preference for the general and universal” (SS, 287).  One can see here the beginning of a 
response to the objection that lives are more banal than stories: much of modern fiction is 
equally banal, at least when compared to Homer, Sophocles, or Shakespeare.  In his 
16 In the historical part of the book, this topic is taken up on 211-302.
17 Taylor leans heavily on Ian Watt's The Rise of the Novel here.  Scholes and Phelan argue that it is not 
until the novel that narrative fully develops a mode “representational” of the world of (everyday) 
experience rather than “illustrative” of ideas (82ff).
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discussion of the novel, Taylor reaffirms that “Life has to be lived as a story” (SS, 289).  
It is less clear, however, that it must be lived as a quest specifically.  Much depends on 
what one takes as one's paradigm of narrative.
It is perhaps worth noting what sort of fictions Taylor ties to everydayness.  With 
the rise of the novel, he cites Defoe, Richardson, and Fielding.  He mentions Rousseau's 
Heloise, Goethe's Werther, Voltaire's Candide, and Rameau's Nephew by Diderot.  
Flaubert is criticized: “The goal seems to be to depict quite unremittingly the tawdriness 
of the mediocre” (SS, 431).  Dostoevsky, Mann, Proust, Joyce, Musil and other modern 
figures are invoked not as providing literary models for everyday life, but instead as 
representing certain (usually quite problematic) currents of thought about the self.  
MacIntyre discusses Jane Austen and points beyond to Henry James.  He briefly discusses 
Sartre's Nausea, and Taylor sometimes mentions Camus.  But that's as contemporary as 
MacIntyre and Taylor get.18  Three trends in twentieth-century fiction find no place in 
their accounts.
First, the everyday becomes more everyday.  Much of contemporary fiction is 
purposefully peopled with blank characters leading uneventful lives.  The consolations 
and/or frustrations of work, family, friendship, infidelity, and so on and so forth needn't 
rise to a pitch of climax beyond what we encounter in our own lives to form the center of 
a contemporary novel.  As Scholes, Phelan, and Kellogg write in their own account of the 
novel, “The ultimate form of mimetic plot is the 'slice of life,' virtually an 'unplot'” (232); 
the contemporary novel, in its naturalistic form, pushes ever further in this direction.  In 
its banal, everyday mode, fiction becomes detached for many writers and readers from 
the expectation of eventfulness.  This will need to be kept in mind when we consider 
what counts as narrative in chapter three.  Second, in modernism and beyond, formal 
experimentation increases in fiction.  Think of Borges's puzzle-box stories, William 
18 Ricoeur at one point refers to Hamlet and Don Quixote as “new works” (TNII, 7).
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Burroughs's cut-up fiction, and John Barth's metafiction.  If, as MacIntyre and Taylor 
argue, we organize our lives as narratives, what happens when we read experimental 
fiction?  Might such fiction offer models of self-understanding different from MacIntyre's 
quests?19  I'll return to this thought in chapter seven.  Third, moral deviance becomes 
commonplace.  Ulysses, Naked Lunch, and even The Catcher in the Rye are censored, 
banned, or the centerpieces of obscenity trials.  Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow is 
selected by the Pulitzer jury, but rejected by the wider board as too transgressive.  J. G. 
Ballard's publisher, afraid of being sued, pulps the entire American print run of The 
Atrocity Exhibition.  In Taylor's account of our narrative self-understanding, certain 
traditional institutions—marriage, children, work—are used as organizing principles, 
often filling in where we've become incredulous of service to god or country.  In its 
deviant mode, fiction puts the content of morality into question.  What happens when 
readers take up such fictions as models?  In the banal, the experimental, and the deviant, 
one finds much of the most celebrated fiction of the twentieth century, but they have no 
place in MacIntyre's and Taylor's genealogies of narrative self-understanding.  At various 
points, I'll suggest that philosophers place too much emphasis on traditional narratives; 
familiarity with a wider range of fiction's forms will enable a more compelling account of 
the relationship between narrative and the self.
We've seen (if only briefly) how narrative emerges in MacIntyre's and Taylor's 
work on ethics and the self.  But both claim not merely that to see one's life in the form of 
a story is an ethical ideal.  Rather, they both claim we necessarily do so.  “Life has to be 
lived as a story,” Taylor claims (SS, 289, emphasis added).  “My self-understanding 
necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates narrative” (SS, 50, emphasis added).  
Similarly, MacIntyre writes that “action itself has a basically historical character” and 
19 A critic like John Gardner, in his On Moral Fiction, explicitly denies the relevance of much recent 
fiction to lived experience: “As cynicism, despair, greed, sadism, and nihilism become increasingly 
chic, more and more meanness creeps into escapist fiction” (43).  Gardner targets such celebrated 
literary figures as Sartre, Pynchon, Barth, and William Gass.
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“Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the 
characterization of human actions” (AV, 212, 208).  On what basis do they claim such 
necessity for narrative?
II. Founding Arguments
MacIntyre's key invocation of narrative occurs in the chapter of After Virtue titled 
“The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life, and the Concept of a Tradition” (204-225).  He 
makes two central arguments.  The first is largely epistemological—it asks how we 
understand human action, how to correctly characterize behavior.  The second is more 
ontological—it asks what unifies our lives, what our lives are such that they can have a 
telos, without which he thinks there is no hope of a coherent approach to morality.  In 
both arguments, narrative plays the key role.  My aim is to present them, and to cast 
doubt on the emphasis on unity, and thus to begin to disentangle narrative from unity.
In the first, epistemological argument, MacIntyre's target is the notion of “a basic 
action.”  Such a notion is at the core of any analysis of action that starts with atomistic 
behavior, objectively described, and builds up to the sort of complicated actions that we 
recognize as meaningful and human.  If the social sciences are to be modeled after the 
natural sciences, in which particular, objectively described instances are brought together 
to form predictive and law-like generalizations, such a foundationalist approach centered 
on basic actions would form its basis (AV, 79-108).20  MacIntyre thinks that extending 
such a scheme beyond the natural sciences is hopeless, arguing that an analysis of human 
action can't be built up atomistically.  “That particular actions derive their character as 
parts of larger wholes,” he writes, “is a point of view alien to our dominant ways of 
thinking and yet one which it is necessary at least to consider if we are to begin to 
20 MacIntyre's version of the relation between the natural and human sciences, and something like the 
distinction between explanation and understanding developed by Dilthey and revised by Gadamer and 
Ricoeur, is found in these chapters.  I'll come to this distinction in chapter four.
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understand how a life may be more than a sequence of individual actions and episodes” 
(AV, 204).  One can see already the general form of his argument, and also how it will 
relate to his ontological conclusions: actions must be understood as part of a life as a 
whole, and lives are whole.
MacIntyre offers a particular example.  We look out the kitchen window and see a 
man doing something—how do we describe his behavior?  If we are to generalize 
correctly from such data points, we had better get them right.  Yet, “It is a conceptual 
commonplace,” MacIntyre notes, “that one and the same segment of human behavior 
may be correctly characterized in a number of different ways” (AV, 206).21  Descriptions 
as various as “digging,” “gardening,” “exercising,” and “preparing for winter” all offer 
themselves up as appropriate.  At the time, MacIntyre's chief opponent was the kind of 
hardcore behaviorist who wanted to make no appeal whatsoever to the internal states, the 
beliefs and intentions, of an agent.  MacIntyre insists that it is only by way of an appeal to 
beliefs and intentions that we can decide which of these various descriptions is accurate, 
as there is nothing in the behavior—the brute physical movements themselves—which 
would allow us to distinguish between gardening and exercising, for example.  “There is 
no such thing as 'behavior', to be identified prior to and independently of intentions, 
beliefs and settings,” he writes.
Suppose MacIntyre is right that, seeing a few seconds of behavior, we have no 
way of settling on the right description.  Do we have to make the categorical jump of 
appealing to internal states to do so?  Our man outside the kitchen window is moving dirt 
around with a shovel.  If we simply wait a few moments to see if he drops some seeds, 
we'll already be quite a bit further along in deciding on the right description.  That the 
behaviorist refuses to speculate about internal states doesn't entail that he or she can't 
amass a larger data set.  MacIntyre's first response here will be that, if we have to wait 
21 Until noted, all quotations come from this and the following few pages.
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and see if seeds are planted in order to decide whether to describe the initial behavior as 
gardening or mere digging, then the notion of a “basic action” has already been lost.  If 
one can't identify discrete behaviors on their own basis, then one is already appealing to 
larger and more intelligible wholes, which is exactly what he insists we must do.
The behaviorist thus needs to maintain that the descriptions with which MacIntyre 
begins—“digging” and “gardening,” “taking exercise” and “preparing for winter” even 
more so—are  the wrong kinds of descriptions, ones that already range into interpretation.  
Descriptions like “moving his arms,” “grasping a shovel,” and “displacing dirt” would 
presumably be better, though quite long descriptions, probably bearing little resemblance 
to our ordinary ways of speaking, would become necessary.  All the better for the 
behaviorist, perhaps, if our ordinary ways of describing human action are ridden through 
with folk psychology.  MacIntyre's response here is that, in trying to buttress the position 
against objections, behaviorism loses sight of its original goal: explaining human action.  
“Hence the project of a science of behavior takes on a mysterious and somewhat outré 
character,” he writes.  “It is not that such a science is impossible; but there is nothing for 
it to be but a science of uninterpreted physical movement such as B. F. Skinner aspires 
to.”  Even if we could settle on a list of behavioral descriptions that don't sneak in 
interpretation, even if we were to collect reams of data on arm movements, knee bends, 
shovel graspings, the uttering of certain phrases, and even if these yielded patterns of 
prediction about subsequent behavior (all dubious hypotheticals), it is MacIntyre's point 
that we wouldn't yet have explained anything about human action.  We would still have to 
interpret these data sets.  Any attempt to describe higher order, distinctively human 
behavior (rather than something like merely moving dirt around) in such an objective 
manner seems all the more hopeless: “what would be utterly doomed to failure would be 
the project of a science of, say, political behavior, detached from a study of intentions, 
beliefs and settings.”
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Here again the behaviorist might insist that the position has been misunderstood.  
Speaking is after all one type of behavior, so we needn't resort to speculation about an 
agent's internal states to access information about intentions and beliefs.  We can rely on 
self-reports, what someone says with respect to his or her intentions and beliefs.  We 
needn't even assume that verbal behavior accurately represents internal states—we 
needn't appeal to internal states as having any reality at all.  Verbal behavior is another 
kind of data to be collected, and another kind of action to be predicted.  In fact, 
MacIntyre thinks we have to call on an even wider context in order to decide which 
description is accurate—and at this point we can probably push beyond these familiar 
arguments to the content which is said to provide human action with its narrative form.
There are few card-carrying behaviorists anymore and, presumably, few 
philosophers would object to appealing to an agent's internal states in order to decide how 
to correctly describe his or her behavior.  The crucial stage of MacIntyre's argument is not 
that we need to appeal to intentions, but rather his subsequent claim that beliefs and 
intentions unify into a hierarchy—a structure he claims is basically narrative in character 
(when that hierarchy is less than fully coherent, it will resemble a less than fully coherent 
story, it would seem).  Returning to the example, MacIntyre thinks even knowledge of the 
agent's intentions in the moment is insufficient to settle the question of how to accurately 
describe—and thus begin to understand—his behavior.  Consider two competing 
explanations: that he is gardening in order to get some exercise or that he is gardening to 
supplement his grocery shopping.  If he intends both, we don't yet know which intention 
is primary, “of which it is the case that, had the agent intended otherwise, he would not 
have performed that action.”  If he didn't care about exercise, would he still toil in the 
garden for the vegetables?  If he didn't need the vegetables, would he still garden just to 
get outside?  MacIntyre argues that to understand this action, we need “to know both 
what certain of his beliefs are and which of them are causally effective; […] we need to 
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know whether certain contrary-to-fact hypothetical statements are true or false.”
MacIntyre argues that the relevant intentions telescope outward: shorter-term 
intentions are made intelligible against longer-term intentions, and longer- against 
longest-term intentions: “Hence the behavior is only characterized adequately when we 
know what the longer and longest-term intentions invoked are and how the shorter-term 
intentions are related to the longer.”  And so, he concludes, “we are involved in writing a 
narrative history.”22  If pressed, I don't think MacIntyre would quibble with the idea that it 
would be at least possible to itemize a person's intentions discursively in a form other 
than narrative.  Probably it would even be possible to explicate the relational structure of 
the resulting corpus in non-narrative form, describing how some intentions are nested 
inside of other ones, or depend on one another for the agent's continued adherence.  He 
would suggest, however, that to do so would be to abstract from the way we normally 
encounter beliefs and intentions—through narrative.  As Taylor puts it, there is “a premiss 
buried deep in the naturalist way of thinking, viz., that the terms of everyday life, those in 
which we go about living our lives, are to be relegated to the realm of mere appearance” 
(SS, 57).  Behaviorism isn't just changing the terms, it's “changing the subject,” he writes, 
invoking Donald Davidson (SS, 58).   Taylor's form of the argument is relevant here, as it 
isn't posed against a hardcore behaviorist.23  One might think that MacIntyre, writing in 
1981, relies on a strawman in arguing against a simplistic form of behaviorism, a view 
already on the wane by that time.  Taylor's rhetorical opponent is instead a more 
sophisticated naturalist who thinks we can do without appeals to what Taylor calls “good-
determined frameworks.”
In his 1977 essay “What Is Human Agency?,”24 Taylor discusses Harry Frankfurt's 
22 MacIntyre makes a simultaneous appeal to “settings” to move from discrete behaviors to narrative 
history.  To locate the gardner's behavior in either a marriage or in the life of a farm, for example, is to 
call on the histories of these institutions as both particular instances and general forms.  This appeal to 
narrative is less relevant to my purposes, so I pass over the particulars of the argument.
23 For an even more recent, summary form of the argument, see Hutto in NUP, 43f.
24 Reprinted in 1985, vol. 1, 15-44.
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distinction between first- and second-order desires.  My desire for a rare sirloin steak, for 
example, is a first-order desire.  But I know that eating the steak would be bad for my 
health, so I desire not to desire the steak.  That is a second-order desire, which has the 
form of evaluating (in this case negatively) a first-order desire.  If that evaluation is 
strong enough, it will create another first-order desire, the desire not to eat the steak, 
perhaps even one stronger than the original first-order desire, such that I don't eat the 
steak.  Taylor agrees with Frankfurt that “what is distinctively human is the power to 
evaluate our desires,” but he thinks Frankfurt's notion of second-order desires doesn't yet 
capture how this works (1985, vol. 1, 15-16).  Taylor makes another distinction, between 
weak and strong evaluation, the latter involving qualitative judgments of worth.  It is only 
in these, Taylor thinks, that the form of desire becomes fully human.
Logically, there's no reason why one can't iterate desires to ever higher levels of 
order.  Fairly quickly, though, it's hard to get a psychological grasp on what they mean.  
My desire to not desire steak is a second-order desire, but already here we usually offer 
some gloss to explain why I have it, and how it feels to possess it: I also want to be 
healthy, and I know that eating steak will frustrate that desire.  The desire to desire to not 
desire steak is a third-order desire, but here it seems we must offer some further gloss to 
understand what this means and to distinguish it from a (mere) second-order desire.  At 
this third level, the gloss that would seem to make sense is this: I want to be the sort of 
person who is committed to my health (and thus desires to not desire steak).  Actually, 
though, such a gloss is problematic.  Frankfurt's scheme reduces desires to one logical 
type.  More complicated desires are formed simply by substituting another desire into the 
place of the object.  Especially for the naturalist, this is appealing, because it suggests 
only that we, unlike other animals, have processing power sufficient to compute such 
multiple-level moves.  There's nothing spooky or discontinuous with lower animals that 
we need to explain.  Taylor doesn't quite make this point, but glossing a third-order desire
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as “I desire to be the sort of person that...” sneaks in a new kind of evaluative content, 
and of exactly the kind he thinks makes us human.  My desire not to desire steak, if it 
springs from the fact that I want to be healthy, is still a means-based calculation.  My 
desire not to desire steak, if it springs from the fact that I want to be the sort of person 
who cares about health, is different.  Only here do we really find what Frankfurt calls 
“reflective self-evaluation.”  Health has been raised to the status of an ethical ideal that 
finds purchase in a self-image.  This is all the more clear if my reason for desiring not to 
desire the steak is, say, a moral commitment to vegetarianism.  This is an instance of 
strong evaluation: in some instances of comparison, the options “are judged as belonging 
to qualitatively different modes of life,” Taylor writes (1985, vol. 1, 16).  Making a moral 
comparison between vegetarianism and meat-eating, or a lifestyle decision between 
pursuing healthy or unhealthy eating habits, are instances of such comparisons.  For 
Taylor, it is only with this sort of evaluation that we become distinctively human.
Consider now how one goes about trying to change someone's desires.  First-order 
desires are for the most part brute givens, physical desires that are not directly negotiable.  
You find, on the basis of certain movements of saliva, that you desire steak.  The way to 
override this desire is to appeal to a second-order desire: but don't you think eating meat 
is unhealthy?  This remains a merely means-based thinking.  Just one more step up, 
however, an appeal to your self-image might change your second-order desires: don't you 
want to be the sort of person who is committed to vegetarianism?  Wouldn't that be 
consistent with other commitments you have?  Non-coincidently, such a process looks 
like incipient storytelling: a coherent self-image is akin to a well-drawn character.
In Sources of the Self, Taylor develops this argument further in the notion of 
“good-determined frameworks.”  The background ideals which we use to make strong 
evaluations (rather than mere means-based judgments) form frameworks.  These 
articulate a proto-ontology of what has worth, and what one needs to value in order to 
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find meaning and to be a person.  The naturalist, by Taylor's account, instead seeks “to 
declare this issue of meaning a pseudo-question and brand the various frameworks within 
which it finds an answer as gratuitous inventions” (SS, 19).  Taylor struggles to see how 
anyone could really inhabit such a view.  “What are the requirements of making sense of 
our lives?,” he asks:
These requirements are not yet met if we have some theoretical language that purports to explain 
behaviour from the observer's standpoint [….] Suppose I can convince myself that I can explain 
people's behaviour as an observer without using a term like 'dignity'.  What does this prove if I 
can't do without it as a term in my deliberations about what to do, how to behave, how to treat 
people, my questions about whom I admire, with whom I feel affinity, and the like? (SS, 57)25
Our current “best account” of how to understand ourselves isn't made from an observer's 
position, divorced from our professed values, and Taylor can't see how any such 
naturalistic account could ever trump our ordinary self-understanding (SS, 58).
Narrative enters Taylor's account because of the way we exist in time: “our 
condition can never be exhausted for us by what we are, because we are always also 
changing and becoming” (SS, 47).  Our ideal of the good shapes our decisions as we 
progress through time: “Since we cannot do without an orientation to the good, and since 
we cannot be indifferent to our place relative to this good, and this place is something that 
must always change and become, the issue of the direction of our lives must arise for us” 
(SS, 47).  We are similarly oriented toward our pasts: “I don't have a sense of where/what 
I am […] without some understanding of how I have got there or became so” (SS, 50).  
Like MacIntyre, Taylor avoids the formal question of what makes something a narrative, 
but he invokes this term in reference to the shape our understanding takes as we 
remember our pasts and project our futures: “My self-understanding necessarily has 
temporal depth and incorporates narrative”; “we understand ourselves inescapably in 
narrative” (SS, 50, 51).
Taylor introduces a further iteration of evaluation in the notion of a “hyper-good”: 
25 Taylor makes a similar argument for why the subjective perspective can't be eradicated in his “Self-
Interpreting Animals” (1985, vol. 1, 45-76).
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“Most of us not only live with many goods but find that we have to rank them, and in 
some cases, this ranking makes one of them of supreme importance relative to the others. 
[…] It is orientation to this which comes closest to defining my identity, and therefore my 
direction to this good is of unique importance to me” (SS, 62, 63).  Recalling MacIntyre's 
structure of intentions, we can imagine a schematic of our criteria of evaluation, lesser 
goods nested within a pyramid capped by one ultimate good.  Taylor stops short of 
concluding that all of us have one highest ideal, but “Even those of us who are not 
committed to so single-minded a way recognize higher goods” (SS, 63).  His main point 
is that we don't merely weigh the strength of competing desires.  We evaluate some kinds 
of goods as qualitatively more valuable—and our tendency is select one, or at most a few, 
goods as highest and thus defining of our identities.
It is in the final step of invoking the longest-term intention, a person's overarching 
concept of the good, that MacIntyre makes the move from his epistemological argument
—How do we understand human action?—to his ontological one—What makes me the 
one person who I am?  The transition is not as smooth as MacIntyre suggests.  We 
understand human action by contextualizing it in terms of longer-term intentions, a 
process MacIntyre describes as akin to storytelling.  This local process connects to life-
long unity only if MacIntyre is right that “behavior is only characterized adequately when 
we know what the longer and longest-term intentions invoked are” (AV, 208, emphasis 
added).  Do we really need to know someone's longest-term intentions in order to 
understand local behavior?  In MacIntyre's own example, do we need to know the man's 
life goals to decide whether he's gardening or exercising?  Or do we only need a bit more 
context?  If longer-term intentions are sufficient for understanding behavior, but it is only 
longest-term intentions that shape our lives into quests, then these two parts of 
MacIntyre's view are detachable.  Narrative might be situationally important without 
necessarily unifying our lives.
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If a person's life is shaped like a quest in pursuit of one ultimate good, then this 
telos might be used to revive a conception of the virtues.  But the claim that a person's 
life is unified as a quest has consequences not only for ethics and identity understood as a 
matter of self-understanding, but identity understood metaphysically or ontologically: 
what makes someone the same person through time?  For MacIntyre, the Lockean 
tradition of trying to ground personal identity in memory is doomed to failure.  “There is 
no way of founding my identity—or lack of it—on the psychological continuity or 
discontinuity of the self,” he writes.  “The self inhabits a character whose unity is given 
as the unity of a character. […] [A missing] background is provided by the concept of a 
story and of that kind of unity of character which a story requires” (AV, 217).  Thus, he 
concludes, “all attempts to elucidate the notion of personal identity independently of and 
in isolation from the notions of narrative, intelligibility and accountability are bound to 
fail.  As all such attempts have” (AV, 218).
What happens if we don't organize our lives in the pursuit of one good?  Our 
fragmented, confused, and ultimately incoherent approach to ethics is one consequence, if 
one is convinced by MacIntyre's history.  Similarly, our self-understanding will fragment 
into a series of discrete roles and situations: “the unity of a human life becomes invisible 
to us when a sharp separation is made either between the individual and the roles that he 
or she plays […] or between the different role—and quasi-role—enactments of an 
individual life so that life comes to appear as nothing but a series of unconnected 
episodes” (AV, 204).  But this is written from MacIntyre's position of certainty that the 
self is unified, and that modernity has occluded this fact.  Perhaps nothing does connect 
these different roles.  Sartre emerges here as MacIntyre's foil: the Sartrean self is 
“liquidated,” a nothing that “can have no history” (AV, 204, 221).  Taylor insists that no 
one can live without an at least implicit good-determined framework which gives his or 
her self-understanding narrative form.  The nihilist and amoralist are mere fictions for 
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Taylor, intellectual positions we can spell out, but that no actual person can enact.  Even 
an ironist—someone who acts as if something is the case, but with no particular 
attachment to it—is an impossibility for him.26  MacIntyre suggests that we can, 
motivated perhaps by a misplaced fashionableness for angst, liquidate the self's unity, but 
that there's no good reason to do so (AV, 5).  Yet certain intellectual trends in the 
enlightenment and modernity have led us, against our better instincts, into such a 
confused state.
Notice that MacIntyre's metaphysical conclusions are somewhat of an 
afterthought.  His yoking together of narrative and the self is motivated by the hope of 
revitalizing a coherent approach to the virtues.  Only after he has described the 
relationship between narrative and the self does he conclude that it might be used to help 
resolve the traditional problems of identity.  And his elaboration remains brief.  Recent 
thinkers—Galen Strawson (discussed in the next chapter), for example—have taken it for 
granted that such metaphysical problems are the main target of narrativity.27  But that's 
not originally the case.  MacIntyre needs the self to be unified in order to rehabilitate 
virtue ethics.  If later narrativists leave his ethical project behind, then they needn't 
necessarily maintain the same ideal of unity.  If one begins by describing the role 
narrative plays in situational understanding, it may turn out that the narratives involved 
don't telescope out to the span of an entire life, in the way that MacIntyre suggests.  Such 
a project might use narrative to challenge rather than rehabilitate the unity of the self.
MacIntyre and Taylor view issues of the self and morality as deeply intertwined.  
26 “The notion of an identity defined by some mere de facto, not strongly valued preference is incoherent” 
(SS, 30).  Gardner writes “The artist so debilitated by guilt and self-doubt that he cannot be certain real 
virtues exist is an artist doomed to second-rate art” (82).  Taylor seems to think that someone who 
doubts the real existence of goods would not be a person at all.
27 Another example: at a recent conference, Elisabeth Camp sketched a narrative theory of the self based 
on the stability of one's character in time (rather than a unified arc of plot over the course of an entire 
life).  During the Q&A, she admitted that she wasn't at all sure that we do in fact possess such stable 
character.  But she insisted that explaining the self's identity through time was the work that narrative 
was supposed to do.  No Quarrels: Literature and Philosophy Today, Boston University, April 2011.
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As Taylor writes, his “entire way of proceeding involves mapping connections between 
senses of the self and moral visions, between identity and the good” (SS, x).  The sources 
of the self are always moral sources, for Taylor.28  But there are ways in which narrative 
relates to our self-understanding that have nothing to do with morality—construed 
narrowly as a matter of duty, or more broadly as ethical thinking about the good life.  If 
one finds the amoralist or the ironist to be more plausible characters than Taylor does, 
then his is too limited a view.
Consider these competing viewpoints in their most basic forms.  The naturalist 
argues:
1. Humans can be explained in scientific terms.
2. Our everyday language of beliefs and intentions, freedom and dignity, isn't scientific.
3. Therefore humans can be explained without appeal to such value-laden folk concepts.
As Taylor writes, “This begs the question.  How can we ever know that humans can be 
explained by any scientific theory until we actually explain how they live their lives in its 
terms?” (SS, 58).  Taylor thus reverses the naturalist's argument: 
1. Humans can't be explained without appeal to value-laden folk concepts.
2. Our everyday language of beliefs and intentions, freedom and dignity, isn't scientific.
3. Therefore humans can't be explained in scientific terms.
MacIntyre's and Taylor's argument at its most ambitious is:
1. Human action can be fully understood.
2. Human action can only be understood through an appeal to a hierarchy of beliefs and intentions 
that coheres in a structure akin to one unified narrative.
3. Therefore our beliefs and intentions are so unified.
If we are more convinced that the conclusion is false than the first premise is true, then 
Taylor's argument can be reversed against him just as he reverses the naturalist's 
argument.  Noticing that there are contradictions and incoherencies in our beliefs, we 
would conclude that human action isn't fully understandable.
1. Our beliefs and intentions don't unify into a hierarchy that coheres in a structure akin to one 
unified narrative.
2. Human action can only be understood through an appeal to such a structure. 
3. Therefore human action can't be fully understood.
28 See too Hayden White, “The Value of Narrativity”: “Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is 
present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too” (ON, 22).
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The question, then, is whether our beliefs and intentions are in fact unified.
It is frequently argued that one of the benefits of studying philosophy is that it 
helps one make one's corpus of beliefs more coherent.29  This assumes that prior to close 
examination most all of us hold contradictory beliefs.  That's easy to lose sight of when 
we talk about generalized, hypothetical instances of understanding “some person” or 
“human action,” rather than a real individual.  As Richard Wollheim writes, “Philosophy 
does no service to the philosophy of mind by presenting persons as easier to gain 
knowledge of than they are” (168).  Consider again MacIntyre's description of what we 
need to know in order to understand an action:
Where intentions are concerned, we need to know which intention or intentions were primary, that 
is to say, of which it is the case that, had the agent intended otherwise, he would not have 
performed that action.  Thus if we know that a man is gardening with the self-avowed purposes of 
healthful exercise and of pleasing his wife, we do not yet know how to understand what he is 
doing until we know the answer to such questions as whether he would continue gardening if he 
continued to believe that gardening was healthful exercise, but discovered that his gardening no 
longer pleased his wife, and whether he would continue gardening, if he ceased to believe that 
gardening was healthful exercise, but continued to believe that it pleased his wife, and whether he 
would continue gardening if he changed his beliefs on both points.  That is to say, we need to 
know both what certain of his beliefs are and which of them are causally effective; and, that is to 
say, we need to know whether certain contrary-to-fact hypothetical statements are true or false.  
And until we know this, we shall not know how to characterize correctly what the agent is doing. 
(AV, 207)
Do we ever, outside of philosophical thought experiments, have all this information?  
MacIntyre's analysis, if correct, seems to invite the conclusion that we can never be 
certain we're characterizing behavior correctly, that we have only better or worse 
speculations as to a person's intentions and their causal efficiency, though speculations 
good enough for our everyday purposes.  With respect to counterfactual claims, do I 
myself even know how I would have acted had something been otherwise?  MacIntyre 
worries that Aristotle's account of the virtues in Athens is “at best an idealization and his 
tendency is always, so it might be said, to exaggerate moral coherence and unity” (AV, 
157).  Yet MacIntyre lauds the Athenian virtues and Aristotle's account of them as 
!" See, for example, Gary Gutting, writing for the New York Times 
(http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/philosophy-whats-the-use) or my own department's 
mission statement (http://www.bu.edu/philo/).  Both accessed March 2013.
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perhaps the most coherent epoch of moral thinking, that which we've utterly lost.  It's thus 
worth wondering if MacIntyre and Taylor overstate the extent to which human belief and 
action are coherent and fully explainable.
Consider just one possible counter-example to the supposition that an agent's 
intentions unify in a hierarchical pyramid, capped by one hyper-good, captured by one 
quest.  Imagine someone who loves both professional football and contemporary art.  
Both are, for her, qualitative goods (in Taylor's terms).  She watches her city's team and 
visits her local museum not merely on the basis of means-based reasoning, in recognition 
that both activities give her pleasure, but because both are part of her self-image.  She 
does not merely love football and contemporary art—she is a football-lover and a 
contemporary art-lover.  Suppose too, for the sake of our example, that these goods never 
come into conflict: her team always plays on Sunday, when the local art museum is 
closed.  How do we identify her hyper-good, the organizing principle of her life quest?  
MacIntyre might ask us to engage in a bit of hypothetical thinking.  What if her team 
were to play on Monday night, the same Monday night as the museum's annual 
fundraising gala?  Which would she choose?  If our football- and art-lover is a real 
person, not a character we've imagined, then we and even she may have no idea how she 
would react to such a conflict, should it not in fact occur.  Why should we think there is a 
truth of the matter before conflict occurs?  Do moments of conflict reveal our priorities, 
or are they occasions by which we craft our identities?
But what of my example's self-image?  How does she reconcile, to herself, being 
a football-lover and an art-lover?  MacIntyre, Taylor, and other philosophers sometimes 
seem to suggest that tending to one's self-image, guided by a criterion of coherence, is 
one of the constitutive activities of personhood.  But there's no incoherence between 
loving both football and art, except according to the thinnest of stereotypes.  In fact, there 
seem very few goods that contradict each other conceptually (they could, due to 
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contingent circumstance, but needn't necessarily), unless one assumes that they must 
spring forth from one and the same higher-order desire.  It may be that real people's 
beliefs and desires neither contradict nor cohere, but simply collect.  If that's the case, 
then there's no reason to believe their behavior is fully understandable, inasmuch as that's 
taken to mean subsumable under one longest-term good or desire.
When I interrogate real people's beliefs (my own included), I am struck most by 
how lacking in order they seem to be.  Most non-philosophers, it seems to me, take the 
demand that their beliefs should be fully coherent to be an unreasonable one.  Such is the 
barest of anecdotal evidence, but evidence I expect most readers will recognize.  To ask 
someone what principle or maxim guides his or her action is, most of the time, to invite 
platitudes, irrelevancies, and confusion.  Even when we can reconstruct, after the fact, a 
principle consistent with an action, it may have little to do with actual causally effective 
reasons.  We happily revise and refine our supposed principles—doesn't this suggest that 
such an interrogative process creates rather than identifies our higher-order beliefs?
MacIntyre and Taylor both describe the narrative unity of our beliefs and 
intentions.  But is this unity something we have, have naturally, have lost, should have, 
should fight for?  To answer this question, we need to consider the complicated tone in 
which their arguments are put forward.
III. Neither Descriptive nor Normative, Rather Redescriptive
Galen Strawson, whose work I discuss at length in the next chapter, distinguishes 
between two theses concerning narrativity.  The “psychological Narrativity thesis is a 
straightforwardly empirical, descriptive thesis about the way ordinary human beings 
actually experience their lives” and states “that human beings typically see or live or 
experience their lives as a narrative or story of some sort, or at least as a collection of 
stories” (AN, 428).  The “ethical Narrativity thesis” is normative and “states that 
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experiencing or conceiving one's life as a narrative is a good thing; a richly Narrative 
outlook is essential to a well-lived life, to true or full personhood” (AN, 428).30  The 
combination of differing positions with respect to these two theses leads to a matrix of 
four possible views:
Strawson thinks the “dominant view in the academy today” is that “all normal non-
pathological human beings are naturally Narrative and also that Narrativity is crucial to a 
good life,” followed by the view that we “are not all naturally Narrative in our thinking” 
but should be (AN, 429).31  On the other side, he describes Sartre, via Roquentin in 
Nausea, as claiming that we do think of ourselves in narrative terms, but shouldn't.32  
Finally, Strawson himself thinks that both claims are false: only some people are 
naturally narrative, and one needn't be to live well.  There are no universal claims to be 
had here.
Between the two dominant positions, it's not clear where Strawson places 
30 That neither MacIntyre nor Taylor would straightforwardly accept this distinction can be seen in their 
rejection of the “naturalistic fallacy” as a fallacy (see AV, 56ff; SS, 53ff).
31 I adopt Strawson's shorthand of “narrative” as an adjective (e.g., “we should be narrative”) meaning 
more fully, “we should employ narrative in our thinking about ourselves.”  I leave off unnecessarily 
capitalizing it, however.





















Figure 2: Strawson's matrix
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MacIntyre and Taylor, however (he never explicitly says).  They both advocate for the 
ethical narrativity thesis, in Strawson's terms.  But do they think we are naturally 
narrative in our self-understanding?  If they do, then it would be difficult to understand 
why there's any problem here worth discussing at length.  We should understand 
ourselves narratively; fortunately we do, and naturally!  Alternatively, if MacIntyre and 
Taylor don't think we are naturally narrative, then it's difficult to see how they could 
claim it is necessarily central to our self-understanding.  Strawson qualifies the dominant 
view (the position that we are and should be narrative), writing that it “does not entail 
that everything is as it should be; it leaves plenty of room for the idea that many of us 
would profit from being more Narrative than we are” (AN, 429).  This sounds most like 
MacIntyre and Taylor, but Strawson's qualification allows too great a variety of positions 
to be lumped together in the same square of the matrix: we should be narrative, and we 
naturally are, but to what extent?
Let me suggest that a third thesis, in addition to the psychological and ethical 
narrativity theses, would help make sense of the variety of narrativist views now on offer.  
Call it the zeitgeist narrativity thesis.  The psychological narrativity thesis asks whether 
each of us naturally conceives of him or herself narratively.  The ethical narrativity thesis 
asks whether we should.  The zeitgeist narrativity thesis asks whether our prevailing 
theories of ourselves conceive of us in narrative terms, whether, to use one of MacIntyre's 
phrases, one thinks that this is the self-image of the age.  Do we live in a narrativist age?  
MacIntyre and Taylor on the one hand and Strawson on the other all position themselves 
against what they describe as our prevailing self-images.  Yet, holding opposing views, 
they can't be positioned against the same set of self-images.  They must have differing 
ideas about the contemporary zeitgeist.  There's always hay to be made by positioning 
oneself against the zeitgeist or, to put in more cynically, by construing the zeitgeist as 
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against one's own views, such that they become more notable.33  Adding this further 
thesis to the matrix better allows us to schematize MacIntyre's and Taylor's views, and to 
understand their motivations.
Given these three theses one could draw a revised matrix of eight possible 
positions.  Some of the combinations aren't particularly interesting, however, so I'll 
discuss only those relevant here.  If MacIntyre and Taylor held that we are naturally 
narrative, should be, and also that we live in a narrativist age, then it would be hard to 
understand why they would need to write at length about narrativity, as here there is no 
dissonance between is, ought, and self-image, what we do, should do, and how we 
conceive of ourselves.  We might call this the position of the happy narrativist 
underlaborer, one who works out the details of narrative self-understanding to maximal 
coherence.  I don't think we can locate MacIntyre and Taylor here, as we wouldn't then be 
able to make sense of how they take themselves to be fighting against false self-images.
Strawson takes himself to be fighting against false self-images as well.  If the 
psychological and ethical narrativity theses are both false, does he think the zeitgeist 
narrativity thesis is true, that we live in an age where our prevailing philosophical, 
anthropological, and psychological theories of the self center on concepts like narrative 
and character?  It's not clear to me how he would answer this question.  Narrativity is 
“intensely fashionable,” he writes (AN, 428).  Does he mean that it is a passing trend?  Or 
does he mean that these views have found a deep-seated place in our self-image?  From a 
wider perspective, surely it is naturalism that dominates the contemporary philosophical 
climate.  Perhaps when it comes to thinking about the self, narrativity now dominates 
even as, on wider ontological and metaphysical matters, naturalism does—and we've 
ghettoized these realms of thinking from one another such that the tension is not felt.  In 
33 It's possible that the zeitgeist has shifted between 1981, when MacIntyre was writing, and 2004, when 
Strawson was, but it seems rather fast to be likely.
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any case, Strawson hopes that we'll come to see the psychological and ethical theses as 
false, and thus that our self-image will align against the zeitgeist narrativity thesis.  This 
shifts us toward the other side of the revised matrix.
We are naturally narrative, and we should be, but this is not how our prevailing 
theoretical self-images conceive of us: this, finally, is where we should locate MacIntyre 
and Taylor.  Our theories of self-understanding are inadequate and reductive, actively 
working to occlude or distort our wiser, ordinary understanding of what it is to be a 
person—which is and should be narrative in character.  For MacIntyre, the site of 
interesting friction is between the zeitgeist and ethical narrativity theses.  We are naturally 
narrative, but modernity has fractured our lives into roles.  Rejecting the zeitgeist of 
modernity will allow us to recover the natural order of our lives.  What is to be changed is 
how we live.  For Taylor, the site of interesting friction is between the zeitgeist and 
psychological narrativity theses.  We are naturally narrative, but naturalism has led us to 
try to talk about ourselves as if we weren't, as if narrativity were an illusion of folk 
psychology.  Rejecting naturalism's ways of speaking will allow us to recover the natural 
order of things.  What is to be changed is how philosophy talks—mostly a theoretical 
problem.  MacIntyre's and Taylor's arguments, though aiming for the same ends, work by 
way of different intermediary assessments.
Given this background, what are we to make of MacIntyre's famous claim that 
each of our lives is quest-like, guided by one ideal of the good or at least the search for an 
ideal of the good?  Are lives quests (psychological narrativity), should they be (ethical 
narrativity), or should we theorize them this way (zeitgeist narrativity)?  The grand 
narrative of After Virtue is one of the fracturing of ethical and social life under modernity.  
Spelled out, MacIntyre's characterization of our lives isn't simply descriptive.  Rather, it's 
something like this: people's lives used to be coherently unified under a traditional 
concept of the good.  Modernity, in freeing us from some straightforwardly bad 
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traditions, went overboard and made tradition, generally speaking, suspect.  It has thus 
left us, beings constituted to find unity in a principle beyond ourselves, not only without 
such a principle, but conceptually and socially ill-equipped to see how to find one, or 
even to realize that we need to.  His claim that our lives naturally assume the form of 
narratives, which looks descriptive, is thus really loaded with a normative nostalgia.34  
Perhaps a singular term for this tone would be restorative or revivalist.
Compare this argumentative approach to that found in many postmodern texts, in 
which it is inverted.  In Roland Barthes's “Death of the Author,” to cite one famous 
example, the waning of authorial intentionality as the locus for a text's meaning is, it 
would appear by the rhetoric, merely described: this has happened.  Here are Barthes's 
phrasings: “writing is the destruction of every voice, every point of origin.  Writing is that 
neutral, composite oblique space where our subject slips away […] No doubt it has 
always been that way […] We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a 
single 'theological' meaning,” and so on (1977, 142-148, emphases added).  But outside 
of professional literary criticism—outside of very small sub-circles of critics, really—
most everyone still does care what an author thinks his or her works mean.  To describe 
the author as dead is really to slyly petition for it.  Describing Foucault's “What Is an 
Author?” (which is similar to Barthes's essay) Alexander Nehamas writes that the “essay 
calls for abolishing [the figure of the author] altogether and for establishing a new and 
different way of dealing with literary texts” (1986, 685, emphasis added).  Putting it that 
way loses much of Foucault's rhetorical approach: it is not simply an argument, but an 
assessment of how critical practice is already changing.  It is an attempt to display the 
fruits of such a new approach, to win over by example and by inaugurating a new way of 
talking about authors.  Could one make Barthes's or Foucault's case in a rhetorically 
34 Lyotard, in theorizing “master (or grand or meta) narrative,” would criticize MacIntyre's account as 
based on a never-existent “lost 'organic' society” (15).
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neutral way?  Perhaps: one could begin to itemize what would be lost and gained if one 
stopped appealing to an author's intentions in reading a text.  But in addressing an issue 
as fundamental as how a literary text generates meaning, where does one turn for a 
criterion to measure loss and gain?  Instead, Barthes and Foucault leap to a new way of 
speaking, and in doing so offer other critics a model for future work.  Barthes's approach 
is liberalizing and forward-looking, whereas MacIntyre's and Taylor's is nostalgic and 
reactionary (if that can be said in as unloaded a manner as possible).
Barthes, Foucault, MacIntyre, and Taylor all write in a tone that can be called 
redescriptive, following Richard Rorty's use of the term.  Rorty argues that most 
important philosophical arguments have this form:
Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of a thesis.  Usually it is, 
implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance 
and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things. [...] The method is to 
redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic 
behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for 
appropriate forms of nonlinguistic behavior [….] This sort of philosophy does not work piece by 
piece, analyzing concept after concept, or testing thesis after thesis.  Rather, it works holistically 
and pragmatically.  It says things like “try thinking of it this way”—or more specifically, “try to 
ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the following new and possibly 
interesting questions.” (1989, 9)
Especially in this last claim, it might seem odd to characterize MacIntyre and Taylor by 
way of Rorty.  This is only because Rorty is forward-looking, however.  He draws on 
historical examples only to remind us that our current way of thinking is thoroughly 
contingent.  But the method is generalizable.  Instead of asking us to ignore traditional 
questions and look at things in their new way, MacIntyre and Taylor push past our often 
confused and quibbling concerns and try to see things as some previous epoch did, 
because that approach was better and more coherent.  Rather than moving 
straightforwardly from premises to a conclusion, a redescriptive method either 
inaugurates new vocabularies, transfiguring the world, or it recovers and adapts old 
vocabularies, revitalizing past ways of seeing.  “But it does not argue for this suggestion 
on the basis of antecedent criteria common to the old and the new language games.  For 
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just insofar as the new language really is new, there will be no such criteria,” Rorty 
concludes (1989, 9).  These are the arguments—or more usually works or even lifework, 
as it may take a philosopher's entire career to bring about such a change—that, in 
Kuhnian terms, bring about new paradigms of thinking, rather than accepting the 
prevailing paradigm.35  With only descriptive and normative registers in play, and a clear 
distinction between them, it is difficult to make a philosophical argument concerning 
something as fundamental as our conception of the self.  Rather than arguing that one 
should view it this way rather than that, based on some comparison grounded in an 
agreed-upon criterion, one describes the self in a new (or old and lost) way in the hopes 
that it will be recognized and taken up by others.
Much of MacIntyre's and Taylor's work is not redescriptive in this sense.  
Frequently their writing is historical, or criticizes an opponent's position as incoherent, or 
is straightforwardly argumentative.  It is the approach that underlies the complicated tone 
of their discussion that is redescriptive.  Their claims about self-understanding are not 
straightforward descriptions of how we are or should be, descriptions made with an 
already-agreed-upon set of concepts.  Rather, their claims are redescriptive, in that they 
attempt to shed various accumulated and misleading ways of talking about ourselves, 
offering a description previously unfamiliar but which we might recognize as true.
However we conceive of the relationship between narrative and the self, our 
account needs to be able to explain both the fragmentation MacIntyre and Taylor lament 
and the unity they recommend.  In the next chapter, I turn to Strawson, who has become 
the most prominent critic of narrativity.  He argues that when one puts narrative at the 
center of philosophical thinking about the self, one is unable to grasp how plural our 
approaches to self-understanding in fact are.
35 Rorty frequently invokes Kuhn in this manner (see, for example, 1989, 6, 20).  Perhaps surprisingly, 
Rorty is dismissive of most contemporary fiction, much in the way Gardner is.  See “American National 




The Phenomenology of Selves, Subjects, and Human Beings
Slothrop, as noted, at least as early as the Anubis era, has begun to thin, to scatter.  
“Personal density,” Kurt Mondaugen in his Peenemünde office not too many steps away from 
here, enunciating the Law which will one day bear his name, “is directly proportional to temporal 
bandwidth.”
“Temporal bandwidth,” is the width of your present, your now.  It is the familiar “  t” 
considered as a dependent variable.  The more you dwell in the past and in the future, the thicker 
your bandwidth, the more solid your persona.  But the narrower your sense of Now, the more 
tenuous you are.  It may get to where you're having trouble remembering what you were doing 
five minutes ago, or even—as Slothrop now—what you're doing here, at the base of this colossal 
curved embankment....
“Uh,” he turns slackmouth to Närrisch, “what are we ...”
“What are we what?”
“What?”
“You said, 'What are we …,' then you stopped.”
“Oh.  Gee, that was a funny thing to say.”
Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow (509)
Galen Strawson's “Against Narrativity” appeared in 2004 and established his 
reputation as the most prominent opponent of narrative views of the self.  Strawson 
attacks narrativity categorically, across the board:
Talk of narrative is intensely fashionable in a wide variety of disciplines [....] There is widespread 
agreement that human beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story 
of some sort, or at least as a collection of stories [and that] a richly Narrative outlook is essential to 
a well-lived life, to true or full personhood. […] Is any of this true?  I don't think so.  It seems to 
me that MacIntyre, Taylor and all other supporters […] are really just talking about themselves. 
(AN, 428, 437)1
He speculates on the causes of narrativity's popularity:
I […] suspect that those who are drawn to write on the subject of 'narrativity' tend to have strongly 
Diachronic and Narrative outlooks or personalities, and generalize from their own case with that 
special, fabulously misplaced confidence that people feel when, considering elements of their own 
experience that are existentially fundamental for them, they take it they must also be fundamental 
for everyone else. (AN, 439)2
Not shying away from his own generalization, he concludes, concerning this misplaced 
confidence that all of our existential constitutions are similar: “I think that this may be the 
greatest single source of unhappiness in human intercourse” (AN, 439n25).
It has become unavoidable to take on Strawson's essay in any discussion of 
1 Boyd similarly describes the fundamental narrativity of the self as a false truism (159).
2 Strawson claims that there is no burden on him to explain narrativity's popularity.  Even if this is true, 
surely some explanation beyond projection, “intellectual fashion,” and the notion that “Theorizing 
human beings tend to favor false views in matters of this kind” would be welcome (AN, 439).  If one 
thinks that the claims of narrativity are false but widely held, then a bit of philosophical therapy or 
exorcism of the sort associated with the later Wittgenstein would be valuable.
53
narrativity.  This is true for the wrong reasons.  Strawson is invoked not merely as an 
opponent or interlocutor, but as if he has chastened narrativists.  Marya Schechtman, for 
example, writes in a programmatic register and directly in response to Strawson: “The 
more hyperbolic assertions must be weeded out, and claims about what work a narrative 
account of identity can accomplish must be made more modest and specific” (NUP, 155).3
The claims of narrativity indeed require more precise statement.  Inasmuch as they 
provide answers to questions that arise in everyday life and language, precision—if it is 
not to shuck the real weight of these questions—is difficult to come by.  Central to my 
arguments, however, is the notion that the claims of narrativity are not in need of 
moderation.  Quite the opposite, I argue that its claims need to be understood as more 
radical than its proponents have supposed.  Strawson's “Against Narrativity” thus needs 
not to be heeded, sheepishly, but answered in full throat.
I aim to do so here with three lines of argument.  First, I argue that Strawson and 
narrativists aren't really talking about the same thing.  Given that Strawson takes himself 
to be directly attacking narrativity (and not, for example, arguing that we should talk 
about something else) this is his problem: his attacks simply miss their intended target.4  
At some level this seems obvious—I doubt any reader of Strawson's Selves and Taylor's 
Sources of the Self would think for a minute that they concern the same topic—yet a 
moderating response like Schechtman's presumes that Strawson's attacks do hit home; it 
is thus necessary to demonstrate otherwise.  Second, I argue that Strawson's elaborate 
schema of technical terms—diachronic, episodic, narrative, non-narrative, I*—fails, both 
to describe phenomenologically recognizable experiences and to helpfully organize the 
argumentative terrain.5  Finally, though Strawson presents himself as at least “relatively 
3 Similarly, Goldie writes, surveying the scene: “Positions can get polarized” (MI, 1).
4 We should be primed to see this by Strawson's response to critics of his own work: “Large differences in 
methodological and terminological habits gave rise to many occasions on which commentators thought 
they disagreed with me although they had in fact changed the subject” (1999A, 99).
5 Outside of direct quotations, I do away with Strawson's capitalization of technical terms.
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Episodic” and “hav[ing] absolutely no sense of [his] life as a narrative,” any person 
demonstrates what should be understood as narrative commitments (AN, 433); I argue 
that the episodic, more fully drawn, isn't in fact recognizable as a person.  Over the 
course of these three parts, I hope as well to clarify what I mean by “phenomenology” 
through criticizing Strawson's co-option of the term, as it is central to my own, 
Heideggerian approach to narrativity.
I. Phenomenology before Metaphysics
Strawson begins from, and insists on, a primary distinction between one's 
experience of oneself as a human being and as a self.  He writes: “The first thing I want to 
put in place is a distinction between one's experience of oneself when one is considering 
oneself principally as a human being taken as a whole, and one's experience of oneself 
when one is considering oneself principally as an inner mental entity or 'self' of some 
sort” (AN, 429).  His distinction is between two experiences one is said to have, “when 
one is considering oneself principally as” one sort of thing or another.  This is an odd way 
of putting it.  Doesn't it suggest that some sort of theoretical consideration—“I am a self” 
or “I am a human being”—comes before experience and thus that the resulting experience 
will vary depending on which theory is presupposed?  I think this is actually exactly 
right, but I take it that Strawson doesn't really want to endorse such a view, which looks 
like a kind of ontological relativity.  “'I' is not univocal,” he writes (1999A, 131).  He 
wants to maintain, however, that its polyphony, at least in his distinction between “I am a 
self” and “I am a human being,” is not guided by (variable) theoretical assumptions.
In his own work on the self, Strawson describes how he views the relation 
between phenomenology and metaphysics.  In attempting to establish what is central to 
our sense of the mental self, he raises the possible objection that one's philosophical 
theories about the self will color one's judgements about what is core to such a notion.  
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He replies: “I believe that a detailed attempt to answer the general phenomenological 
question will show that this is not so: our basic judgments about [the necessary conditions 
of what counts as a sense of the mental self] can remain comfortably independent, in any 
respect that matters, of metaphysical theorizing about the nature of the self” (1997, 5).6  
He doesn't then defend this point, however.  Instead, he concludes one sentence later: “So 
much for the claim that phenomenology is substantially independent of metaphysics.”
In fact, it's hard to think that Strawson's phenomenology isn't thoroughly affected 
by his metaphysics.  Over the last two decades, he has developed an elaborate theory of 
the self.7  My aim here is not to criticize it; I only want to say enough to suggest that it is 
coloring his supposedly purely phenomenological claims.  Strawson presents as a bit of 
phenomenology the notion that in its most minimal form, “Self-experience is a sense of 
the self as”:
1. a subject of experience
2. a thing, in some interestingly robust sense
3. a mental thing, in some sense
4. single at any given time, and during any hiatus-free or strongly experientially unified period of 
    existence (1999A, 108)
These are presented as phenomenological claims—he hasn't yet come to metaphysics and 
the attempt to say what the self is.  He explains the ordering: “One must have well-
developed answers to phenomenological questions about the experience of the self before 
one can begin to answer metaphysical questions about the self” (1997, 5).  “Any 
metaphysical speculations that are not properly subordinate to phenomenology can be 
cheerfully 'commit[ted] … to the flames',” he writes, alluding to Hume (1997, 6).
Yet Strawson writes such things as “I have no sense that I […] was there in the 
further past.  And it seems clear to me that this is not a failure of feeling.  It is, rather, a 
registration of a fact about what I am” (AN, 433).  The supposed metaphysical “fact” here
—that the self is transitory—is not drawn from “sense”; rather, the metaphysical belief is 
6 He maintains this approach in his later work.  See 1999A, 102ff; 2009, 52ff.
7 See 1997, 1999A, 1999B, and especially 2009.
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guiding experience.  Strawson's starting point, what he calls “the local phenomenological 
question,” is the attempt to articulate what is core to the sense of the self.  His list results 
not from phenomenological description, however, but rather from something like an 
endoxic method.  “I propose that the mental self is ordinarily conceived or experienced 
as,” is his lead in to the list above in one instance, “the self tends to be figured as,” in 
another (1997, 3; 1999A, 106).  What these actually mean is that theorists usually or in 
aggregate posit self-experience to consist as follows.  But we're already way off track, 
then, because if we're starting from received theory, then we're not doing phenomenology 
before metaphysics, as Strawson claims is necessary.  It's easy to lose track of this given 
that his claims are familiar, though not uncontroversial.
Strawson's argument for his (supposed) phenomenological claims isn't a bit of 
phenomenological description.  Rather, he raises the objection that one might think the 
self is experienced as “a property or set of properties of something else (perhaps a human 
being), or just a process of some sort” (1999A, 112).  He then appeals to Kant in the 
Paralogisms and the notion that we must regard ourselves as subjects and substances, not 
properties of something else.  The stock reply from historical phenomenology is not, 
given this set of theoretical terms, that the self is a property rather than a substance 
(though it may indeed by something more like a process or event), but rather that this 
theoretical schema, so useful for explaining breadbox-sized objects, fails to get at the 
experience of the self that we have.  What Strawson means by “phenomenology” here is 
“the parts of a theory, of whatever sort, that pertain to subjective experiences” rather than 
“a theory based on attention to subjective appearances.”  To be clear, my objection is not 
the parochial one that Strawson is using the word “phenomenology” in a way that 
Husserl, et. al., would not sanction.  “Some object that what I call 'phenomenology' is no 
such thing,” Strawson writes.  “It is, however, a matter of the study of certain structures 
of experience considered just as such, and so fully qualifies for the name” (1999A, 103).  
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I'm suggesting that, in fact, Strawson fails to practice phenomenology even by this, his 
own definition, because he's not studying “certain structures of experience considered 
just as such,” but unwittingly through the lens of his own metaphysical program.  He's 
decided already that the list of candidates of what the self might be is limited to a thing, a 
property or properties, or a process, and he eliminates the other possibilities by argument.  
In doing so, his metaphysical assumptions are guiding his phenomenological claims.
If Strawson's explanation of the phenomenological core of the sense of the self 
were indisputable, perhaps this methodological misordering would be defused.  But 
consider just one of its parts.  Do we experience the self as a thing?  As Dan Zahavi 
writes, “phenomenologists would typically deny that the self is an object (be it an internal 
or an external one)” (NUP, 190n38).  Citing Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Husserl, Zahavi 
writes: “The crucial idea propounded by all of these phenomenologists is that an 
understanding of what it means to be a self calls for an examination of the structure of 
experience, and vice versa.  Thus, the self is not something that stands opposed to the 
stream of consciousness, but is, rather, immersed in conscious life; it is an integral part of 
its structure” (NUP, 188).  Again, these figures don't have ownership of the word 
“phenomenology.”  But they, after having tried to pay careful attention to experience, 
have come to very different conclusions than those Strawson quickly presents.
In contrast, Strawson spends little time attending to experience and genuinely 
asking how he encounters the self.  Consider one moment where he does:
The early realization of the fact that one's thoughts are unobservable by others, the experience of 
the profound sense in which one is alone in one's head—these are among the very deepest facts 
about the character of human life, and found the sense of the mental self.  It is perhaps most often 
vivid when one is alone and thinking, but it can be equally vivid in a room full of people.  It 
connects with a feeling that nearly everyone has had intensely at some time—the feeling that one's 
body is just a vehicle or vessel for the mental thing that is what one really or most essentially is. 
(1997, 3)
This, it seems to me, starts accurately and eloquently,8 but then slips out of description 
8 Strawson's claim that “ordinary experience imagines the self” as residing “Two or three inches behind 
the eyes, and maybe up a bit” is also quite wonderful (1999A, 102).
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and into theory.  The description is of a sense: of interiority, privacy, aloneness.  But then 
suddenly he is talking about a mental thing, and without explanation of what it means to 
experience oneself as a thing, rather than to have certain experiences and then judge that 
one is a thing.  There is consistently a descriptive gap, in Strawson's work, between the 
sense of oneself, in all its interiority and privacy, and the supposed sense of the self as a 
thing.9  I'm not sure if I've ever had the feeling, intensely or otherwise, that my body is a 
mere vehicle.  This is a familiar way of speaking, overused to the point that we no longer 
notice its dead metaphors.  Metaphors often arise as part of a theory and become 
ingrained in ordinary language to the extent that they continue to hold sway, unnoticed, 
even when the theory that originally housed them is rejected.10  Though Strawson claims 
phenomenology needs to precede metaphysics methodologically, his metaphysical beliefs 
color his phenomenological claims.  This happens both due to the specifics of his theory 
of the self—the self is a thing—and due to his lack of attention to received ways of 
talking about the self.  His (supposedly, but not actually) phenomenological claims are 
then used in his metaphysical arguments, so a vicious circle ensues.  Elsewhere, Strawson 
raises this objection in the voice of an imagined critic: “many will find your claim about 
the phenomenology of the sense of the mental self to be false, or at best unconvincing.  
They will suspect that it is the distorted product of prior theoretical commitment.”  Rather 
than answering this criticism and explaining why worries about the distorting effects of 
prior theoretical commitments are misplaced, he says only: “Some may be suspicious, 
others won't be” (1999B, 143).
I do think our theoretical assumptions thoroughly affect our experiences, and I 
don't think we can free ourselves of this condition.  Instead, we need to remain ever 
aware of this possibility, scrutinizing the background of our descriptions and 
9 See too 2009, 36-7.
10 Hegel: “The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about understanding is by 
assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all its pros and cons, such 
knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why” (18).
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interpretations.  Any instance of “seems,” if it is to be genuinely phenomenological, 
should not upon gloss really mean “it seems to me this is the case, but only because I 
assume this theoretical background.”  Even more straightforwardly, a phenomenological 
“seems” should never take the form “it seems to me this theory is true.”  Doing 
phenomenology requires one to adopt, as much as possible, a standpoint of metaphysical 
and theoretical naivety.11  Because that is not fully possible, constant vigilance, testing, 
and going back and forth between descriptions and claims is required.12  Perhaps most 
telling of Strawson's failure to really adopt such a stance is his lack of worry about the 
difficulty of interpreting self-descriptions.  He offers long lists of philosophical and 
literary figures whom he counts as diachronics and episodics (AN, 432n7).  And he is 
fond of quoting Henry James, Sartre's Roquentin, Musil's “man without qualities” and 
others as evidence of various standpoints.  But when James says he thinks of the author 
of one of his early novels as “quite another person than myself … a rich … relation, say, 
who … suffers me still to claim a shy fourth cousinship,” do we really think, as Strawson 
does, that James “does not feel he is the same self or person as the author of that book” 
(AN, 429-30)?  Or do we think, instead, that this is merely James's dramatic way of 
describing how far his literary style has evolved?  As evidence, rather than epigraphs, for 
various ways of being, quotations like this require much more interpretation.  And we 
need to remain ever vigilant that we aren't interpreting them through the lens of 
metaphysical theories and assumptions.
Let me now return to my worry that Strawson and narrativists are simply talking 
past one another, about different subject matters.  Strawson's “self” is a site of experience, 
stripped of anything personal, closer to what we usually call a subject (in the 
epistemological, not political sense), none of which is what narrativists target.  The 
11 Ricoeur writes that part of “phenomenology's ambition” is “to owe nothing to an epistemology of the 
physical and human sciences” (TNI, 86).
12 The relationship between phenomenological descriptions and metaphysical claims is an instance of the 
hermeneutic circle (see SZ, 152f).
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disconnect is not immediately apparent.  Strawson uses “person” to mean both self and 
human being.  This is perfectly reasonable, as person (plural: people) is the most generic 
term of self-description we have.  It leads to an important slippage of meaning when he 
uses it as a synonym for “the self as interior mental presence,” however.  Using “person” 
as a synonym for “self” makes selfhood look like a more robust phenomenon than 
Strawson claims it is.  One of the characteristics that he initially considers as possibly 
core to the sense of the self is personality.  Ultimately, he rejects it as necessary, however, 
limiting himself to the four planks quoted above (1999A, 108).  But surely we would 
never think of a person as potentially lacking personality (to say someone lacks 
personality means he or she has a bland or boring personality).  Strawson is mostly 
willing to abandon the term “self” for “SESMET” in his own work.  SESMETs are 
“Subjects of Experience that are Single MEntal Things” (1999A, 118).  This is the 
conception of “the self” that Strawson is bringing, largely concealed, into “Against 
Narrativity.”  It may well be metaphysically fruitful in other contexts.  But it's not the sort 
of thing that narrativists are after.  “So what do I mean by the sense of the self?” 
Strawson asks (1999B, 131).  “[W]hat do I mean by 'Self-experience'?” (1999A, 104).  “I 
don't mean the kind of thing that is discussed in books about 'personal growth'” (1999B, 
131).  Whatever one thinks of books about “personal growth,” narrativists exactly are 
interested in people's change, and their sense of that becoming, over time.  Am I the same 
self as I was in 1990?  Strawson, as we have seen, insists that we begin in 
phenomenology.  The object of that phenomenology is SESMETs.  Do I experience 
myself, now and then, as the same SESMET?13  For narrativists, the way to approach the 
question of whether I am the same is to ask whether I have a continuous sense, drawing 
on my past, of how I became myself, and whether these changes are coherent, intelligible, 
13 Schechtman sometimes invokes a similar but stronger standard, based on “empathic access” (see NUP, 
171; 2001).  This seems to me contrary to the general idea of narrativity.  I can see how a younger self 
became me, even if I no longer empathize with him.  Stories can make sense of radical changes, even as 
such changes bar empathic access.
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story-like.  Strawson is interested in something far below this.  Maybe such a bare self is 
the right target for metaphysics, or maybe it's a mere abstraction.  Either way, it's not 
what MacIntyre, Taylor, Schechtman, Ricoeur, Bruner, or any of the other thinkers 
Strawson attacks in “Against Narrativity” are talking about.
Strawson's distinction between the self and whole human being, under analysis, is 
that between subjects and bodies in their full history (including their memories and 
psychological history), and his own work is then entirely about subjects.  Narrativists, on 
the other hand, care almost not at all about that side of his distinction.  In taking ourselves 
as subjects, one implies an epistemological frame and a gap between subject and object.  
Within this framework, arguments focus almost exclusively on individual perceptual 
experiences or knowledge claims too limited in time to involve narrativity.  Subjects, or 
atomistic “selves” that are the subjects of experience, to the extent that narrativists 
discuss them, are—it is insisted—not primordial experiential phenomena, but theoretical 
abstractions.14  Especially among phenomenologically inclined narrativists, those 
influenced by Ricoeur, Gadamer, and Heidegger, it's argued that we don't have isolated 
experiences of ourselves as interior mental presences.15  Rather, this is intertwined with 
our experience of ourselves as persons in a world.  We can thematize each of these in 
isolation, but to do so is always somewhat contrived.  According to my Heideggerian 
account, we have to begin from the rich notion of being-in-the-world; to view ourselves 
as isolated, atomistic subjects of experience is to pare away more and more parts of this 
primordial structure, not to identify the core out of which everything else is built.
If Strawson insists on the distinction between selves (interior mental presences—
much more like subjects) and human beings (biological entities) then he's left out 
somewhere in between that which narrativists actually care about: people.  Among our 
14 See, for example, SS, 143-158.
15 Strawson dismisses this line of thinking in 2009, 23-25. 
62
many terms for describing ourselves, “self” is especially fraught, in that it doesn't impose 
a disciplinary framework the way that other terms do.  This is perhaps due to the fact that, 
if anything, it is a term of phenomenology, and phenomenology properly understood 
exactly seeks to avoid any assumptions about what its objects are.  Strawson and 
narrativists talk past one another because their use of the term “self” pulls in opposite 
directions.  As Schechtman writes (in response to Strawson):
the concept of person as used by psychological theorists mixes together two components.  One is 
Strawson's notion of the self; the other is a practical notion that is more intimately connected to 
social context.  On the one hand a person is conceived as the subject of experiences, the 'I' that we 
experience as a psychological entity with persistence conditions distinct from human beings.  On 
the other hand, a person is conceived as the bearer of certain complex social capacities that carry 
important practical implications.  A person is a moral agent who can be held responsible for her 
actions, a reasoning creature who can be held to be irrational when she acts against her interests, 
and a creature capable of a range of complex relationships with other persons. (NUP, 169)
If Strawson's notion of the self can't get a grip on the richer notion of personhood to 
which Schechtman here appeals, then he's simply missed the target he meant to criticize.
Why is only one's experience of oneself, considered as a self, and not also one's 
experience of oneself, considered as a whole person, relevant to Strawson?  Responding 
to the objection that the episodic would be incapable of moral responsibility, he writes, 
“If my past acts have given me obligations, including obligations of reparation, these are 
obligations I* now fully feel myself to have without any sense that I* performed those 
actions” (NUP, 100).16  Every time Strawson makes such an appeal, he owes us an 
explanation as to how his attack on the narrativity of the self alone (rather than also the 
person) is sufficient.  Having drawn the distinction between the self and whole person, 
and having claimed his concern is the former, he sneaks the latter back in to explain the 
episodic's normal functioning.  As Schechtman writes, “Strawson acknowledges quite a 
strong relation among the temporal parts of his human life taken as the life of Galen 
Strawson, that these are of special emotional significance, and that he has certain 
16 Unhelpfully, he goes on: “This is an experiential fact for many Episodics, make of it what you will.”  In 
doing so, he makes his claim into an impenetrable black box, an unchallengeable fact of experience 
(unless one calls him a liar) when in fact it seems to encode questionable theoretical assumptions.
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responsibilities with respect to them” (NUP, 168).  Doesn't his explanation of the 
episodic's sense of moral responsibility suggest that the episodic (the supposed opposite 
of a diachronic) is diachronic and thus potentially narrative at the level of the person?    
He writes that “one is of course the same person in 2000 as one is in 2020, legally and 
morally and bodily speaking, just in so far as one is the same human being, and one is 
also (barring certain sorts of brain lesions and major changes in brain chemistry) 
fundamentally the same in respect of character and personality, however spectacular the 
phenomena of personal revolution; however Episodic one is” (NUP, 104).  According to 
his peculiar mapping of the terrain, why wouldn't we suspect that it is at the level of the 
person, not a secret self, where narrativity, psychological or ethical, is located?
It remains unclear to me why Strawson thinks an attack on the narrativity of the 
self alone would amount to a definitive rejection of narrativity, rather than (at best) half of 
one.  Why couldn't narrative self-understanding be a phenomenon at the level of the 
human being as a whole, rather than an interior mental subject?  One possibility is that 
Strawson is fixated on the term “the narrative self.”  Some narrativists (not all) use this 
term, not alternatives such as “the narrative person” or “the narrative human being.”  
Thus, one could perhaps argue, they've limited themselves to one side of the distinction.  
But such terms are too contested to think that everyone's usage will align.  Consider an 
objection he makes to critics of his own work, however: “I intentionally avoided the 
common phrase 'sense of self', using 'sense of the self' instead” (1999A, 104).  Whereas 
one's “sense of self” “involves one's sense of oneself considered quite generally as a 
human being,” Strawson stipulates “sense of the self” much more narrowly as “the sense 
that people have of themselves as being, specifically, a mental presence; a mental 
someone; a single mental thing that is a conscious subject of experience” (1999A, 104, 
quoting 1997, 3).  Strawson criticizes those who, while ignoring this definition and 
shifting between “sense of self” and “sense of the self,” object to his theory of the self 
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(1999A, 104).  One can stipulate one's terms as narrowly as one pleases.  But if Strawson 
wishes to criticize narrativists, he can't impose his terms on them.  They, unlike him, are 
interested in what he calls one's “sense of self,” not one's “sense of the self.”  If he insists 
on the distinction, then all his own claims about the latter become irrelevant.
Another possibility is that, having drawn the distinction between the self and 
human being, Strawson takes the self to be more essentially what we are.  “One of the 
most important ways in which people tend to think about themselves (quite independently 
of religious belief) is as things whose persistence conditions are not obviously or 
automatically the same as the persistence conditions of a human being considered as a 
whole,” he writes (AN, 430).  I exist from my birth to my death, someone might think, 
but I truly exist for only this period now.  “[M]y primordial referential intention always 
cleaves first and foremost to I* [myself as a self rather than whole human being],” he 
claims (NUP, 101).  Further: “I believe that the primary or fundamental way in which we 
conceive of ourselves is as a distinct mental thing” (1997, 3).  Even if this is the case, 
however, it remains unclear why narrativity would have to apply to all of a person's ways 
of accounting for him or herself, or even his or her most cherished one.
To summarize: having drawn the distinction between selves and human beings, 
Strawson's discussion focuses entirely on selves, and in a narrowly construed sense: “It is 
this phenomenon of experiencing oneself as a self that concerns me here” (AN, 430).  But 
why?  No explanation is given for why narrativity must be a phenomenon of the self 
rather than the person or human being, and thus why Strawson's mapping of the 
argumentative terrain might not immediately preclude him from hitting his target.  
Considering the charge that he might be “as Narrative as anyone else, and [his] narratives 
about [him]self determine how [he] think[s] of [him]self even though they are not 
conscious,” he insists that “If I were charged to make my self-understanding explicit, I 
might well illustrate my view of myself by reference to things I (GS) have done, but it 
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certainly would not follow that I had a Diachronic outlook, still less a Narrative one” 
(AN, 448-449).  In fact, it would seem to follow that he might have a narrative outlook, at 
the level of himself as a whole human being, and that this reveals his particular stipulated 
definition of diachronic self-experience (as applying to experience of the self, not human 
being) as having led the conversation astray.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
Strawson's conception of the self shares little with narrativists' own conception.  His 
conception of the self whittles away all that might be personal or particular in it, until he 
is talking about a bare subject of experience that has no necessary duration in time.  
Further, his appeal to self-experience, if one is familiar with his wider work, is revealed 
to be colored by his metaphysical commitments.  No argument is given in “Against 
Narrativity” that we should conceive of the self as Strawson does, so there's no reason 
that narrativists, if they have a different conception of the self, should be threatened by 
Strawson's argument.  His argument really takes the following form: if you conceive of 
the self as I do, then there is nothing necessarily narrative about it.  To which narrativists 
should respond: we don't conceive of the self as you do, indeed our discussions try to get 
a grip on what it is to be a person, not an atomistic subject.
Strawson's argument might appear to be an internal critique of narrativity: if we 
take narrativity on its own terms, it is false.  Or it might appear to be made from a naïve 
foundation: assuming nothing, we can see narrativity's inadequacy at explaining all 
people.  Actually, it is an external critique: on the basis of views developed elsewhere 
(here undefended and which Strawson's opponents would not grant) narrativity fails.  
External criticisms are philosophically effective only when one fails to notice the external 
basis of their premises.  Strawson's real focus is not narrativity.  Rather, he is interested in 
developing his own theory of the self, to which narrativity runs contrary; it thus serves 
him as a useful but finally passing foil.  It will no doubt seem uncharitable to suggest that 
“Against Narrativity” is a quick volley fired from a deeply fortified position.  Thinking of
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it this way, however, is much more illuminating that supposing that Strawson is meeting 
his opponents on a neutral battlefield.17
II. Specious Distinctions
“Diachronic,” “Narrative,” “Episodic,” “non-Narrative,” “I*”: I've quoted, 
without sufficient gloss, Strawson using these technical terms, some of his own devising, 
in order to examine the framing and motivation of his arguments.  I suggest that his 
distinctions, rather than clarifying this muddled terrain, make it all the more unclear.  
Further, I make explicit the argumentative pathways through Strawson's terms that are 
supposed to lead to the conclusion that the psychological and ethical narrativity theses are 
false.  At key moments, Strawson equivocates over the relationship between his terms, or 
seems to lose sight himself of how they sit within the larger organization of his argument.
experience of oneself as a self versus experience of oneself as a whole human 
being: We can and do think of and describe ourselves in various ways.  Some of these 
ways are generic (selves, people, persons, human beings), others apply only to some of us 
(brother, sister, only child; professor, carpenter), and some are inherently value-laden 
(misanthrope, lecher, saint).  At different times, we can identify ourselves more of less 
fully with these types, feeling that some get at the core of who we are, others only 
marginally so.  Types can overlap or sit in tension conceptually.  I can think of myself as 
a person and student simultaneously, but a gestalt switch is necessary to think of myself 
now as my body, now as an interior mental entity.  Is such a switch part of normal 
experience, or part of experience only within philosophical thought experiments?
I would suggest that we have no experience (following Strawson, 
phenomenologically pure, metaphysically-unladen) of ourselves now as one, now as 
17 In the preface to his Selves, Strawson forthrightly admits: “I'm not trying to argue other people into my 
view by starting from their premisses, let alone premisses we share.  My main aim is to give useful 
expression to, and develop further in certain respects, views that others are already interested in or 
already disposed to find sympathetic” (2009, xv-xvi).
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another, sort of thing.  When Strawson glosses Henry James and says the novelist “does 
not feel he is the same self or person [rather than human being] as the author of that 
book,” he is using “feel” in a way common in everyday discourse, but which is here 
especially imprecise (AN, 430, emphasis added).  James thinks or believes or is of the 
opinion that he is not the same self; he does not feel it.  What would it mean to have a 
feeling or sensation of oneself as a self?  What, further, would it mean to feel oneself as 
the same or different?  The distinction from which Strawson begins is one between two 
different judgements, not experiences.18  Those judgements are possible only against the 
background of theoretical beliefs or assumptions about the concepts of self and human 
being.  This background needn't be coherent or worked out or conscious.  Perhaps it need 
consist in nothing more than a native language user's sense of what contexts are 
appropriately home for the term “self” and what contexts for the term “human being.”  
Strawson might even be right that we associate or identify certain experiences with 
ourselves as selves and others with ourselves as whole human beings.  My experience of 
loneliness is one I ascribe to my self as a self; my experience of chronic headaches is one 
I ascribe to myself as a whole human being—but exactly because loneliness doesn't 
require a bodily context, whereas my headaches do.  Perhaps we even have a feeling or 
experience or sense of our selfhood—though this is notoriously difficult to talk about and 
most famously Hume claimed he found no such feeling in himself.  But even if we do, 
what would a sense of the sameness or difference of my self as a self or human being be?  
Sameness or difference is a judgement made on the basis of some criteria, stated or 
suppressed, coherent or contradictory.  If it is the case that Strawson's entire discussion of 
narrativity is framed by a distinction which he claims is phenomenologically pure, but is 
actually theory-laden, then we have every reason to think that where his and his targets' 
18 Compare Strawson's use of these terms to Schechtman's, for whom the distinction between persons and 
human beings is conceptual, made at the level of analysis and explanation, not experience (CS, 120).
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theories of the self and person conflict, they'll end up talking past one another.
objective versus subjective narrativity: One of Strawson's most important 
argumentative assumptions (not articulated clearly until the mid-point of his essay) is that 
narrativity is a psychological, perhaps even conscious,19 phenomenon:
the distinctive claim of the psychological Narrativity thesis is that for a life to be a narrative in the 
required sense it must be lived Narratively.  The person whose life it is must see it or feel it as a 
narrative, construe it as a narrative, live it as a narrative.  One could put this roughly by saying that 
lower-case or 'objective' narrativity requires upper-case or 'subjective' Narrativity. (AN, 440)20
Absent such a subjective sense, Strawson thinks narrativity will be trivially true of all 
human lives (more on this below).  Is it true that narrativists do ground their claims 
subjectively, that “The person whose life it is must see or feel it as a narrative”?  One can 
find passages were such an idea is suggested, but is it universal to narrativists?
The thinkers Strawson cites definitionally a few pages earlier (AN, 435-6) are, at 
times, far from clear on this question.  Oliver Sacks: “Each of us constructs and lives a 
'narrative'” (110).  Jerome Bruner: “Self is a perpetually rewritten story” (1987, 15).  
Daniel Dennett: “we are virtuoso novelists […] We try to make all our material cohere 
into a single good story” (1992, 114).  Schechtman: “a person creates his identity by 
forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of his life” (CS, 93).  None of these 
slogans necessarily demonstrates the commitment which Strawson assumes 
definitionally, of a subjective, psychological, even conscious grounding to narrativity.  
One can construct, create, and “write” absent any subjective experience of doing so.  So 
it's not obvious that narrativists themselves all found their arguments on a subjective 
sense each of us is said to have of our lives as narratives.  Having articulated this key 
assumption, Strawson comments only on MacIntyre, admitting that in After Virtue he 
19 “The conscious/non-conscious border is both murky and porous” (AN, 443).  Just how conscious this 
subjective experience needs to be is unclear.  Strawson says that it needn't “involve any clearly 
intentional activity” (AN, 440) and he writes of kinds of “self-understanding” which are “not staged in 
consciousness” (AN, 448).
20 Strawson's very naming of the descriptive thesis as “the psychological Narrativity thesis” presses this 
assumption.  An alternative name such as “the anthropological Narrativity thesis” would just as well 
name a descriptive, empirical thesis—this is how humans are—without insisting or assuming that 
narrativity is a matter of psychology, something we're at some level aware of.
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does not explicitly ground the (objective) narrativity of life in (subjective) narrative self-
understanding (AN, 440n27).
If we move beyond quotable slogans, we quickly find grounds to doubt Strawson's 
assumption.  Peter Goldie, for instance, detaches the notion of narrative from explicit 
textuality, even from discourse generally: “narrative can be readily, and in an intuitively 
appealing way, widened to include narrative thinking.”  Thus narrative requires “no 
communicative act,” yet still “another kind of representation: thoughts.”  What is 
required is perhaps only the potential that such thinking could be made explicit: 
“Narrative thinking is narratable” (2003B, 301).  If such thinking is, at least at times, 
below the level of conscious experience, might it not become detached from any 
subjective experience?  Goldie does not press this thought, but it seems implicit.
Schechtman, in her discussion of “the articulation constraint” leaves even more 
room open to oppose Strawson's assumption.  Initially, it might seem that her “narrative 
self-constitution view” is grounded in a person's subjective, even conscious, 
understanding of his or her life as narrative in form.  “Personhood and personal identity,” 
she writes, “rely crucially on an individual's inner life and her attitude toward her actions 
and experiences” (CS, 95).  Taking one's attitudes into consideration doesn't mean that a 
person, to be a person, must intentionally work to order his or her inner states into a 
narrative, however, much less that his or her beliefs must invoke narrative terminology: 
“the construction of an identity-constituting narrative does not have to be self-conscious. 
[…] Having an autobiographical narrative does not involve actually articulating the story 
of one's life to oneself or anyone else, but only organizing experience according to an 
implicit narrative” (CS, 105, 114).  She continues, calling “a person's underlying 
psychological organization a self-narrative because it is not simply a static set of facts 
about him, but rather a dynamic set of organizing principles, a basic orientation through 
which, with or without conscious awareness, an individual understands himself and his 
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world” (CS, 115-116).
Schechtman provides the example of a man who claims to love his brother, yet 
repeatedly acts, against his avowed intentions, in ways that hurt him.  The “implicit” 
narrative in such a case—one of sibling rivalry or worse—actually drives his behavior, 
but it diverges from the man's “explicit” narrative—one of brotherly love—which the 
man tells himself and others.  In discussing this case, Schechtman wants to balance two 
responses.  On the one hand, we are often guided by unconscious or subconscious 
concerns, some of which are recognizable to others or ourselves after the fact as narrative 
in form (if they were made conscious, they would count as instances of Goldie's narrative 
thinking).  On the other hand, however, where we are incapable of making such concerns 
transparent to ourselves, our identities seem compromised, ruled as we are in such cases 
by things we can't identify or identify with.  Her example of the brothers is only an 
exaggerated case of an even more familiar phenomenon.  Though guided by a self-
narrative, we don't usually make it explicit to ourselves.  Schechtman's “articulation 
constraint” is stated as a hypothetical: if asked, or pressed, or put in the right 
circumstances, one could articulate one's self-narrative.  The requirement is that “an 
identity-constituting narrative be capable of local articulation” (CS, 114).  Framed as a 
possibility, this would seem to deny, against Strawson's assumption, that narrativity 
necessarily and in all cases have a subjective ground—that we “see, feel, construe” our 
lives as narrative.  Absent certain conditions—an introspective nature, inquisitive friends, 
therapy—it is possible that a person could be guided by an implicit self-narrative, be 
capable of articulating it, but never do so in fact.
If cases like this are as familiar as I think they are, then one of Strawson's central 
argumentative assumptions is awry: objective narrativity doesn't require subjective 
narrativity, and it's a mistake to treat it as a merely psychological, even conscious, 
phenomenon.  If that's so, then Strawson's appeal to his own experience—I don't think of 
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myself in narrative terms, therefore it's not universal—loses its argumentative force.  This 
may be an area where individuals do not have privileged access to their own manner of 
being, where self-reports lack authority.21  Narrativity is not necessarily a 
“straightforwardly empirical, descriptive thesis about the way ordinary human beings 
actually experience their lives” (AN, 428, emphases added).
If narrativists themselves don't found their claims on what Strawson calls 
“subjective narrativity,” then his argumentative claim that, conceptually, narrativity is 
indistinct and trivial without such grounding is more important than his presentation of 
himself as a counterexample.  Strawson's charge of triviality comes in two forms, but 
both can be rebutted.  In the first, he writes that “if someone says, as some do, that 
making coffee is a narrative that involves Narrativity, because you have to think ahead, 
do things in the right order, and so on […] then I take it the claim is trivial” (AN, 439).  
Making coffee involves time and causality, but not yet narrative.  Fine.  But Strawson 
claims further that the connections asserted in psychotherapy “between features of one's 
very early life and one's present perspective on things” aren't “distinctively” narrative 
either: this suggests he has too rigid a standard in mind (AN, 448).  In the next chapter, 
I'll offer a characterization of narrative broad enough to capture its variety of forms, but 
specific enough to apply non-trivially. 
In the second version of his charge of triviality, Strawson writes that, absent 
subjective grounding (as above), narrativity will be trivially true of all human lives since, 
by the simple fact that they are the lives of human beings, they will possess “a historical-
characteral developmental unity as well as a biological one” (AN, 440).  Grasped after 
the fact, or from the outside, or by someone else, “any human life, even a highly 
21 Let me make explicit here that nothing in what follows is meant as an ad hominem attack on Strawson.  
But because he has made his own self-experience central to his arguments, my comments will 
sometimes unavoidably appear as such.  The quotation marks around Strawson's name in my title imply 
that when I discuss “Galen Strawson” not as the author of “Against Narrativity,” but as the owner of 
certain self-experiences appealed to within that essay, we should think of him as a fictional character.
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disordered one, can be the subject of an outstanding biography,” he writes (AN, 440).  It 
seems to me that this suggests not that it is trivially true that human lives are narratives, 
but that it is definitionally true, because narrative order is part of our concept of 
personhood.  If the lives of all (non-damaged) humans are ordered in time in a way that 
animals' lives aren't,22 then doesn't that seem like a candidate for what makes us people 
(or a candidate for part of such an analysis)?
diachronic versus episodic: Diachronic self-experience takes the following form: 
“one naturally figures oneself, considered as a self, as something that was there in the 
(further) past and will be there in the (further) future” (AN, 430).  Episodic self-
experience takes the contrasting form.  Merely figuring myself as persisting into the 
future, rather than the “further” future, is not yet sufficient for diachronic self-experience.  
A huge debate about the scope of narrativity is here passed over.  At one extreme, we saw 
that MacIntyre hopes to unify entire lives, from birth to death, under the arc of one 
continuous quest.  At the other extreme, Strawson, when he does draw his own 
metaphysical conclusions about the self, argues for what he calls “the Transience view”: 
many selves or, speaking more carefully, many SESMETs exist over the lifespan of a 
human being.23  “How long does a given SESMET last?  As long as the experientially 
unitary period of experience of which it is the subject” (1999A, 129).  SESMETs are 
“short-lived,” then, usually lasting about three seconds (1999B, 134).24  Both of these 
extremes seem implausible to me.  MacIntyre (and perhaps Taylor) are too wedded to the 
ideal of a life as a whole.  They have larger philosophical reasons, emerging from their 
ethical projects, for this.  Strawson focuses on a bare subject.  Narrativity requires longer 
stretches of diachronicity, he suggests, but it can't find them (in everybody).  Just how 
22 Strawson adds that “Actually, even dogs and horses can be the subject of excellent biographies,” but 
this seems to me true only if one anthropomorphizes their experiences (AN, 440).
23 See 1999A, 129-30; 2009, 9-10 for a summary.
24 See too NUP, 89, where he distinguishes between phenomenological and metaphysical claims about the 
specious present.
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long, though?  Strawson writes “I take it that Sartre […] is not particularly concerned 
with [diachronic self-experience] in so far as he is mainly interested in short-term, in-the-
present story-telling” (AN, 446; see too 435n10).  I'll discuss Sartre at length in chapter 
five.  In fact, I think Sartre is interested in narrativity at the most interesting level of 
scope—that of the contours of what we might call an immediate situation.  Strawson 
precludes Sartre's situational story-telling as sufficiently involving the further past and 
future to count as diachronic.  But the situation, rather than the whole life or mere 
moment, is perhaps where narrativity is most fruitfully to be pursued.
narrative vs. non-narrative: Early on, Strawson asks us to “Suppose that being 
Diachronic is at least necessary for being Narrative” (AN, 432).  This is a crucial 
assumption, as most of the essay is concerned with distinguishing diachronic and 
episodic experience of the self, with the episodic standing as a counterexample to 
narrativity's universal claims: “it follows that if you're Episodic you're not Narrative” 
(AN, 432).  Toward the end of the essay, however, Strawson retracts this assumption: 
narrativity “does not even require one to be diachronic” (AN, 446).  Though he's claimed 
that there “are marked correlations between” the episodic/diachronic distinction and 
narrative/non-narrative distinction (AN, 430n4), here, late in the game, he admits that 
there is no strictly necessary relationship.  It follows that his extended discussion of 
episodic self-experience, seemingly the heart of his argument, is only stage-setting, or 
even a mere sideshow.  This is a stunning admission, because it means that the episodic is 
not necessarily a counterexample to narrativity, despite his having presented it that way.  
Whatever argument is left thus turns on the final set of terms enumerated.
diachronic self-experience, form-finding tendency, story-telling tendency, revision:
Once Strawson takes back his assumption that diachronic self-experience is necessary for 
narrative self-experience, his argument against narrativity turns on denying that other 
specific traits or tendencies are universal.  The first of these is a “form-finding tendency.”  
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Anyone can “grasp one's life as a unity simply in so far as it is the life of a biologically 
single human being” (AN, 440-441).  This can't be enough for narrative self-
understanding, Strawson claims, because it would apply trivially to all human beings.  As 
I put it above, one can mistake the definitional for the trivial.
Strawson insists, however, that on top of form-finding one must “construe” one's 
life as having a form, put a “construction” on the underlying, possibly already-ordered 
events: “One must have some sort of relatively large-scale coherence-seeking, unity-
seeking, pattern-seeking, or most generally form-finding tendency” (AN, 441).  How 
coherent, unified, or patterned must one see one's life if one is said to possess a form-
finding tendency?  Strawson equates “narrative structure” with “some sort of ethical-
historical-characterological developmental unity […, with] a story, a Bildung or 'quest'” 
(AN, 441).  This seems much too strong, however, unless one is set on attacking only 
MacIntyre and Taylor.  Not all narratives are so fully or conventionally formed.  Strawson 
quickly concludes that a form-finding tendency is a necessary condition to narrativity 
(AN, 441), but without defending his stringent standard for what counts as meeting it.
Since there are forms that aren't story-forms, Strawson next introduces a “story-
telling tendency.”  One who possess such a tendency “must be disposed to apprehend or 
think of oneself and one's life as fitting the form of some recognized narrative genre” 
(AN, 442).  Strawson writes:
Story-telling is a species of form-finding, and the basic model for it is the way in which gifted and 
impartial journalists or historians report a sequence of events.  Obviously they select among the 
facts, but they do not, we suppose, distort or falsify them, and they do more than merely list them 
in the correct temporal order, for they also place them in a connected account.  In its non-falsifying 
mode story-telling involves the ability to detect—not invent—developmental coherencies in the 
manifold of one's life. (AN, 442-443)
Again, this seems too stringent a definition.  Not every person will measure his or her life 
against “some recognized narrative genre,” but there are narratives that aren't generic.  
Disagreement here matters little for the larger argument, however, because Strawson 
concludes that story-telling tendency (which “entails form-finding”) is a sufficient 
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condition of narrativity (AN, 443).  The important point of disagreement is over what 
narrativity would minimally require, so it is necessary, not sufficient, conditions that 
matter.  That is, an explicit story-telling tendency might not just be sufficient evidence of 
narrative self-understanding, but massively overdetermine such a conclusion.  What is 
contested is whether all people's experience is structured by forms, less obviously story-
like, but which still merit the name “narrative.”
Strawson goes on to discuss worries that narrative self-understanding might 
necessarily involve revision and falsification of one's life (AN, 443-446).  He points out 
that some narrativists embrace such a claim: “If the revision thesis is true, it would be bad 
news for the ethical Narrativity thesis, whose supporters cannot want ethical success to 
depend essentially on some sort of falsification” (AN, 443).  (More carefully, it would be 
prima facie bad news, but maybe not finally so, depending on how they conceive of 
ethics, truth, and reality.)  He concludes that we don't necessarily revise our lives in 
memory, so this point can be left aside.  It is mainly there to allow Strawson to offer a 
taxonomy of different thinkers' views.25
Given this set of terms, let's make explicit how quick Strawson's actual argument 
is: he defines form-finding (a necessary condition of narrative self-understanding) and 
story-telling (a sufficient condition) tendencies in rather more stringent ways than we 
might suppose correct, then asserts that some people, himself included, lack them.  
Therefore, he concludes, narrativity's universal claims are false.  I defer my rebuttal of 
these claims until part two, where I'll argue, in my interpretation of Heidegger, for a less 
stringent (but non-trivial) notion of narrative self-understanding and try to motivate the 
idea that it is universal to our way of being-in-the-world.  “I've made some distinctions, 
but none of them cut very sharply,” Strawson writes (AN, 446).  This is, I've argued, quite 
25 There's a distracting inconsistency in this taxonomy.  Dennett, for example, is described as [+D +F +S 
+R], as endorsing all these terms as part “of what it is to be Narrative” (AN, 446).  But then Strawson 
describes himself (rather than his own view of what it is to be Narrative) as [-D -F -S -R] (AN, 447).
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true.  Strawson's terminology would be better scrapped than embraced by those of us 
seeking more precise statements of narrativist and anti-narrativist views.
III. The Episodic
Against the supposition that all people do and/or should have a narrative 
understanding of themselves, Strawson responds: I have no such understanding of 
myself, yet I'm a full person, capable of moral experience, or anything else people should 
be capable of.  Therefore the universal conclusions narrativists wish to draw are false.  To 
fill in the imaginative picture of non-narrative experience, Strawson puts forward a 
character called the episodic.  This picture remains sketchy, however.  Strawson has 
responded most thoroughly to the objection that the episodic would be incapable of 
experiencing certain emotions or reactive attitudes, and thus of leading a fully moral life 
(see his “Episodic Ethics” in NUP).  Here, I want instead to dwell on two much more 
banal examples and ask, first, whether the episodic could defer pleasure in the most basic 
of ways and, second, whether the episodic is capable of even basic prudential planning.  
Dwelling on such cases will, I'll argue, reveal the episodic's psychology to be so 
convoluted that we would not recognize it as that of a person.  Strawson's supposed 
counterexample26 to narrativity is a logical possibility, but an empty one.  It is not a 
description of some people in our world, but a philosophical fiction.  Like Super 
Spartans, Pleasure Monsters, or Philosophical Zombies, it might be useful in thought 
experiments meant to establish certain conceptual possibilities, but it isn't a 
counterexample against claims made about real people.
To begin, it's necessary to make explicit an argumentative slight of hand that 
Strawson makes frequent use of in rebutting objections.  Possessing an episodic or 
26 Since Strawson admits that diachronic self-experience is not necessary to narrative self-experience, it's 
not true that any episodic would serve as a counterexample to narrativity.  “Against Narrativity” is built 
around the idea that if episodic self-experience is anything other than a complete aberration, then 
narrative self-experience can't be universal, even as that elides certain admitted logical possibilities.
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diachronic nature is not an all-or-nothing matter; rather, there is a spectrum between 
them.  These “styles of temporal being are radically opposed, but they are not absolute or 
exceptionless” (AN, 430).  This point is well taken, but it muddies Strawson's arguments 
enormously.  It leads him to repeatedly respond to critics by saying, for example, “It's 
important […] that the Episodic sense of self is not absolute [….] Episodics vary greatly 
among themselves, from extreme to moderate, and one's general sense of one's temporal 
being may also vary considerably depending on what one is doing or thinking about, or 
one's chemistry or mood” (NUP, 91).  If Strawson is allowed to respond that a 
hypothetical episodic isn't necessarily an extreme case, that his or her sense of self is not 
necessarily without any diachronic element, then why shouldn't we worry that it is 
exactly that lingering trace of diachronicity which allows this “episodic” to act in familiar 
ways?  Elsewhere, he writes “It may be said that life without any significant sense of the 
relatively long-term continuity of the mental self is conceivable for aliens, but hardly 
possible for human beings.  Strictly speaking, all I need for my argument is the formal 
possibility” (1999B, 140).  This may be true in the context it is written, where Strawson 
is trying to establish a formal framework for thinking about the self.  A merely formal 
possibility is not sufficient here, however, inasmuch as the episodic is put forward as a 
real counterexample.  Only a full episodic would refute the program of narrativity.  Thus 
in what follows below, the episodic does not figure him or herself, taken as a self, to exist 
for more than a few moments, even while understanding that he or she, taken as a whole 
human being, does continue to exist.
I turn now to my first example: the deferral of pleasure.  Suppose that I'm running 
up against a deadline to submit a conference paper.  Submissions are limited to 3,000 
words, and my current draft is 5,000; I need to make cuts, and substantial ones.  I find this 
to be tedious and not particularly worthwhile work, and I'd much prefer to set it aside and 
return to reading a novel.  Yet I do think that presenting my work at this conference 
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would be pleasurable and worthwhile.  So, unless I'm completely lacking in self-
discipline that day, I buckle down and do the work.  I tell myself that if I stop 
procrastinating and put in these couple of hours of work now, I can soon get back to the 
pleasure of reading the novel.  And I understand as well that attending the conference, 
which I want to do, will be possible only if I do this work now, and do it well.  Such 
calculations are completely familiar.  And for someone with even a moderately 
diachronic sense of self, they are easy to make.  In order to make possible greater future 
pleasure, we are willing to endure tedium now.  Within Strawson's terms, how do we 
understand such a deferral of pleasure?  If I am a diachronic, I figure that the self and 
human being (there's no disconnect between the two) who will attend the conference is 
the same as the self and human being who endures the tedium of cutting the paper—me.  
If the pleasures of the conference will outweigh the tedium, then it's worth enduring.
Now let's try to imagine the calculations that a true episodic would have to make 
in such a familiar situation.  The episodic figures that the self who would experience the 
pleasures of the conference would not be the same as the self who would suffer through 
the tedium of shortening the paper for submission.  A straightforward calculation to defer 
pleasure is thus barred.  A number of alternative pathways present themselves.  Perhaps 
the episodic thinks it is worth his enduring the tedium of cutting the paper because it will 
allow someone (not him, figured as a self) the pleasure of attending the conference.  His 
action is thus admirably charitable and un-self-centered.  This is obviously incorrect, 
however.  If there are a dozen spots available for presenters at the conference, then twelve 
papers will be accepted, even if his is not one of them.  Furthermore, if the episodic were 
tempted to explain his behavior in charitable terms—he's helping someone else—surely 
his couple of hours could be spent helping others in more productive ways.  The 
calculations of pleasure deferral need to be self-centered.
It thus seems that—if he is capable of deferring pleasure—the episodic would 
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need to make a calculation routed through a consideration of himself figured as a whole 
human being, rather than a self.  The episodic doesn't think that he, figured as a self, will 
reap the pleasures of attending the conference.  But he understands that, figured as a 
whole human being, he will be the same at that time.  He, in one sense, won't be there, 
but in another (seemingly weaker) sense will be, and that's enough to explain pleasure 
deferral.  I take it that this is how Strawson would respond, though I am less than certain.  
The response is unsatisfying, though it is difficult to elaborate why with sufficient care.
First, isn't it the case that if the episodic can appeal to his continuity (as a whole 
human being, rather than a self) so easily, he is still importantly “diachronic”?  According 
to Strawson's narrowly stipulated sense, he isn't, because “diachronic” and “episodic” 
apply to one's temporal sense of oneself as a self.  But such a stipulation obscures rather 
than reveals the argumentative terrain.  The episodic still views himself as an enduring 
entity, and narrativity for him (maybe for all of us) could apply at the level of the person 
or whole human being.  Second, to what degree the episodic is supposed to identify with 
himself figured as a whole human being, rather than a self, is unclear.  Figuring himself 
as a self is given privilege.  But does he also think that he is a whole human being, of 
greater continuity?  Or does he merely understand that, by the customs of a culture 
predominately peopled by diachronics, we are held responsible for actions committed by 
our bodies, even when they were not committed by the selves that we are now?  
“Although there is a sense in which my primordial referential intention cleaves first and 
foremost to I*, my overall referential intention can equally well embrace both I* and GS, 
and when I am thinking about and mentioning myself in public I certainly and solidly 
mean GS, whatever else I mean” (NUP, 101).  “I believe that the primary or fundamental 
way in which we conceive of ourselves is as a distinct mental thing [….] This is not to 
deny that we also naturally conceive of ourselves as mental-and-non-mental things, 
human beings considered as a whole” (1997, 3, emphasis added).  The invocation of 
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“referential intention” in one case and use of the cognitive verb “conceive” in the other 
leaves unclear whether the episodic identifies himself as a person or only understands 
intellectually that it is the case (or even that it might not be the case, factually speaking, 
but that's how our culture operates).
Strawson has not offered up a sufficiently full picture of the episodic for me to be 
certain how to answer this question.  Describing himself (not a complete episodic), he 
claims “I have [no] great or special interest in my past [….] Nor do I have a great deal of 
concern for my future.”  And he writes that “it seems clear to me, when I am 
experiencing or apprehending myself as a self, that the remoter past or future in question 
is not my past or future, although it is certainly the past or future of GS the human being” 
(AN, 433).  “I do not really think of [my past] as mine at all, in so far as 'mine' picks out 
me as I am now” (1999B, 141).  These claims demonstrate that Strawson identifies 
himself with himself as a self.  But they leave unclear whether he also identifies himself 
with himself as a human being, only in a different and weaker sense, or if that is not him.  
As I argued above, I'm deeply skeptical that we have these two different kinds of 
experiences of ourselves, now as a self, now as a human being.  Rather, the distinction 
seems to be a theoretical one, between two different judgments we make, using two 
different vocabularies of explanation, against varying metaphysical backgrounds.  
Elsewhere Strawson writes “I make plans for the future […] But I experience this way of 
thinking of myself as utterly remote and theoretical, given the most central or 
fundamental way in which I think of myself, which is as a mental self or someone” 
(1999B, 141-142).  This is the clearest suggestion we get that the episodic's 
understanding of himself as a whole human being is merely theoretical and will have to 
be appealed to in that register.
If I try to imagine my way into the radical episodic's experience, the best I can 
come up with is something like the following.  I experience myself as lasting but a few 
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moments.  I understand that I have a special relationship to myself as a whole human 
being, and even the other selves, past and future, connected to that human being, 
inasmuch as we share memories and a body.  Further, I understand that our world is 
organized around a conception of responsibility according to which I will be held to 
account for things I (as a self) didn't do.  Hopefully, I avoid doing wrong because it's 
wrong, not out of fear of possible consequences.  But should “I” have done wrong in the 
past, I understand that I can be held responsible now.  In attempting to imagine my way 
into an episodic's experience, it seems to me that the episodic identifies himself with his 
present self alone.  If his experience isn't to become diachronic, just at the level of the 
person, then his identification with himself as a whole human being must remain merely 
theoretical, based on custom.27
If that picture is right, let's try to imagine whether and how the episodic could 
defer pleasure, routing his calculation through a consideration of himself as a whole 
human being.  He can't think that he'll forego pleasure now to reap pleasure later, because 
he won't be there later.  Neither can he offer some charitable, utilitarian calculus to 
facilitate pleasures for a future self, not him but connected to him through the same 
human being.  So why would the episodic endure the tedium of cutting 2,000 words from 
his conference paper, rather than turning to other, immediately available pleasures?  He 
has no apparent reason to care about the pleasures future selves (not him) will experience.  
Neither will setting the paper aside saddle future selves (not him) with unwanted 
responsibilities.28  Might the episodic think to himself: “I don't want to do this, and doing 
so will bring me no pleasure.  Yet I understand that it is good for me as a whole human 
being.  I don't identify myself with this whole human being, but I understand that most 
27 How an episodic, living in a diachronic culture ruled by such customs, could avoid being re-habituated 
into thinking of himself in straightforwardly diachronic terms, is a question Strawson never considers.  
David Roochnik raised this excellent point in conversation.
28 In a different example, it would be cruel for him to make flippant promises, thereby saddling a future 
self with responsibilities, and we can explain his doing so by saying that he avoids acting cruelly.
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everyone else does.  There's no reason for me to care about the future fate of myself as a 
whole human being, except mediated by this external understanding of myself.  If I set 
the paper aside now, someone assuming the ways of the world will think me imprudent.  
It's not actually imprudent, since the future doesn't affect me, but I don't want to suffer 
that censure, even if it won't occur until later, when I won't even be around anymore.  It 
would transgress the memory of who I am.  So I'll edit the paper.”  Such a thought 
process would be bizarre and pathetic.  One can't imagine anyone partaking of it, and 
were someone to do so, it doesn't seem like it would actually be successful in motivating 
the deferral of pleasure.29  Yet it's not an exaggeration of the machinations Strawson 
ascribes to the episodic: “I am and now experience myself as myself*, who was not there 
in the past, but I am also GS, and I know this, and I know that others know this, and I 
know that I am for others fundamentally GS, the continuing person and human being, and 
there is for this reason alone a straightforward respect in which that is how I primarily 
figure myself when I am engaged with others” (NUP, 101).
Perhaps, then, the true episodic can't defer pleasure.  The expression “live in the 
moment” is usually exaggerated, but maybe in his case it is not.  But wouldn't someone 
who truly couldn't defer pleasure, even for a few moments, lead a miserable, bestial 
existence?  One unrecognizable as human?30  An ability to defer and calculate pleasures 
over a span of time greater than the passing moment is necessary to experience 
practically any pleasures at all.  The strangeness of the episodic becomes even more 
apparent if we consider my second banal example: routine prudential planning.
“As for my practical concern for my future, which I believe within the normal 
range (low end), it is biologically—viscerally—grounded and autonomous in such a way 
29 As Korsgaard writes, “When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea 
of a merely present self” (114).  Korsgaard is here responding to Parfit, whose work hovers as an 
important influence behind Strawson.
30 See too Richard Wollheim's argument that for a person “to disregard his future states […] ignores or 
denies a constitutive feature of what it is to lead the life of a person,” namely, “self-concern” (236).
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that I can experience it as something immediately felt even though I have no significant 
sense that I* will be there in the future” (AN, 434).  What does Strawson mean by this?  
Suppose, crossing the street one day, a blaring horn brings Strawson back from his 
distraction in thought.  Glancing up, he sees a truck bearing down on him, and jumps out 
of the way.  Why, we might ask, does he?  Or more pressingly, why would the radical 
episodic?  Why should the episodic be concerned—at all—about “his” or “her” future, if 
he or she won't exist then?  Strawson suggests that an appeal to visceral, biological 
instinct is enough.  When jumping out of the way of an oncoming truck, no prudential 
calculation is made.  The diachronic doesn't think “I want to remain alive in the future, 
therefore I'll jump out of the way.”  Neither does the episodic think, “I know it won't be 
me who will survive this possible accident, but being an ethical person, I might as well 
exert this minimal effort to save that future self who won't be me.”  Rather, both are 
instinctually primed to avoid harm without thinking.
Restricted to immediate cases like the dangers of oncoming traffic, Strawson's 
response is compelling.  But is instinct sufficient to explain the wider practical concern 
for the future we recognize in every person, even those most committed to living in the 
moment?  Elsewhere Strawson tries, implausibly, to extend hard-wired biology to more 
distant concerns, explaining that he feels anxiety concerning a lecture he is writing now 
to give in several months time, “even though [he has] no sense that it will be [him]* that 
will be giving the lecture” (1999B, 142).  Perhaps this works in cases when the episodic's 
planning for the future is motivated by something like anxiety, rather than rational 
concerns.  It doesn't work when the episodic then overcomes what must be judged 
irrational anxiety (since he believes it won't be him who will give the lecture), or in the 
countless cases were we act concerning our futures not on the basis of inarticulate drives, 
but fully cognitive concerns.  Consider again very simple cases.  Would a full episodic 
keep groceries around the house?  Would he take water along on a desert hike?  Visceral 
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biology can only explain that the episodic would eat when hungry, drink when thirsty, 
and so forth.  It can't explain why the episodic would rationally plan for even the near 
future.  Nor, again, can a normal appeal to self-interest.  If the episodic thinks that he as a 
self is transitory, then there's no future self that's him to have concern for.  I bring water 
along on a desert hike because I know I will be thirsty later.  The episodic, by contrast, 
would seemingly have to think: “I'm not bringing this water along for me.  I'm bringing it 
along for that future self who won't be me.  I don't owe him anything, but it takes so little 
effort to help out, why wouldn't I?  It would be uncharitable not to.”  Or: “I understand 
that I won't be around to drink this water later, but other people will think I and that 
future self are the same, so I might as well play by society's rules, even though doing so 
won't benefit me, since I'll be gone by then.”  As with pleasure deferral, this seems 
logically possible, but so distant from any actual description of someone's motivations as 
to be pure fantasy.
These convolutions might seem ridiculous, a bit of parody.  I don't mean them to 
be.  That is to say, I don't mean to exaggerate their absurdity as a rhetorical ploy aimed at 
undercutting the notion of the episodic.  Rather, I think they are the most restrained 
portrayal one can imagine of the thinking a true episodic would have to go through every 
day.  Why, we should ask ourselves, are such psychological machinations unfamiliar?  
Why have we never heard anyone, in reality or portrayed in fiction,31 justify his or her 
actions in anything like these ways?  I very much doubt that anyone recognizes him or 
herself in such descriptions, and I don't think we would recognize such a being as a 
person.  This is neither a problem nor an insult, nor is it to use “person” as an excessively 
lofty honorific, because the episodic is a philosophical confabulation and doesn't exist.
31 According to Strawson's estimation, a good number of novelists are episodics: Stendahl, Ford Madox 
Ford, Virginia Woolf, and Iris Murdoch, among others (see AN, 432n7).  His basis for such estimations 
is in most cases puzzling.  Even these writers don't, it seems to me, produce episodic characters.  The 
quotations Strawson marshals as evidence are always in the form of theoretical declarations, never 
descriptions of how a supposed episodic manages his or her temporal being.
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Perhaps, by way of conclusion, we might ask: what if the episodic is meant not as 
a description of an existing misunderstood and beleaguered type, but as a new ethical 
ideal?  What if Strawson's episodic is an act of redescription of the sort I ascribed to 
MacIntyre and Taylor at the end of the last chapter?32  The official position of “Against 
Narrativity” is that “It's just not true that there is only one good way for human beings to 
experience their being in time” (AN, 429).  There are naturally narrative and naturally 
non-narrative people, and good ways to live that are narrative and non-narrative.  The 
same goes for diachronicity, form-finding, a storytelling-tendency, and revision: “some 
normal human beings have none of them” (AN, 446).  That is, there are no universal 
claims to be had here, “almost anything goes” (AN, 446).33  The same is said in “Episodic 
Ethics”: “There is I suggest no interesting correlation between moral worth and being 
Episodic or Diachronic, Narrative or non-Narrative” (NUP, 115).  Occasionally, however, 
such pluralism is hard to reconcile with Strawson's rhetorical excess: views which 
suggest that narrativity is essential to a well-lived life, he writes, “hinder human self-
understanding, close down important avenues of thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical 
possibilities, needlessly and wrongly distress those who do no fit their model, and are 
potentially destructive in psychotherapeutic contexts” (AN, 429).  Do these dangers arise 
only because episodics are forced into narrative-shaped roles?  Or do such comments 
suggest an attack on narrative self-understanding as such?  Strawson writes that “It may 
be that what [narrativists] are saying is true for them, both psychologically and ethically.  
This may be the best ethical project that people like themselves can hope to engage in” 
(AN, 437).  This seems to adhere to Strawson's official position of pluralism: narrative 
32 I owe this thought to a conversation with Bojana Mladenovi  .   Strawson: “when it comes to those to 
whom one's thinking is unsympathetic, one can define success as making things that seem obviously 
wrong to them seem a little less obviously wrong.  Perhaps this book [Selves] will gradually undermine 
certain natural views of the self, in some, in a lasting way, even though its specific conclusions are 
utterly rejected” (2009, xvi).
33 It is important to acknowledge that this is the official position of the essay.  I occasionally speak to 
people who take it as obvious that Strawson is attacking narrativity as such, rather than just its 
universalization.  That's inconsistent with many of the essay's claims.
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lives for the naturally narrative, non-narrative lives for the naturally non-narrative.  But is 
there not a hint of pity in it?  The best “they” can hope for (as opposed to the more 
fortunate episodic)?  “My guess is that […] the Narrative tendency to look for story or 
narrative coherence in one's life is, in general, a gross hinderance to self-understanding,” 
he writes (AN, 447).
This speculative suggestion finds further evidence.  Strawson writes that 
narrativity is “more of an affliction or a bad habit than a prerequisite of a good life” (AN, 
450).  Criticizing Ricoeur's claim that narrative self-understanding is necessary for one to 
“give an ethical character to [one's] own life taken as a whole” (OA, 158), Strawson 
writes that such a desire baffles him: “why on earth, in the midst of the beauty of being, 
[should it] be thought to be important to do this[?]” (AN, 436).  He goes on: “I think that 
those who think in this way are motivated by a sense of their own importance or 
significance that is absent in other human beings.  Many of them, connectedly, have 
religious commitments.  They are wrapped up in forms of religious belief that are—like 
almost all religious belief—really about the self” (AN, 436-437).  Strawson accuses those 
inclined to narrative self-understanding and (almost all) religious believers of 
“narcissism” (see too AN, 437n18 where he reserves extra vitriol for converts).  But, it is 
suggested, the episodic way of being allows one to avoid such vices.  Despite rejecting 
the desire to “give an ethical character to [one's] life taken as a whole” as baffling and 
narcissistic, Strawson has no problem making such a judgment about others' lives.  He 
writes that “my own conviction is that the best lives almost never involve this kind of 
self-telling” (AN, 437).  So, it's not that there's anything incoherent about the idea that a 
life as a whole has an ethical character, it's just that one shouldn't ask such a question 
about one's own life?  Living a narrative life may be the (relative) best a naturally 
narrative person can hope for, but the (truly) best kind of life is to him or her all but 
precluded.  Against the official claims of the essay, this suggests that Strawson is not 
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merely advocating pluralism, but championing the episodic's way of being.  In a stark 
reversal, it would then be rather bad news for the narratively inclined if “the 
fundamentals of temporal temperament are genetically determined” (AN, 431).
If Strawson believes that the basis for an individual's episodic or diachronic way 
of being is largely hard-wired (no evidence is put forward for this claim), then it would 
make little sense for him to advocate for one over another.  Yet there is a subterranean 
line in his work that suggests he does think that episodic self-understanding holds 
untapped possibilities.  The episodic is fully capable of a moral life, but less inclined to 
guilt, which “adds nothing—nothing good—to moral being”; the episodic is likewise less 
capable of sustained resentment (NUP, 93, 108).  The episodic is more present “in the 
midst of the beauty of being.”  The best lives don't involve self-telling.  This subterranean 
line in Strawson's thinking is fascinating, but undeveloped.  If such claims are true and 
“Against Narrativity” and “Episodic Ethics” can be read as redescriptions in favor of the 
episodic's way of being, they barely begin this task—and exactly because they aren't 
sufficiently rich in their descriptions.34  Strawson does little to help us imagine our way 
into the episodic.  Instead, he argues for a sequence of formal possibilities, possibilities 
that, absent our ability to project ourselves into them, remain empty.  As Rorty suggests, 
successful redescription resides not in analytic argument, but in fully developing new 
vocabularies and bringing them to life.  One great novel, richly realizing an episodic35 
from the inside—making such machinations as “I know I* won't be there, but I will still 
do it anyway, not for me*, but for him that won't be me*, since others view him as me” 
not only relatable, but attractive—and contrasting narrative and non-narrative 
understanding, would have more of an effect than all of Strawson's distinctions.
34 Perhaps Strawson's Life in Time, long in preparation, will fill in the picture.
35 Despite Strawson's collection of quotations and identification of various literary figures as episodic, I 
can think of no literary character who fits the bill.  Sartre's Roquentin and Musil's Ulrich, “the man 
without qualities,” absolutely do not.  Shelby Leonard, the main character of Christopher Nolan's film 
Memento, is the closest I can come up with, and that's an extremely imperfect example.
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Chapter Three
The (Re)Presentation of Temporal Human Meanings:
A Baseline Characterization of Narrative
Stories are things that get told.  They can exist outside of any particular medium or any particular 
method of narration. […] In stories, there are agents and actions; there are patterns; there is 
direction; most of all, there is meaning.
                  William Gass, “The Nature of Narrative and Its Philosophical Implications” (3, 5)
As philosophy1 has turned its attention to narrative, it has attempted to define it, 
often in the distinctively philosophical manner of enumerating necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  As my larger argument progresses, I will need to draw on my own notion of 
what exactly narrative is—yet I don't think that it can be rigorously defined.  Here, I offer 
a baseline characterization of narrative, one narrow enough for me to draw on later, but 
wide enough that it doesn't arbitrarily claim that experimental narratives (which will be 
relevant to my account in part two of the dissertation) aren't narratives at all.  I proceed 
by analyzing two recent and excellent, but revealingly limited, accounts: Noël Carroll's 
“On the Narrative Connection” and David Velleman's “Narrative Explanation.”  My 
major claims in this chapter are fairly simple, yet analysis of these essays and their 
narrower approaches reveals that they need to be reasserted.
I. Carroll's “On the Narrative Connection”: Causally Necessary Conditions
Carroll's “On the Narrative Connection” (2001, 118-133) begins from the 
observation that, while some notion of narrative is more and more often invoked in 
scholarly discussions, “it is not often defined” (118).2  Whether narrative is susceptible to 
definition—if this taken to mean strictly delimited, in the most rigorous case by the 
itemization of necessary and sufficient conditions3—is a concern to keep in mind.  
1 And literary criticism and theory.  It should be remembered that the academic discipline of literary 
studies wasn't much interested in narrative, even the novel specifically, until fairly recently in its history.
2 “Even philosophers like Richard Rorty and Alastair [sic] MacIntyre invoke it,” he writes (118).  I have 
no sense of what “even” is meant to suggest here.  Even philosophers so well-known?  Even 
philosophers not typically interested in literature (not true of Rorty, at least), or in aesthetics?
3 Garry Hagberg suggests that this is what Aristotle's Poetics, in part, amounts to (in Gibson, ed., 153).  
The influence, often pernicious (given its narrower framing), of the Poetics on philosophical discussions 
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Indeed, Carroll seeks instead to “advance a characterization of our ordinary concept of 
narrative in terms of one of its crucial ingredients” (118).  If something is defined by a 
property, it can't lose that property without ceasing to be that thing.  If it is merely 
characterized by a property, then exceptions remain possible (Carroll doesn't introduce 
this distinction).  And he targets only one of narrative's characteristic properties.
Carroll frames his discussion by noting that particular texts—novels, works of 
history—that we call narratives consist of narration only in part.  Novels also include 
“commentary, description, and decoration,” histories “argument and explanation” (118).  
With this in mind, his goal is not to identify what is characteristic about some novels and 
histories as whole texts such that we count them as narratives; instead, he attempts to 
characterize what he calls “the narrative connection,” suggesting that we will count 
particular texts as narratives “because they possess a large number of narrative 
connections or because the narrative connections they contain have special salience or a 
combination of both” (118).  This seems plausible, though we might be skeptical of 
Carroll's atomistic approach—of building up from an analysis of constituent parts.  Might 
not particular connections be deemed narrative because they are found in the kind of 
works we traditionally call, on the whole, narratives?4  I'll return to these anti-atomistic 
concerns at the end of the chapter.  Having bracketed any treatment of full works of 
of narrative seems hard to overstate.
4 Suppose a film presents us with a character injecting himself with heroin.  Then, following a quick cut, 
we see him lethargically slumped in his now disarray home.  We will conclude that he has become 
addicted to heroin and that his previous life has fallen apart.  Yet we haven't been shown this, and no 
causal connection is asserted by the cut itself.  Indeed, we can imagine a viewer unfamiliar with recent 
cinematic conventions being confused by such editing.  At an earlier stage in film's development, the 
character's descent into addiction would have been shown more gradually.  Somewhat more recently, we 
might have been given a montage—faster, but still including intermediary stages—to convey the same 
sequence of events.  Now, however, filmgoers are sufficiently familiar with the formal device of a 
montage that one can show them merely a first and final state of affairs and they will fill in the rest.  
This suggests that an examination of the atomistic connections of a work might prove insufficient.  Top-
down analysis might also be relevant: films are typically narrative, thus if a certain technique of 
connection becomes more prevalent in films, we might increasingly count it as a connection narrative in 
nature.  Similarly, we count most novels as narratives.  With modernism, the technique of interior 
monologue becomes commonplace in the novel—so much so that this once experimental, unfamiliar, 
and potentially confusing technique is now found in every kind of popular genre fiction.  Doesn't this 
prime us to count interior monologue as a form of narrative discourse, rather than, say, a discursive 
representation of psychological states that is to be contrasted to narrative?
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narrative, Carroll establishes his theme: “The domain of narrative discourse is at least 
comprised of events and states of affairs” (119).  Before turning to his key 
characterization of the narrative connection, he more briefly itemizes four necessary but 
largely background conditions.
First, “a narrative representation [must] refer to at least two, though possibly 
many more, events and/or states of affairs” (119).  “There was an old lady who lived in a 
shoe” is not a narrative, Carroll writes, whereas “There was an old lady who lived in a 
shoe that was very small, so she went looking for a boot” is a narrative, or at least “looks 
more like” one (119).  The first example is perhaps merely an assertion or description, 
whereas in the latter something happens.
Second,5 narrative is presented “in a globally forward-looking manner” (126).  
“'The battle was lost for want of a horse and the horse was wanting for lack of a 
horseshoe' is not a narrative,” Carroll thinks, but rather only an explanation, while “'King 
Philip could find no shoe for his horse and could not ride into battle and as a result the 
battle was lost' is a narrative” (126).  A narrative might include flashbacks and 
flashforwards, but each of these subcomponents will be internally ordered in time, and 
overall “the events are told in a temporally progressive way” (126).  This, Carroll admits, 
is “a discursive, rather than a logical requirement” (126).  If that's the case, I would add 
that we might think it is quite changeable according to custom—conventionally, we tell 
stories from beginning to end, but not without exception and not necessarily.  Carroll's 
example fails as a narrative (if it does) not because of its backward-looking temporal 
orientation, but because it is presented rhetorically as an explanation, it seems to me.  It 
answers the question “Why was the battle lost?” instead of the question “What 
happened?”  Asked “What did you do today?,” I might respond “I'm just coming from 
dinner; before that I worked in the library for a while; before that I was in class all 
5 My order follows Carroll's summary (126), which deviates from his own order of presentation.
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morning and then went for a run to try to relax.”  This is a bit of (uninteresting) narrative, 
despite its mostly backward-looking orientation.  Unlike Carroll's example, it is not 
obviously some other familiar form of discourse (an explanation, for example).  Little, 
perhaps, is at stake in this emendation, except a reminder of narrative's various and often 
experimental forms.6
Third, a narrative “must be about a unified subject” (119).  Again, the condition is 
made plausible by an example: “The Tartar hordes swept over Russia; Socrates 
swallowed hemlock; Noël Carroll got his first computer; Jackie Chan made his most 
successful movie; and dinosaurs became extinct” (119).  This does not appear to be a 
narrative, despite its inclusion of multiple events.  Nothing unifies or even loosely ties 
them together.
Fourth, “Narrative requires that the events and/or states of affairs represented be 
perspicuously time-ordered.  A narrative is not simply a series of events arranged helter-
skelter; a narrative is at least a sequence of events, where 'sequence' implies temporal 
ordering” (120).  “The President talked to his advisor; the President ate a piece of cheese; 
the President jogged; the President waved to reporters” is not a narrative, Carroll writes, 
because no order is ascribed to the events listed.  Isn't it safe to assume that these events 
happened in the order that they are told?  Carroll thinks not: “If you look closely at the 
discourse string in terms of the information it carries, I suspect that you will quickly 
realize that all the activities notated could occur at the same time” (120).  I take it that 
Carroll's point is not that, because they could all have happened at the same time, this 
might not be a narrative because it is potentially only a description of one (multi-part) 
state of affairs, thus failing to meet his first condition.  Rather, I take it that his point is 
that the multiple events might have occurred in any order.  But he goes on to admit that 
6 See Abbott, 16-17 for related discussion.  Philosophers tend to dismiss experimental narratives as 
irrelevant to definitional discussions.  See Carroll, 129; CS, 102; Goldie 2003B, 311; TNI, 70ff.
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the temporal order does not need to be “stated outright,” just “retrievable” (120).  Thus 
“Context and the knowledge that the intended, informed audience brings to the discourse 
may be enough” (120).  It seems to me that we conventionally assume, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, that the order of telling and order of events is the same.7  If this 
isn't a safe assumption, what would Carroll make of the following example?: “The 
President jogged; the President chugged a bottle of water; the President choked; the 
President accidentally spat on a Secret Service Agent.”  Here the order is not stated 
outright, yet most readers will assume that the order of events matches the telling.  It 
makes sense that the President would be thirsty after jogging, might choke after 
chugging, and might spit accidentally after choking.  Yet these events too could have 
taken place in any order.  If appeals to readerly competence and convention are allowed
—as they must, lest Carroll require a discourse be pedantically spelled out in order for it 
to qualify as a narrative—then I would suggest that it is safe to assume alignment 
between the order of telling and events until presented with contrary evidence.
Whatever our intuitions about the above cases, Carroll would bar them for another 
reason.  “I woke up; later I dressed; still later I went to class,” though it refers to multiple 
events, is globally forward looking, has a unified subject, and is perspicuously time-
ordered (thus meeting Carroll's first four conditions), still “falls short of full-fledged 
narrative” (121-122).  Here my intuitions depart fully from Carroll's (and he admits “this 
is open to terminological dispute”; 121).  Whereas he claims that this example “isn't a 
narrative properly so called […] although the events cited might be turned into 
ingredients of a narrative,” I would say that it is a narrative, just not an interesting one 
(122).  For Carroll, “the connection among the events alluded to by it is not tight enough” 
(122).  Thus, background conditions enumerated, he turns his attention to what he thinks 
7 Exactly because we make this assumption, writers can take advantage of it, leading us to think initially 
that events took place in one order, only to undercut that assumption later.
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is the key characteristic of the narrative connection: causality.
“On my view,” Carroll writes, “narratives proper require more than simply 
temporal ordering as a principle for connecting events” (122).  Because “narratives 
typically represent changes in states of affairs, and change implies some subtending 
causal process,” Carroll looks to causality as the potential key to the narrative connection 
(122).  To begin, he considers the possibility that narrative connections might consist in 
sufficient causes: “Earlier events in the discursive string are the cause of the later events 
in the string in the sense that the earlier events supply sufficient grounds, all things being 
equal, for the occurrence of the later event” (122).  Causal sufficiency is too strong a 
connection to be a requirement of narrative, however: “that would suggest that earlier 
events in narratives causally entail later events” (122).  Even if this is sometimes the case, 
it is clearly not always so.  Otherwise, we would never need to be told more than the first 
event of a story, as the rest would be there implicit.
Next, Carroll considers the possibility that earlier events, plus further “causal 
inputs,” yield later events in narratives.  In the example “the thief enters the bank to rob 
it, but subsequently, as he exits, he is apprehended by the police,” the first event—the 
robbery—doesn't determine the latter—the thief being caught.  It might seem, however, 
that the first event plus another causal input—the revelation that the police are nearby—
does (122-123).  That's not the case, however.  This example would remain a narrative 
even if the thief escaped; the second event, though causally connected to the first, remains 
indeterminate even when the presence of the police is announced.8  Here again, even if 
this model sometimes applies to narrative, it doesn't always.  If it did, the only suspense 
in narrative would be tied to the revelation of previously withheld information: were the 
police there or not?  But narratives are also suspenseful because we are waiting to see 
8 Carroll unnecessarily provides a new example to make this point.  He writes that the robbery plus “the 
presence of the police observers […] explains the second event” (122).  That's true only in a weaker 
sense of “explains” than he has been using: at stake is whether the first event and new causal input 
entail the second event.
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what will happen, what characters will do, not just what obstacles were already there, 
despite our not knowing it.
Next, Carroll (following the work of W. B. Gallie; 409n6) proposes a weaker 
sense of causality: an earlier event might be a “causally necessary condition for 
successive states (or a contribution to such a causally necessary condition),” might be 
what J. L. Mackie calls an INUS condition: “an insufficient but necessary part of a 
condition that itself is unnecessary but sufficient for an effect event” (124; 409n7).  That 
is to say that: (1) an earlier event does not entail the later event, but (2) it is a 
indispensable part of a larger group of events which (3) though it isn't the only way of 
causing events of the later type, (4) does entail the later event.  In our example, (1) the 
bank robbery does not entail the thief being caught, but (2) his robbing the bank 
combines with other factors (like the police being nearby, and competent), and though (3) 
he could have been caught for other reasons (if the bank's alarm were tripped, for 
example), (4) this group of events was one way of causing his capture.
This characterization of the narrative connection meshes with our experience of 
hearing stories: later events remain unpredictable, even as they make sense in relation to 
earlier events.  “Many events share the same causally necessary conditions,” Carroll 
writes (124).  A bank robbery is a causally necessary condition both of the robber being 
caught and getting away.  Carroll's theory also sheds light on the “the phenomenon of 
retrospective significance,” since later events will “reveal the relevance” of earlier events 
that were causally necessary in bringing them about (127).  Given that the causal 
connections in narrative are sometimes, but not always, stronger than this, Carroll finally 
articulates the relevant causal connection as “the earlier event and/or state of affairs in a 
narrative connection is at least a causally necessary condition or ingredient in bringing 
about later events (or a contribution to such a condition)” (125).
Lastly, Carroll considers the possibility that his proposal is too strong: perhaps 
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earlier events need be only necessary conditions, not causally necessary conditions of 
later events.  Again, a test case for intuition: “Aristarchus hypothesized the heliocentric 
theory thereby anticipating Copernicus' discovery by many centuries” (125).  The word 
“anticipating” here makes Aristarchus' hypothesis a necessary condition of Copernicus' 
“discovery” (by making it a rediscovery), but it isn't a causal one because there is “no line 
of influence” between the two.  Carroll describes this example as “more of the order of 
coincidence than of narrative,” though he admits intuitions may diverge (125, 409n9).  
He thus stands by causally necessary conditions as the key component of the narrative 
connection.  If you think this last example is a narrative, then necessary conditions more 
generally might characterize the narrative connection.  If you think that “Aristarchus 
hypothesized the heliocentric theory; centuries later, Copernicus discovered it” is a 
narrative (“anticipating” removed, the two events remain connected thematically, but the 
first is in no way a condition of the second), then the appeal to necessary conditions 
appears wholly off track.  This point will return in Velleman's discussion.
With Carroll's argument in front of us, I now develop two critical lines.  In the 
first, I collect some worries about his briefly stated background conditions to suggest that 
it is characteristics not at the level of discourse or telling, but concerning the order of 
events themselves, which should be our focus in attempting to characterize narrative.  
This will be the basis for the first half of my baseline characterization of narrative, its 
connection to temporality.  I will then criticize Carroll's emphasis on causal connections.  
This will carry us forward into the next section and my treatment of Velleman's essay, 
where the second half of my baseline characterization can be developed.
First, let's review Carroll's background conditions with a more critical eye.  He 
argued that a narrative must refer to at least two events and/or states of affairs.  This 
condition isn't uncontroversial, however.  As Abbott writes, surveying various 
narratologists' accounts, “the bare minimum” is not two, but “an event”: “'my dog has 
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fleas' is a description of my dog, but it is not a narrative because nothing happens.  'My 
dog was bitten by a flea' is a narrative.  It tells of an event.” (13, emphasis added).  
According to Carroll's account, “My dog was bitten by a flea” is not a narrative.  Here his 
emphasis on narrative as a form of discourse, one that “refers to” or “contain[s] the 
citation of at least two […] events and/or states of affairs” appears problematic 
(emphases added).  Recall Carroll's own example: “There was an old lady who lived in a 
shoe.”  It refers to only one state of affairs, so nothing happens.  But doesn't Abbott's 
example—“My dog was bitten by a flea”—though it refers to only one event, imply two 
states of affairs, viz., the dog's unbitten condition, and then its bitten one?  Indeed, isn't 
this true of any event, that it can be separated into two states of affairs, a before and an 
after?  I don't wish to suggest that much of anything hangs on this definitional question.  
Perhaps it is a necessary condition that a narrative include at least one event or at least 
two states of affairs.  More interesting is the issue of how a work must “include” such 
component parts to count as a narrative.  Literary narratives often go to great lengths to 
imply rather than refer to their events: obliqueness is valued aesthetically.  The distinction 
is thus invited between whether it is in the telling or in what's told—what the telling is 
about—that a narrative must include an event or states of affairs.
In focusing on telling and the process of reference, Carroll approaches narrative as 
a formal type.  Narratives are, it is assumed by his analysis, realized in the medium of 
words.  Narrative is a form of discourse, and attention to some of the features of that 
discourse—that it refers to or cites events—will reveal to us what formal characteristics 
make some discourses, but not others, narratives.  This approach is misguided for two 
reasons.  Stories, as William Gass writes, “can exist outside of any particular medium” 
(2002, 5).  Narratives can exist not just in words, but in the sequence of still images on 
celluloid as a film or in the ordered panels of comic strips and graphic novels, to take 
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fairly uncontroversial examples.9  Even the category of “narrative paintings” is a familiar 
one.10  A painting can represent an event; it can even represent multiple events by using 
different spatial locations on a canvas to represent different temporal ones.  Given that 
narrative can be realized in such different media, formal analysis might have little to tell 
us about its nature.  That's one reason to be skeptical of Carroll's approach.
Another: the crucial events of a story can be conveyed without their ever being 
referred to.  Raymond Carver's story “Cathedral” includes an example:
“Are you crazy?” my wife said.  “Have you just flipped or something?”  She picked up a potato.  I 
saw it hit the floor, then roll under the stove.  “What’s wrong with you?” she said.  “Are you 
drunk?” (213)
The key event here is that the wife throws a potato at her husband (the narrator).  That 
event is never actually referred to, yet any accurate retelling of the story of “Cathedral” 
would include something like the statement: “She throws a potato at her husband in 
frustration.”  That event is part of the story (what happened) but not the narrative 
discourse (the way it is told), part of the fabula but not the sju!et, in Russian Formalism's 
terms.  Especially given familiar conventions and a competent audience (something to 
which Carroll appeals, as we saw, in his fourth background condition), a discourse can be 
about an event without ever referring to it.11  It is familiar to think that “the real story” is 
what a discourse, or film, or comic strip is about, not the particularities of how it conveys 
that story to an audience.12  Even Carroll at one point refers to “the narrative proper, the 
narrative connection (or fabula)” in contrast to the “exposition” or “the story as told” 
9 Though not wholly uncontroversial.  Some theorists require that a narrative have a narrator, others think 
that a “narrator is one of a number of instruments—among them actors and cameras—that can be used 
in the narrative process of representing events” (Abbott, 15).  I'll return to these points below.
10 See Nelson Goodman, “Twisted Tales; or, Story, Study, and Symphony” (ON, 99-115).
11 Another example: the central event of Alain Robbe-Grillet's novel Jealousy is that the (effaced) narrator 
has become jealous of his wife.  That's never referred to, however.  In fact, the husband is never referred 
to, despite the fact that it is his attention that organizes the novel.  Rather, the reader gathers that the 
husband is part of the proceedings, and has become jealous, on the basis of what he pays attention to.
12 That stories are “transposable” into different media is, Seymour Chatman claims, “the strongest reason 
for arguing that narratives are indeed structures independent of any medium” (1978, 20).  Genette points 
out that one meaning of “narrative” (récit) has it “refer to the succession of events, real or fictitious, that 
are the subjects of [a] discourse, and to their several relations of linking, opposition, repetition, etc.” 
(25).  He uses “story” (histoire) for this sense to distinguish it from others (27). 
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(126).  I would thus suggest that what makes something a narrative is not to be found in 
the formal qualities of its discourse (or the formal qualities of whatever other medium 
might be used to convey a story), but rather in what sort of thing it is about.13
Let me try to state this more precisely.  We can distinguish, in any mimetic work, 
between qualities of the work and qualities of what it presents/represents/is about (I 
evade the question of what exactly “mimesis” is).  A statue carved from marble doesn't 
thereby portray David as marbly; contrariwise, David can be portrayed as fleshy in a 
medium other than flesh.  A formalist approach will attend to the qualities of the work, 
whereas qualities of what is represented will fall under the purview of the label “content.”  
Let's now take things a step further and subdivide both form and content according to the 
distinction static/dynamic, giving us four categories: static forms about static content, 
dynamic forms about static content, static forms about dynamic content, and dynamic 
forms about dynamic content.  A still life would be an example of a static form about 
static content: neither the work nor what is represented need to be understood in time.  
Certain kinds of music (academic experiments in tonality or rhythm, math-rock) seem to 
me examples of dynamic forms about static content: the work is experienced in time, but 
it is really about certain abstract numerical relationships.  Neither of these categories 
holds much promise for narrative.  A painting of a historical event or, even more so, a 
painting which includes multiple events from the life of one person, using different 
locations on the canvas to represent different times: these are examples of static forms 
about dynamic content.  The work itself needn't be experienced in time, yet what it is 
13 There may be something more complicated going on here.  Mieke Bal, in an influential account, 
distinguishes between three aspects of a narrative: text, story, and fabula.  The text is the artifact in front 
of a reader, the story includes deviations in chronology like flashbacks, and the fabula consists of the 
events, chronologically ordered, as the reader imagines them.  I suspect, though I am not sure, that 
Carroll does not mean by “the narrative proper” the events themselves, but rather still the discourse 
about those events once artifices of telling have been removed and the text is sorted into chronological 
order.  In Bal's terms, he is using “fabula” to refer to something between the story and fabula, which we 
might call the reconstructed story.  I mean to shift the emphasis wholly away from the specifics of the 
discourse to the events themselves.
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about is temporally extended.  We understand even a painting of one historical event to 
be about more than the spatial relationships frozen at that moment; it is about the event, 
which includes the transition from one state of affairs to another.  Though static works 
can be about dynamic, temporal content, and thus be narrative, it is dynamic forms about 
dynamic content that are most typically narrative: novels, plays, epic poems, anecdotes, 
films, comic strips, graphic novels, mime, puppet theater, etc.  In all of these, the work 
can be experienced only in time and what the work is about is extended in time as well.  
That both dynamic and static forms can be narrative, but neither necessarily is, suggests, I 
think, that a formal definition of narrative will miss our target.  It is via content—where it 
is dynamic, though further distinctions will be necessary—that we find narrative.
Historically, structuralism offers perhaps the most formalistic approach to 
narrative.  It tries to remove the temporality from the objects of its analysis.  But, as Peter 
Brooks writes, “I don't think we do justice to our experience of [various stories] in 
reducing their narratives—as Lévi-Strauss suggests all mythic narratives can be reduced
—to their 'atemporal matrix structure,' a set of basic cultural antinomies that narrative 
mediates” (10).  Structuralism in many ways gave birth to narratology, and its influence 
remains: “narratological models are excessively static and limiting.  Whatever its larger 
ambitions, narratology has in practice been too exclusively concerned with the 
identification of minimal narrative units and paradigmatic structures; it has too much 
neglected the temporal dynamics that shape narratives in our reading of them” (Brooks, 
xiii; see too 35-36).
Narrative, to prefigure what I will argue below, needn't necessarily focus on causal 
connections, but it does concern temporality more broadly (this characterization will be 
narrowed).  That general intuition typically leads to a formal claim: “Temporal art forms 
have been defined as those where there is a canonical order of presentation of 
components of the work” (Feagin in Gibson, ed., 63).  Literature, according to such an 
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approach, will thus be grouped together with music, film, theater, and dance, for example.  
Yet, even if useful in other ways, a formal approach will fail to see how a narrative poem 
and a lyric poem14 are different and how a short story and a narrative painting are similar.  
This is because narrative is not a formal category.  Narrative is characteristically about 
events in time.  Different narratives are not united in the formal manner in which they 
achieve this mimetic quality, since they do so differently (a novel through words, a comic 
strip through graphic panels).  Neither are they united in the specifics of the content they 
represent (the life of Don Quixote, the travails of Charlie Brown).  They are united by the 
fact that they represent the same general kind of thing: events in time.  Non-narrative art
—still lifes, abstract expressionist paintings, busts, buildings—doesn't do this.  Narrative 
is about temporal content, and inextricably so.  To drain the time out of a narrative—by 
translating its plot into a spatial diagram, for example—is to drain the narrative out of it, 
transforming it into something else.
Note that shifting the focus to events rather than the discursive representation of 
them does not commit one to conflating events and stories, as if we couldn't tell life and 
fiction apart.  A discursive narrative is still about events, and thus at a remove from 
them.15  But, according to my account, it is not how a discourse represents those events 
that makes it narrative.  Rather, the events it is about must be of a certain sort for that 
discourse to count as a narrative.  (I will try to soften the distinction between events and 
stories, but that's a separate matter.)
Narrative is about events in time: this is the first part of my baseline 
characterization in this chapter.  Temporality alone is not enough, however.  Carroll make 
14 Brooks: “Lyric poetry, we feel, strives toward an ideal simultaneity of meaning, encouraging us to read 
backward as well as forward (through rhyme and repetition, for instance), to grasp the whole in one 
visual and auditory image; and expository argument, while it can have a narrative, generally seeks to 
suppress its force in favor of an atemporal structure of understanding; whereas narrative stories depend 
on meanings delayed, partially filled in, stretched out” (20-21).  Lyric poetry, expository argument, and 
narrative are all discursive in form, and all temporal forms since they require time to be said or read.  
But they have little else in common.
15 See Goldie 2003B, 303 and Vice.
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the same claim, but I disagree about what else is needed.  I begin now to motivate the 
second part of my characterization.
Recall Carroll's earlier example: “I woke up; later I dressed; still later I went to 
class.”  He didn't count this as a narrative proper.  But isn't my being awake a necessary 
but not sufficient causal condition of my getting dressed (and, later, of my going to 
class)?  Isn't my being dressed a necessary but not sufficient causal condition (practically 
speaking) of my going to class?  That is, isn't this example, by Carroll's fully articulated 
definition, a narrative?  This reveals, I think, that Carroll's characterization of the 
narrative connection has missed the mark—he hasn't matched even his own test 
intuitions, with which he began.  If we are hesitant to grant “I woke up; later I dressed; 
still later I went to class” the status of narrative, I suspect that it is not because it lacks 
causality, but rather because it lacks sufficient meaning or significance.
Consider another kind of example where intuitions vary.  Is a scientific description 
of a causal series of events a narrative?  Carroll thinks so.  He writes (in another essay) 
“clearly, science can be narrative in form—for example, the geological account of the 
disposition of the continents” (2001, 135-136).  Similarly, storytelling and the 
descriptions of physics are sometimes said to be similar: “Telling stories […] is simply 
another way of thinking about how we all make patterns and create sense out of chaos” 
(Hutcheon in Gibson, ed., 207).  Abbott too agrees, though he begins to show us how 
someone might differ: “When scientists give accounts of the behavior of an atom or the 
interaction of chemical elements […] it would be misleading to speak of them as 
involving characters yet these scientists are nonetheless deploying our narrative gift” 
(19).  Alan Palmer takes the opposite side: “Events only have significance if they are 
experienced by actors.  It is difficult to imagine a narrative that consisted entirely, for 
example, of descriptions of natural events in which no person was present to experience 
those events” (30).  He goes on: “It would in a sense, therefore, be more accurate and 
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more revealing about the function of physical event descriptions in narratives to refer to 
them not as events but as experiences” (31).  Similarly, Peter Goldie writes that is 
characteristic of narratives that they are “meaningful,” in the sense that they allow their 
“audience to grasp and make sense of internal perspectives” (2003B, 305).16  Scientific 
descriptions would seem to fail on this front, lacking as they do subjects of experience 
and perspective.  My intuitions agree with Palmer's and with the implications of Goldie's 
claim: mere descriptions of natural events, even in terms of causes, don't rise to narrative. 
At least in some cases,17 Carroll's own comments can help flesh out the intuition 
that temporal scientific descriptions aren't, despite how he would have it, narrative.  
Carroll holds, as we've seen, that in narrative proper, “earlier events in the sequence are at 
least causally necessary conditions for the causation of later events” (126), thus leaving 
open the possibility that the causal connection might be even tighter.  Earlier events 
might be sufficient causes of later events, fully determining them.  Later, however, 
Carroll comments that “following a narrative involves anticipation” (130).  Typically, 
anticipating a story involves “a range of expectations,” “a broad sense of where it is 
headed,” but not prediction.  “Prediction would be a feasible mental state for readers, 
listeners, and viewers typically to be in if deterministic causal models of narration were 
persuasive” (130).  He concludes: “that our sense of the direction of a narrative is 
typically indeterminate fits nicely with our hypothesis about causally necessary 
conditions” (127).  If the narrative connection is based in causally necessary but not 
sufficient conditions, then we will have a sense of where narratives are going, but we 
won't be able to predict exactly where.  This is consistent as well with some connections 
in a narrative being stronger, causally sufficient and fully determining.  The “nice fit” that 
16 Elsewhere Goldie says that he does think that there can be narratives without people (MI, 19n20).
17 Obviously, different sciences traffic in more or less determinate descriptions.  Physics, at certain scales, 
is probabilistic according to our current models.  Geology (as I understand it) is currently far from 
predictive, though perhaps this mostly has to do with our limited data.  The Newtonian example I offer 
avoids these many difficulties; I'm assuming that such an example is still paradigmatic of our notion of 
scientific description, even if we can't universalize it.
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Carroll points to is lost, however, in a narrative where all of the connections are causally 
sufficient.  But isn't it the case that scientific description at least aspires to naming 
causally sufficient conditions?
Consider an example: “On a flat, frictionless surface, a billiard ball rolled at a rate 
of five feet per second directly at another billiard ball; the first struck the second, causing 
the second ball to move off at a rate of five feet per second.”  My own linguistic intuition 
is that this is not a narrative, despite its meeting all of Carroll's standards, including the 
description of at least causally necessary conditions.  His comments on following a 
narrative suggest the problem: here all of the causal conditions are sufficient.  We can 
thus predict later events in full, and there's nothing to follow.  Even when they involve 
time, scientific descriptions of this sort seem just that—descriptions—and not narratives.
For a number of years, FOX's television broadcast of the World Series, under the 
reasonable assumption that postseason baseball games draw more casual viewers than 
those throughout the season, included a segment in which various pitches were explained 
by an anthropomorphic cartoon baseball named Scooter.  Scooter would explain that, 
when he was thrown as a fastball, he would go pretty much straight, as fast as he could.  
Thrown as a curveball, he would dive down and away from the batter.  And so forth.  A 
description of the physics of a curveball is not, it seems to me, a narrative.  Scooter's 
description of his trip to the plate, however, is.  If Aristotle is right that tragedy primarily 
concerns actions (and if his definition is generalizable to narrative), then a scientific 
description of a causal series of events lacks actions, agents doing things.  
Anthropomorphizing the objects of a scientific description turns them into agents capable 
of action.  These various worries—that scientific descriptions aren't narratives, that 
narratives involve experience, that narratives involve action—all point toward the same 
path beyond Carroll.  Brooks writes that “the meaning dealt with by narrative, and thus 
perhaps narrative's raison d'être, is of and in time” (10).  The first part of my baseline 
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characterization of narrative stressed its relation to time, the temporality of its content.  
The second part of my characterization concerns meaning.  Narrative is characteristically 
not just about causality, but about certain kinds of meaning.  I turn to Velleman to 
elaborate this thought.
II. Velleman's “Narrative Explanation”: Typical Emotional Arcs
Velleman's “Narrative Explanation” (2003) begins from the claim that “A story 
does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, 
thus conveying not just information but also understanding” (1).  The fact that phrases 
like “an unintelligible story” and “an incoherent story” are not nonsense, that we can be 
told a story yet fail to understand it (while still identifying it as a story), would seem to 
immediately falsify Velleman's starting point.  His claim, more charitably interpreted, 
cannot be that it is a necessary condition of a discourse that it must convey understanding 
in order to be a story.  Rather, as he goes on to gloss his point: “the question how 
storytelling conveys understanding is inseparable from the question what makes for a 
good story” (1, emphasis added).  Bad stories are still stories, but what interests Velleman 
are good stories and their nature.  Compared to Carroll's, Velleman's frame is thus in one 
sense narrower, in another wider.  It is narrower in that, by seeking to characterize the 
narrative connection, Carroll seeks the crucial component of all narratives; Velleman is 
interested in explanatory narratives only.  It is wider in that Carroll seeks to characterize 
only the narrative connection, saying little about works as wholes; Velleman, by contrast, 
targets narratives in their full scope: “what makes a story good specifically as a story—
what makes it a good example of storytelling, or narrative—is its excellence at a 
particular way of organizing events into an intelligible whole” (1).18
18 Notice, right away, that this would seem to suggest that Kafka's novels, or H. P. Lovecraft's stories, or 
any works of literature that leave us with a feeling of confusion and disorientation, that present the 
world as unintelligible, are, at least as stories, bad.  Velleman's claim that “a bad story can make for a 
great novel” begs the question (10).  Why assume that understanding is the sole purpose of stories?
105
As we saw, Carroll includes scientific explanations as a species of narrative, 
insofar as they fit his general definition: earlier events serve as at least causally necessary 
conditions of later events.  Velleman begins from the hypothesis that narrative, properly 
speaking, explains in a way different than science.  “Can we account for the explanatory 
force of narrative with the models of explanation available in the philosophy of 
science?,” he asks.  “Or does narrative convey a different kind of understanding?” (1).  
Velleman concedes that “the idea of a plot without causality is absurd” (4).  But he 
suggests that the mere itemization of causal connections doesn't yet amount to narrative.19
Whereas Carroll seeks the “tightness” proper to the narrative connection, Velleman asks 
what makes various events and connections add up to a unified plot.  To reject Carroll's 
analysis, he seeks “to show that something other than causality or probability serves the 
function of differentiating narrative from other genres and endowing it with its peculiar 
explanatory force” (4).
Recall one of Carroll's examples: “Aristarchus hypothesized the heliocentric 
system and then centuries later Copernicus discovered it again.”  Velleman points out that 
Carroll must hold not only that this isn't a story, because the events are causally 
unconnected, “but that there is no true story to be told about them, given their mutual 
isolation in the web of causality” (5).  His “skepticism […] aroused,” Velleman recounts 
Aristotle's example from the Poetics of “a disjointed story”: Mitys is murdered, and then 
his murderer is killed when a statue of Mitys falls on him (5).  Such an incident, Aristotle 
says, “we think to be not without a meaning” (quoted on 5).  Is this a story?  One 
possibility, consistent with Carroll's analysis, is that it is, but only because we infer a 
causal connection between the events.  We might, for example, “imagine an avenging 
19 His “null hypothesis,” taken from Carroll, is “that the explanatory force of narrative is due to 
information that would be equally explanatory if recast in non-narrative form” (3).  This suggests that, if 
Carroll's analysis is right, the discursive conventions of narrative don't matter—they can be pared away, 
leaving the itemization of causal connections, without lessening the explanatory effect.  This perhaps 
ignores Carroll's second condition, which is specifically discursive.
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spirit, or some other force of cosmic justice, behind the falling statue” (6).  Velleman 
writes, however, that “the story holds up even under an absurdist reading, which takes the 
murderer's death for an accident” (6).  In that case, we have two examples of causally 
unrelated events: Aristarchus and Copernicus, Mitys' killing and the death of his 
murderer.20  Yet the latter looks more like a narrative than the former.  Why?
“The crucial difference between these examples, I think, is that in Aristotle's the 
sequence of events completes an emotional cadence in the audience,” Velleman writes 
(6).  Concerns of causality are thus reduced to a background condition.  What gives a 
narrative explanatory power, and thus what makes a story good as a story (according to 
Velleman's framing), is its enactment of a typical emotional cadence or arc.  Causal 
chains don't have beginnings and endings, and neither does nature.  But, filtered by our 
emotions, our understanding of events (in which causality will play a part, just not the 
crucial one) will find unified narrative shape (14).  “Emotions like hope, fear, and anger 
are by nature unstable, because they motivate behavior, or are elicited by circumstances, 
that ultimately lead to their extinction,” Velleman writes.  They will naturally serve as 
beginnings to emotional/narrative arcs.  “By contrast, grief and gratification are stable,” 
so, for example, “grief can resolve an emotional sequence but it rarely initiates one” (15).  
Thus “human affect follows a cycle of provocation, complication, and resolution” (12).21
Velleman develops and defends his account in further ways that need not concern 
us here.  As a rejection of Carroll's definition of narrative and an analysis of one way that 
stories can acquire unity and larger explanatory coherence, Velleman's thesis is an 
20 Perhaps another rebuttal is available to Carroll.  Mitys' murder is a causally necessary condition of 
Mitys' murderer being killed by the falling statue.  Not because the statue is in any way causally 
connected, but because only given the first event is the person who dies in the second “Mitys' 
murderer.”  Reading “causally necessary condition” this weakly would seem to entail that any chain of 
events with a unified subject will, if only in passing, state causally necessary conditions, making them 
useless as a further identifying characteristic.
21 Velleman claims these patterns are “biologically programmed,” but can “be modified by cultural 
influences” (13), and that some but not all emotions “are subject to cultural elaboration” (24-25n35).  
See Le Guin (ON, 190) and Bordwell 1985, 35 for skepticism.
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appealing one.  But he would seem to be making a much grander claim: that the 
enactment of typical emotional arcs is what makes stories what they are, or at least what 
makes good stories good.  Some questions: that a statue of Mitys falls on and kills Mitys' 
murderer completes a typical emotional cadence, unifying the story in the absence of 
causal connections.  If the statue of Mitys were to fall, but narrowly miss Mitys' 
murderer, would an emotional cadence still be completed?  One of disappointment rather 
than just desserts?  But what if a roofing tile were to fall and kill the murderer?  What if 
he accidentally (and anachronistically) stepped in front of a bus?  Velleman maintains that 
the example, even on the absurdist reading that there is no force of justice at work, 
remains a story.  These last examples strain even an absurdist reading, it seems to me, and 
in a revealing way.  If the death of Mitys' murderer completes an emotional cadence, even 
on the absurdist reading, then it seems like it shouldn't matter how he dies—if it does 
matter, then some remnant of the assumption of another background cause, like a force of 
justice, seems to linger.  Yet “Mitys is murdered, then his murderer dies by accident” isn't 
much of a story.  It doesn't mean anything, even absurdly, because not only has causal 
connection between its events been lost, but any larger thematic connection has as well.
Aristotle's observation that disjointed stories are “not without meaning” seems 
right.  That the only way they come to have meaning is through the emotions is 
implausible.  Notice that Velleman has subtly changed the standard of definition used to 
analyze narrative.  Carroll proceeds by way of philosophical definition, in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions (though perhaps somewhat informally, in allowing 
that the result is only a characterization, as noted above).  Velleman proceeds by way of 
normative definition.  He seeks to characterize narrative by defining what it aspires to, 
what makes for a good narrative.  There remain such things as bad narratives, but only in 
light of what they fail to accomplish.  Let me make the workings of this kind of definition 
in Velleman's essay explicit, then suggest that it too is a misguided approach.
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Velleman provides “an apparent counterexample” to his analysis, from the 
Histories of Herodotus, via Walter Benjamin's “The Storyteller”:
When the Egyptian king Psammenitus had been beaten and captured by the Persian king 
Cambyses, Cambyses was bent on humbling his prisoner.  He gave orders to place Psammenitus 
on the road along which the Persian triumphal procession was to pass.  And he further arranged 
that the prisoner should see his daughter pass by as a maid going to the well with her pitcher.  
While all the Egyptians were lamenting and bewailing this spectacle, Psammenitus stood alone, 
mute and motionless, his eyes fixed on the ground; and when presently he saw his son, who was 
being taken along in the procession to be executed, he likewise remained unmoved.  But when 
afterwards he recognized one of his servants, an old, impoverished man, in the ranks of the 
prisoners, he beat his fists against his head and gave all the signs of deepest mourning.22
The story doesn't explain why it is only upon seeing his servant that Psammenitus breaks 
down.23  Indeed, for Benjamin, this is what makes it a great story: “A story,” he writes, 
“does not expend itself” (90).  Whereas Velleman claims that a story explains the events 
it recounts, Benjamin contrasts the art of storytelling from explanation: he takes it as 
emblematic of the decline in storytelling that “no event any longer comes to us without 
already being shot through with explanation” (89).  Stories, unlike mere information, live 
on, because in them an interpretation “is not forced on the reader” (89).  Velleman 
suggests that the story of Psammenitus might appear to be a counterexample to his 
account, since it “fails to guide us toward any emotional resolution” (17).
It is not a counterexample, however, because Velleman's account isn't “meant to 
be strictly applied”: “many genres are based on narrative without employing it 
straightforwardly” (17).  This “story” is, according to Velleman, a marginal case, not part 
of “the core extension of the term” narrative (17).  “Herodotus has left part of the 
storytelling to us,” thus it is “a protean story only” (17-18).  Velleman's analysis of this 
example reveals his account of narrative to be even more implausible than one might 
have so far supposed.  If, as seemed to be the case, his claim was that a narrative should 
enact a typical emotional arc, then the story of Psammenitus wouldn't seem to loom as a 
22 Velleman, 16; Benjamin, 89-90.  The story makes it into Sartre's Nausea as well (149).
23 Benjamin claims “Herodotus offers no explanations” (90).  Allen Speight pointed out to me that this is 
actually false.  Herodotus reports Psammenitus' explanation: “my own suffering was too great for tears, 
but I could not but weep for the trouble of a friend, who has fallen from great wealth and good fortune 
and been reduced to beggary on the threshold of old age” (Book 3, Chapter 14).
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counterexample.  Velleman writes that the story “doesn't arrive at any emotional 
conclusion” (17).  But it does do this: Psammenitus is captured, various complications 
ensue, then Psammenitus grieves (Velleman even named grief as a typical resolving 
emotion).  Velleman is only threatened by this example because, even more strongly, 
narrative must explain why exactly Psammenitus grieves, and thus what we should feel 
about his reaction, and why we should feel it: the story “closes with what must be 
Psammenitus' conclusory emotion about his defeat, which clearly calls for a conclusory 
emotion on our part” (18).  We've now, it seems to me, strayed quite far from any 
plausible standard of even good narrative.  According to Velleman's standard here, 
narrative in the paradigmatic case, good narrative, would descend into didacticism.  
Surely part of the appeal of narrative is that it “understands” its objects in a manner other 
than theoretical discourse does.  It shows us something to which we react, rather than 
telling us how to react.  I would suggest that Velleman has things the wrong way around.  
A pedantically spelled out story, which includes its own interpretation, is dependent on 
the paradigm of narrative as “inexhaustible,” as in Benjamin's account.  Good stories 
encode understanding in a way other than literary criticism and philosophy.  They can be 
translated endlessly into those discourses because those discourses will always leave 
something behind.24
Velleman's analysis successfully demonstrates that Carroll's fixation on causal 
connections in narratives is too limited.  Charitably interpreted, Velleman offers an 
account of explanatory narratives or, actually even more narrowly, narratives that explain 
specifically through means of emotional cadences.  He seems to suggest, however, that 
his account is one of narrative generally, because all narratives aspire to explain.  This is 
misguided.  Explanatory narratives are but a subset of narrative generally.  Indeed, any 
normative definition of narrative seems misguided, as it will depend on identifying the 
24 I'll say more about this at the end of chapter five.
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purpose—universal—of narrative.  Narrative is a cultural practice with a long history and 
diverse, even contradictory, uses.  Any attempt to single out what makes narrative “good” 
is likely to do little more than reveal one's own extremely contingent tastes.
We should follow Velleman in his broadening of narrative beyond causal 
connections, noting that connections of meaning, even absent causes, are characteristic of 
narrative.  We should resist his emphasis on emotional cadences, except inasmuch as 
these are one way, among many, that meaningful connections between events can be 
established.  What's important is that a series of events doesn't rise to narrative unless it 
possesses human meaning.  It can do this via human emotion, but also by presenting the 
internal perspective of human agents, or through thematic resonances.
III. The (Re)Presentation of Temporal Human Meanings
I'm now able to assemble the above comments into my baseline characterization 
of narrative: narrative is the (re)presentation of temporal human meanings.  This 
characterization is, perhaps, disappointingly vague, but I don't think that it can be made 
more precise except at the expense of arbitrarily barring many things that reasonably 
count as narrative.  My characterization is not a formalist one.  Many different forms 
within standard taxonomies of art are rightfully described as narrative, not just discursive 
ones.  And many different objects and utterances that fall outside the purview of art and 
aesthetics are narrative as well.
My characterization has two main parts.  First, narratives concern temporality.  
They are about events—at the limit perhaps only one event—and events, unlike states of 
affairs, are in time.  To get the emphasis right, we should say that narrative is the 
(re)presentation of temporal events, rather than the temporal representation of events.  
What matters is the content, not the form.  An art object needn't itself be diachronic to be 
narrative.  What matters is that what it is about be temporally extended.  Different forms, 
111
different media, have different—sometimes completely dissimilar—ways of being about 
events.  Often they needn't even refer to, present, or represent these events directly, but 
can otherwise manipulate an audience into an experience or consideration of them.  These 
events need to be connected, but I am skeptical that any attempt to identify exactly how 
they must be connected is possible.  Carroll's emphasis on causality is contradicted by the 
reasonable intuition that some strings of events, connected in non-causal ways, still strike 
us as narratives.  Velleman's emphasis on typical emotional arcs is able to explain only 
certain kinds of traditional and satisfying narratives, ones which he reasonably likes, but 
we needn't think are paradigmatic.
Second, narratives concern human meanings.  They might do so by focusing on a 
specific type of event—persons acting—or by representing human experience directly.  
Again, however, I am skeptical that one can transform either of these into a necessary 
condition without erecting arbitrary boundaries.  Accounts of people merely suffering 
happenings still seem to me narratives.  And some narratives give us no access to 
characters' internal states, yet are narratives nonetheless.25  I have argued, however, that 
the temporal causal descriptions of science aren't narratives.  They aren't exactly because 
they don't concern human meanings.  That this is the relevant criterion of difference 
seems to me revealed by the fact that anthropomorphizing the objects of a causal 
description, ascribing (or inviting readers to ascribe) experiences to them, transforms 
otherwise person-less descriptions into narratives (remember Scooter the baseball).
My account now sketched, I place it between two limits that might help elucidate, 
if not strictly define, narrative's borders.  In dance we have an example of temporality 
without human meaning.  In gesture we have an example of meaning without temporality.  
I'll explain these two limits, and how easily they blur into narrative's domain.
Dance is a temporal form of art.  By way of its choreography, it has a “canonical 
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order of presentation” (as above).  Likewise, its content is temporal: it is about movement 
and, in some cases at least, emotions or sequences of emotions.  Yet it seems to me that 
the movement and emotion of dance may or may not be specifically human—when not, 
dance remains abstract, while when it is, dance blurs into narrative.  When still abstract, 
dance presents a series of movements and through them emotions, but there are no 
characters to assign them to.  The dancer is not an actor who moves, but pure movement.  
But dance can easily blur toward drama.  It does so exactly when we begin to think of the 
dancers as characters.  An abstract portrayal of aggression and pain is transformed if one 
dancer becomes the aggressor, causing pain in another.  In such a case, their performance 
is no longer found purely in their movement.  Instead, they present us with characters 
who move.  And their dance becomes drama, which presents human events, and is 
therefore narrative.
Gesture tests the other part of my characterization of narrative.  In a gesture, 
everything is given at once—only technically, not in experience, is there temporal 
duration.  To say “she closed her hand, then raised her middle finger slightly, then 
extended it all the way,” would be to fail to grasp that gesture.  One can't divide a gesture 
into parts, first this, and then that, without destroying it—that's the wonder of a perfect 
gesture.  Often, a gesture is something like an epigraph of character, by which a person's 
essence is distilled into a single moment and movement.  Gestures are thus rich in human 
meaning but not temporal.  And because they are not temporal, they are not narratives.  
But they can easily slip into narrative, if extended only ever so slightly.  Consider the 
beginning of Milan Kundera's novel Immortality.  The narrator (who we are encouraged 
to conflate with Kundera himself) sits beside a swimming pool.  He observes a women, 
sixty or so years-old, taking a swimming lesson from a young lifeguard.  After the lesson,
She walked around the pool toward the exit.  She passed the lifeguard, and after she had gone 
some three or four steps beyond him she turned her head, smiled, and waved to him.  At that 
instant I felt a pang in my heart!  That smile and that gesture belonged to a twenty-year-old girl!  
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Her arm rose with bewitching ease.  It was as if she were playfully tossing a brightly colored ball 
to her lover.  That smile and that gesture had charm and elegance [….] The essence of her charm, 
independent of time, revealed itself for a second in that gesture and dazzled me.  I was strangely 
moved.  And then the word Agnes entered my mind.  Agnes.  I had never known a woman by that 
name. (3-4)
Kundera spins an entire novel out of this one moment.  His observation of the gesture 
gives birth to a character, who gives birth to a story.  But the gesture itself remains merely 
at the limit of becoming temporal, and thus being narrative.
IV. The Widening Gyre
I take as my title for this last section—of a chapter attempting to characterize 
narrative—a line of poetry.26  This is not so paradoxical as it might seem, since my aim is 
to briefly track the widening usage of the term “narrative.”  Despite this widening—and, 
eventually, the application of narrative to series of events in themselves, rather than just a 
discourse about them—mere anarchy is not loosed upon the world.  The characterization 
of narrative I've offered is inclusive.  Such is appropriate in that it is a baseline, one 
which might be narrowed when applied in different contexts.  As Abbott writes, “the field 
of narrative is so rich that it would be a mistake to become invested in a more restrictive 
definition that requires either more than one event or the sense of causal connection 
between events” (13).  Such inclusive impulses are not unusual.  James Phelan, updating 
Scholes and Kellogg's The Nature of Narrative, writes, for example: “We are living in the 
age of the Narrative Turn, an era when narrative is widely celebrated and studied for its 
ubiquity and importance” (285).  I end this chapter by collecting, usefully though not 
systematically, some of the inclusive moves that theorists of narrative make, expanding 
its “rich field” beyond that of discourse.  This will begin to enable us to see how narrative 
might apply even beyond the field of representation.
Aristotle, in the third chapter of the Poetics, distinguishes between works that 
26 From Yeats's “The Second Coming.”
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represent through narration and those that (re)present by imitating action directly, as if it 
were happening (as well as works that mix the two).27  This gives us the distinction 
between narrative, in which events are represented through telling, and drama, in which 
they are performed without the mediation of a narrator.  Given that plays still have a story 
or plot, many theorists have taken the category of narrative to encompass both, however.  
Ricoeur, for example, writes: “Does this distinction prohibit us from reuniting epic and 
drama under the title 'narrative'?  Not at all.”  Like I have here, Ricoeur characterizes 
narrative by its “object,” what it is about, namely “muthos, the organization of events” 
(TNI, 36).  (Ricoeur places much more emphasis on the process of emplotment, and its 
regular forms, than I do, as we'll see in chapter seven.)  He thus refers to “narrative in the 
broad sense,” which includes both narration and drama, but this doesn't prohibit him (or 
us) from, when relevant, making the finer distinction between “diegetic composition” and 
drama.  I follow Ricoeur in thinking that, until a narrower argumentative context is 
specified, it is more useful to think of narration and drama together than separated.
Others push back: narratives have a narrator, thus barring (in most cases) drama, 
as well as film.  Traditionally, “narrative is essentially a mode of verbal presentation and 
involves the linguistic recounting or telling of events” (Prince quoted in Abbott, 15).  
Film is a controversial case.  It is not (primarily) linguistic, but camera placement and 
editing impose a particular perspective on the story that one might think akin to a 
narrator's filtering of events.  Thus Scholes, Phelan, and Kellogg write that “film is 
primarily narrative rather than dramatic in form,” since “it does not present a story 
directly, without narration, but always through the medium of a controlled point of view, 
the eye of the camera” (280).  Similarly, Mieke Bal defines “A narrative text as a text in 
which a narrative agent tells a story,” but both “text” and “narrative agent” are used 
27 Stephen Halliwell notes that Aristotle “denotes narrative by the verb apangellein (to relate/report)” not 
with diegesis, as is commonly thought.  See “Diegesis—Mimesis,” section 14, in The Living Handbook 
of Narratology: http://wikis.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php/Diegesis_-_Mimesis (accessed 
December 2013).
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inclusively.  A text isn't necessarily linguistic, and a narrator is “a function and not a 
person,” and can be “linguistic, visual, cinematic” (15).  Bal's use of the word “narrator” 
is somewhat peculiar and perhaps revealing.  She writes: “I do not mean a story-teller, a 
visible, fictive 'I' who interferes in his/her account as much as s/he likes, or even 
participates as a character in the action” (17-18).  This is an “explicit narrator,” but a 
narrator can be much more minimal.  Strictly defined, it is “the agent which utters the 
(linguistic or other) signs which constitute the text” (18).  She thus includes both film and 
some works of visual art amidst narrative.28  As does Abbott: “silent instruments like 
painting can convey the events of narrative” (15).
If a narrator can be reduced to a mere function, then it might seem it can be done 
away with completely.  William Gass wholeheartedly rejects the need for narrators.  He 
distinguishes between fictions and stories and includes narrators as but part of the artifice 
of fictions.  In contrast, “Stories are strange creatures, because normally they have no 
point of view, not even the godly omniscient one with which the nineteenth-century novel 
has made us so familiar.  Because the story, as such, belongs to no medium and has no 
designated 'teller,' it acts as if it had no point of view in particular” (2002, 19).  Meir 
Sternberg makes the same point, writing that narrative makes use of “a largely 
extraverbal logic” (34).  We thus get a sense of just how many different formal 
approaches might fall under the name of narrative: not just the core case, in which a 
narrator recounts events, but film, drama, comics, certain kinds of paintings—anything, 
by my baseline characterization, that (re)presents temporal events of human meaning.
Despite my inclusive characterization, there remain, of course, many things that 
are not narrative: architecture, the vast majority of sculpture, most paintings, drawings, 
and other works of graphic art, much of dance, lyric poetry, and on and on (and this is to 
28 Bordwell: “No trait we assign to an implied author of a film could not more simply be ascribed to the 
narration itself [….] To give every film a narrator or implied author is to indulge in an anthropomorphic 
fiction (1985, 62).
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draw only from aesthetic categories).  Perhaps particularly illuminating are examples of 
things which others have claimed as narrative, but I continue to exclude.  Above, I 
excluded scientific descriptions.  Another example: suppose, shortly after meeting, I ask 
you “So, what's your story?”  In response, you tell me where you're from, what you do 
for a living, where you live, and what you like to do in your free time.  Despite my 
question, you haven't, it seems to me, told me a story.  You've given a certain kind of 
account of yourself, one that could be transformed into a narrative, but you haven't 
presented it as one.  If, more intimately, you were to offer a characterization of yourself—
whether you're generally honest, how ambitious you are, what doubts you have, whether 
you're optimistic overall—you again, it seems to me, wouldn't have told me a story.  In 
both cases, you've given a certain account of yourself, but not a narrative one, since none 
of your replies (I'm stipulating) are about events, only facts and qualities.
One other example.  As the official respondent to a lecture by Galen Strawson 
(2010), Christopher Ricks began his remarks with the (you will understand) back-handed 
complement that we had just heard “a wonderful story about the episodic.”  Though the 
joke was well received, it seems to me that Ricks misspoke.  Though Strawson could tell 
a story about the episodic (indeed, in chapter two I suggested that doing so might be the 
best way of making the strange psychology of the episodic clearer), he hadn't.  He had 
given an account—in the form of a psychological and, perhaps, metaphysical description
—of the episodic.  And though that account was, like any discourse, itself in time, since it 
took Strawson a certain duration of time to speak it, the object of his account was not 
interestingly in time.  He wasn't describing events, but a fixed character.  Strawson's 
account sought to articulate certain psychological qualities the episodic has, and sought 
as well to articulate certain conceptual relations—between diachronic and episodic self-
experience, between narrative and non-narrative understanding.  None of this involved 
representing events in time.  So only in a colloquial sense, a sense that I think we would 
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here be well advised to avoid, had Strawson told a story.
I said that I would return, at the end of the chapter, to my anti-atomistic worries 
about Carroll's approach to narrative.  Carroll bracketed any question of why works as a 
whole are or aren't narratives, investigating instead the narrativity of the basic 
connections out of which they are (in part) composed.  He suggested that it is when 
narrative connections prevail in a larger work that we deem it to be a narrative.  Yet one 
might well think that such judgments are not analytic, based on an examination of a 
work's atomistic parts.  Abbott points out that works like T. S. Eliot's “The Wasteland” 
and Samuel Beckett's The Unnamable, though they include narratives, are not usually 
thought to be such on the whole: “They just don't seem to have the cumulative effect of 
narrative” (14).  Can this thought be refined?  Kundera writes: “'Prose': the word signifies 
not only nonversified language; it also signifies the concrete, everyday, corporeal nature 
of life.  So to say that the novel is the art of prose is not to state the obvious; the words 
define the deep sense of that art” (2006, 8).  This suggests that the feel of narrative is the 
feel of life.  Monika Fludernik makes the thought explicit: “narrativity is a function of 
narrative texts and centres on experientiality of an anthropomorphic nature” (26).29  
Scholes, Phelan, and Kellogg summarize her approach:
Fludernik coins the terms 'narrativize' and 'narrativization' to refer to how readers naturalize texts 
by the use of narrative schemata.  Among the many suggestive consequences of Fludernik's 
approach is its conception of narrativity (that which makes a text a narrative rather than something 
else) as grounded not in the presence of a teller and a sequence of events but rather in our 
embodied experience of the world, what she calls experientiality. (291)
These thoughts suggest that narrative is most basically an attempt to capture the feel of 
everyday life, and, subsequently, that we recognize narratives on the basis of their capture 
of this feel.  I turn in the next chapter to the question of what it might mean to apply the 
language of narrative to real life, what it might mean to say, non-metaphorically, that our 
29 Fludernik is quick to distinguish experientiality from “the Heideggerian notion of Geworfensein” (28).  
In part two, I'll argue for the narrativity of our self-experience, though primarily through the 





Are Lives Narratives, Non-Metaphorically?:
Or, “What Ontology in View?”
And yet his mention is less a narration than a reference, having to do hardly at all with details.
Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor (318)
Here, above all, the triumphant novelist can be brought up short and demolished by details, those 
very details in which reality is always so rich, and which are always neglected by such unfortunate 
and unwilling authors, as if they were utterly insignificant and unnecessary trifles, if indeed they 
even occur to them.  Oh, they cannot be bothered with that at the moment, their mind creates only 
the grandiose whole—and then someone dares suggest such a trifle to them!
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (721)
[James Joyce's] writing is not about something, it is that something itself.
Samuel Beckett (27)
In the first two chapters, I examined the views of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles 
Taylor, who I'm treating as the founding fathers of narrativity, and Galen Strawson, the 
most famous opponent of such views.  In the third chapter, I argued for an inclusive 
characterization of narrative: as the (re)presentation of temporal human meanings.  This 
characterization is indifferent to the means by which variable forms—discursive, 
cinematic, dramatic, or otherwise—are about human events.  There's no danger in 
mistaking a narrative (noun) for the real world; a novel or a film is an object that presents 
or represents or is about a, or the, world.  But if what is characteristic of narrative is that 
it is about the right kind of events—temporal human events—then it is tempting to 
describe temporal human events themselves as narrative (adjective).  Here I ask whether 
and how one could make such a move.  What would it mean to say, as narrativists 
sometimes do, that our lives are narratives?  Is that a metaphor, or an analogy made 
between two objects?  What does it mean to say that life is narrative (adjective)?  That 
real life events have the same structure as narratives?  That they are narratable?  I argue 
that if narrativity is to be philosophically grounded, then it must be an ontological thesis 
coherently situated in a larger account of what we are and how we exist.  Current 
narrativist accounts have not yet done this, and the Heideggerian account I offer in part 
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two will begin to do so.
 What exactly narrativists claim about the relationship between lives, selves, and 
narrative varies enormously from philosopher to philosopher.  Weaker claims include the 
idea that our lives are at some times and for some purposes usefully understood in 
narrative terms, and thus the idea that there might be an illuminating parallel between the 
sorts of arcs of events that characters on the one hand and real people on the other live 
out.  According to such a conception, the claim that our lives are narratives appears to be 
a metaphor: two essentially different sorts of things—lives and stories—are equated to 
draw attention to an aspect or aspects that they have in common.  But if the claim is 
merely metaphorical, then lives are no more really stories than the moon is really a silver 
platter.  At worst, the comparison of lives and stories might be a tempting metaphor, but 
more misleading than illuminating, and thus one that should be avoided.  The moon and a 
silver platter may indeed have something in common, but not nearly enough to ground 
philosophical claims about the moon (or platters), and likewise for lives and narratives.
Occasionally, however, the stronger claim—that our lives are narratives, non-
metaphorically—is at least apparently made, if not fully defended.  When MacIntyre 
writes, for example, that “Stories are lived before they are told—except in the case of 
fiction,” he appears to be asserting not merely that it is possible for us to understand our 
lives through narrative, that they are usefully or accurately described through storytelling 
(AV, 212).  Rather, he orders things the other way around: our lives are narratives, before 
any telling of them, and only because of this are we able to understand and describe them 
in terms of explicit narration.  “[H]uman life has a determinate form, the form of a certain 
kind of story.  It is not just that poems and sagas narrate what happens to men and 
women, but that in their narrative form poems and sagas capture a form that was already 
present in the lives which they relate,” he writes (AV, 124).
Such a claim, when philosophers have tried to take it at face value rather than 
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resorting to a metaphorical weakening of it, has often faced ridicule.  Peter Goldie, for 
example, responding directly to MacIntyre, insists that a narrative must be different and 
at a distance from that which it narrates: “to elide the notion of narrative and the notion of 
what a narrative is about is to lose the distinction between language (and thought) and the 
world—between representation and what is represented” (2003B, 303; see too MI, 153-
154).  The notion that our lives are narratives, rather than things of some other sort that 
we can narrate, tell stories about, is “a particularly post-modern sort of exaggeration” for 
Goldie that would leave us unable to distinguish between story and history, fiction and 
reality (2003A, section IV).  Likewise, Samantha Vice, who understands any strong 
narrative view of the self to claim ultimately that we are characters, cannot muster the 
resources to take it seriously.  “Put in these terms,” she writes, “the view just seems 
obviously false—we are clearly not characters and our lives are not stories and it is a 
blatant category mistake to think so” (100-101).  To her credit, Vice immediately worries 
that the mistake looks so obvious that she must be straw-manning the position, but she 
finds that any metaphorical interpretation dilutes the narrative view out of distinctiveness.  
The weight of the adverbs here—“obviously,” “clearly,” “blatantly”—is this, I take it: 
characters are imaginary things that populate fictional worlds created by authors, and they 
exist only in text, on the screen, and in our imaginations.  Actual persons are biological 
organisms, if of a particularly complicated kind in that they are capable of such acts of 
imagination, and they (we) live in the real, material world.  Any equation of the two is a 
denial of the latter and crazy in whatever terms one cares for: mystical, idealist, 
subjectivistic, postmodern, unscientific.
Even if one is inclined toward a narrative view of the self, these objections have a 
great deal of pull and are in need of being answered.  They admit a certain intuitive 
appeal to the notion that our lives are stories.  But they deflate that appeal, suggesting that 
if we pause and even momentarily consider in more straightforward language what a 
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claim such as “my life is a story” might mean, we can't in fact cash it out.  And if we 
can't, then such talk remains indistinct, metaphorical, and resistant to fuller theorization.  
That said, we in turn should pause and ask if such objections rely too heavily on more 
straightforward language and its unquestioned commitments.  Vice and others cut off the 
debate just as it starts to push toward larger framing questions in metaphysics and 
ontology.  At the bottom level, the implicit argumentative form of these sorts of 
dismissals of the narrative view of the self is this: such would entail non-standard 
ontological views, and therefore we needn't or can't take it seriously in any but a diluted 
metaphorical form that leaves our ontologies unchallenged.  Proponents of narrative 
views of the self are no less responsible for the success of such attacks, however.  
MacIntyre and others tend to trail off just where it looks like they owe us a fuller account 
of the world, one which might ground their claims.  Without such an account, it remains 
unclear how, even if we want to, we might resist retreating into metaphor.
Theoretical work on the notion of the narrative self thus remains, if no longer in 
its infancy, at least in the throes of its adolescence.  That is to say that, though some such 
idea has long been of interest to philosophers, psychologists, literary theorists, critics, and 
most especially novelists, filmmakers, and other artists, it has been thematized only 
haphazardly.  There remains no agreement about what commonly employed terms mean, 
nor clear consensus about what questions need to be raised.  And yet, at least by some 
thinkers' lights,1 the narrative view of the self has achieved dominance in the academy, 
spawning new critics and criticisms in turn.  We've thus come to a moment of, if not 
retreat, at least regathering.  First order debates—Is the self narratively constituted?  
Should we understand our lives in narrative terms?—are put on hold in favor of clarifying 
meta-discourse.  How are we using terms like “narrative,” “diachronic,” “self-
experience”?  How should we use them?  What framing assumptions are we making 
1 Strawson, as we saw in chapter two (AN, 429).
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when we raise the particular questions that we do?
I aim to contribute to this regathering by asking whether it can be reasonably 
asserted that our lives are narratives in more than a metaphorical sense.  What does it 
mean to describe lives as narratives?  What sort of framework might house this claim and 
avoid being thrown back immediately into debates (or worse, mere confusions) over 
terminology?  Though the dichotomy between literalness and metaphor is surely too 
simplistic in the end, I make use of it here initially as a rhetorical gambit: such is the 
frame through which the most outspoken opponents of narrativity see the debate.  And I 
agree with Vice that “In order for this view to be distinctive, its claims on behalf of 
stories or narratives must be taken as seriously and literally as possible” (93).  If, even in 
these—their own—terms, one can reply to such critics, then perhaps more lasting 
progress will have been made in stabilizing narrativist views.2  Is it possible to assert 
philosophically the notion that our lives are narratives in a literal, non-metaphorical sense 
without immediately facing crippling objections (that is to say, really, commonsense, 
incredulous scoffing)?  I think that it is, but that this claim is even more radical than its 
proponents, such as MacIntyre, have acknowledged.  What sort of ontological claims 
might one have to make or avoid in order to coherently assert a literal view of the 
narrative self?  Asserting it in such a way that it can avoid the charges of opponents such 
as Goldie3 and Vice requires doing so within a robust and non-standard ontology.
This chapter moves through three sections.  I start with the narrative self-
constitution view of Marya Schechtman, the most detailed theory now on offer.  
Schechtman herself has come to view her original position as hamstrung by certain 
objections and tried to revise it, and on her critics' terms.  Tracking her revisions suggests 
2 In fact, I'm extremely sympathetic to the view that much of any conceptual system is metaphorical 
through and through, a view defended by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson or, for that matter, 
Nietzsche (“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”).  But I avoid relying on this controversial claim.
3 To be clear, Goldie is an opponent only of the literal view I'm examining here.  He has otherwise 
contributed enormously to recent philosophical thinking about narrative.  He defends a narrative sense 
of self, but thinks there is no such thing as a narrative self, as I'll discuss in the conclusion.
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that the narrative view cannot be made compatible with an unelaborated but basically 
commonsensical realism.  I turn back then to MacIntyre's own presentation and consider 
whether he has further resources to combat objections.  He does, but he cuts off 
discussion before noting the radical implications of his view; that view thus relies on us 
not asking further questions lest we be dissuaded by their ramifications.  After a much 
briefer consideration of the apparent ontological implications of the narrativist views of 
Paul Ricoeur, Daniel Dennett, and David Velleman, I end by locating my claims about 
narrativity and ontology against philosophical naturalism.  In the second part of the 
dissertation, I will suggest that Heidegger provides fruitful grounds for working out the 
ontological implications of narrativity.  But first, I need to argue that such an ontological 
turn is necessary.
I. Schechtman and Narrative Self-Constitution
Schechtman's The Constitution of Selves can be seen (and not uncharitably) as an 
attempt to work out the details of two provocative paragraphs of After Virtue, where 
MacIntyre briefly comments on the relation between his account of the self as essentially 
narrative in character and psychological accounts of identity from Locke onwards (AV, 
216-217).  I start from her later version, however, because an examination of her struggle 
to make a narrative notion of the self cohere with an unelaborated but commonsensical 
realist worldview will reveal it as necessary for narrativists to embrace a more radical 
ontological context (which will in turn lead us back to and finally beyond MacIntyre).  
Schechtman summarizes her original view as follows:
I call the narrative view I endorse the “narrative self-constitution view.”  Its most basic claim is 
that we constitute ourselves as persons by forming a narrative self-conception according to which 
we experience and organize our lives.  This self-conception and its operation are largely implicit 
and automatic.  As we are socialized into human culture, we are taught to operate with a 
background conception of ourselves as continuing individuals, leading the lives of persons.  What 
this means more specifically is that we experience the present in the context of a larger life-
narrative.  In order to have a narrative self-conception in the relevant sense, the experienced past 
and anticipated future must condition the character and significance of present experiences and 
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actions.  When I have a self-constituting narrative, what happens to me is not interpreted as an 
isolated incident, but as part of an ongoing story. (NUP, 162)
What we are depends on the sense in which the question is asked, for Schechtman.  Our 
status as biological entities precedes any narrative activity on our part.  So much is 
encapsulated in the verb “constitute” and the claim that we are “socialized into” such 
self-constituting abilities.  We are things of one sort, but we make ourselves into 
something else through the use of narrative.  Speaking with the utmost care, however, it 
might be more accurate to say that there are things (human animals) that make 
themselves into us: “we” aren't strictly there prior to this self-constitution.  Personhood is 
honorific for Schechtman, and it is achieved only as a result of this activity.  We might 
wonder if Schechtman's account is thus a fair candidate for Vice's search for a 
distinctively literal claim about the self's narrativity (as we'll see, pressure from 
objections has actually led Schechtman to a more literal view).  Schechtman's account, in 
maintaining a distinction between what we are prior and posterior to narrative 
constitution appears to satisfy Goldie's call to hold apart narrative and narrated as well.  
And with Goldie (2003B, 301), she maintains that our narratives might remain implicit—
one of the major claims guiding her account is that our narratives might not be explicit, 
though she requires that they must in principle be capable of being made so: “The 
articulation constraint requires that a person be able to articulate her narrative locally 
when appropriate” (NUP, 163).4  Thus it's not clear that she can be taken, any more than 
Goldie, to sanction the notion that our lives are narratives.  Rather her claim seems to be 
that we are biological things that achieve the higher order of personhood through 
narrating our lives.  But this remains dependent on our prior and more basic status as 
biological things.
Of course, without saying more, it would look crazy not to affirm our status as 
4 See CS, 114-119 for the full details.
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biological beings as basic.  What else might we be made of if not cells, matter?  Words?  
Stories?  Endlessly slipping chains of signifiers?5  Hence Goldie's worry that the strong 
narrative claim is a postmodern exaggeration.  But exactly the attempt to avoid this 
exaggeration and remain within an unquestioned and commonsensical ontological 
context opens Schechtman to an apparently crippling objection.  If we maintain a 
distinction between narrative and narrated, and my personhood, though formed through 
autobiographical narration, is ultimately reliant on my more basic status as a biological 
being, why shouldn't we think that the narratives I tell about myself are false?  If my life 
is not a narrative, but only something that can be narrated, shouldn't we worry that 
bridging that gap in representation will be falsifying?  Schechtman attempts to answer 
this objection with her second constraint.  “The reality constraint requires that a person's 
narrative conform to what we are generally accepted to know about the basic character of 
reality and about the nature of persons,” she writes (NUP, 163).6  My self-narrative will 
be false if I think I'm 500 years old, or that I simultaneously exist in two places, for 
example.  My self-narrative is constrained in its specifics by material evidence as well.  If 
my self-constituting autobiographical story says I grew up in Paris, but I'm confronted by 
endless photographic evidence and witnesses' accounts that I grew up in St. Louis, then 
my own story is revealed to be a delusion.
Schechtman's reality constraint is too narrow and answers only specific problems 
of falsification, however.  It can't answer the overarching worry that our lives are often, 
usually, or perhaps even always and necessarily too episodic and unstructured to be 
described accurately by narrative at all.  That is, the reality constraint can only answer the 
worry that my story falsifies some particular fact or facts about my life.  It can't answer 
the worry that narrative, categorically, fails to represent the way our lives actually are.  In 
5 See Roth 2012, where I suggest, through a discussion of Paul de Man's reading of Rousseau's 
Confessions, that this language is more useful than it might appear.
6 See CS, 119-130 for the full details.
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the terms that the recent literature has developed, narrative is generally regarded to be 
form-finding, revealing of coherence, unity, and patterns.7  But—it's said in the next 
breath—our lives aren't (especially necessarily) well-formed in these ways.  This should, 
I think, be thought of as the master objection against all narrative views of the self.  If 
narrative is characterized essentially by its unifying, form-finding function, then it will 
always misrepresent the randomness and banality of most of our day-to-day activities.8  
And any view which holds narrative and narrated apart and admits something below 
narrative as basic will fall to it, because an act of representation will always be 
incomplete, adequate only to some purposes or in some context.  Any representational 
view will thus retreat into metaphor.  If my or any other narrative of my life is but one 
possible account of more basic, prior, actual, and merely described events, then it might 
be good enough within a particular context that there's no reason to call it false.  But it 
can't be that such a narrative just is my life itself.  Consider the competing accounts that 
can be given of a domestic argument.  What “gets things right” from the various 
standpoints of a police officer taking a report, a psychiatrist treating one of the people 
involved, and a confidant of the other will vary widely, each leaving out details relevant 
to the others.  Unless one challenges the conception of narrative as a re-presentation, 
whatever it is that's there prior won't be exhausted, and thus it will seemingly be falsified.
At first blush, the quantitative way I've articulated this objection will seem 
misguided.  We talk of stories as true (or at least not false) even though they don't include 
every detail which they possibly could.  The term “verisimilitude” designates the illusion 
of a complete world behind a limited description.  So while it's unanswerable what Anna 
Karenina ate for breakfast on her thirteenth birthday, and, knowing that it's unanswerable, 
we all understand that it's a silly question, Tolstoy's novel (often thought of as among the 
7 By Strawson's definition (AN, 441).  I've translated it away from his more psychological handling.
8 See Christman, 702-703.
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most realistic) succeeds in creating the illusion of a world where Anna would in fact have 
eaten something that morning.  Literary critics have long understood that “naturalistic” or 
“realistic” fiction relies, perhaps even more heavily than other forms, on all kinds of 
artifice and convention.9  And of course Anna Karenina represents a fictional world, one 
which doesn't exist prior to the text.  But a work of history, or even an anecdotal relating 
of an event that occurred earlier during the course of one's day, can achieve or fail to 
achieve verisimilitude.  Such narrative representations of actual events don't exhaustively 
detail their objects either, however.
So isn't it misguided to require any supposed narrative of my life to exhaust its 
events?  If my life is a narrative, if that narrative has ontological status, I don't think it is.  
If my life is a narrative, if this is its most basic status, then it seemingly must contain the 
details of all of my activities.  Otherwise, what other account would?  How could any 
higher-order account spin these details out of nowhere?  Vice's charge of categorical error 
is perhaps looking better and better as we try to cash out in literal terms the metaphor that 
lives are stories.  I'll return to these worries at the end of this chapter, but I won't answer 
them fully until my conclusion, where I interpret Heidegger's conception of Dasein as 
world-disclosing as akin to the selective telling of a story.  Only if I can eventually 
answer the master objection will I have succeeded in motivating, even as a possibility, the 
literal acceptance that our lives are narratives.  Now, however, we should turn to the 
specific objections that Schechtman sees as crippling to her original view.
Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view says essentially that we are formed 
by the true stories that we do (or at least could) tell about ourselves.  As I've noted, the 
referential character of “true” (apparently correspondence, given no further gloss) and 
“about” in such a definition should in and of itself lead us to ask whether Schechtman 
9 For one particularly relevant take on this, see David Foster Wallace's comments in Lipsky, 36f.  I'll 
return to these issues in chapter seven.
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doesn't suppose that we are really something more basic below such storytelling.  This 
supposition becomes explicit in her more recent work, where she exposes her original 
view to scrutiny.  Emerging somewhat indirectly from the work of Eric Olson,10 
Schechtman worries how, if our lives and selves are constituted by the stories we tell 
about ourselves, they can encompass our entire lives.  Specifically, how can periods at the 
margins of life when we are incapable of autobiographical storytelling—in utero 
existence and infancy on the one side, possibly a vegetative state on the other—be part of 
our lives?  If we accept the basic dichotomy in theories of identity between psychological 
(which would include narrative views) and biological/material/corporeal ones, then surely 
a biological theory will here succeed in encapsulating an entire life, whereas a 
psychological theory will counterintuitively suggest that a person exists only for a certain 
phase of high functioning in the life of each human animal, a phase which necessarily 
won't include its beginning and possibly not its end.11  Rather, the narrative view suggests
that a person comes into existence only as certain capacities are developed, that it goes 
out of existence when these capacities are lost, and that the gaining and losing of such 
capacities needn't correspond with birth and death (in fact almost certainly won't).
Schechtman avoids a number of easy responses.  She wants, for example, to be 
able to sanction the “truism that each of us was once a fetus who grew into an infant, and 
eventually an adult” (2009, 13).  I'm not sure why we should think that such ordinary 
10 For Schechtman, the objection is driven by certain metaphysical arguments Olson makes based on (in 
his own words) “the assumption that each concrete particular, each thing, belongs essentially to exactly 
one kind,” and that this “substance concept” of each thing is what it cannot cease to be without ceasing 
completely to be what it is.  Olson then argues that “person” based on psychological continuity is not a 
viable candidate for our substance concept, while “human animal” based on biological continuity is.  I 
see no reason why we should accept the metaphysical assumption that each thing has a substance 
concept, and Olson himself presents it as only an assumption necessary to limit the argumentative 
terrain (1997, 28).  I thus try to articulate the objection in a more straightforward and compelling way.  
Schechtman seems to want to make the same move, though she does so only after having taken the 
metaphysical arguments seriously (2009, 18).  Quotes from this lecture should be taken provisionally as 
they remain unpublished.  I'm primarily interested here in what Schechtman is struggling with, not her 
conclusions.  Her forthcoming book Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity 
of a Life will, I expect, include her worked-out views on these matters.
11 Even setting aside possible vegetative states, this is necessarily a problem at life's end if we take 
seriously Heidegger's worries about the hermeneutic problems of grasping one's own death and thus 
one's life as a whole.  See SZ, §46ff and my discussion in part two.
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language is doing any metaphysical heavy lifting, however.  Perhaps we do indeed want 
to say that this is true, but surely what we really want to say, especially in a philosophical 
context, is that such a claim requires more discussion.  Is it more accurate to say that I 
was a fetus who grew into a person or to say that a fetus grew into me?  The specific 
grammar of various formulations encodes competing assumptions, none of which we 
need blindly sanction.  Is “me” really the broader category that includes as sub-parts 
“fetus” and “adult”?  Likewise, the claim that a person ceases to exist when suffering a 
stroke and falling into a permanent vegetative state might indeed be problematic if it's 
said to entail that “a new entity, a vegetative human, pops into existence” (2009, 13).  But 
isn't that a rather strange, overly rhetorical way of skewing the debate?  If Olson takes the 
weight of his objections to be based on detailed metaphysical arguments and frequently 
moves to reject our intuitions (which lead most of us to associate identity with 
psychological rather than biological continuity in memory transplant thought 
experiments, for example12), then we shouldn't allow him to use ordinary language 
intuitions to frame the debate.13  Finally, Schechtman seems to reject the rebuttal that we 
might simply be talking about different things here.  Olson argues that “psychological 
theorists conflate ethical and metaphysical questions” and that questions of personhood 
are ethical, while questions of our identity as things, human animals, are metaphysical 
(2009, 12).  Schechtman might respond that this is exactly right, but that the latter isn't 
what interests her (or, indeed, anyone other than metaphysicians).14  I note this potential 
12 As made famous by Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2, Chapter 27, 
Section 15; Bernard Williams in “The Self and the Future”; and Derek Parfit in “Personal Identity.”  All 
three are collected in Perry, ed.
13 The last entailment (of a new entity popping into existence) in particular can't even be motivated by 
ordinary language intuitions, but rather only given his questionable metaphysical assumptions.
14 In the terms of The Constitution of Selves, it looks like this is the response that Schechtman should 
make.  There she distinguishes between two questions relating to personal identity: the “reidentification 
question,” or “what makes a person at time t2 the same as a person at t1” and the “characterization 
question,” or “which beliefs, values, desires, and other psychological features make someone the person 
she is” (CS, 1-3).  The importance of the reidentification question has been, she claims, vastly 
overstated.  Interestingly, Olson seems to have moved in the same direction.  His more recent book 
begins from the distinction (which he credits to Judith Jarvis Thomson) between personal identity and 
personal ontology and the thought that the latter has been woefully neglected (2007, v).
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response here because I think it is close to the move we'll see MacIntyre make.  
According to one description, that of ourselves as complicated social beings, as people, 
our identities are narrative in form.  According to another description, that of ourselves as 
biological things, narrative is irrelevant.  Schechtman's refusal of this rebuttal is 
important.  Radical claims about the narrativity of the self are easier to make if they're 
restricted to a fairly high-order ethical context where, given the non-systematicity of 
contemporary philosophical practice, ontological entailments are rarely spelled out.  But I 
suspect that most of us don't think, philosophically, that our ethical identities and 
metaphysical ones are wholly unrelated.15  At the very least, we probably hope that these 
two realms of philosophical inquiry can be made to cohere.  So philosophers like Vice 
and Strawson are right to ask (if often only implicitly) how narrativists might bridge such 
a gap.  They're wrong to think narrativists can't (even obviously can't, according to Vice).
Schechtman notes the general form of the objection:
Our brute existence is a metaphysical fact for Olson, and our literal persistence rests on relations 
quite distinct from whatever story is told about us, and is presupposed in any story that is told.  In 
this respect, Olson's view holds that the narrative of a life is an overlay and imposition on a more 
basic continuation, and so the most fundamental form of a human life is not narrative. (2009, 16)
I've suggested that Schechtman herself originally held such a view, at least implicitly.  
Indeed this seems to be why she takes the challenge raised by Olson so seriously.  She 
attempts to respond not then in anything like the terms I've suggested above, but instead 
by accepting the basic contours of such a commonsensical (and materialist) realism.  This 
has the effect of transforming her view into a literal one.
If one accepts the general charge that a gap between biological reality and 
narrative selfhood means narrativity is of secondary importance, then one must push to 
close this gap such that one can assert the reality of our narrative selves.  This is just what 
Schechtman seeks to do.  First, she extends self-constituting narrative activity from each 
15 Schechtman comes close to this claim in distinguishing between “selves” and “persons” while insisting 
that they can't be kept ultimately apart (NUP, 175-178).
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self to others.  While I as an infant and I as comatose can't narrate (and thus constitute) 
my self, other people—family, friends, and so forth—can narrate my life during these 
stretches, connecting them to the normal case where I provide my own story.  This raises 
an obvious objection, however.  The notion that our self-narratives are real is more 
palatable if each of us has exactly one.  Schechtman's reality constraint was necessary, in 
part, for this reason: one of the things that we know about persons in general is 
presumably that the principle of non-contradiction holds, so I can't without delusion think 
myself both heroic and cowardly in the same sense at the same time.  The very fact that 
Schechtman's original view was one of self-constitution now looks overwhelmingly 
important.  We might ask why my own story about myself has authority versus the stories 
other people tell about me in determining what I in fact am.  But by granting ownership 
to each of us over our own stories, the original view at least had a structural mechanism 
in place for guaranteeing that each of us has exactly one story.16  Now, however, in 
granting others' stories about me a constitutive role in the formation of my self, we have 
no mechanism for refereeing between competing accounts.  Even if I maintain authority 
over my autobiography during periods of full functioning, different people might tell 
different stories about my infancy, which connect up differently to the story of the rest of 
my life.  Why again shouldn't we think that these are then merely stories and that reality 
must be of a different sort entirely?
Schechtman's response is to give up on any strong notion of what a narrative is 
and thus on the claim that my narrative needs to be traditional in form.  She writes:
Since a single person may be a devoted son to his parents, a brilliant surgeon to his colleagues and 
patients, and a troublesome and unreasonable neighbor to the person next door, this understanding 
of what a narrative is suggests that there will be (at least) three narratives of this man's life.  But 
this is not the conception of narrative I have in mind.  “Narrative” in the sense at work in [the 
revised view] is, quite literally, the story of a person's life, as it would be told if someone were 
chronicling it.  This story will include the person's history in all of its complexity. (2009, 29)17
16 This is to set aside the objection that each of us can and almost certainly does tell competing, even 
contradictory, stories about ourselves.  This seems to me no small problem, but one that Schechtman 
doesn't address (perhaps for reasons that will become clear in a moment).
17 “Chronicling” was “recording” in the distributed pre-lecture text.  Both terms are similarly problematic 
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Perhaps Schechtman has in mind here Arthur Danto's “ideal chronicler”: “He knows 
whatever happens the moment it happens, even in other minds.  He is also to have the gift 
of instantaneous transcription: everything that happens across the whole forward rim of 
the Past is set down by him, as it happens, the way it happens (149).  Compare now 
Schechtman's revised claim to her earlier view: “Obviously there is no single narrative 
which is the objective story of a person's life.  Different people narrate a person's life in 
different ways, and so the 'objective' narrative as I use the term is not a monolith” (CS, 
95n5).  Schechtman has now abandoned any gap between narrative and narrated.  We are 
the full amalgamation of stories told (or which could possibly be told) about us, though 
presumably still following the filtering of the reality constraint.  It's one problem that 
“brilliant surgeon” and “troublesome neighbor” don't necessarily cohere in one story.  It 
is another that “troublesome neighbor” from downstairs and “lovely neighbor” from 
upstairs might more directly contradict.  Schechtman's response seems to be that our 
narratives are real, so they can't truthfully contradict.18  Tellingly, Danto rejects the 
hypothetical work of the ideal chronicler as a work of history: “suppose that we know 
everything that ever happened; that we have some Ideal Chronicle of the whole past. This 
would still not be the whole of history [….] Such an ideally complete account of the 
whole past would at best furnish data for a substantive philosophy of the whole of 
history” (2).  According to her earlier view, Schechtman seemingly would have criticized 
in implying that any observer would produce the same text, that no judgment or interpretation is 
involved.
18 This is far from clear in the lecture itself, and I should again stress that I'm more interested in the sort of 
moves Schechtman makes than the the substance of her resulting views.  Her realism came out most 
clearly in response to a question by John McHugh.  She was asked whether in some post-apocalyptic 
world where only one man remained alive if he as a person would disappear if he fell into a vegetative 
state and no one were there to narrate his life for him.  In response she said “no,” that in principle his 
life could be narrated.  This seems to me the wrong answer, one based on the barest and least 
compelling sort of possibility.  It seems to me we should happily say he would cease to exist as a 
person, indeed we should perhaps even say that one man walking the earth alone would quickly lose his 
personhood.  As she writes, “Personhood, it might be said, is an intrinsically social concept” (CS, 95).  
But her response revealed that she takes there really to be a story here, even if it could be told only in 
principle by no one from nowhere.
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the revised view: such an ideally complete account of a person's whole past would at best 
furnish data for a substantive narrative of his or her identity.  If we are the total collection 
of everything we do, everything we and others (accurately) say about ourselves, how are 
we left with any notion of narrative?
This is the flip side of the master objection.  Why, if my life really is the 
exhaustive itemization of my banal day-to-day activities, should I call it a narrative?  As 
Garry Hagberg writes, “a full and exacting recitation of every event in a life […] would 
not constitute what we desire […] as a life's story” (in Gibson, ed., 155).  Schechtman's 
claim that we are the “chronicles” of our lives is telling: Noël Carroll, David Velleman 
and others have argued that a chronicle—“which represent[s] temporally ordered events 
pertaining to a single subject”—isn't yet a narrative, exactly because it doesn't display 
sufficient coherence of form.19  And a chronicle as well is usually taken to still be a 
representation of something else, so we're no closer to understanding what it might mean 
for our lives to literally be narratives (or even chronicles).
We have reached an argumentative dilemma.  If, on the one hand, there is a gap 
between what my life really is and some narrative of it, then it looks like that narrative is 
likely to be categorically falsifying, imposing unity and structure where neither in fact 
exist.  If, on the other hand, there is no gap between what my life really is and narrative, 
then there seems to be no reason to call it a narrative rather than a number of events, or 
various configurations of matter interacting in space and time.  The development of 
Schechtman's view can, in these terms, be seen as having begun along the first branch and 
then, under pressure, shifted to the second.  But the argumentative dilemma can be 
avoided only by challenging something in its background assumptions.  This then is the 
lesson we should learn from the development of Schechtman's views.  If we're going to 
assert that our lives are literally narratives, then we're going to have to make problematic 
19 The definitional quotation is from Velleman 2003, 2.
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the idea that we're really biological things.  We're going to have to venture into ontology 
and not leave untouched commonsense material realism.  Schechtman's adherence to 
common sense is built into the very wording of her reality constraint: “The reality 
constraint requires that a person's narrative conform to what we are generally accepted to 
know about the basic character of reality and about the nature of persons” (NUP, 163).  
What we are generally accepted to know about the basic character of reality is itself 
incompatible with the notion that our lives are literally narratives.  But what we're 
generally accepted to know shouldn't hold automatic philosophical sway.
By way of transition, let me try to summarize the preceding in a different set of 
terms.  Does Schechtman take our narratives to be told in the first or third person?  On 
her initial view, I am formed by the story that I tell about myself.  The account is in the 
first person: narrative identity is not “something that an individual has whether she knows 
it or not, but something that she has because she acknowledges her personhood and 
appropriates certain actions and experience as her own” (CS, 95).  I might not actually so 
narrate myself, but I could in principle.  And since one will immediately worry that such 
a first-person account might be (merely) subjective, her further reality constraint requires 
it to be compatible with objective evidence.  Upon revision, her account becomes ever 
more third-personal, however.  By marshaling the narrative work of others to assimilate 
my infancy and so forth into my own first-person account of my life in its high-
functioning middle, her account becomes intersubjective at the very least.  And in 
concluding that it is not the resulting collection of narratives that constitutes me, but that I 
am that thing which this assemblage narrates, her revised account is implicitly in the third 
person, it would seem.  A first-person account can't handle the sheer number of details our 
lives possess: “It is obviously impossible that this narrative should contain each and 
every event befalling the human being in full detail—such a goal would result in a 
Proustian paralysis in which the recognizable general features required for a coherent 
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story would be lost in the richness of information” (CS, 124).  Schechtman abandons her 
original, first-person stance: my life is an object under the gaze of something like an 
impartial narrator.  Recall her formulation “as if someone were chronicling it” and how 
abstract this someone needs to be.  In pushing toward a more literal account, such 
terminology becomes strained, however.  “First person” and “third person” are in the 
most straightforward sense technical terms for different forms of textual narration: “I did 
this,” a narrator says (by further convention, usually retrospectively) of him or herself, 
whereas “She did that,” another narrator says of someone else.  If we follow Schechtman 
and seek to close the gap between narrative and narrated, between a discourse and the 
events it is about, then such formal terms become unmoored from their normally explicit 
textual markers (“I” vs “he/she”).  This is all the more the case as we move back to 
MacIntyre's work, where first-person narration doesn't do the work of constituting my life 
story.  Instead, I can only tell such a story because it already exists.
II. MacIntyre and the Mutual Presupposition of Identity and Narrativity
In chapter one, I discussed MacIntyre's influential views on narrativity and the 
particular argument he (and, similarly, Taylor) use to justify the claim that narrative 
necessarily plays a role in our self-understanding.  I suggested that both suppress the 
dubious premise that human action is fully coherent and thus responsive either to an 
exhaustive counterfactual analysis or capable of being ordered in terms of a hierarchy of 
goods.  My line of criticism challenged narrativity at the lifelong, but not situational, 
scale.  Here I turn to the specific question of what the ontological status of the 
provocative claims MacIntyre makes about lives and selves is.  His clearest statement 
occurs midway through After Virtue, well before his main discussion of the narrative 
unity of our lives.  He writes (to quote once more):
[H]uman life has a determinate form, the form of a certain kind of story.  It is not just that poems 
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and sagas narrate what happens to men and women, but that in their narrative form poems and 
sagas capture a form that was already present in the lives which they relate. (AV, 124)20
This is, I think, the closest one can find in the literature to a literal assertion of our lives' 
narrativity.  Even here, it is arguably hedged by the emphasis on form—MacIntyre writes 
that lives have narrative form, not that they are narratives.  How important a difference 
this is depends on how exactly one characterizes narrative.  As we saw in the last chapter, 
recent philosophers have at least implicitly treated narrative as a kind of thing and then 
debated what qualities such things—actual texts, paradigmatically—must have to make 
them narratives specifically.  MacIntyre, by contrast, tends to use the concept of narrative 
adjectivally, referring to it as a quality that something either does or doesn't have.  Given 
his ascription of narrative form not only to actual and potential texts, written, spoken, or 
merely thought, but also to lives, he has to do so.  MacIntyre does indeed dilute the 
concept of narrative in the sense that he views it as a quality sensibly ascribed to many 
different sorts of things, not just texts.  But, counterbalancing this move, he maintains an 
extremely traditional notion of how something must be shaped to be considered narrative 
in form.  This is clear if we move forward to the great reveal of After Virtue:
It is now possible to return to the question from which this enquiry into the nature of human action 
and identity started: In what does the unity of an individual life consist?  The answer is that its 
unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life.  To ask 'What is the good for me?' is to 
ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion.  To ask 'What is the good for 
man?' is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in common.  But now it is 
important to emphasize that it is the systematic asking of these two questions and the attempt to 
answer them in deed as well as in word which provide the moral life with its unity.  The unity of a 
human life is the unity of a narrative quest. (AV, 218-219)
MacIntyre isn't interested in the narrative experiments of modernism and postmodernism, 
in their streams-of-consciousness, pastiches, and fracturing of the self.  His ideal of 
narrative is that of a traditional quest, in which all action is unified by one guiding 
purpose.21  This might save him from the charge of dilution, as even allowing that many 
20 He refers to poems and sagas here because he is discussing “heroic societies.”  Presumably novels and 
films would be much better examples in a contemporary discussion.
21 Bernard Williams notes the ambiguity in MacIntyre's phrase “narrative quest”: does it mean a quest for 
a narrative, or the narrative of a quest?  Williams thinks MacIntyre means the former, which seems to 
me clearly incorrect (2007, 305).
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things might be narrative in form, very few of them in fact are.  Narrative thus remains 
restricted enough as a concept to be useful.  Such a response opens MacIntyre to another 
objection, however: are our lives really unified in this way?
I largely want to bracket this first-order question of whether our lives are in fact 
narratives to focus instead on the categorical question of whether they even could be.   
Let me only note again that I think MacIntyre's traditional characterization of narrative 
and his emphasis on overriding unity is problematic.  It's not enough to simply say that 
our lives are more fractured, however.  MacIntyre admits and laments this.  To disprove 
him, one would instead have to show that lives never were, couldn't, and shouldn't be so 
unified.  In chapter one, I began to disentangle narrative from MacIntyre's and Taylor's 
emphasis on unity.  In the last chapter, I characterized narrative inclusively enough that it 
needn't be unifying, but restrictively enough that my use doesn't trivialize the term.
Where does MacIntyre fall on the two branches of the argumentative dilemma I 
have proposed against narrative views of the self?  Clearly the latter, which in asserting 
that our lives are narratives, risks trivializing the concept through overextension.  In 
asserting the narrativity of our lives literally, he doesn't separate narrative and narrated, 
presenting the former as a representation of the latter.  He takes the form of our lives as 
basic, read off in explicit biographical narratives because actual lives are already so 
formed.  This is clearest in his discussion of various biographies of Thomas Beckett, 
where he interrogates the relationship between a life and explicitly textual descriptions of 
it.  There exist versions that present Beckett's life as a saga, others that present it as 
hagiography, and yet others as a tragedy.  The question of which it is “has to be asked and 
answered before we can decide how it is to be written,” MacIntyre writes.  The view that 
lives are only retrospectively narrative, on the basis of explicit tellings of them is, he 
claims in opposition, “paradoxical,” such that “this question could not be asked until 
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after the life had been written” (AV, 212).22  Glaringly absent from consideration here is 
the possibility that such telling imposes narrative form on actual lives.  This is 
symptomatic of MacIntyre's realism.  There is one true and intelligible narrative of each 
life.  We can of course fail to identify and properly articulate it when engaged in the work 
of biography, but there's no categorical worry about narrative's falsifying nature (in fact, 
quite the opposite: any account of a life other than a narrative would falsify it).
MacIntyre is immune to the charge that a gap between narrative and narrated 
leaves narrative inherently falsifying: there is no such gap for him.  Instead he must 
answer the charge of the second branch, that if what we're talking about isn't distanced 
from the messy and banal details of our lives, then there is no reason to call it narrative.  
This is the more categorical way of raising the charge of trivialization.  It's not just that 
this or that life isn't in fact unified by some conception of the good.  Much more broadly, 
lives don't seem to be unifiable in such a way if we can't filter out their many irrelevant 
details.  If I ask why I'm now writing, I can indeed initiate a telescoping chain of further 
“why?” questions that terminates in a final notion of an ideal life as pursing the good of 
knowledge.  But if I ask why I made a curry for dinner, or why I keep my thermostat at 
62 degrees, or why I have exactly as many skin cells as I do, no such ideal is reached.  
Such facts would of course be left out of any explicit narrative representation of my life.  
As Velleman writes, “our life stories do not record every meal eaten, every phone 
answered, or every itch scratched” (2005, 223).23  But if my life really is a narrative, it's 
unclear how such details can be filtered out, and thus unclear why it's fair to characterize 
my life as a narrative at all.  
MacIntyre's account is thus stranded at the same place as Schechtman's revised 
22 MacIntyre here fails to see the circular nature of interpretation.  It is not as if one would have to write an 
entire biography before asking what genre it belonged to.  One ventures a hypothesis, then begins to test 
it, adjusting the hypothesis, the testing, and the emerging text as one proceeds.
23 Velleman thinks only “agential unity” arises from narrativity, and that it “is not related to personal 
identity in such a way that a single entity plays the role of self in both phenomena.”  So my approach 
here is wrongheaded from his point of view (2005, 223).
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one.  He suggests an alternative way forward, however.  Schechtman, it seems to me, 
abandons narrativity in all but name by equating us with the exhaustive chronicle of our 
paths as biological things through space and time.  She thus retreats into a commonsense 
materialism and away from the apparently radical claims of narrativity.  MacIntyre 
instead refuses to sink below a certain literary register in his language.  The question of 
how his account relates to biology (to say nothing of meals and thermostats) is too crude 
to broach.  Or, at the very least, his purposes are historical, social, and ethical, not 
metaphysical.  He opts for the out I showed Schechtman passing over earlier.  Questions 
of personhood are ethical, questions of identity metaphysical, and it is the former that 
interest him.  Objections from the latter side are about something else.  The larger frame 
might then be a Wittgensteinian one.24  We are different things according to different 
descriptions.  In an ethical context, our lives and selves are narrative.  Of course there's 
another context where we are merely biological things.  But that context isn't our 
everyday one, and it is generally irrelevant to our self-understanding.  Ricoeur usefully 
summarizes the related view of Anscombe (Wittgenstein's student and MacIntyre's 
teacher):
It is not in the same language game that we speak of events occurring in nature or of actions 
performed by people.  For, to speak of events, we enter a language game including notions like 
cause, law, fact, explanation, and so on.  The two language games must not be mixed but kept 
separate.  It is, therefore, in another language game and in another conceptual network that we can 
speak of human action.  For, if we have begun to speak in terms of action, we shall continue to 
speak in terms of projects, intentions, motives, reasons for acting, agents, and so forth.  
Recognizing and distinguishing language games is then a task of clarification, the essentially 
therapeutic task of philosophy. (1991A, 132-133)
Or consider Nelson Goodman's assessment: “If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell 
me how it is under one or more frames of reference; but if I insist that you tell me how it 
is apart from all frames, what can you say?  We are confined to ways of describing 
whatever is described” (2-3).  Saying anything further about what we really are is an 
empty philosopher's game: of that which we can't speak meaningfully, we shouldn't speak 
24 Robert Chodat suggested this idea to me.  Not unrelatedly, see his Worldly Acts and Sentient Things.
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at all.
I find this answer uncompelling, but perhaps that's only a matter of philosophical 
sensibility: we can (and routinely do) say something further.  Indeed, MacIntyre himself 
goes a bit further.  Having apparently presented the narrativity of lives as basic and thus 
opened himself up to Vice's bafflement that anyone could make such an obvious category 
mistake, he goes on, motivated to combat just such a response:
It is important to notice that I am not arguing that the concepts of narrative or of intelligibility or 
of accountability are more fundamental than that of personal identity. [...] The relationship is one 
of mutual presupposition.  It does follow of course that all attempts to elucidate the notion of 
personal identity independently of and in isolation from the notions of narrative, intelligibility and 
accountability are bound to fail.  As all such attempts have. (AV, 218)
But isn't this to say that there is some context (even, perhaps, some language game) 
where ethics and metaphysics are intertwined?  That we can't simply hold them apart?  
What could this realm be other than ontology, where a fuller accounting of what we and 
the world are is offered?  I began in my introduction by insisting that it is the question 
“Who am I?” not “What am I?” to which a narrative account of self responds.  We've now 
reached the point where, in the larger theoretical frame, we're forced to ask an ontological 
question: “What am I such that I can ask the question 'Who am I?'”  MacIntyre's text 
remains both enticing and frustrating exactly because it refuses to tread further into this 
territory.25  But absent such an accounting, it remains impossible to see what it means to 
say that our lives are narrative prior to any representation of them as such, and thus 
literally.
In the early development of philosophical hermeneutics, Dilthey made the 
distinction between explanation and understanding.  The natural sciences sought to 
explain an event by subsuming it as a particular case under a universal law.  There didn't 
seem much hope in extending this model to the human sciences, yet Dilthey didn't want 
to give up on their status as wissenschaftlich.  Hermeneutics thus tries to develop an 
25 See Williams 2007, 307-308.
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alternative model for the human sciences, according to which they don't explain human 
action according to laws, but rather where they come to an understanding of it.26  Later 
practitioners of philosophical hermeneutics such as Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur all 
criticize the sustainability of Dilthey's distinction.27  Such an approach suggests, however, 
that it is categorically confused to ask the interpretive claims of a narrative to do 
explanatory work, or for them to reduce or even map fully onto another level of 
description, that of scientific laws.  My suggestion is that ontological claims, about what 
we are, are neither explanatory nor a matter of understanding, but fundamentally underlie 
both.  To say what something is is neither to explain it nor to understand it.  We want to 
see why some things are in need of explanation, others are in need of understanding, and
—as in the case of entities such as ourselves—why some seem amenable to both.  As 
Ricoeur asks, “What is the being that makes possible this double allegiance of motive to 
force and to sense, to nature and to culture, to bios and to logos? […] Human being is as 
it is precisely because it belongs both to the domain of causation and to that of 
motivation, hence to explanation and to understanding” (1991A, 135).  What one 
tradition sees as the stopping point of philosophical inquiry, another sees as a place to 
begin.
In his Oneself as Another (as well as other texts), Ricoeur develops what he calls a 
“hermeneutics of the self.”  At its center is the distinction between idem and ipse identity, 
or identity as sameness and identity as selfhood.28  This tracks fairly cleanly with 
Schechtman's distinction, mentioned above, between reidentification and characterization 
questions about identity.  Famously for Ricoeur, our ipse identity, our identity as selves, is 
in large part constituted through narrative activity.  A full analysis of our identities 
requires what Ricoeur calls a “dialectic” between our narrative identities and more 
26 Beginning with his 1883 Introduction to the Human Sciences.
27 See Ricoeur's “Explanation and Understanding” in 1991A and 1976, 71-88 for discussion.
28 For Ricoeur's own summary of the view, see OA, 2f.
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traditional accounts of the metaphysical conditions of our continuity through time.  For 
my purposes, his dialectic is not especially different than MacIntyre's claim of the 
“mutual presupposition” of personal identity and narrative intelligibility.  In a very basic 
sense, it's hard for me to see how a dialectic could ever be taken as fundamental, rather 
than a mode of (in Dilthey's terms) understanding or perhaps explanation.  That is, it's 
hard for me to see how one could read a dialectical account of anything as making 
ontological claims.  In two famous historical instances of dialectic, Hegel's philosophical 
method and Adorno's and Horkheimer's “dialectic of enlightenment,” I take it the claim is 
something like that the object of analysis is best understood by positing two competing, 
countervailing forces.  But then it is those forces themselves, or whatever they in turn are 
analyzed into, that would have ontological heft.
The substantial ontological conclusions Ricoeur begins to draw at the end of 
Oneself as Another (the final, speculative chapter of which is titled “What Ontology in 
View?,” which I've co-opted as my subtitle) go afield from what I'm interested in here: 
into Merleau-Ponty's concept of “flesh,” into Levinas, and into parts of Heidegger—his 
account of conscience—that I positively want to avoid (as will be explained later).  I 
defer a fuller treatment of Ricoeur until I can compare his account with the Heideggerian 
one I'll develop.
In order to draw the conclusion that narrativity needs to turn explicitly to 
ontology, I've sketched a path through the work of Schechtman and MacIntyre.  One 
could arrive at this same conclusion by means of other argumentative pathways.  Let me 
sketch, much more briefly, just one.  Dennett offers an account of the narrative self as 
fictional and useful, and Velleman amends such a view, offering an account of the 
narrative self as fictional and true.
In his essay “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity,” Dennett argues that the 
self is an “abstractum” or “theorist's fiction” analogous to an object's center of gravity 
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(103, 105).  As a fiction, we can and do usefully employ it for explanatory purposes—yet 
we shouldn't be confused into thinking that it actually exists.  It even factors into causal 
explanations, Dennett argues: “We ask 'Why doesn't that lamp tip over?'  We reply 
'Because its center of gravity is so low.'  Is this a causal explanation?  It can compete with 
explanations that are clearly causal, such as: 'Because it's nailed to the table,' and 
'Because it's supported by wires'” (104).  The dis-analogy in Dennett's argument is this, 
however: an object's center of gravity, as a useful explanatory fiction, is ultimately an 
unnecessary one.  We could calculate when lamps would tip over and books would fall 
off desks without ever naming their center of gravity.  “Center of gravity” is just a 
placeholder, the solution of an equation (mass averaged over position).  Any causal 
claims we want to make concerning an object's center of gravity could instead be made 
by reference to its mass averaged over position.  The same isn't obviously true concerning 
selves, however.  As Dennett is quick to admit, a self “is a much more complicated 
concept” than a center of gravity (105).  Perhaps the most pressing complication is the 
way that we attribute causal relations to selves.  Physicalists might hold that these causal 
attributions are no different than the case above.  Just as “center of gravity” is a fiction 
and shorthand for underlying physical properties, “self” is a (more complicated) fiction 
and shorthand for (more complicated) underlying physical properties.  Until we can 
actually make causal predictions concerning selves in terms of merely physical 
properties, as we can make predictions concerning an object's mass averaged over 
position, other philosophers will be unwilling to accept the analogy that selves are merely
fictions, however.  According to Dennett's analysis, the self would seem not to have any 
ontological status.  An object's center of gravity “is not one of the real things in the 
universe” (103); analogously, so too for the self.  Our brains, in all their complexity, are 
what actually exist.  The functioning of a brain gives rise to the illusion of a self.  Dennett 
uses the same language as Vice to preclude further discussion: “if you still want to know 
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what the self really is, you're making a category mistake” (114).  This attempt to end 
discussion is made just where it should instead be expanded.
Responding to Dennett, Velleman writes “My only disagreement with Dennett [is] 
that, whereas he regards an autobiography as fictive and consequently false in 
characterizing its protagonist, I regard it as both fictive and true.  We invent ourselves 
[…] but we really are the characters whom we invent” (2005, 205-206).  Velleman's 
argument against Dennett hinges on our attribution of causal powers to the self.  Consider 
just one of his examples: “As you putter around the office at the end of the day, you 
finally say, 'I'm going home,' not because you were already about to leave, but because 
saying so will prompt you to leave” (213-214).  Whereas Dennett describes our narration 
of our lives as following along after our actions, Velleman suggests our self-narration is 
also prospective: “These utterances are issued as commitments, in the understanding that 
they will feed back into your behavior.  Hence you do understand that your running 
autobiography not only reflects but is also reflected in what you do” (214).  If this is the 
case, Velleman writes, “then the self [one] invents is not just an idle fiction, a useful 
abstraction for interpreting […] behavior.”  Rather, it “is a determinant of the very 
behavior that it's useful for interpreting” (212).  Velleman doesn't seem to consider the 
possibility that even in such instances, where the self and its narration apparently cause 
behavior, the self might only be operating in parallel to deeper physical causes, still in a 
merely fictional manner.  As is the case throughout this chapter, I don't want to enter into 
these first-order debates, however.  My aim is instead to locate their ontological 
commitments.
Velleman concludes that examples of the self as prospective and causing, rather 
than merely retrospective and caused, amount to “a conception of the self [that] no longer 
supports the skepticism of Dennett's initial conception”; the self is thus “true” rather than 
“false” (220).  He identifies two “subsidiary disagreements” as leading to this result.  
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First, whereas Dennett believes that the self is only an illusion of a “central controller,” 
Velleman thinks that, in the face of examples such as that above, “Dennett himself is 
committed to crediting a human being with a central controller, in the form of a narrative 
intelligence” (222).  Second, he thinks that Dennett's view of the self as an illusion gains 
unfair traction in the suggestion that “a human being's autobiography portrays the central 
controller as a 'brain pearl' or Cartesian ego” (222).  If we believe that the self couldn't be 
such a thing, then its appearing as such would suggest it must be an illusion.  As my 
treatment of Strawson's views should make clear, I agree with Velleman that the claim 
that the self appears as a punctual thing is not in fact a bit of phenomenology, but rather a 
claim colored by theoretical commitments that we should reject.  If we do, Velleman 
suggests, we don't have reason ahead of investigation to suppose the self is merely a 
fiction.
Until the day that physicalism can make good on its promissory notes (if such a 
day ever does come), Velleman's analysis of the self—as something not only caused, but 
which also causes—is the more compelling.  In what Taylor calls “the best account 
principle,” “The terms we select have to make sense across the whole range of both 
explanatory and life uses.”  It is unclear to Taylor how a purely scientific explanation 
could ever meet it: “How can we ever know that humans can be explained by any 
scientific theory until we actually explain how they live their lives in its terms?” (SS, 58).  
A more restrained conclusion would be that a physicalist explanation may one day 
suffice, but today we have only promises to that effect.  Velleman's conjunction of the 
predicates “fictive” and “true” seems strained, however.  If the selves we invent are 
“true,” why should we call them fictions?  These terms, it seems to me, are exhausted.  
The takeaway from Dennett's and Velleman's line of thinking should be the same as that 
from MacIntyre's and Schechtman's.  Terms such as “fiction,” “true fiction,” “fictive and 
true” are too metaphorical to ground the narrativist project.  Turning explicitly to 
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ontology will, I hope, allow us to develop more robust terms.
III. Narrativity and Naturalism
To be all meat and raw nerve is to exist outside of time and—momentarily—outside of narrative.
Jonathan Franzen (279)
From the arguments of this chapter, I want to draw a number conclusions that 
enter the ongoing path of the dissertation as a whole.  In order to even in principle assert 
that our lives are narratives in a literal sense, we must do so in the overarching context of 
an ontology that allows us to avoid two otherwise entailed and insurmountable problems.  
First, we need to have some grounds to deny that we are really, according to the most 
final accounting, biological organisms.  If we can't find some way to avoid simply 
condoning this materialist claim, then we have to admit that any narrative quality that our 
lives or selves possess is honorific and higher order, not basic to what we are, and thus 
not literally assertable.  We are describable both as biological organisms and in other 
terms; what is at stake is which description, if any, is most basic.  Second, our ontology 
requires some structural filter in place such that we don't have to admit that every last 
detail that could potentially be part of a chronicle of our lives is finally part of them.  If 
we don't have this, then we have no reason to describe such an exhaustive accounting as 
narrative.  At the same time, I think there is something to Goldie's worries of postmodern 
exaggeration and Vice's about categorical error.  We don't want to jump to the ontological 
extremes of flatly denying that we are biological organisms or denying the facts of the 
many minor details related to our lives.  We thus need to agree with the implicit line of 
argument in MacIntyre that we are different things according to different descriptions.  
There is both a true sense in which our lives are narratively shaped and our selves are 
characters defined by these plot arcs and there is a true sense in which we are just 
material things and our lives are inherently meaningless paths in space and time, 
148
endlessly describable in detail.  We need to go one step further in asserting an ontology 
that explains how such claims might function simultaneously.  I'll argue that Heidegger's 
conception of being-in-the-world offers productive ground for such a way forward.
It is necessary at this turn to locate my claims about commonsense and realism, 
denying that we're really biological organisms, and so forth, against philosophical 
naturalism.  “Naturalism” is a heavily contested term—both in the sense of what it means 
and whether it is true—and it is not my intention to enter into either type of debate here.  
In the broadest sense, I take it to be the view that the sort of entities that the natural 
sciences investigate are what there really is.  Thus explanation of other, higher-order 
phenomena will eventually need to reduce to these materialist explanations (even if we 
are far from being able to do so yet).  This is to put naturalism in ontological terms, as a 
thesis about what exists.  It is sometimes also articulated as a methodological thesis: only 
the scientific method of hypothesis and verification (or falsification) is a valid way of 
establishing knowledge.  Intuition, biblical revelation, metaphysics, mythology, 
storytelling, and so forth are not.29
Naturalism is at the heart of many contemporary thinkers' understanding of 
philosophy.  Anything that runs afoul of it runs the risk of becoming a kind of 
Hegelianism or worse, spinning metaphysical theses about the world out of nothingness.  
In my analysis of Schechtman's evolving views on narrativity, it seems to me that she 
wants very much to avoid saying anything that runs afoul of naturalism.  For thinkers of 
another sort, naturalism is a non-starter, as they don't see how even in principle it could 
ever explain human activity.  Again, it is not my purpose to enter into these arguments, 
only to locate myself against them, but a frequent starting place for motivating 
phenomenology is this: matter is never about anything else, yet we're all familiar with the 
basic intentionality of thoughts and words, and also with the way a story is about 
29 See Williams 2002, 22-27 for further discussion.
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something.  Taylor argues repeatedly against naturalism, and though he finds it deeply 
“implausible,” he still thinks we need to understand why, with the Enlightenment, it 
becomes a pervasive view.  Similarly, MacIntyre rejects behaviorism, perhaps the most 
popular form of naturalism contemporaneous to After Virtue.  He argues that there are no 
such things as basic human actions available for neutral description, prior to being 
interpreted for meaning.  Rather, human action can only be understood against a 
background of our understanding of what constitutes meaningful or intelligible behavior
—which in turn draws on interiority, intentions, and beliefs not reducible to a materialist 
explanation.
The question of whether beliefs, intentions, intentionality, and so forth are 
reducible to naturalist explanation is far beyond the scope of my project here.  Two 
points, however.  First, if one wants to use literary terms like narrative, plot, character, 
and so forth more than metaphorically in order to analyze selfhood, then it seems at least 
prima facie to be the case that one runs afoul of naturalism.  One must be willing to move 
beyond the strictures of current commonsense (as Schechtman, I've claimed, is not) and 
ask openly what such an analysis suggests about a larger worldview.  Second, it is far 
from sufficient to simply deny naturalism, as Taylor does.  Denying the possibility of 
materialist reduction doesn't explain how narrativity is to be grounded.  Whatever one's 
thoughts about naturalism, if we want to take narrativity seriously, then we have to begin 
to sketch an ontology and worldview that would explain how the dilemma I've proposed 
can be avoided.  Moving forward, my aim will not be to naturalize narrativity, but instead 
to make some of its apparent commitments less counterintuitive such that we can see 
what kind of worldview might comfortably house the apparently overstated claim that 
“life is a story.”
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Chapter Five
How Sartre, Philosopher, Misreads Sartre, Novelist:
Nausea and the Adventures of the Narrative Self
Besides, art is fun and for fun, it has innumerable intentions and charms.  Literature interests us on 
different levels in different fashions.  It is full of tricks and magic and deliberate mystification.  
Literature entertains, it does many things, and philosophy does one thing.
Iris Murdoch (4)
If there is something comforting—religious, if you want—about paranoia, there is still also anti-
paranoia, where nothing is connected to anything, a condition not many of us can bear for long.
Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow (434)
Both those who write in favor of and against the notion of the narrative self cite 
Sartre and his novel Nausea as exemplary opponents of it.  MacIntyre writes: “Sartre 
makes Antoine Roquentin argue not just [...] that narrative is very different from life, but 
that to present human life in the form of a narrative is always to falsify it” (AV, 214).  
Similarly, Strawson writes that “Sartre sees the narrative, story-telling impulse as a 
defect, regrettable. [...] He thinks human Narrativity is essentially a matter of bad faith, of 
radical (and typically irremediable) inauthenticity” (AN, 435).  This type of interpretation 
of Nausea is blindered and relies on an impoverished approach to reading fiction typical 
of philosophers: of taking one character at one moment as mouthpiece for both a novel as 
a whole and the author behind it.  Beginning as it does in description, the novel 
challenges these conceptual orders rather than taking one side or the other; it thus invites 
us to rethink the terrain of narrativity.  My argument here will move through three parts.  
First, in the main section of the chapter, I sketch a more holistic reading of Nausea and its 
notion of “adventures.”  Second, I suggest, calling on Heidegger’s distinction between 
the ontic and ontological, as well as categorical and existential analysis, what the broad 
shape of a revised conception of the narrative self might be.  This is the decisive shift of 
the dissertation, moving us from my criticisms of contemporary debates into my own 
positive interpretation of Heidegger as offering a conception of the narrativity of the self.  
Finally, I suggest that this leaves us with a robust notion of why the novel as a form has 
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philosophical importance, an importance exactly passed over by the sort of approaches 
that allow, for example, Nausea to be reduced to an argument.
I. Narrative and Adventures
MacIntyre, in his comments on Nausea, makes no distinction between the 
standpoint of Roquentin, as character, and Sartre, as author of the novel specifically or 
philosopher and literary figure in general.  Rather, he distinguishes between 
Sartre/Roquentin, Sartre/Heidegger, and Sartre/Marx and claims that Sartre/Roquentin 
believes that living and storytelling are mutually exclusive: “There are not and there 
cannot be any true stories.  Human life is composed of discrete actions which lead 
nowhere, which have no order; the story-teller imposes on human events retrospectively 
an order which they did not have while they were lived” (AV, 214).  Strawson is initially 
more careful in distinguishing Sartre and Roquentin, ascribing such a view to the 
character alone (AN, 429), but he quickly conflates them as well, thus doing away with 
the interpretative problems with which Sartre for better or worse burdens us when he 
chooses a form other than the treatise and doesn't speak in his own voice.1  Strawson 
ascribes to Sartre and Roquentin the view that we impose narrative form on our lives, but 
doing so is falsifying and so we shouldn’t: “the story-telling impulse” is “regrettable” and 
“inauthentic,” though natural and nearly unavoidable (AN, 435).  This is, I think it is safe 
to say, the orthodox reading of Nausea, among philosophers and most especially with 
respect to narrativity.2
The key moment to support this reading occurs early in the novel.  Roquentin 
muses on the possibility of what he calls “adventures”:
for the most banal even to become an adventure, you must (and this is enough) begin to recount it.  
1 Similarly, a popular anthology of Sartre's work includes passages from Nausea alongside ones from his 
treatises under the title The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (Cumming, ed.).
2 See too Abbott, 22, 135-6; Brooks, 22.
152
This is what fools people: a man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and 
the stories of others, he sees everything that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his 
own life as if he were telling a story. (39) 
All this falls under Strawson’s descriptive “psychological Narrativity thesis,” which (see 
chapter one) he differentiates from the normative “ethical Narrativity thesis” (AN, 428).  
Roquentin continues, however, making his own normative claim:
But you have to choose: live or tell. [...] Nothing happens while you live. [...] But everything 
changes when you tell people about life; it’s a change no one notices: the proof is that people talk 
about true stories.  As if there could possibly be true stories. [...] I wanted the moments of my life 
to follow and order themselves like those of a life remembered.  You might as well try and catch 
time by the tail. (39-40)
If this were all the novel had to say on the matter, then MacIntyre and Strawson might be 
right to identify Roquentin as an opponent of the narrative self (though even then 
extending such a claim to the novel and Sartre would require further moves).  Formally, 
Nausea becomes a rather odd novel by this reading, with its key moment occurring so 
close to its beginning, less than a fourth of the way in.  Indeed, this moment begs to be 
considered in conjunction with at least two others: when Roquentin goes to see Anny in 
Paris and the close of the novel.  Doing so undercuts the claim that Roquentin, the novel 
as a whole, and Sartre finally sanction the choice: “live or tell.”
Despite its fractured beginnings and diary form, Nausea evolves into a fairly 
traditional novel.  It begins with such formal contrivances as an “editor's note,” which, in 
a Kierkegaardian manner, describes what follows as “found among the papers of Antoine 
Roquentin” and “published without alteration” (1), as well as a number of undated pages 
whose gaps and illegible sections are highlighted by supposedly editorial footnotes (1-3).  
Only two more footnotes follow, on pages four and twelve, then the device is abandoned.  
Roquentin's entries become longer and more straightforward, lengthy stretches of action 
related naturalistically with less and less commentary.  They lose their diary-like 
character, becoming instead a typical first-person narrative.  As Frank Kermode writes, 
“Sartre began La Nausée as an episodic work, and Roquentin's practice reflects this; but 
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the need for structure grew imperious” (146).  All this is to say that Nausea becomes just 
the sort of story that MacIntyre and Strawson claim Sartre/Roquentin opposes, with a 
clear arc from a motivating crisis, through various rejected possibilities for restoration, to 
a final epiphany.  Roquentin has been beset by the titular nausea, a feeling of unknown 
cause and meaning that comes over him when he is in close observation of various 
objects.  Simultaneously, he has been thrown into what we familiarly call (in part due to 
Nausea) an existential crisis.  He gives up his writing and is plagued by the thought that 
he “hadn't the right to exist” (84).  Figuring out how exactly these two problems are 
related—or whether they are really just one problem—requires interpretive work, but 
they motivate everything that follows.  In the middle of the novel, Roquentin is presented 
with traditional solutions to at least his existential purposelessness: the self-taught man 
offers him humanism and socialism as reasons for living (103ff), and Bouville offers him 
images of the life of society.3  Rejecting all of these options, Roquentin is left fully abject: 
“there is absolutely no more reason for living, all the ones I have tried have given way 
and I can't imagine any more of them. [...] my life is ending” (156-157).  About to leave 
for Paris to retire from life at his young age, Roquentin comes, in the novel's final scene, 
to his great realization while listening to the jazz record.  This traditional epiphanic 
structure is obscured because the novel cuts off just after his realization without 
dramatizing its consequences.  It is there nonetheless and set up by his musings on 
“adventures.”  Before moving forward with my reading, I want to compare its notion of 
“adventures” to Georg Simmel's concept of the same name.
Simmel's 1910 essay “Philosophie des Abenteuers” (reprinted as “Das 
Abenteuer”) begins from the claim that every experience is twofold: it can be taken 
3 This latter is represented by Roquentin's Sunday walk down the Rue Tournebride (40ff) and visit to the 
Bouville Museum to look at the portraits of the city's past luminaries (82ff).  Hayden Carruth makes a 
similar point in his introduction to the novel (xi-xii).
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immediately, by itself, or it can be taken as “a segment of a course of life” (243).  The 
difference is not in the content of the events themselves, but rather in how they are taken, 
the “form of experiencing” (253).  The first manner of taking an experience—as 
immediate, detached from the course of life—Simmel names “adventure.”  Given two 
experiences “not particularly different in substance,” perhaps only one is “perceived as an 
'adventure' and the other not,” because everything hangs on us, not the events (243).  This 
line of thought is mirrored in Roquentin's first, fumbling attempts to explain the nausea 
and the change that has come over him.  “I think I'm the one who has changed,” he writes 
(4).  Later: “This feeling of adventure definitely does not come from events: I have 
proved it.  It's rather the way in which the moments are linked together” (56).
“[T]he most general form of adventure,” Simmel writes, “is its dropping out of the 
continuity of life” (243).  Its events are actually continuous with what comes before and 
after, but “an adventure stands in contrast to that interlocking of life-links,” and “in its 
deeper meaning, it occurs outside the usual continuity of life” (243).  In what would seem 
to be a paradox, an adventure, while marginal to the course of life, “is distinct from all 
that is accidental and alien”; it is ultimately “connected with the center” (243).  It should 
thus not be confused with “the merely accidental episode” (252).  In an early encounter, 
Roquentin is “astonished” when the self-taught man introduces the concept of adventures, 
on which Roquentin himself has been privately musing, into their conversation.  And the 
self-taught man's definition echoes Simmel's: “an event out of the ordinary without being 
necessarily extraordinary” (35-36).
Afterward, in memory, an adventure takes on a dreamlike quality, Simmel claims.  
And “What we designate as 'dreamlike' is nothing but a memory which is bound to the 
unified, consistent life-process by fewer threads than are ordinary experiences” (244).  
Indeed, an adventure can appear so detached from the normal course of one's life as to be 
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thought of as someone else's experience: “we might well feel that we could appropriately 
assign to the adventure a subject other than the ego” (244).  Roquentin moved to Bouville 
after traveling for a number of years, and it is these experiences abroad that provide the 
initial template for adventures in the novel: “in the old days, in London, Meknes, Tokyo, I 
have known great moments, I have had adventures” (37).  He describes the end of this 
stretch of his life as like waking “from a six-year slumber” (5; see too 98).  Thinking 
about his time in Meknes, he becomes unsure “whether they are memories or just fiction” 
(32).  And, again recalling Simmel, he writes that “There's a person who does this, does 
that, but it isn't I, I have nothing in common with him” (33).  He takes this back mere 
pages later, writing with double emphasis “Well you can call that by any name you like, 
in any case, it was an event which happened to ME” (37).  Yet he is unsure, at least at this 
point, “what the word [adventure] means” (36), leaning momentarily toward the 
conclusion that, in fact, he has “never had adventures” and “It isn't a question of words” 
(37).
Simmel writes further that “We ascribe to an adventure a beginning and an end 
much sharper than those to be discovered in the other forms of our experiences” (244).  
Being disconnected from the larger course of life, an adventure's beginning is not 
dependent on prior events' endings, and its own ending does not necessarily give way to 
subsequent events' beginnings.4  Roquentin seems again to take up Simmel's language.  
Sitting in a cafe, he thinks: “I marvel at these young people: drinking their coffee, they 
tell clear, plausible stories. […] If I were in their place, I'd fall over myself” (7).  Why?  
Because he sees now that “you plunge into stories without beginning or end” (7).  But 
this is true of non-adventurous experience in the normal course of life.  Of his adventures 
4 Compare this claim to Aristotle's in the Poetics: “By 'beginning' I mean that which does not have a 
necessary connection with a preceding event, but which can itself give rise naturally to some further 
fact or occurrence.  An 'end', by contrast, is something which naturally occurs after a preceding event, 
whether by necessity or as a general rule, but need not be followed by anything else” (39).
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abroad, Roquentin claims “I could tell stories, tell them too well (as far as anecdotes are 
concerned, I can stand up to anyone except ship's officers and professional people)” (33).  
Even as he comes to doubt whether these really were adventures and whether there can 
be adventures at all, Roquentin still appears to employ Simmel's vocabulary: “The 
beginnings would have had to be real beginnings.  Alas!  Now I see so clearly what I 
wanted.  Real beginnings are like a fanfare of trumpets, like the first notes of a jazz tune, 
cutting short tedium, making for continuity” (37).  In turn, endings are emphasized as 
well: “Something is beginning in order to end: an adventure does not let itself be drawn 
out.” (37).  An adventure forms a self-standing whole.
Simmel draws a connection between the adventurer and the artist: “For the 
essence of a work of art is, after all, that it cuts out a piece of the endlessly continuous 
sequences of perceived experience, detaching it from all connections with one side or the 
other, giving it a self-sufficient form as though defined and held together by an inner 
core” (245).  Roquentin puts the storyteller in the place of Simmel's artist.  Coming back 
now to the key passage, one has to choose, “live or tell,” because “nothing happens while 
you live.  The scenery changes, people come in and go out, that's all.  There are no 
beginnings.  Days are tacked on to days without rhyme or reason, an interminable, 
monotonous addition” (39).  Telling organizes an experience by way of a beginning and 
an ending, making it akin to an adventure.  “[E]verything changes when you tell about 
life [….] You seem to start at the beginning […, but] in reality you have started at the 
end,” because “the end is there, transforming everything” (39-40).  Such is impossible of 
lived rather than recalled experience, though we all too easily “forget that the future [is] 
not yet there” (40).5
5 Heidegger's account of projection, which I turn to in the next chapter, suggests that the future is always 
already here in some sense.  Roquentin briefly toys with a similar idea: “I see the future.  It is there, 
poised over the street, hardly more dim than the present” (31).
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This emphasis on beginnings and endings, which are said to be absent from the 
normal course of life, leads Roquentin to a further comment on adventures: whereas life 
is merely one thing after another, in an adventure the exact chronology matters.  There is 
a “rigorous succession of circumstances” (23).  He thus equates the “feeling of 
adventure” with the “irreversibility of time” (57).  Recalling his adventures abroad, 
Roquentin writes that “never was I able to turn back, any more than a record can be 
reversed” (23).6  Such a feeling is in contrast to the random, happenstance quality of 
Roquentin's everyday life in Bouville, where he can take a walk, visit a cafe, work in the 
library, and so forth in any order he pleases.  While experiencing the feeling of adventure, 
Roquentin says he “cannot even conceive of anything around [him] being other that what 
it is” (54).  Everything is determined and has its exact place.  In contrast, normally 
everything is contingent: “Anything can happen, anything” (77).
Roquentin's larger fate seems to hang not on whether adventures as such are 
possible or not, despite his sometimes putting it this way.  Even after declaring it 
impossible to have an adventure—and experience it as such in the moment instead of just 
telling it that way after the fact—he still has momentary feelings of adventure.7  Rather, 
Roquentin's problem is perhaps that such moments are not enough: he wants his entire 
life to be an adventure.  “I wanted the moments of my life to follow and order themselves 
like those of a life remembered,” he writes (40).  Simmel argues that this is in fact 
possible: “life as a whole may be perceived as an adventure” (247).  As noted, the 
seeming paradox of adventures is that, while detached from the wider course of a life, 
they seem to bear on, or represent more forcefully, the meaning of an entire life.  “[I]t 
connects with the most recondite instincts and some ultimate intention of life as a whole,”
6 The novel frequently draws an analogy between life and melody.
7 In one moment, he recalls “I felt my heart swell with a great feeling of adventure,” but there is no sense 
that the retrospective narration is creating this feeling.  He goes on to report his real-time feelings while 
writing in the diary: “I am as happy the hero of a novel” (54).  In another entry he writes again in the 
present tense (135).
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Simmel writes (252).8  “[A]n action is completely torn out of the inclusive context of life 
and […] simultaneously the whole strength and intensity of life stream into it” (254).  But 
if an adventure distills or compacts a life's larger meaning into one episode, how can life 
as a whole be experienced as an adventure?  “To have such a remarkable attitude toward 
life,” Simmel writes, “one must sense above its totality a higher unity, a super-life, as it 
were, whose relation to life parallels the relation of the immediate life itself to those 
particular experiences which we call adventures” (247).  He goes on:
Perhaps we belong to a metaphysical order, perhaps our soul lives a transcendent existence, such 
that our earthly, conscious life is only an isolated fragment as compared to the unnamable context 
of an existence running its course in it. […] Whoever senses through all actual life a secret, 
timeless existence of the soul, which is connected with the realities of life only from a distance, 
will perceive life in its given and limited wholeness as an adventure when compared to that 
transcendent and self-consistent fate. (247-248)
As his lengthy conversation with the self-taught man demonstrates, however, Roquentin 
rejects any principle of order or meaning beyond himself such as humanism or socialism, 
to say nothing of religion (112ff).  At the same time, he rejects the idea that he himself 
can bequeath a meaning to his life.  The self-taught man offers such an alternative as 
well: “Life has a meaning if we choose to give it one.  One must first act, throw one's self 
into some enterprise.  Then, if one reflects, the die is already cast, one is pledged” (112).  
Sartre is frequently taken to sanction something like this view in his doctrines of radical 
freedom and a life project.  Here, however, Roquentin at least rejects it: “I think that that 
is precisely the sort of lie that [the others in the cafe] tell themselves” (112).  At least one 
way of reading the novel is that Roquentin used to have a goal or principle guiding his 
life and that it is its loss that initiates his crisis.  Having lost any sense of what he's doing, 
Roquentin can no longer experience adventures which speak to a larger meaning.  At best 
he can experience brief flashes of dramatic, heightened feeling.  But these are now taken 
as mere feelings, an illusion to be seen through.
8 An “ultimate intention of life as a whole” seems the same as the good which is the object of MacIntyre's 
quests and Taylor's hyper-good (see chapter one).
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If the normal course of life is “continuous” and “whole,” according to Simmel, 
with a “consistent process run[ning] through the individual components” (243), but it is 
only adventures that have real beginnings and endings ordering and shaping their 
meanings, where is narrativity to be found?  As I began by noting, Nausea is frequently 
taken as a venue for disputing narrativity, or even an argument against it.  But is a 
rejection of adventures a rejection of narrativity, or is their identification too quick?  
Roquentin writes, in one moment, “at last an adventure happens to me and when I 
question myself I see that it happens that I am myself and that I am here; I am the one 
who splits the night” (54).  To the extent that adventures are associated with such 
“absolute presentness” (Simmel, 254), it would seem that a rejection of their possibility is 
exactly not a rejection of narrativity.  Rather it is the normal course of a life which is said 
to consist of one thing linked to and following another, seemingly a quality of narrative.  
A great strength of Nausea as a novel is that its descriptions elude didactic subjection to 
our more straightforward conceptual orders.  It doesn't dramatize preexisting 
philosophical theses—it describes the (or a) world.  Against the thought that it is merely 
or at least primarily pedantically philosophical, it seems to me that Nausea begins from a 
set of familiar experiences in all their inarticulateness and apparent contradictions and 
honestly describes the crisis they bring forth.  A narrativist reading of Nausea should take 
it not as an argument, but an invitation to new and further distinctions, an invitation to the 
thought that the current vocabulary of narrativity fails to get at experience as we actually 
have it.  Is narrative best characterized by temporal succession, by beginnings and 
endings, by meaningfulness, by unity?  I've argued for a particular characterization in 
chapter three, and one can't extract an attack or defense of narrativity from Nausea absent 
such touchstones.  Following my characterization, in which unity, retrospection, and 
actual beginnings and endings are less important than temporal succession, there is no 
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clear link between adventures and narrativity.
The notion of adventures invoked in Nausea is so similar to that in Simmel's essay 
that it is hard for me to think other than that Sartre knew of it.  So far as I can tell, no 
scholar has made this connection before, and there is perhaps no way of proving it.  
Sartre hardly ever refers to Simmel in his work, and never to “Das Abenteuer.”9  Later 
scholars have, of course, drawn connections between other parts of their work.  Deena 
Weinstein and Michael Weinstein, for example, distinguish between, in their terms, 
“modern(ist)” and “postmodernized” versions of Simmel.  Among the first camp, which 
they further subdivide, they include Sartre:
For the romantic faction life-experience is centered in the individual self. […] For the 
phenomenological faction life-experience is centered in the interactive event.  Here Simmel 
becomes a (hyper-liberal) 'existentialist,' a partisan of being-in-the-world like Martin Heidegger, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. (21-22)
This they contrast to the “postmodernized” Simmel of Michael Kaern:
In Kaern's challenging work, Simmel appears as a philosopher of the 'as-if' [….] Kaern's Simmel 
is an adventurer of inquiry: the human condition is to live by hypothesis, never by certainty, and 
each experiment is an adventure undertaken in the absence of any ontological confidence. (26)
I'm less sure of the contrast between these views; my own interpretation of Heidegger sits 
right on the cusp between them, as he is already a philosopher of the “as-if” by my 
reading, and his conception of being-in-the-world is what secures our ability to 
hypothesize regional ontologies for specific purposes.  But I'm getting ahead of myself.  
Let me track the final scenes of the novel before developing these suggestions.
Visiting his ex-girlfriend Anny, Roquentin realizes that she too appears to have 
come to the realization that adventures are impossible, only she has a different 
vocabulary.  She has realized that “there are no more perfect moments” (144).  As a child 
seeing the few pictures included in a history book (“three pictures for the whole sixteenth 
century”) she came to believe that there were “privileged situations,” “which had a rare 
9 In a diary entry he refers to “historical relativism of the Simmel type” (1999, 298, 300).
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and precious quality, style” (147).10  It is left to people who find themselves in privileged 
situations to make them into perfect moments.  Roquentin, carried away, fills in the 
explanation for her: “In each one of these privileged situations there are certain acts 
which have to be done, certain attitudes to be taken, words which must be said—and 
other attitudes, other words are strictly prohibited. [...] In fact, then, the situation is the 
material: it demands exploitation” (148, see too 62).  Notice that, despite the similarity, 
there's at least one decisive difference between adventures and privileged situations.  An 
adventure is only an adventure after the fact, in telling.  But one is aware, in the moment, 
that one is in a privileged situation—thus the ability and responsibility one has to make 
use of it, to realize a perfect moment.  Roquentin suggests that a perfect moment is like 
an artwork and thus, perhaps, that the normative weight here is aesthetic, but Anny cuts 
him off and says this is wrong, that making a perfect moment of a privileged situation 
was rather a duty, even a moral duty.  And Anny disagrees further when Roquentin 
explains to her his realization about adventures.  She says:
you’re not thinking like me at all.  You complain because things don’t arrange themselves around 
you like a bouquet of flowers, without your taking the slightest trouble to do anything.  But I have 
never asked as much: I wanted action.  You know, when we played adventurer and adventuress: 
you were the one who had adventures, I was the one who made them happen.  I said: I am a man 
of action.  Remember?  Well, now I simply say: one can’t be a man of action. (150-151)
It’s not at all clear that Roquentin agrees with this and even less clear that the novel as a 
whole could be said to endorse it.  Roquentin has, as Anny suggests, been asking the 
question of whether life is an adventure.  But their conversation holds other tensions.  
Roquentin used to think that adventures naturally befell him.  Here Anny reveals that she 
made them happen, both for herself and him.  He’s never asked whether one can make 
one’s life an adventure.  We’ve witnessed him wander around Bouville, thinking and 
telling himself stories, but never even attempt to really do anything.  Thus we have the 
10 The novel highlights the similarity: Roquentin uses the phrase “a rare and precious quality” (une qualité 
rare et précieuse) early on to describe adventures (37).  Anny, unprompted, uses the same phrase (une 
qualité tout à fait rare et précieuse) here to describe privileged situations (147).
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beginnings of a distinction between one’s life as a narrative and the narrativizing impulse
—the action of making one’s life a narrative or of taking it as such.  And in the move 
from the vocabulary of adventures to that of privileged situations and perfect moments, 
the manner of this taking is no longer limited to retrospective storytelling—it is available 
in the present.  I’ll come back to this, but here we should notice that Roquentin hasn’t 
clearly rejected the possibility of action, as Anny has.  In fact, immediately following her 
monologue, Roquentin reports: “I couldn’t have looked convinced” (151).
The conversation turns to the question of what to do, given all this.  Anny says she 
“outlives” herself (151).  She seems to mean that her life is already over and she's now 
just filling time meaninglessly until death.  “Outliving oneself” is contrasted to acting: 
describing a painter, Anny says that he “isn't like us—not yet.  He acts, he spends 
himself” (153).  By contrast, we're told that she travels widely and lives off a man who 
“keeps” her (151).  But now Roquentin is lost in thought about the possibilities of art.  
From the impetus of the “strange happiness” the jazz record gives him each time he hears 
it, he says: “I was wondering if, in that direction, one couldn’t find or look for...” and 
trails off before making explicit the thought that art might offer some sort of happiness, 
consolation, or salvation (151-152).  He rejects the possibilities of painting and sculpture, 
saying that they “can’t be used” because “they’re lovely facing” him (152).11  He needs 
something he can embody, not something given from outside, again suggesting the 
distinction between observing one’s past life as a narrative and living or experiencing it 
as such in the present.  Elsewhere Sartre writes: “An event: that's to say, a temporal flow 
that happened to me—that wasn't in front of me, like a picture or piece of music, but that 
was made around my life and in my life, with my time” (1999, 283).  Roquentin rejects 
theater as too tied to its audience.  Finally he says that he “tried to write a book...” but is 
11 Earlier, he rejects ceramics as well, saying “baked objects […] do not amuse [him]” (82).
163
interrupted (152).  The scene quickly ends, but it has set up the novel’s finale.
MacIntyre notes as evidence for his interpretation that Roquentin gives up writing 
his historical biography of Rollebon: “either he will write what is true or he will write an 
intelligible history, but the one possibility excludes the other” (AV, 214).  Astonishingly, 
though, MacIntyre says nothing about the fact that Nausea ends with Roquentin deciding 
to write a novel.12  This despite the fact that he holds it against Sartre that “in order to 
show that there are no narratives, he himself writes a narrative” (AV, 214).  So MacIntyre 
would seem to have us believe that Sartre’s use of narrative is evidence of its importance, 
but Roquentin’s use of narrative doesn’t suggest anything parallel in his (fictional) or 
Sartre’s (real) thinking.  How does Roquentin get to this point?  At the beginning of the 
novel he says “you plunge into stories without beginning or end” (7).  Now, though, he 
views his previous life as ended and decides to make a new beginning: “I am still fairly 
young.  I still have enough strength to start again.  But do I have to start again?” (156).13  
Here he hasn't quite yet resolved to do so, instead taking up Anny's notion of outliving 
oneself: “My whole life is behind me [….] I am going to outlive myself.  Eat, sleep, 
sleep, eat.  Exist slowly, softly, like these trees, like a puddle of water, like the red bench 
in the streetcar” (157).  By the closing scene of the novel, however, Roquentin has 
gathered new resolve.  He goes back to the Railwaymen’s Rendezvous one last time, and 
the waitress puts the jazz song on for him.  In the length of two plays (he asks her to 
repeat it) he is again captivated, transported from the dismissive thought that “there are 
idiots who get consolation from the fine arts” to the resolution that he will become an 
artist himself (174).  He thinks about the singer and songwriter: “They are a little like 
dead people for me, a little like the heroes of a novel; they have washed themselves of the
12 This move is foreshadowed earlier, when Roquentin lets his imagination of Rollebon’s situation run 
rampant only to conclude that, taking this tack, he’d be better off writing a novel about him instead of a 
biography (58).  Even earlier, he writes “I have the feeling of doing a work of pure imagination” (13).
13 Interestingly, he seems to take this language over from the young couple whom he overheard (and 
mocked in his thoughts) in the cafe while talking to the self-taught man (110).
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sin of existing” (177).  He thinks he could do the same:
Can you justify your existence then?  Just a little? [...] Couldn’t I try....  Naturally, it wouldn’t be a 
question of a tune ... but couldn’t I, in another medium? ... It would have to be a book: I don’t 
know how to do anything else.  But not a history book: history talks about what has existed—an 
existant can never justify the existence of another existant. [...] Another type of book.  I don’t quite 
know which kind—but you would have to guess, behind the printed words, behind the pages, at 
something which would not exist, which would be above existence.  A story, for example, 
something that would never happen, an adventure.  It would have to be beautiful and as hard as 
steel and make people ashamed of their existence. (177-178)
One can’t justify the existence of another person or thing but can, at least in part, justify 
one’s own.  And Roquentin proposes to do this exactly by producing a story.14  That story 
itself couldn’t happen in life, but the telling of it will justify his life.  And it seems 
important to him that he be understood as a novelist, that he lives that story, in which he 
is identified with a typical role and character.  “A novel,” he writes, “And there would be 
people who would read this book and say: ‘Antoine Roquentin wrote it, a red-headed 
man who hung around cafes,’ and they would think about my life as I think about [the 
jazz singer's]: as something precious and almost legendary” (178).15
There seems to me no irony in any of this—either on Roquentin’s or the novel’s 
part.16  That is, this way of revitalizing himself really is proposed as a solution to his 
crisis.  The novel, against the standard reading of it, doesn't finally dismiss the notion of 
the narrative self, I think.  MacIntyre and Strawson have to hold that Roquentin falls back 
into inauthenticity at the end of the novel.  By this reading, the full arc of the story is this: 
the novel opens with Roquentin's first experiences of the nausea and his initial failures to 
articulate its meaning.  By the time he poses the choice “live or tell,” a quarter of the way 
into the novel, he has grasped its core, though he will nuance his explanation in later 
14 Hazel Barnes claims that the novel Roquentin will produce is Nausea itself (203).  This is possible, but 
she offers no argument for this claim, and I see no evidence for it.
15 Again, this is set up early in the novel.  He writes “I am so happy when a Negress sings: what summits 
would I not reach if my own life made the subject of the melody” (38).
16 Against Fredric Jameson, for example, who writes that “it is characteristic of Sartre’s way of dealing 
with such literary problems that he should tell an anecdote to demonstrate the impossibility of 
anecdotes, that he should possess the means to make this lived time spring drearily from the page at the 
same time that he is demonstrating how irreducible it is to language” (25).  I’ll return to this point in my 
discussion of Kermode's reading of the novel.
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scenes.  The main part of the novel then dramatizes Roquentin's attempts, with various 
backslidings, to live without the consolations of narrativity and tarry instead with raw, 
unstructured existence, nauseating as it is—a brave decision philosophically, a foolish 
one practically, within the frame of the novel.  Its climax is then his failure, his return to 
inauthenticity, buttressed now with false rationalizations of narrative in the guise of art.  I 
am skeptical of such a reading most of all because I see nothing in the final pages to 
undercut Roquentin's epiphany and turn to art.  The idea that one’s life—especially one’s 
entire life—literally is a narrative remains dubious, but Roquentin will aim to justify his 
existence through producing narrative, and exactly doing so will allow him to understand 
himself (and have others understand him) within a certain narrative, that of the cafe-
frequenting novelist.  Narrative is not inherently falsifying, either, sanctioned by a merely 
practical rubric: it is both justifying and a legitimate form of understanding.  Roquentin's 
“live or tell” motivates the events of the novel; it is not a solution to them.  Once we 
diagnose the nature of Roquentin's crisis, we have to see this and everything else he says 
not as epigraphs or philosophical theses, but instead claims made from inside a particular 
and likely problematic mood and mindset.  Thus let me sketch how I interpret both the 
nausea and Roquentin's larger existential crisis, as well as the relation between them.
First, then, Roquentin's existential crisis.  Though it is thematized only in the later 
portions of the novel, after various episodes of the nausea, it seems to me that 
Roquentin's crisis of purpose is actually more important, and indeed at least a condition 
of the possibility, if not the cause, of the nausea.  Roquentin has isolated himself in 
Bouville to write a biography of Rollebon.  He has no family, no friends, and his only 
personal interactions are with the proprietress of the cafe, with whom he occasionally has 
sex, and with the self-taught man, whom he mocks mercilessly in his diary.  Indeed his 
isolation is perhaps best exemplified by his agreeing to spend time with the self-taught 
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man, despite loathing him, apparently in order to have something, anything, to do outside 
of his writing.  Roquentin declares that “Rollebon now represents the only justification 
for my existence” (70).  Midway through the novel, he abandons writing the biography, 
leaving himself with no such justification.  This, in and of itself, is unremarkable.  He 
seems to think that practically no one else's existence is justified either.  He describes the 
young couple in the cafe, for example, as needing to “find something else to veil the 
enormous absurdity of their existence” (111).  What is remarkable is only that Roquentin, 
unlike everyone else, notices this lack of justification.  At times, not noticing seems 
equated (though perhaps only sardonically) with having a justification.  Roquentin looks, 
for a long time, at a portrait of one of the city's past luminaries: “The slightest doubt had 
never crossed those magnificent grey eyes,” and “He had never looked any further into 
himself: he was a leader,” and thus he, like the other leaders portrayed, “had a right to 
everything: to life, to work, to wealth, to command, to respect, and, finally, to 
immortality” (83-85).17  It might seem, then, that Roquentin's existential crisis is really a 
subjective matter: it's not that various people's existences are or aren't objectively 
justified, but rather that he has lost his ability to interpret his life, as, having given up 
writing the biography of Rollebon, he no longer has any goal or purpose.  This is to 
suggest, despite MacIntyre's seeing Sartre as an opponent, that the novel is actually in 
line with the wider analysis in After Virtue:
When someone complains—as do some of those who attempt or commit suicide—that his or her 
life is meaningless, he or she is often and perhaps characteristically complaining that the narrative 
of their life has become unintelligible to them, that it lacks any point, any movement towards a 
climax or a telos.  Hence the point of doing any one thing rather than another at crucial junctures 
in their lives seems to such persons to have been lost. (AV, 217)
Nausea arrives at this point, as novels do, by way of plot and psychological description, 
not argument and analysis.  In fact, the argument nested within the novel—“live or 
tell”—is a red herring, inadequate when understood within the larger frame of the story.
17 See too Sartre's story “The Childhood of a Leader” (1975, 84-144).
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Roquentin denies his problem has anything to do with purpose, however.  He tells 
the self-taught man that “there is nothing, nothing, absolutely no reason for existing” 
(112).  The self-taught man interprets this claim as one might: “you undoubtedly mean, 
Monsieur, that life is without a goal?”  But Roquentin thinks to himself that this is wrong: 
“Certainly not, that is not the question I am asking myself” (112).  Instead, he comes to 
equate the realization that one is not justified in one's existence with the very realization 
that one exists.  Other people, “they don't know they exist” (122).  They can, by 
Roquentin's way of seeing things, therefore delude themselves into thinking their lives 
have meaning.  Previously, he had thought this way as well: “Never, until these last few 
days, had I understood the meaning of 'existence.'  I was like the others [….] I said, like 
them, 'The ocean is green; that white speck up there is a seagull,' but I didn't feel that it 
existed or that the seagull was an 'existing seagull'; usually existence hides itself” (127, 
see too 124).  Now, though, he realizes: “I hadn't the right to exist.  I had appeared by 
chance, I existed like a stone, a plant or a microbe” (84).  “Every existing thing is born 
without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance,” he declares (133).  
The nausea is equated with this realization.  “So this is Nausea,” he concludes, “I exist—
the world exists—and I know that the world exists.  That's all” (122).
From Roquentin's perspective, the nausea comes first.  He realizes, due to the 
heightened experiences of the pebble at the shore, the waiter's suspenders, and so forth, 
that objects exist—that is, that they exist contingently and without purpose.  He then 
extends this thinking to himself, bringing about an existential crisis.  From our 
perspective as readers, however, it seems to me we should think the order is in fact the 
opposite: he has lost the ability to interpret the ongoing course of his life, which leaves 
him in crisis.  Roquentin is an unreliable narrator in the banal sense that we all are 
insomuch as we are not necessarily best located to interpret the meaning of our own 
experiences.  While Roquentin's stated reason for starting his diary is to understand the 
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changes that first befell him while holding the pebble on the shore, and only later does he 
think he has lost his life's purpose, we can see that already at the beginning of the novel 
his ennui is being displaced onto innocent objects.  It is from within this particular mood 
that he makes the strange mistake of extending the category of justification to material 
objects.  This allows him to reinterpret his crisis as a weighty philosophical discovery.  
But asking after the “justification” of material objects is a category mistake.  And when 
Roquentin has a real epiphany in the novel's final scene of the value of art, he regains the 
possibility of assigning himself goals and interpreting his actions in relation to them.
To read the novel in this manner is to suggest that many of Roquentin's 
philosophical “realizations” aren't that because they are false.  It is thus perhaps to 
downplay a certain kind of philosophical worth the novel is sometimes thought to have 
and to play up its psychological insight into the phenomenon of a hermeneutic crisis.  
That's not to say that the novel lacks philosophical insight—it's just to suggest that its 
insight is not of the most abstract, metaphysical sort, into the arbitrariness of being, but 
anchored instead always in our particularly human way of being-in-the-world.
II. An Ontological Narrative Self
I've started to let slip certain bits of Heideggerian jargon, so let me make explicit 
the claim that Nausea might be read more insightfully through Heidegger's rather than 
Sartre's philosophy, especially as it concerns narrativity.18  My aim in this section is to 
introduce and motivate the major shift of the dissertation: from an ontic version of the 
narrative self to an ontological one.  What follows here is only a first sketch, to be 
elaborated and defended over the remaining chapters.
Roquentin's claim, which grows almost to a mantra, that he alone knows that he 
18 Compare William V. Spanos's “The Un-naming of the Beasts: The Postmodernity of Sartre's La Nausée” 
in 1987 which, though also a Heideggerian reading, comes to different conclusions.  Like Jameson and 
Kermode, Spanos reads the end of the novel ironically, integrating this claim into a fuller interpretation.
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exists, whereas everyone else “forgets” this, should remind us of Heidegger's starting 
point in Being and Time, the “question of Being”: “This question has today been 
forgotten” (SZ, 2).  We've forgotten it inasmuch as we tend to ask not about being, but 
beings or entities.19  But “The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity” (SZ, 6).  Consider 
most strikingly Roquentin's language when (after the fact) he comes to understand how 
he was overtaken, nightmarishly, by the chestnut tree's being:
So I was in the park just now.  The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk in the ground just under 
my bench.  I couldn't remember it was a root any more.  The words had vanished and with them 
the significance of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have 
traced on their surface.  I was sitting, stooping forward, head bowed, alone in front of this black, 
knotty mass, entirely beastly, which frightened me.  Then I had this vision.
It left me breathless.  Never, until these last few days, had I understood the meaning of 
“existence.”  I was like all the others, like the ones walking on the seashore, all dressed in their 
spring finery.  I said, like them, “The ocean is green; that white speck up there is a seagull,” but I 
didn't feel that it existed or that the seagull was an “existing seagull”; usually existence hides 
itself. (126-127)
The first paragraph recalls Heidegger's famous account of “equipmental” or “tool being.”  
Normally, we do not encounter objects as “present-at-hand,” as things of a certain shape, 
possessing certain qualities, extended in space.  Instead, we simply use them as tools.  A 
bit farther down the page, Roquentin says explicitly of objects that they “served [him] as 
tools” (127).  What commands our attention are instead our goals, what we are doing.  
The tools we use to accomplish these goals fade to the edges of our experience.  A 
hammer becomes an extension of me and my will as I focus, not on the hammer as an 
object, but on driving the nail (SZ, §15).  Roquentin's phrase “points of reference” recalls 
as well Heidegger's analysis, by which a tool's usefulness is only intelligible in a network, 
where it refers to and interconnects with the uses of other tools (SZ, §17).  Particularly in 
the English-speaking world, these are among the most familiar parts of Heidegger's 
thought, due especially to the commentary of Hubert Dreyfus.  A distinctive claim of my 
interpretation of Being and Time is that Heidegger's analysis of our experience of the 
being of tools as ready-to-hand is actually quite marginal to the main purposes of the 
19 Except in direct quotations, where I adhere unless modification is noted to Macquarrie and Robinson's 
translation, I leave aside the unjustified capitalization in English of nouns like “being.”
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project.  Let me begin to explain by way of Roquentin's second paragraph.
Roquentin's claim that he had never understood existence, never understood what 
it means to use the verb “is,” invokes the first moves of Being and Time.  Roquentin uses 
the example “The sea is green”; one of Heidegger's is “The sky is blue” (SZ, 4).  We 
think, since we use the verb “to be” all the time, “that 'Being' is of all concepts the one 
that is self-evident” (SZ, 4).  Heidegger admits that we must indeed have some 
understanding of it, but we are unable to make it explicit.  We're not even sure how to 
formulate the question of what we mean by our use of the verb “to be.”  “The very fact 
that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still 
veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again,” he 
writes (SZ, 4).  The goal of Being and Time is not really even to answer the question of 
the meaning of being, but only to raise it.  Heidegger's analysis of tools as ready-to-hand 
plays a primarily negative role along this path.  One of the main reasons the question of 
being has been forgotten, according to Heidegger, is that we equate being with presence, 
especially since Descartes.  We think, for example, that when we say “The sea is green,” 
that the sea is present before us, filling space in a certain way, and exhibiting the quality 
of greenness.  The purpose of Heidegger's analysis of tools is to undercut this equation of 
being and presence by showing us that we're already familiar—in fact we're most familiar
—with experiencing objects' being not as present-at-hand, but as ready-to-hand.  In the 
course of our everyday routines, we don't experience the objects we use as present, but 
almost as absent.  We attend to our goals, and, so long as things are going well, the tools 
we use to accomplish these goals don't impinge on our attention.
The details of Heidegger's analysis of equipmental being are well-known and 
don't need further rehashing here.  What does need to be stressed is that this analysis isn't 
actually central to Being and Time.  Once Heidegger has undercut the equation between 
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being and presence by thematizing the ready-to-hand, he can move on to his actual focus, 
which is our being, what he calls “Dasein.”  Literally meaning here-being or there-being 
and used to refer to existence, Dasein is the being that each of us as an individual human 
person is.  But why is Dasein the focus of Being and Time?  If Heidegger's task is to raise 
the question of being, it would seem that examining our being as Dasein would be just as 
off-track as examining the being of a hammer experienced in use as ready-to-hand or as 
examining the being of a rock we just look at as present-at-hand.  Dasein too is an entity.  
The key difference is that we have some understanding of being, what it means to use the 
verb “is,” even if we can't make it explicit: “Understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein's Being” (SZ, 12).  Or as he otherwise puts it: “Dasein is an 
entity which does not just occur among other entities.  Rather it is ontically distinguished 
by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it” (SZ, 12).  
Because Dasein already has an understanding of being implicit in its own manner 
of existence, Heidegger takes it as the privileged site for pursuing ontology, or the study 
of being.  We can now understand his key distinction between the ontic and the 
ontological.  Ontic investigations are of the being of entities as entities of this or that type 
and ontological investigations are of their being itself.  Natural science is exemplary of 
the ontic, treating the world as it does as composed of objective and empirically 
investigatable entities, forces, and so forth.  There are much more everyday instantiations 
of the ontic, however—science is simply the most formalized.  To look at different 
foodstuffs on the grocery store shelf as ingredients for cooking or as objects with 
different kinds of packaging is ontic as well.  We can investigate ourselves ontically if we 
take ourselves as objects—in physiology, psychology, and anthropology, for example.  
But we as Dasein underlie such ontic investigations.  This is seen most clearly if we make 
explicit the schema implicit in a key quote from Being and Time:
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The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the 
possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so 
doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those 
ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. 
(SZ, 11)




Individual sciences such as physics or anthropology investigate entities.  They are ontic.  
They are guided by particular and differing conceptions of what sort of entities exist, 
what it is that entities are.  These guiding conceptions are ontologies—plural because 
they are different, and sometimes called regional ontologies to stress this point.  What 
Heidegger is finally most interested in, however, is how it is that we are able to 
hypothesize such plural ontologies.  We as Dasein are taken as the condition of such a 
possibility.  Being and Time's task of raising the question of being is pursued through the 
intermediary task of investigating Dasein's manner of being, which is taken as the 
fundamental ontology underlying all other investigations.   The way I want to invoke the 
distinction between the ontic and ontological is this: an ontic notion of the narrative self 
would follow after the world has been sorted out according to some conception of what 
entities are.  Most conceptions of the self's narrativity are pursued within the frame of 
psychology or, more generally, the philosophy of mind.  We are taken as minded beings, 
and narrativists claim that the form of our mindedness is to see our lives and experiences 
as conforming to narrative patterns.  An ontological notion of the narrative self would 
claim instead that the basic structure of the way we exist—as being-in-the-world—is, 
properly understood, narrative in form, prior to to any assumption about whether we are 
best understood as minded beings, or biological entities, or anything else.  Indeed, if our 
being-in-the-world is narrative in form, then the possibility of understanding ourselves in 
other ways is derivative of this account.  Before saying more, we have to see how the 
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ontic/ontological distinction leads directly into another, methodological one.
Following his explanation of the ontological difference,20 Heidegger distinguishes 
between two modes of analysis: existential and categorical.  He writes, “Existentialia and 
categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being.  The entities which 
correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: any 
entity is either a 'who' (existence) or a 'what' (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense)” 
(SZ, 45).”21  In our case, “The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence,” Heidegger writes, 
in a phrase Sartre will latch onto (SZ, 42).  We do not exist fully in any one moment, 
definable by stable categories, but temporally: “whenever Dasein tacitly understands and 
interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint” (SZ, 17).  So in 
order to understand the being of Dasein, our being, we have to analyze our way of 
existing temporally as a who.  Heidegger will note later that “In Being and Time, the term 
'existence' is used exclusively for the being of the human being” (1998, 283).  We are the 
only entities that merit a form of analysis other than the categorical: “rocks,” “trees,” 
“horses,” “angels,” and “God” by his enumeration all “are, but don't exist” (1998, 283).  
Being and Time is an investigation into how we understand ourselves in the first person, 
temporally, in a world—here I hope one can begin to get a glimpse of why I take 
Heidegger's account of Dasein to be implicitly narrative in form.
These distinctions—ontic/ontological, categorical/existential—lead to Sartre's, 
from Being and Nothingness, between being-in-itself and being-for-itself (Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirt is another important source), but I think the latter terms can't do 
the work we need them to do.  Sartre's indebtedness to Heidegger is well known, and my 
aim is not to offer a full Heideggerian reading of Nausea.  But I do want to claim that, 
20 Heidegger doesn't introduce this famous phrase for distinguishing the ontic and ontological until later in 
his 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
21 Recall that I began from this distinction in my introduction to the dissertation.
174
occurring so early as it does in Sartre's career, Nausea remains sufficiently in thrall of 
Heidegger's thought to motivate the notion of an ontological narrative self.  Roquentin 
happens into just the experience Heidegger seeks to recover: of the being of things 
instead of just those things by way of their familiar names and categories.  This order of 
influence was perhaps obscured historically in Anglo-American philosophy.  In English, 
Being and Time first appeared in 1962, much later than Nausea (1949) and Being and 
Nothingness (1948).  Sartre's two works are yoked together in the minds of many English 
speakers, and plausibly so, as they appeared in translation nearly simultaneously, well 
before Being and Time became available.  Iris Murdoch and Frank Kermode, whom I'll 
discuss in the final section of this chapter, straightforwardly take the novel to present the 
philosophical thinking of Being and Nothingness, despite the fact that they were written 
in the opposite order, with some time in between.  Being and Time was published in 
German in 1927, Nausea in French in 1938, and Being and Nothingness in French in 
1943.  Sartre studied at the French Institute in Berlin in 1933-4, when he was at work 
writing the novel; he intended to read both Husserl and Heidegger there, but ended up 
focusing on Husserl.  He claims that he read Being and Time in full only in 1939, but he 
bought and began it while in Berlin in 1933 (1999, 182ff).  Ethan Kleinberg, in his 
account of Heidegger's influence on Sartre, argues that the first encounter was through 
“What Is Metaphysics?,” which Sartre read in translation in 1931 (116ff), and he makes 
the case as well that Nausea is indebted to Heidegger (124ff).  The parallels in the 
passage I've quoted above, as well as those elsewhere, lead me to think that Sartre had 
more than a passing familiarity with Being and Time when he wrote Nausea, as specific 
language which recurs there is not present in “What Is Metaphysics?”22
22 Kleinberg claims specifically that Sartre's “contingency” (contingence)—which plays a central role in 
the novel—is a translation of Heidegger's “Geworfenheit,” or “thrownness” (124).  That word appears 
only once, and in passing, in “What Is Metaphysics?,” however: “These possibilities of nihilative 
behavior—forces in which Dasein bears its thrownness [Geworfenheit] without mastering it—are not 
types of mere negation” (1993, 105).  Without knowledge of other Heideggerian texts, I don't think one 
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All of this is by way of background to making my central claim: Nausea, in the 
particular ways that it evades the contemporary conceptual apparatus of narrativity, 
should lead us to distinguish between ontic and ontological conceptions of the narrative 
self.  Philosophical debates have often been preoccupied with the ontic narrative self and 
thus the question of whether our lives and selves, treated as objects, are narrative in form.  
MacIntyre and Strawson are right that Roquentin, Sartre, and Nausea all reject this 
notion.  Here they can martial their evidence of Roquentin musing on the lack of 
objective beginnings and ends, the perverting shaping of telling, and so forth.  And this 
criticism—of the notion that our lives just are stories—is right, I think.  The idea that 
most of our lives literally enact a plot diagram, say, of exposition, rising action, 
complication, climax, and resolution is almost farcical.  MacIntyre’s reliance on the 
nearly archaic word “quest” is telling (AV, 219ff).  Some of our lives may indeed involve 
a fairly reliable search for happiness or wealth or knowledge, but most of our activities 
aren’t as dramatic as that, but instead usually banal, repetitive, and irrelevant to the larger 
course or meaning of our lives.23
All of this seems to miss the point.  Are our lives narratives?  This seems the 
wrong question.  Much more compelling is an ontological notion of the narrative self.  
Such would be the idea not that our lives are, taken as objects, narrative in form, but that 
we necessarily understand or take them that way, that our manner of being sorts the world 
out according to narrative threads.  This would allow us to admit that according to one 
(vaguely scientific) description our lives are contingent, formless, and usually 
undramatic, while at the same time admitting, when we’re not abstracting to a more 
would have any idea what the word means here (there is one more mention in the introduction, but that 
isn't added to the lecture until 1949).
23 I would suggest, as an alternative to “quest,” the concept of “the search” from Walker Percy's novel The 
Moviegoer.  MacIntyre might respond that “search” is not open-ended enough.  We quest after the holy 
grail, something whose appearance and perhaps even existence we're unsure of (AV, 219).  We search 
for our car keys or a missing hiker.  Invoking “the,” rather than “a” search, as Percy's novel does, 
perhaps overcomes this objection; the definite article inflates the term's importance and abstraction.
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distanced and objective perspective, that our lives seem to have shape and intelligibility.  
If it is we who are narrativizing rather than our lives that are narratives, then our concern 
acts as the filter which emphasizes moments of importance while passing over the routine 
and banal.
David Carr, in his Time, Narrative, and History (woefully ignored in the recent 
literature), reframes the questions of narrativity exceptionally well along these lines.  The 
relation between narrative and the “real world” is miscast “By stressing the discontinuity 
between 'art' and 'life'” and taking narrative as a form of representation (16):
In discussing the “representational” character of narrative, theorists such as [Louis] Mink and 
Hayden White are sometimes unclear on exactly what it is in their view that narrative tries, but is 
constitutionally unable, to represent.  “The world,” “real events” are terms they often use.  But this 
way of speaking introduces a very misleading equivocation.  Narratives, whether historical or 
fictional, are typically about, and thus purport to represent, not the world as such, reality as a 
whole, but specifically human reality.  But when the term “reality” is left unqualified, we are 
tempted by the strong naturalist prejudice that what counts as reality must be physical reality.  
What this suggests is either the random activity and collision of blind forces, devoid of order and 
significance, or, alternatively, a reality totally ordered along rigorous causal lines without a flaw or 
gap in its mechanism.  These two notions are of course incompatible with each other, but what 
they have in common is the idea that in either case “reality” is utterly indifferent to human 
concerns.  Things simply happen, one after the other, randomly or according to their own laws.  
Any significance, meaning, or value ascribed to events is projected onto them by our concerns, 
prejudices, and interests, and in no way attaches to the events themselves. […]
All this confuses the issue because, as these theorists very well know, what stories and 
histories represent or depict is not purely physical events but human experiences, actions, and 
sufferings, including the human activity of projecting meaning onto or finding meaning in physical 
and other events. (19-20)
The right question to ask is not whether the events of our lives, according to an 
objectifying description, have the shape of artistically wrought stories.  The right question 
to ask is whether, from the perspective of lived experience, we see and organize our lives 
in such a manner.  Whether, to put it even more strongly, our notion of what we are as 
people, and how people differ from other entities, is ultimately grounded in such a way of 
being in the world.  Above, I made the initial distinction between the notion that our lives 
are narratives and the notion that we make or take them as such.  Carr writes: “the 
narrative character or structure of our experience and action is not something that simply 
va de soi.  Life can be regarded as a constant effort, even a struggle, to maintain or restore
177
narrative coherence in the face of an ever-threatening, impending chaos at all levels” 
(91).  Working from Husserl's account of time-consciousness, Carr criticizes the analogy 
between isolated events and sense data or, better, criticizes the notion of isolated events in 
the same way that others have criticized the notion of sense data.  They are abstractions, 
not building blocks (24, 66).  Heidegger, following Husserl, offers examples:
We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of 
things—as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear 
the three-motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volkswagen.  
Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves.  We hear the door shut in the 
house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds.  In order to hear a bare sound we 
have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly. (1971, 25-26)
The novelist Don DeLillo offers an even richer example:
She was in town, driving down a hilly street of frame houses, and saw a man sitting on his porch, 
ahead of her, through trees and shrubs, arms spread, a broad-faced blondish man, lounging.  She 
felt in that small point in time, a flyspeck quarter second or so, that she saw him complete.  His life 
flew open to her passing glance.  A lazy and manipulative man, in real estate, in fairview condos 
by a mosquito lake.  She knew him.  She saw into him.  He was there, divorced and drink-haunted, 
emotionally distant from his kids, his sons, two sons, in school blazers, in the barest blink.
A voice recited the news on the radio.
When the car moved past the house, in the pull of the full second, she understood that she 
was not looking at a seated man but at a paint can placed on a board that was balanced between 
two chairs.  The white and yellow can was his face, the board his arms and the mind and heart of 
the man were in the air somewhere, already lost in the voice of the news reader on the radio. 
(2001, 72).
We don't merely hear a car rather than a set of sounds; Heidegger's example is still 
abstracted from any context in which we might actually hear a car.  Nor do we merely 
mistake a pile of junk for a person.  Rather, we ascribe character and story to that gestalt, 
experience it most immediately in a richly meaningful form.  In ordinary experience, we 
don't witness isolated events, one after another, then put them together: “The bedrock of 
human events, then, is not sequence but configured sequence” (Carr, 44).  
In the end, Carr goes too far: “no elements enter our experience, we maintain, 
unstoried or unnarrativized” (68).24  He admits that at “a very abstract level of analysis” 
we can divorce elements of our experience from narrativized form (68).  In Heideggerian 
terms, we can posit a regional ontology that allows us to look at bits of our experience in 
24 Schapp is the only other thinker I'm aware of that defends such a radical claim.
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isolation.  This is what skeptics of narrativity do: they posit a regional ontology, if only 
implicitly, then ask whether the resulting isolated bits form a recognizably story-like 
pattern.  Instead, Carr wants to inquire after what I'm calling an ontological notion of the 
narrative self: is our ordinary, temporal experience narrative in form before such analysis 
and abstraction, indeed ultimately what underlies the possibility of more scientific 
investigations?  Carr's claim that everything is narrativized by our experience is too 
strong, however.  This is a claim I want to carefully delimit as one about our selves.  
There is no reason, it seems to me, that my experience of much of the world—of a 
painting, for example, or a landscape—will take narrative form.  It is only when we turn 
to my experience of my self in the world that narrative assumes a central role.  Why?  
Because, as we saw Heidegger claim above, we—unlike rocks, trees, and animals—exist 
and can be understood only through temporal, existential analysis.
If we maintain a distinction between the ontic and ontological, it’s not clear that 
such narrativizing is falsifying.  Bad faith, in Sartre’s terminology, occurs most often 
when being-for-itself takes itself as being-in-itself.  This can happen, as in his famous 
scenarios, when we slip entirely into social roles, behaving in a certain way because that 
is how one in that situation—one playing that role—typically acts (see my discussion in 
chapter eight).  Thereby we avoid taking responsibility for our behavior.  But simply to 
understand one’s self and situation in narrative terms isn’t necessarily to fall into bad 
faith.  This happens only if one reifies oneself into a thing—a thing rigidly defined, a 
thing that is—instead of understanding, much more provisionally, that one is always 
projecting an understanding of oneself and where one is going.  In this way we can 
perhaps make narrativity more compatible with Sartre’s philosophical thought and his 
emphasis on our free making of ourselves.  Like many readers, I take it as a great 
weakness of Sartre’s thought that he seems to constantly overstate our freedom, whereas 
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Heidegger, through his concept of thrownness in particular, is more attuned to the 
constraints within which we always have to find ourselves.
All this suggests that the appropriate master metaphor or analogy is not that a life 
is or is like a story, but that living is or is like reading.  Narrative is of philosophical and 
phenomenological interest not because we think back on our pasts like we think back on 
a novel that we’ve finished reading.  MacIntyre writes: “Stories are lived before they are 
told—except in the case of fiction” (AV, 212).  But isn’t it a part of our character as self-
conscious beings that we don’t live, then tell, and keep these acts isolated from one 
another, but see the larger, emerging structure of our lives even as we live them?  Don’t 
we sometimes act for narrative reasons?  We saw Velleman raise this claim against 
Dennett in chapter four.  Again, Heidegger is here key: he emphasizes that we cannot 
grasp the structure of our entire lives, since they are available in full only after death, so 
we have to live in anticipation of our deaths much as, through the hermeneutic circle, we 
understand anything through active projection.  Considering the sweep and architecture 
of a novel as a whole exactly doesn’t seem to say anything about the meaning of our 
lives.  Instead doing so leads us into more formal concerns unrelated to the structure of 
living.  But the process of actually reading a novel (reading rather than having read), of 
finding oneself in the midst of a hermeneutic situation, projecting the future plot, 
receiving new information, entering into and abstracting beyond characters’ perspectives
—this tells us much about our own situations and the fact that our self-understanding is 
always located, projecting, fragmented, and progressive, not retrospective and whole.  
Only in exceptional circumstances (near-death experiences, the writing of autobiography, 
truly off-putting self-indulgence) do most of us probably cast an eye over the shape of our 
entire lives.  But our understanding of individual situations and our motivations for acting 
within them are ridden through by narrative concerns.  I develop these suggestions more 
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fully in the remaining chapters.
III. Against Didacticism
I have yet to say much about how Sartre himself understood Nausea, despite the 
title of the chapter.  I admit that I don’t much care about the answer to this question, and 
I’m not sure that one can substantiate the claim that Sartre viewed all narrative as a 
manifestation of bad faith.  Instead, I think Sartre’s misreading of his own work is more 
categorical, that his theory of literary interpretation is flawed.  It’s clear, though, that 
Sartre himself did care about this sort of question.  In his autobiography The Words, he 
identifies Roquentin with himself completely and suggests how he understood the novel's 
larger meaning, while ironically suggesting some embarrassment25 looking back:
At the age of thirty, I executed the masterstroke of writing in Nausea—quite sincerely, believe me
—about the bitter unjustified existence of my fellowmen and of exonerating my own.  I was 
Roquentin.  I used him to show, without complacency, the texture of my life. I was I, the elect, 
chronicler of Hell [….] I was impossible myself and differed from the others only by the mandate 
to give expression to that impossibility [….] I was a prisoner of that obvious contradiction, but I 
did not see it, I saw the world through it (251-252).26
In his War Diaries, Sartre discusses Nausea as if it were a treatise: “In La Nausée, I assert 
that the past is not...”; “I appeared to be saying, in La Nausée, that [adventures] didn't 
exist.  But that's wrong...”; “I'd already explained all that in La Nausée” (1999, 209, 198, 
283).
More importantly, in his “What Is Literature?,” written some two decades before, 
say, Roland Barthes’s “Death of the Author,” Sartre emphatically endorses authorial 
intentionality.  He begins by making a strong distinction between poetry and prose.  Poets 
treat words as things in themselves, not as signs, and so they don’t traffic in meaning at 
all, since their words don’t refer to anything beyond themselves.  “Poets […] refuse to 
25 That's how I take the interjection in the first sentence.  Elsewhere, however, Sartre names the novel first 
when asked how he wanted people to remember him (Charlesworth, 154).
26 In his War Diaries as well, Sartre identifies Roquentin (as well as Mathieu from the The Age of Reason) 
with himself (1999, 338).
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utilize language,” he writes (29).  Prose is then just a utilization of language and only 
about something beyond itself.  This leads Sartre to the conclusion that a prose writer is 
always communicating something and his affirmation of authorial intentionality as the 
locus of meaning for a text:
And if prose is never anything but the privileged instrument of a certain undertaking, if it is only 
the poet’s business to contemplate words in a disinterested fashion, then one has the right to ask 
the prose-writer from the very start, ‘What is your aim in writing?' (36)
Even more strongly, he goes on to argue that a prose writer always knows the meaning of 
his or her texts in advance and never discovers anything in them: “he knows them [his 
words] before writing them down [….] Thus the writer meets everywhere only his 
knowledge, his will, his plans, in short, himself” (50-51).  Here is the philosopher’s way 
of reading fiction at its worst: a novel has a meaning that exists behind it, perhaps even 
before it, and its purpose is merely to dramatize that meaning.  Once it is extracted, it’s 
unclear that the novel has any remaining value.  Often even the complexities of 
dramatization are ignored, as in MacIntyre’s and Strawson’s readings of Nausea when a 
character is understood to simply speak the meaning of the novel.27  One might call this 
the disquotational theory of literary meaning: find the most epigraphic line of dialogue in 
the novel and remove the quotation marks.  Indeed it may be even worse.  The novel may 
only be a bad, imperfect instantiation of the meaning it points back to, a meaning which 
might be better—more purely—presented in treatise form.  Cynically, then, the novel 
might only have value inasmuch as one can find more readers for novels than treatises.
27 This way of reading might be traced back to Aristotle’s claim in chapter six of The Poetics that the 
“thought” of a tragedy consists in the actual statements and arguments uttered by the characters.  
Stephen Halliwell insists that one shouldn’t confuse the thought internal to a tragedy with the poet’s 
own guiding thought, however, and thinks Aristotle might not embrace any concept at all of the latter 
(Aristotle, 38, 96, 171-3).  By contrast, Ricoeur writes that “'Thought,' in this narrative context, may 
assume various meanings.  It may characterize, for instance, following Aristotle's Poetics, the 'theme' 
(dianoia) that accompanies the 'fable' or 'plot' (mythos) of a tragedy” (ON, 175).  We might even reach 
all the way back to Plato.  Recall the opening of Book III of the Republic, where Socrates reads off 
countless lines of poetry as the sorts of things that need to be barred from the city, seemingly taking 
mere inclusion of a statement in a poetic work to suggest sanction.  Of course Plato’s own dramatic 
maneuverings complicate this.
182
Affirming these hermeneutic practices, Frank Kermode takes a reading of Nausea 
as far as one can in his The Sense of an Ending.  He too starts from the claim that Sartre 
distrusts fictions.  “The absurd dishonesty of all prefabricated patterns is cardinal to his 
beliefs,” Kermode writes (133).  And so he argues that Nausea represents the struggle 
between the ideal and real, fiction and contingency.  But since he starts from Sartre’s 
philosophy, he can’t but conclude that philosophy is true and fiction only useful inasmuch 
as it gets the philosophy right, out-and-out wrong inasmuch as it misrepresents it: “In so 
far as it [Nausea] gives structure and form to the metaphysical beliefs expressed in the 
treatise [Being and Nothingness], it both represents and belies them” (137).  The 
interpretive path remains one-way: “In all these ways, then, the novel falsifies the 
philosophy” (139).  Never is there any talk of the treatise falsifying the novel, and indeed 
that seems a strange thought, but perhaps it is a thought we should have.  As the novelist 
Milan Kundera writes, discussing Sartre, “This is still the old ineradicable error, the 
belief that the relation between philosophy and literature goes only one way, that insofar 
as 'professionals of narration' are obliged to have ideas, they can only borrow them from 
'professionals of thought'” (2006, 63).  Kermode’s reading remains penetrating in that it 
sees these interpretive issues as themselves integral parts of the workings of the novel.  
They are not a mere failure on Sartre’s or the novel’s part, but structural: “it [Nausea] 
reflects a philosophy it must, in so far as it possesses novel form, belie” (144-145).  
Finally his reading is unnecessarily limited by the assumptions of authorial intentionality 
and unidirectionality in the relationship between philosophy and literature.  “The novel, 
then, provides a reduction of the world different from that of the treatise.  It has to lie.  
Words, thoughts, patterns of word and thought, are enemies of truth,” he writes (140).  
And so he agrees with Strawson that Sartre views fiction as “distrusted” yet “humanly 
indispensable” (Kermode, 150). 
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Playing the role of a critic of his own novels, it's clear that Sartre agrees.  “I'm 
perfectly well aware that in a novel it's necessary to lie in order to be true,” he writes 
(1999, 158).  In writing that novels “lie,” Sartre is suggesting that novels present reality 
in a different form, and that this form falsifies reality as it actually is.  It seems to me that 
Sartre’s novels don’t distrust themselves in these ways, however.  As mentioned, Nausea 
becomes a more traditional novel as it progresses, its diary form quickly becoming a 
forgettable bit of artifice.  Most of Sartre’s other fictions display no ironies at all about 
their status.  To the extent that Sartre’s philosophy and fiction are in tension, I would 
suggest we conclude not that the fiction is falsifying, but instead that he’s a better novelist 
than his own theories and most specifically his theory of prose allow.  Once one makes 
such a move, Sartre's stated interpretation of the novel and identification of Roquentin 
with himself become mere anecdotes from literary history, curiosities that we'd be better 
off ignoring.28  Nausea seems to me a somewhat embarrassing novel if about the horror of 
contingency, but a very good one if about a man in hermeneutic crisis.  Having lost his 
sense of where his own life is going, Roquentin starts to view the justification of 
everything's existence as unmoored—even mere physical objects, to which applying the 
concept of justification seems in fact merely confused.  Similarly, Camus’s The Stranger 
seems to me somewhat tedious if taken as a polemic about the absurdity of existence but 
very good if taken as a black comedy about an inarticulate man.  Only if we view 
characters strictly as puppets manipulated by authors for polemical purposes (as Sartre 
himself seems to) need we conclude that existentialist novels are about existentialism, or 
any novel about its novelist’s beliefs.29  Instead, we might view characters not as objects, 
28 In the introduction to his Philosophy as Fiction, Joshua Landy provides an excellent model, arguing for 
the distinction between Proust and the narrator of his novels, though he appeals to Proust's external 
writings in doing so (36), whereas I'm arguing that, in Sartre's case, this leads us astray.
29 I’m reminded of Curtis White’s lament that his friends, when asked about Saving Private Ryan, seemed 
unable to think of the characters as anything but real people, that is, to also think of them as part of a 
structure of meaning manipulated by Stephen Spielberg (42).  One thinks that we’re in rather bad shape 
if, at the other extreme, we can only think about characters as puppets.
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but instead ontological constructions, structures of sensibility—indeed ways of being, of 
existing—that we can work to inhabit.30  And so even if one is finally unsympathetic to 
Sartre’s or Camus’s philosophical program, one might think that they had real talents as 
fiction writers, and exactly part of what constitutes such talent is putting more or other on 
the page than one conceptually intends.  Indeed, Sartre dramatizes a moment in Nausea 
which speaks exactly against his own later theory.  Roquentin writes a sentence only to 
have its meaning escape him:
I had thought out this sentence, at first it had been a small part of myself.  Now it was inscribed on 
the paper, it took sides against me.  I didn't recognize it any more.  I couldn't conceive it again.  It 
was there, in front of me; in vain for me to trace some sign of its origin.  Anyone could have 
written it.  But I … I wasn't sure I wrote it. (95)
According to Sartre's theory of prose, the meaning of a sentence can't “takes sides 
against” its author—it just means what the author wants it to.  Elsewhere, Sartre describes 
“the writer who does not want to be responsible” for what he or she writes as a 
“schizophrenic dreamer,” and that such is the “inverted and inauthentic dream of 
freedom” (1992, 46n; see too 53).  But when he actually writes fictional prose, he 
dramatizes his alter-ego's realization that things are more complicated.
The overarching idea that philosophy’s truths are truer than fiction’s truths is 
wrongheaded, I would suggest.  One of the great attractions of the existentialist 
philosopher/novelists was the apparent thought that the novel might be a better venue for 
thinking than the straightforward treatise if our thinking (and living) in fact isn’t itself 
straightforward.31  Iris Murdoch, herself a philosopher/novelist and a great promoter for 
existentialism, seemed to give in to these parochial notions in her early encounters with 
existentialism, writing that “Sartre’s novels and plays have a strictly didactic purpose” 
30 What I’m defending here is a certain kind of psychologically realist novel, though “psychology” is not a 
broad enough category.  Better: what Murdoch (following French critics, she says) calls “the 
phenomenological novel” (101).  See too Farrell in Gibson, ed., 254-256.  There are other arguments to 
be made for the philosophical importance of other versions of the novel.
31 Goldie: “To the complaint that narrative thinking is messy and imprecise […] the right reply is that this 
is just what it should be, given that life itself is messy.  We must resist the temptation to oversimplify 
life, the mind, the life of the mind” (MI, 173).
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(103).  A decade later, however, Murdoch criticized Sartre’s theory of prose and argued 
that literature might help us recover from the reductions modern thought has performed 
on our lives.  “We have been left with far too shallow and flimsy an idea of human 
personality,” she writes (287).32  And so now “We need more concepts than our 
philosophies have furnished us with [….] We need more concepts in terms of which to 
picture the substance of our being” (293).  But if it is a categorical, formal difference in 
approach between philosophy and literature that has allowed the former to impoverish us 
and that gives the latter hope, surely it is not further concepts that we need at all.  Better: 
“It is here that literature is so important, especially since it has taken over some of the 
tasks formerly performed by philosophy.  Through literature we can re-discover a sense 
of the density of our lives” (294).  Sense, not concepts: that is, literature has an ability 
philosophy lacks, to imply or perform or produce thoughts rather than literally inscribing 
them onto the page.  To show rather than tell.  The mistake that MacIntyre and Strawson 
make in reading Nausea, and that philosophers all too frequently make in reading fiction 
generally, is to think that the meaning of a fiction must be right there on the page and not 
require any critical work greater than quotation for extraction.  Philosophers are well 
accustomed, both personally and professionally, to the charge that they have no real 
expertise or that their field has no use at all.  In turn, though, they have a bad habit of 
leveling the same charge against criticism and the study of literature.  Brian Leiter, for 
example, in an influential if controversial statement, writes with hubris: “Whatever the 
limitations of 'analytic' philosophy, it is clearly far preferable to what has befallen 
humanistic fields like English, which have largely collapsed as serious disciplines while 
becoming the repository for all the world's bad philosophy, bad social science, and bad 
32 This sentence should remind us of the discussion of MacIntyre and Taylor in chapter one.  See too 
Kundera's “The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes”: “If it is true that philosophy and science have 
forgotten about man's being, it emerges all the more plainly that with Cervantes a great European art 
took shape that is nothing other than the investigation of this forgotten being” (1990, 4-5).
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history.”33  It’s possible to think that we can do without the talents of literary critics and 
that one can read the meaning of a novel right off the page only if one thinks that 
literature’s functioning is no more complicated rhetorically than philosophy’s.  Such a 
view often seems to take the phenomenology of reading to consist of nothing but the 
reception of acts of communication and in no need of closer formal and critical attention.  
If we’re interested, in my example, not in the ontic narrative self, the self as an object 
with a narrative shape, but the ontological narrative self, or the manner of our being 
inasmuch as we understand ourselves through narrativizing, then it is perhaps literature 
with its rhetorical complications and not philosophy which will allow us to explore this 
phenomenology.  And so the quotation from Murdoch I’ve placed atop this chapter: 
“Literature entertains, it does many things, and philosophy does one thing” (4).
33 http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp (accessed December 2013).  Alexander Nehamas 
writes: “Systematic philosophers think of the philosophers of the art of living [e.g., Montaigne, 
Nietzsche, Foucault] at best as 'poets' or literary figures, at worst as charlatans writings for precocious 




Our Situation as Readers in the Middle
[N]arration is not only a mode of discourse but more essentially a mode, perhaps the mode, of life.
David Carr (in Wood, ed., 1991, 173)
Let us never forget the condition of life as of narration: that we can never see the whole picture at 
once—unless we propose to throw overboard all the God-conditioned forms of human knowledge.
Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain (594)
Heidegger's name for the kind of being which each of us is—Dasein—normally 
refers to existence (“menschliches Dasein,” for example, means “human existence”).  
Most literally, it is composed of linguistic elements which mean here-being or there-
being.  His initial and general characterization for our manner of being is being-in-the-
world.  While time and temporality will ultimately play the more important role in what 
is, after all, titled Being and Time, these, his two most basic terms of art—Dasein and 
being-in-the-world—suggest the extent to which Heidegger views our condition as 
spatial.  We exist always here, and in a world.  Tempting glosses of the term “Dasein,” 
more fluent than “here-being” and “there-being” (though these translations' primordial 
sound is in many ways a strength), include “located-being,” “situated-being,” and 
“oriented-being.”  The kind of “here” or locatedness that we have—that we are, 
according to Heidegger—is one that we carry with us wherever we go, even when we are 
lost: “The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every 
case its 'there'. […] By its very nature Dasein brings its 'there' along with it.  If it lacks its 
'there,' it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein” (SZ, 132-133).  
According to Heidegger's analysis, the roots of our spatial locatedness are temporal.1
That our situatedness, in space but even more so in time, is basic to our way of 
being means that we cannot be understood as isolated entities, as animals of a human 
form, for example.  This is why Heidegger uses the term “Dasein,” rather than more 
1 Heidegger later recants the excessive claim that spatiality can be derived from temporality (1972, 23).
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familiar ones like “person” or “human being”: because they are familiar, such terms 
encode too many assumptions about how we are to be understood.  Dasein exists not as 
an isolated and self-standing thing, but as being-in-the-world.  The first division of Being 
and Time, which will be my focus, elucidates this notion.  My guiding claim is that this 
structure amounts to a narrative conception of the self.  Interpreting Heidegger as I do is 
tangential to his own project in two ways, however.
First, “narrative” is not a term of Heidegger's.  I will highlight the handful of 
references to narrative and character in Being and Time, but nowhere does he suggest 
explicitly, as Ricoeur does and I will, that our temporal condition is usefully understood 
in terms of narrative.  In fact, he quotes Plato's Sophist and writes that “if we are to 
understand the problem of Being,” then we must avoid “telling a story” (SZ, 6).  What he 
means by this, however, is that we cannot explain beings by way of a causal story 
“tracing them back in their origin to some other entities” (SZ, 6).  My account isn't this—
a creation story—but rather an account of the narrative form of our self-understanding.  
Heidegger includes biography among the “many ways in which [Dasein] has been 
interpreted,” and which are at our disposal, yet are insufficiently “primordial” (SZ, 16).  
In his later thinking, Heidegger turns to poetry (Dichtung) as a privileged site for 
investigating being.  I won't have space to develop these thoughts here, but it seems to me 
that this turn can be made sense of, in part, as a turn away from narrative.  If our ordinary 
understanding is ridden through with narrative conventions (as I'll suggest in chapter 
eight especially), poetry might allow us more authentic, primordial access to being.  But 
if we're interested in our ordinary understanding, and not, with Heidegger, recovering the 
meaning of being, then attention to narrative will be of great importance.
Second, for Heidegger, the existential analysis of Dasein is not intended primarily  
as a philosophical anthropology, but as part of the path to the Seinsfrage.  Heidegger's 
goal is to recover the meaning or sense of the question of being.  In order to do so, he 
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analyzes Dasein, our way of being, because our way of being includes a pre-theoretical 
understanding of what it means to be.  Thematizing our manner of existence might allow 
us to make explicit this understanding, which might in turn allow us to formulate and 
answer the question of being.  The main part of the first division of Being and Time 
consists of Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein, which amounts to a partial 
philosophical anthropology.  He then goes on, in the second division, to begin to interpret 
that analysis, against the horizon of time, as part of his larger project.  My own goal is to 
better understand our manner of existing.  I'll thus be chiefly concerned with Heidegger's 
existential analysis of Dasein as a philosophical anthropology, leaving aside his grander 
ambitions.  Doing this means that the emphases of Heidegger's analysis change, however. 
Philosophical anthropology is an account of our being, whereas fundamental ontology 
investigates specifically our pre-thematic understanding of our own being, with an aim at 
understanding being in general.  Fundamental ontology isn't interested in everything that 
philosophical anthropology is (Heidegger has little to say about our bodies, for example).  
In turn, philosophical anthropology needn't necessarily stress, as fundamental ontology 
does, those parts of our being that make it conspicuous to us.  Since I'm concerned with 
our temporal, ultimately narrative, self-understanding, Heidegger's analysis of our 
spatiality can be left aside.  Since I'm concerned with our ordinary self-understanding, his 
account of Angst, and the way it throws us back on ourselves, taking us out of our 
everydayness, can be left aside as well.  Perhaps most prominently, I will have little to 
say about Heidegger's account of authenticity (I'll explain why in chapter eight), focusing 
instead on the account of our everyday manner of being.  For the purposes of narrativity, 
Heidegger's philosophical anthropology is an especially relevant one, because 
temporality and self-understanding are central to his conception of what we are.
Halfway2 through Being and Time, Heidegger comes to a provisional conclusion.  
2 As we have it, uncompleted (see SZ, §8).
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Dasein's manner of existence has been defined as being-in-the-world.  This structure, 
though holistic, has been divided into constitutive parts, each thematized in turn.  Now 
Heidegger is able to offer a definition of our manner of existence which is rich in content:
Dasein's “average everydayness” can be defined as “Being-in-the-world which is falling and 
disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, 
both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in its Being-with Others.” (SZ, 181)
Shortly thereafter, he offers a synonymous though differently articulated definition:
the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside 
(entities encountered within-the-world). (SZ, 192)
These definitions are not nearly as opaque as they might appear.  By this point in the 
book, every component term has been explained at some length—the task which I'll 
rehearse, though to a limited extent and through the particular interpretive lens of 
narrativity, in this second part of the dissertation.  The density of hyphens in Heidegger's 
definitions, especially the latter, is meant to emphasize that our manner of being is a 
holistic phenomenon.  We can explain, by itself, what it means to be “thrown,” as 
Heidegger does and I will, but it is never the case that Dasein is merely thrown.  We are 
always thrown and … everything else in that whole structure.  Keeping the entire 
structure in one's head all at once is no easy task.  It is essential to Heidegger's project, 
however: to lose the unity of being-in-the-world is to fall back into thinking that I am a 
kind of being—an animal, an individual, an atomistic self, a consciousness—that is self-
standing and merely happens to encounter objects, other people, and a world beyond 
myself.  And these are exactly the traditions of Western philosophy that Heidegger seeks 
to overthrow or, at the very least, call severely into question.
Being and Time offers its reader constant reminders that being-in-the-world is 
holistic.  It seems to me that it offers insufficient help as to how to comprehend this 
holism, however.  Heidegger writes that “the totality of the structural whole is not to be 
reached by building it up out of elements.”  Instead, “The Being of Dasein […] becomes 
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accessible to us when we look all the way through this whole to a single primordially 
unitary phenomenon” (SZ, 181).  To this single phenomenon, Heidegger gives a one-
word name: “care” (SZ, §41).  He spends little time helping the reader understand how to 
“see through” his arduously articulated definitions to the single and unitary phenomenon 
of care.  That care (Sorge) is modified in the terms for our comportment toward things in 
concern (Besorgen) and other people in solicitude (Fürsorge) seems to me to help very 
little; the wordplay and common root signal that these terms are related but not how.
Instead, the second division of Being and Time quickly explains how we don't yet 
have a whole (in a different sense) and authentic version of Dasein before us.  The sense 
of wholeness at stake in the second division is that of Dasein's life as a whole.  Because 
my life will be whole only when I'm dead, I can never grasp it in its full actuality, from 
birth to death.  Whether and how our lives are unified is a central question of narrativity.  
It's one that I won't take up here, though.  Not because it is unimportant, but because, in 
order to even broach this question, I think narrativity needs more carefully defended 
foundations.  By focusing on Heidegger's first sense of wholeness—the wholeness of 
being-in-the-world—I'll argue that our local, situational self-understanding is already 
narrative in form.  From such foundations, one might be able to assemble an account of 
how we organize our entire lives in time (a project I hope to take up in the future).
My focus is thus Heidegger's provisional stopping place, the care-structure as 
Dasein's everyday manner of being.3  Despite his never using such terminology, my 
contention is that Heidegger conceives of our everyday understanding as narrative in 
form: we are selves at the center of a fabric composed of numerous narrative threads.  I'll 
thus work through the analyses of thrown projection, understanding and interpretation, 
falling and das Man, and Dasein's disclosedness to the end of articulating a notion of the 
3 I will, however, sometimes look further ahead, to sections 64 and 68, for example, where the parts of 
the care-structure are explicitly interpreted in temporal terms.
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self's narrativity, which I'll put in place of Heidegger's concept of care.  “Care” is, I think, 
insufficient in helping us to understand Dasein's being-in-the-world as a holistic 
phenomenon.  Redescribing “being-in-the-world” as an account of our narratively 
structured selves, and our reading of them, will offer additional help.
What follows will be open to the criticism that I am overemphasizing Dasein as a 
self.  I'll attempt to answer this concern at some length in my discussion of Hubert 
Dreyfus's reading of Heidegger, which famously downplays the significance of the self.  
Two additional responses should be kept in mind.  First, the self is my theme.  Inevitably, 
in thematizing one part of the care-structure, that part rises to prominence as the rest fade 
into the background.  This is a problem only if we mistake the prominent part for 
something able to exist in isolation.  Thus frequent reminders of the holism of being-in-
the-world and the dependence of the self on other parts of that structure will be necessary.  
Second, so long as we don't construe the self as atomistic, I think that there is a clearer 
relationship between Dasein's being and the self than any other part of the care-structure.  
Dasein differs from all other entities because it is a “who,” whereas they are “whats” (SZ, 
45).  This “who” remains the target, even as understanding it necessitates understanding a 
myriad of other structural conditions: “Here we are seeking that which one inquires into 
when one asks the question 'Who?'” (SZ, 53).  Within the details of Heidegger's analysis, 
inasmuch as Dasein understands itself as a “who,” it is asking about its self: “The 
question of the 'who' answers itself in terms of the 'I' itself, the 'subject,' the 'Self'” (the 
scare-quotes remind us not to take these terms to be transparent, or as they are 
conventionally understood; SZ, 114).4  This is something that we shouldn't lose sight of, 
even as Heidegger (and, even more so, his commentators) downplays, against the 
4 Heidegger uses many different formulations in Being and Time to refer to Dasein's understanding of 
itself.  Some, like “es selbst” seem merely reflexive, while at the other extreme, “Selbstsein” and “das 
Man-selbst” are robust notions of self, though only part of Dasein's being-in-the-world.  Intermediate 
gradations include “umwillen seiner,” closer to the merely reflexive, and “umwillen seiner selbst,” 
“seiner selbst,” and “verwendet sich ... für sich selbst,” which are closer to implying a full-blown self.
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philosophical tradition, the role of the self in our existence.  It is important to not fall into 
the wrong ways of thinking about what the self is.  But it is equally important to honor 
whatever phenomenological truth there is in the fact that, asking “who” we are, we begin 
to speak of not just ourselves (a merely grammatical reflexive), but our selves.  How we 
model our notion of everydayness here is perhaps decisive.  To philosophers, the self 
might seem a kind of thing.  To most anyone else, the self, or the person, or even the 
human being, is to be contrasted with a mere thing.  I began from these issues in my 
introduction, but it's worth reminding ourselves of them again.
Existing accounts which put Heidegger in conversation with narrativity differ 
from mine in two ways.  Either they are cast at a level above my concerns (based on the 
second sense of wholeness I've flagged above) interrogating being-towards-death, 
authenticity, and historicality for an account of how we assemble our lives as wholes.  Or 
they remain quite brief, making claims with which I often concur, but which are in need 
of fuller articulation and defense.  Charles Taylor, for example, writes:
Heidegger, in Being and Time, described the inescapable temporal structure of being in the world: 
that from a sense of what we have become, among a range of present possibilities, we project our 
future being.  This is the structure of any situated action, however trivial.  From my sense of being 
at the drugstore, among the possible other destinations, I project to walk home.  But it applies also 
to this crucial issue of my place relative to the good.  From my sense of where I am relative to it, 
and among the different possibilities, I project the direction of my life in relation to it.  My life 
always has this degree of narrative understanding, that I understand my present action in the form 
of an 'and then': there was A (what I am), and then I do B (what I project to become). (SS, 47)
Taylor goes on to say that “narrative must play a bigger role than merely structuring my 
present” and to endorse MacIntyre's notion of a “quest,” which stretches one's story to 
encompass life as a whole (SS, 47-48).  He thus moves very quickly from the narrative 
structure of our situational understanding—my target—to the narrative structure of our 
lives as wholes—a project I have deferred.  In another example, Charles Guignon writes, 
glossing Heidegger, that “Autobiography may be thought of as an explicit form of what 
we all do all the time: in a sense, we are all composing our autobiographies as we live.  
Whether consciously or not, we are constantly interpreting and reinterpreting the events 
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of our lives in terms of our grasp of what they mean as a totality” (1983, 93).5  Like 
Taylor, he focuses on life as a whole.  I work out in much greater detail the claim that, 
according to Heidegger, we always have a narrative understanding of our situation.  My 
hope is that it will be able to answer both those who hold alternative interpretations of 
Heidegger and those who are skeptical that narrativity speaks to anything true at all.
I. Projection
The law governing artistic production applies, on a smaller scale, to every one in daily life.  Every 
man who has a real experience experiences at the same time all its possibilities in an ideal sense, 
including the opposite possibility.
Kierkegaard, “The Present Age” (44)
“[N]arrativity collapses into a capacity for self-interpretation.”  So writes John 
Christman (709), and it's become a common deflationary charge: that, excepting in its 
more exaggerated and thus indefensible forms, there's actually nothing distinctively 
narrative about narrativity.  Using such a view as a foil, I argue here that the hermeneutic 
stance we take toward our own lives is quite specifically that which we bring to bear on 
narrative objects when reading fiction and watching films, explicitly aesthetic contexts 
where talk of “hermeneutic stances” is more familiar.  The deflation of narrativity to self-
interpretation fails because we don't interpret our lives and selves the way we interpret 
anything else except narrative.
Narrative accounts of the self are typically driven by a master metaphor: we are 
the authors or narrators of our lives, or our lives are narratives, or we are characters 
within them.  In defending a revised account of the self's narrativity, the first thing I want 
to put in place is a different master metaphor: we are the readers of our lives.  As a 
metaphor, it serves as a useful guide, but it is not merely a metaphor, I'll argue.  The 
structures according to which we interpret our ongoing lives are the same as the 
structures according to which a reader interprets a narrative when in the middle of it.  
5 See too a short section of his “Narrative Explanation in Psychotherapy” (1998, 567-571).
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Remnants of those other, related metaphors will remain, since talk of interpreting our 
lives as stories will carry connotations concerning authorship, character, and plot.  But 
the master metaphor of reading doesn't entail that we freely author our lives, or that we 
are as coherent as well-drawn characters, or that our lives enact typical plot arcs—
entailments that might be thought to cripple other approaches.  And again, my claim will 
be that the structure of reading an ongoing story and reading one's ongoing life are the 
same—my argument is grounded on that non-metaphorical claim, even as the metaphor 
helps us understand the larger picture.
The Heideggerian structure which forms the basis of our situatedness in time is 
“thrown projection.”  To explain the parts of this structure, Heidegger invokes the 
phenomena of understanding and disposedness6: “In understanding and disposedness, we 
shall see the two constitutive ways of being the 'there'; and these are equiprimordial” (SZ, 
133).  The ontological roots of understanding are in projection, of disposedness in 
thrownness.  That they are equiprimordial means that they are equally basic, and that both 
always obtain.  “A disposedness always has its understanding,” Heidegger writes, and 
“Understanding always has its mood” (SZ, 142).  As always, we can—and Heidegger 
does—thematize them in isolation, so long as we don't lose sight of their place in a larger 
gestalt.  In what follows, I take them up in turn—projection, then thrownness7—before 
discussing the readerly form of the whole of thrown projection.
“Higher than actuality stands possibility,” Heidegger writes (SZ, 38).  What any 
one of us is presently is only part of the story.  We are always ahead of ourselves, 
6 While I generally adhere to Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of major terms, it's widely agreed 
that “State-of-mind” is a particularly poor rendering of “Befindlichkeit.”  I use Theodore Kisiel's 
translation of it as “disposedness” instead.  Other options include “affectedness” (Dreyfus), and 
“already-having-found-oneself-there-ness” (William Richardson).
7 This reverses Heidegger's initial order of presentation, where thrownness comes first.  Projection, not 
only in my interpretation, but in Being and Time itself, is more important.  When they are combined in 
thrown projection, it is telling which term is nominalized, which reduced to a modifying adjective.  
Heidegger reverses the order when he interprets everydayness in terms of temporality (SZ, §68).
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awaiting, expecting, and anticipating future possibilities.8  The most famous consequence 
of this within Being and Time is that no one can ever grasp his or her entire life in its 
actuality—whatever time remains between now and one's death remains always only a 
matter of possibilities, and it is possible that one will die at any moment (SZ, 231ff).  Our 
necessarily futural orientation toward possibilities has much more immediate 
consequences, however.  At every moment, to have an implicit understanding of what is 
and is not possible isn't an “optional extra,”9 what the prudent do in contrast to the 
adventurous or “fully present,” those who live in the moment.  Living in the moment is, 
strictly speaking, impossible by Heidegger's account, an experience unfamiliar to beings 
like us: a being that was fully present would not be the kind of being that we are.  One 
can live without obsessing over one's death, worrying about one's career prospects, or 
even thinking about what's for dinner.  But if our manner of existence weren't structured 
by expectations concerning the future, we couldn't be surprised, understand jokes, hear a 
melody, or, probably, make it down a staircase without falling on our faces.10
What we possibly are is a part of what we are, so central is this futural orientation 
to Heidegger's analysis: “Dasein is constantly 'more' than it factually is, supposing one 
might want to make an inventory of it as something-at-hand and list the contents of its 
Being, and supposing that one were able to do so” (SZ, 145).  No account of me restricted 
to a moment in time, no matter how exhaustive, would explain my manner of being, and 
thus what I am.  Heidegger co-opts the slogan “Become what you are,” but rather than 
meaning that we have a telos or determined fate, this means that we are what we will be 
(or will fail to be), because we are always ahead of ourselves (SZ, 145).  Indeed this is 
the underlying reason for Heidegger's distinction between ontology as it is traditionally 
8 Heidegger distinguishes between awaiting (gewärtigen) and anticipating (vorlaufen) as, respectively, 
inauthentic and authentic orientations toward the future (SZ, 336-337).  As I am largely bracketing 
Heidegger's treatment of authenticity, my use of these various terms follows no technical distinction.
9 SS, 47 and passim.  Taylor argues further that we are always oriented toward moral goods.
10 Dennett writes that “the fundamental purpose of brains is to produce future,” that “all brains are, in 
essence, anticipation machines” (1991, 177).
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practiced through categorical analysis and his approach to fundamental ontology through 
an existential analysis of Dasein.  What it is to be, for Dasein, is to be more than what one 
actually is, to be ahead of oneself in possibilities.  “[P]ossibility as an existentiale [a form 
of existence, the existential equivalent of a category] is the most primordial and ultimate 
positive way in which Dasein is characterized,” Heidegger writes, signaling this theme's 
central import to Being and Time (SZ, 143-144).  Hence my beginning here and putting 
projection at the center of my account.
Heidegger calls our way of existing as possibilities “understanding”: 
“Understanding is the Being of such potentiality-for-Being” (SZ, 144).  As an ontological 
term, descriptive of our manner of existence, “understanding” is to be contrasted to the 
way we normally use it, as naming a mode of cognition (SZ, 143).  To speak, in the 
language of psychology or even the philosophy of mind, of my understanding something 
is already to conceive of me as a kind of entity set against and in a certain relation to 
other entities.  It is thus an ontic claim, certainly related to, but “derivative of that 
primary understanding which is one of the constituents of the Being of the 'there' in 
general” (SZ, 143).  Let's not lose sight of what Heidegger means by a claim like this, 
which would seem to denigrate psychology, and why it is important to his project.  
Psychology, like all individual sciences, is guided by a conception of what sort of entities 
exist—it articulates its part of the world according to this underlying regional ontology, 
and it can't comment on those aspects of our experience that fall outside of its purview.  
Psychology, as the study of minds, can't say anything about rocks or furniture.  In and of 
itself, that's not a bad thing at all.  Individual sciences can achieve rigor and specificity 
only because they're systematically guided by some conception of the world.  Of 
necessity, they can no longer grasp what it means to be, rather than to be as a cognizing 
subject, or as a collection of material particles, etc.  This is especially important to keep 
in mind when talking about something like ourselves.  Many regional sciences—
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psychology, physiology, anthropology—overlap in trying to explain what we are, but 
each is guided by a competing regional ontology of what exists, and so they disagree 
about what terms are relevant to explaining what we are.  If we mistake any individual 
science, or even all sciences in conglomeration, as that which offers the final account of 
what we are, or what the world is, we “forget” being.  So, here, understanding as an 
ontological notion is meant to account for our way of existing in possibilities—our very 
manner of being—unsorted by any standard of what sort of entities exist.  Lest we fall 
back into a derivative, ontic account of understanding, Heidegger reminds us not to take 
ourselves as something present-at-hand at the given moment, which might or might not 
encounter other things “not yet actual” but “merely possible” (SZ, 143).  Possibilities, 
properly conceived, are neither that which is present-at-hand now, but only contingently, 
nor that which might be later.  We ourselves are our possibilities.
This language remains dangerously abstract.  Heidegger thus introduces the term 
“projection” (Entwurf): “the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we 
call 'projection'” (SZ, 145).  This term describes the specific form of our existing always 
not as what we merely are in a given moment, but ahead of ourselves in possibilities.  
“Entwurf” relates to the verb “entwerfen,” which itself comes from the root “werfen,” to 
throw.  “Entwerfen” means to sketch or draft.  “Projection” thus suggests throwing 
oneself forward in existence, sketching possible projects.11  Heidegger offers an 
immediate qualification, however:
Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, 
and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being.  On the contrary, any Dasein has, as 
Dasein, already projected itself; and so long as it is, it is projecting.  As long as it is, Dasein has 
always understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities. (SZ, 145)
Commentators tend to take this warning as equivalent to just its first part—projection has 
11 See too Macquarrie and Robinson's gloss (185n1).  Projection should not be mistaken for psychological 
projection, when something is merely a creation of one's thoughts.  For this Heidegger uses the term 
“Projektion” (SZ, 124).
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nothing to do with a plan.12  The point is only that such a plan is not explicitly thought 
out, however.  This is clearer in the German “ausgedachten Plan,” where “thought out” 
directly precedes and modifies “plan” such that the latter can't be read in isolation.  Even 
properly grasped, the point has to be hyperbolic, it seems to me.  Obviously we do 
sometimes make plans, and surely projection is the underlying basis for such activity: 
planning is derivative of projecting, in Heidegger's terms.  Surely too, planning is ontic 
evidence for projection, especially since, in thinking through the phenomenon, we notice 
that we sometimes have “plans” we aren't even aware of until they are upset.  The point 
of Heidegger's warning is that projection is not normally or necessarily a cognitive 
activity.  “Plan” is a word that is to be avoided if it is taken to be based in explicit and 
conscious intentions.  Even saying we comport ourselves as if we had a plan is 
misleading if it suggests cognitive states, reconstructed afterward, are the proper 
explanation of normal behavior.  But we shouldn't abandon the connection between 
planning and projection entirely.  A projection is a sketch, not a hard and fast design.13
Heidegger's claim is this, then.  We always have an understanding of our 
existence.  This understanding is likely, in some measure, to be a misunderstanding.14  
“Understanding” as Heidegger uses it doesn't mean to fully grasp or to be able to explain 
something.  Rather, it is contrasted to whatever (seemingly unimaginable) confusion—
non-understanding rather than misunderstanding—would ensue if we weren't always 
situated in some basic way.  Our understanding takes the form of projecting possibilities.  
We understand what is and is not possible for us.  In temporal terms, which Heidegger 
introduces only later but are here rather obviously implicit, we project possible futures for 
ourselves.  These future possibilities needn't (and, if Heidegger is right, most of the time 
12 See, for example, Dreyfus, 187.
13 “Entwurf” can mean “design,” however.  A porcelain mug, for example, might be stamped “Entwurf: 
Walter Gropius.”  At the extreme, planning can be fully reified, and a plan turned into a self-standing 
object: a book of blueprints, e.g.  But that's not a representative case of planning, much less projection.
14 Taylor 1985, vol. 1, 3.
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don't) take the form of explicit plans, even if they might.  Instead, our bearing—our 
existential posture—demonstrates an orientation toward what we implicitly take as 
possible.  When I stand on a high balcony, my body tense and my hands gripping the rail 
tightly, I may not explicitly fear falling, nor do I expect someone to push me.  But, in my 
bearing, I understand that falling is possible.  Though you show up on time for work on a 
daily basis, you might not think often, or indeed ever, about what would happen if you 
weren't so punctual.  Such is what one does if one wants to keep one's job—and you 
understand this even if you never experience or articulate a desire to keep your job.  
Projection is the form our expectations take.  What is projected is our very being or 
existence.  We have always already “imagined” possible futures for ourselves, only such 
futures needn't have been explicitly posited or daydreamed.
This way of explaining projection is not uncontroversial, so let me elaborate it in 
greater detail.  Heidegger explains the place of projection within the corpus of 
terminology he has so far developed:
The understanding projects Dasein's Being upon its “for-the-sake-of-which” just as primordially as 
upon significance as the worldhood of its current world.  The character of the understanding as 
projection constitutes Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness of its there as the there 
of a potentiality-for-Being.  Projection is the existential state-of-Being of the leeway of factical 
potentiality-for-Being. (SZ, 145)15
This difficult quotation requires extensive gloss and an explanation of terms from 
Heidegger's earlier analyses.  Notice first, however, the order and structure of the claims 
15 I've modified the translation, and the details will prove important.  The original passage is:
Es [das Verstehen] entwirft das Sein des Daseins auf sein Worumwillen ebenso ursprünglich wie 
auf die Bedeutsamkeit als die Weltlichkeit seiner jeweiligen Welt.  Der Entwurfcharakter des 
Verstehens konstituiert das In-der-Welt-sein hinsichtlich der Erschlossenheit seines Da als Da 
eines Seinkönnens.  Der Entwurf is die existenziale Seinsverfassung des Spielraums des faktischen 
Seinkönnens.
Macquarrie and Robinson translate this as:
With equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon its 'for-the-sake-of-
which' and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world.  The character of 
understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness 
of its existentially constitutive state-of-Being by which the factical potentiality-for-Being gets its 
leeway. (185)
This runs the second and third sentences together to confusing results.  It elides the phrase “seines Da 
als Da eines Seinkönnens” completely, referring only to “Being-in-the-world's disclosedness” instead of 
“Being-in-the-world's disclosedness of its there as the there of a potentiality-for-Being.”  It also fails to 
make clear that Spielraum is introduced as part of a new, further claim.  Stambaugh's translation is 
initially better, but then minimizes the reference to Spielraum (145).
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made.  First there are references to the “for-the-sake-of-which” and significance, in 
parallel.  Then there is a reference to disclosedness.  Finally there is a reference to 
leeway.  I'll offer my explanation by way of Dreyfus's commentary, which loses this 
order.  Earlier, I signaled that my account of Being and Time deviates importantly from 
Dreyfus's.  Here I can substantiate that claim while clarifying the meaning of projection.
As is well known, Dasein is by Dreyfus's reading characterized essentially by its 
know-how—we move through the world as skilled copers.  Dreyfus's presentation of 
understanding and projection is a key moment where he domesticates Heidegger toward 
this overall vision.  He states, quite bluntly, “For Heidegger primordial understanding is 
know-how” (184).  And also: “We have a skilled, everyday mastery of equipment and 
ourselves. […] Moreover, we are such skills” (185).  In his conjunction of equipment and 
selves and in his emphasis on the ready-to-hand, Dreyfus loses much of Heidegger's 
account of the latter—our selves.  Formally speaking, my overall thesis—that inasmuch 
as our selves are revealed to us, it is within narratives—isn't in tension with Dreyfus's 
analysis, by which there is no (at least individuated and experienced) self much of the 
time, so far as coping prevails.  By my interpretation of Heidegger, as compared to 
Dreyfus's, the self is much more frequently experienced.  If Dreyfus were right on this 
point, it would suggest that Heidegger's thought is a poor venue for developing my 
revised narrativist view of the self.  I therefore want to call into question parts of 
Dreyfus's analysis.  Recall my account of the larger argumentative order of Being and 
Time.  Traditionally, philosophy mistakes being for presence-at-hand.  Heidegger 
introduces the alternative of the ready-to-hand, I've claimed, most importantly in order to 
demonstrate that we're already familiar with being as something other than presence—
thus undercutting the hegemony of that category.  Even philosophers otherwise 
uninterested in Heidegger admit that his analysis of tools is insightful.  But his real target 
is our being as Dasein.  Having undercut presence by thematizing the ready-to-hand, he 
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can move on to his analysis of Dasein without our mistaking it for a form of presence.
For Dreyfus, the ready-to-hand is much more central to the overall arc of Being 
and Time.  The being of Dasein, which is not present-at-hand, is of course not ready-to-
hand either.  But Dreyfus risks, it seems to me, reducing Dasein to something along the 
lines of “the kind of being which experiences other things as ready-to-hand,” to the 
skilled craftsman in his or her workshop, to the expert athlete.16  Part of Heidegger's 
analysis of Dasein is our relation to the ready-to-hand.  Another part is our (derivative) 
relation to the present-at-hand.  Most important, though, is Dasein's relation to itself.  
Remember that, in order to raise the question of being, Heidegger chooses to analyze 
Dasein exactly because Dasein already has an understanding of its own being—not 
because it understands other entities, tools or otherwise (though it does this as well).  To 
say that Heidegger's (intermediary) target is Dasein's relation to itself is, at first, to use 
“itself” merely as a grammatical reflexive: Dasein's relation to (its own) Dasein.  To say 
further that Heidegger's target is Dasein's relation to its self takes more argument.
These concerns are much more present in Heidegger's account of the 
understanding than Dreyfus suggests.  We can see this if we return to the details of the 
long quotation above.  Let me backtrack and explain the terms “significance” and “for-
the-sake-of-which,” then walk through the quotation claim by claim.  First, significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit).  According to Heidegger's earlier analysis, we don't normally encounter 
objects as meaningless things in space.  Rather, we've been acculturated into an 
understanding of how they are used, and thus how they relate to one another, how they 
relate to different uses, and how these uses relate to one another.  Hammers aren't 
understandable in isolation, but only in reference to nails, to fixing boards to one another, 
to erecting larger forms, to carpenters, and so forth.  “The relational character which these 
relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of signifying,” Heidegger writes (SZ, 
16 Relatedly, see Dahlstrom 2001, 423ff.
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87).  All together, the relevant nexus of tools and uses is called significance: “The 
relational totality of this signifying we call 'significance'” (SZ, 87).  How exactly we 
make use of tools will depend on our own purposes and actions.  The set of relations 
between tools, their uses, and possible purposes precedes any particular purpose or 
project we take up, however.  We've always been acculturated into a given understanding 
of what makes sense and what it is possible to do.  This is what “worldhood” is for 
Heidegger, the form that our way of existing as being-in-the-world takes: “Dasein, in so 
far as it is, has always submitted itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this 
submission belongs essentially to its Being” (SZ, 87).
Next, “for-the-sake-of-which” (Worumwillen).  A “for-the-sake-of-which” is one 
kind of term in the structure of significance.  Specifically, it relates to Dasein's purposes, 
rather than a tool's possible use.  Even more specifically, it is the highest-order or final 
purpose in an implicit hierarchy.  Consider Heidegger's example:
with this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a “hammer”, 
there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making 
something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad 
weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of providing shelter for Dasein—that is to say, for the 
sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being. (SZ, 84)
Confronted with a given action, we can ask a series of increasingly broad “Why?” 
questions: “Why are you hammering?”  “To secure this board.”  “Why are you securing 
that board?”  “To build a roof.”  And so forth.17  This chain of answers makes explicit a 
number of intermediaries, each of which Heidegger calls a “towards-which.”  But the 
chain of reference eventually ends: “The primary 'towards-which' is a 'for-the-sake-of-
which'” (SZ, 84).  This purpose is what connects our routine actions to our very being: 
“But the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, 
that very Being is essentially an issue” (SZ, 84).18  A “for-the-sake-of-which” is the 
17 We should, of course, see ties to MacIntyre's argument about the gardener here (see chapter one).
18 Heidegger notes, by way of foreshadowing, that “Dasein's very Being [is] the sole authentic 'for-the-
sake-of-which'” (SZ, 84).  Normal answers to a chain of “Why?” questions will stop short of making 
this final move, connecting our action to our very existence.  If our “Why?” questions were to reach so 
far, we wouldn't usually ask someone why he or she wants to be sheltered from the rain, for example.
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highest reason why we are doing something, that which connects to our very existence.
We're ready now to walk through Heidegger's explanation of understanding as 
projection.  “The understanding projects Dasein's Being upon its 'for-the-sake-of-which' 
[….]”  Dreyfus rightfully but too exclusively ties this to the ready-to-hand.  Dasein 
projects its being upon the “for-the-sake-of-which” in having a purpose for its activity.  
Dreyfus too freely interchanges his standard example of hammering with higher-order 
purposes like “being a conscientious carpenter” or “being a father.”  Hammering is only a 
lower-level “towards-which,” not a “for-the-sake-of-which” that can connect up to 
Dasein's very existence.  Hammering, in isolation, won't show how “the understanding 
projects Dasein's Being” (emphasis added).  Dreyfus's example looks like Dasein 
projecting the hammer's being or, at best, a particular task of Dasein's, but not Dasein's 
being itself.  Dreyfus's brief example of “a-for-the-sake-of-which such as being a father 
as a way of understanding myself” is more promising, but it doesn't drive the discussion 
(187).19  Knowing how to be a father seems in fact dis-analogous to knowing how to 
hammer, especially in its inclusion of “to be.”  By saying that Dasein projects its being 
upon a “for-the-sake-of-which,” Heidegger is saying that understanding is guided by 
Dasein's present purpose, as it relates to its very existence.
Let's now add the second claim: just as primordially, “The understanding projects 
Dasein's Being […] upon significance as the worldhood of the world.”  Dasein can't do 
something for the sake of something else in a vacuum.  It finds itself in a given culture 
and situation, a given world of what makes sense and what it is possible to do.  Dasein's 
being is thus projected not only upon its purpose, but also upon this contextual 
background.  In his treatment, Dreyfus first skips over significance, but glosses it well, as 
the most general level of understanding, “the full range of possibilities available in the 
culture” (191), but he loses its place, parallel to the “for-the-sake-of-which.”  He also 
19 His other examples, “being a homemaker” or “conscientious carpenter” split the difference (188-189).
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dismisses it, writing that the Heidegger of Being and Time isn't interested in the “cultural, 
historical level of analysis,” but rather “only in the ahistorical structure of being-in-the-
world” (192).  A little more exactly, we can say that Heidegger isn't yet interested in how 
different cultures or different historical epochs make a difference to Dasein's world.  But 
he's already attuned to the fact that Dasein's world is given by its wider background.
Downplaying significance, Dreyfus hops forward to Heidegger's reference to 
Spielraum, leeway or, as Dreyfus sometimes retranslates it, “room for maneuver.”  He 
reads it as “the idea of a space of possibilities that constrains Dasein's range of possible 
actions without in any way determining what Dasein does” (189).  This gets the emphasis 
all wrong, making it sound as though projection closes down possibilities.  Projection 
opens up a space of possibilities without allowing Dasein to do whatever it wants, 
absolutely anything it might imagine.  Dreyfus notes further that it is not logical 
possibilities that the understanding projects, or even physical possibilities, but “live 
options,” what is existentially possible (190).  This is correct, but I'm not sure it has 
anything to do with the text at hand.  Rather, if we continue to look more slowly at the 
structure of Heidegger's explanation, we can see how Spielraum emerges.  “The character 
of the understanding as projection constitutes Being-in-the-world with regard to the 
disclosedness of its there as the there of a potentiality-for-Being.”  Heidegger is claiming 
that by projecting itself, in parallel, onto (1) a “for-the-sake-of-which,” a purpose for 
existing within (2) the structure of significance, or what its world makes meaningful and 
possible, Dasein opens up a space of possibilities.  I am not what I merely actually am, in 
pursing a given action such as hammering.  Rather, by hammering I've already projected 
a reason for existing, and projected it against a background of relations which detail why 
anyone might do anything at all.  This is the form of my existence as more than I actually 
am, in possibilities.  This is how a “there” is opened at all, a space within which Da-sein 
as being-in-the-world pursues any activity whatsoever.  Thus, finally, “Projection is the 
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existential state-of-Being of the leeway of factical potentiality-for-Being.”
Dreyfus's treatment of the understanding is tripartite (“we must distinguish each 
of three levels of understanding”; 186), as his section titles make clear: “current coping as 
pressing into possibilities,” “room-for-maneuver: the range of possibilities available in 
the current world,” and “significance, worldliness, and the background understanding of 
Being.”  This schema doesn't correspond to anything in the text, however; rather, he 
imposes it in parallel to his analysis of disposedness.  What Dreyfus presents first and 
third—the “for-the-sake-of-which” and “significance”—are actually presented in parallel, 
then together interpreted as constituting Dasein's disclosedness (which Dreyfus passes 
over), and finally disclosedness is interpreted as Spielraum, which Dreyfus presents 
second and analogous to the other parts.20  This structure is present not just in the  
quotation I've focused on, but at the beginning of Heidegger's account of the 
understanding, where he makes clearer that his target is disclosedness itself:
The disclosedness of understanding, as the disclosedness of the “for-the-sake-of-which” and of 
significance equiprimordially, pertains to the entirety of Being-in-the-world.  Significance is that 
on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such.  To say that the “for-the-sake-of-which” and 
significance are both disclosed in Dasein, means that Dasein is that entity which, as Being in the 
world, is an issue for itself. (SZ, 143)
Dreyfus's explanation of the understanding reduces Dasein to know-how—the ability to 
skillfully maneuver through the world by manipulating the possibilities of the ready-to-
hand within the contours of a situation.  It reduces what is projected to Dasein's purposes 
(which are then skillfully actualized or not).  These are merely the specifics enabled by 
Dasein's own disclosedness, Dasein's projecting of its own being, that which “is an issue 
for itself.”  Again, Dasein's being, not the ready-to-hand, nor even Dasein's relation to the 
ready-to-hand, is Heidegger's focus.21  Essentially, I think Dreyfus is just rehashing 
20 Part of the problem is what exactly Dreyfus quotes: “With equal primordiality, the understanding 
projects Dasein's being both upon its 'for-the-sake-of-which' and upon significance, as the worldliness 
of its current world. … Projection is the existential being make-up by which [Dasein's] factical ability to 
be gets its room for maneuver” (189).  This is a modified version of Macquarrie and Robinson's 
translation, and Dreyfus elides even their already too minimal reference to Dasein's disclosedness.
21 Dreyfus loses the outermost frame of Being and Time when he equates “to raise the question of being” 
with “to make sense of our ability to make sense of things” and when he writes that “what Heidegger 
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Heidegger's earlier, preliminary account of the understanding (§18).  There, Heidegger 
wrote “In the act of understanding, which we shall analyze more thoroughly later 
(Compare Section 31), the relations indicated above must have been previously disclosed; 
the act of understanding holds them in this disclosedness” (SZ, 87).  This is what he is 
doing now in section 31: thematizing the “there” of Dasein's own being as disclosedness, 
not just what happens in the space it opens.  That is lost in Dreyfus's treatment.
An act of hammering, quickly mentioned or taken as an isolated example (e.g., 
Dreyfus, 195), is too narrow to help us grasp the form of the understanding as projection.  
My projection of possibilities must go far beyond the “in-order-to” of the hammer.  A 
whole chain of such references is projected, toward an ultimate “for-the-sake-of-which.”  
An “in-order-to” is the most immediate kind of “towards-which,” whereas a “for-the-
sake-of-which” is the highest.  As Dreyfus makes clearer in his initial discussion (92-95), 
a “for-the-sake-of-which” has to do with the part of being-in-the-world we most readily 
identify with ourselves—the “who” of Dasein, the self.  I am a father, or a homemaker, or 
a conscientious carpenter in his examples (which he reuses too briefly here).  Hammering 
or any other instance of coping at the most immediate level is only intelligible because it 
refers back to such ways of being.  But even Dreyfus's better examples—being a father—
stop too short.  We can still ask for the sake of what someone is being a father.  Thus 
Heidegger writes, “But the 'for-the-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for 
which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue” (SZ, 84).  One is being a 
father for the sake of being.  That is, for the sake of being or existing at all, full stop.  
Such would be true of someone whose identity, whose self-interpretation, is so tied up in 
being a father that to cease being one would undercut his entire sense of existence.  Thus 
has in mind when he talks about being is the intelligibility correlative with our everyday background 
practices” (10).  Such tasks are the goal of the existential analytic.  But that's only preparatory to raising 
the question of being.  Heidegger never gets back to raising, much less answering, the question of being 
in the published parts of Being and Time, but these tasks remain in place motivationally.  §69 is perhaps 
the closest he gets to the question of being, and the lecture course The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology is based on the abandoned third division of part one of Being and Time.
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when Heidegger discusses hammering, the chain of references stretches all the way back.  
It's worth quoting again, as he so rarely provides concrete examples: “with hammering, 
there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is 
an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection 'is' for the sake of 
providing shelter for Dasein—that is to say, for the possibility of Dasein's Being” (SZ, 
84).  Just as it would be a mistake to think that the self of Dasein exists in isolation, it 
would be a mistake to think being as coping gets by without a self.  Tony Fisher makes 
this point well:
In Heidegger's terms I project a for-the-sake-of-which—say in this case 'for the sake of paying my 
bills on time' according to which the task of going to the bank makes sense of my ability to keep a 
tight rein on my accounts.  Note, I stress the 'me' to counter the rather implausible objection that 
this kind of perfunctory example need not involve any sense of 'self,' as though I were simply 
acting on autopilot.  On the contrary, projecting a for the sake of which—a 'reason' to do 
something—directly implicates me in some form of self-directed activity.  In Heidegger's terms, a 
for the sake of which is always performed for the sake of myself. (253)
How much time each of us spends in mindless coping, and what is typical of the 
“everyday” that is thematized in Heidegger's existential analytic, are matters of debate.  
Except at the extreme, in experiences where (after the fact) we talk about “forgetting 
ourselves,” Dreyfus exaggerates the absence of our sense of self.
Heidegger is clear that “Projection always pertains to the full disclosedness of 
Being-in-the-world” (SZ, 146).  An entity or entities are not projected in isolation, nor is 
the self.  But he contrasts different possible weightings.  “Dasein can, proximally and for 
the most part, understand itself in terms of its world” (SZ, 146).  This is inauthentic 
(uneigentlich, literally “not own-ish”).  “Or else understanding throws itself primarily 
into the 'for-the-sake-of-which'; that is Dasein exists as itself” (SZ, 146).  This is 
authentic (eigentlich, usually meaning “really” or “actual”), “arising out of one's own 
Self as such” (SZ, 146).  Neither of these possibilities excludes the rest of the structure of 
being-in-the-world—it is a matter of source and emphasis.  Those cases where the self is 
absent from projection Heidegger dismisses as not genuine, a phenomenon he spends 
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little time discussing, as compared to inauthenticity.  When not genuine, projection seems 
to involve a confused suppression of either the world or self—confused “Because 
understanding, in every case, pertains rather to Dasein's full disclosedness as Being-in-
the-world” (SZ, 146).22  Just as I am always in a world, projection is always a projection 
of this whole—of a future self into a future world.  As Sartre writes, commenting on these 
sections, “Options represent the real future, [the] meaning of my present.  But this future
—future of the world, future of ipseity—transcends consciousness” (1999, 42; see too his 
foregoing discussion).
The “who” of Dasein largely disappears in Dreyfus's presentation of the 
understanding.  This is because Dreyfus reduces the very notion of Dasein “taking a stand 
on itself” to, again, skilled coping: “the stand Dasein takes on itself, its existence, is not 
some inner thought or experience; it is the way Dasein acts” (61).  This is too strong: by 
insisting on Heidegger's difference from the cognitivist tradition (represented by Husserl 
and Searle, for Dreyfus), Dreyfus reduces Heidegger to its opposite: “This can be viewed 
as a kind of behaviorism, the sort found in Wittgenstein, and perhaps in Gilbert Ryle” 
(147).23  A glimpse ahead is useful.  It's not clear that authentic existence would look, 
from the outside, any different from inauthentic existence.24  This would be unintelligible 
if Dasein's taking a stand on its existence (and, on the way, the call of conscience) were 
somehow reduced to activity.  Being-in-the-world is reducible to neither inner states nor 
activity, but it must be able to explain both.  Dreyfus not only distrusts, with Heidegger, 
Western philosophy's traditional conception of the self, but distrusts as well Heidegger's 
22 Heidegger is even clearer elsewhere, in “On the Essence of Ground”: “Yet insofar—and only insofar—
as Dasein exists as a self, it can comport 'itself' toward beings” (1998, 109). 
23 This is a completely unhelpful characterization of Heidegger, it seems to me, requiring so much 
qualification as to drain the original term, “behaviorism,” of content.
24 As Heidegger's model, Kierkegaard, writes: “Whether the single individual actually is undergoing a 
spiritual trial or is a knight of faith, only the single individual himself can decide” (1983, 79).  It is 
unclear whether Dreyfus agrees.  He writes that the “difference between irresoluteness and resoluteness 
[the basis of authenticity] [is] in style but not in content” (326), but he is also tempted to translate 
Augenblick as “moment of transformation” (321).
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own revised conception of the self.25
Heidegger signals that projection won't really be grasped in full until it is 
interpreted in terms of temporality: “The existential meaning of this understanding of 
Being cannot be satisfactorily clarified within the limits of this investigation except on 
the basis of the Temporal Interpretation of Being” (SZ, 147).  So just as it was necessary 
to look back to section 18, it will be helpful to look forward to section 68.  There he 
writes, “Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the projected 
possibility thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a 
possibility.  In each case Dasein is understandingly in the way that it can be” (SZ, 336).  
Projecting is not a matter of daydreaming—imaginatively picturing—the future (though 
daydreaming, like planning, would seem to be derivative of it).  But it does concern the 
future.  By my very manner of existing, I orient myself toward future possibilities.  It 
might seem that this reduces projection to acting, and I want to further contrast my 
explanation from others, where such a reduction is made.26  Stephen Mulhall, for 
example, writes that “Dasein must project itself onto one or [an]other existentiell 
possibility” (82).  This way of understanding—really using—the term makes “projection” 
close to synonymous with “acting,” and indeed Mulhall writes that the understanding 
“corresponds to the active side of Dasein's confrontation with its own existentiell 
possibilities” (81).  On this account, there are various specific ways of being that are 
available to me: carpenter, professor, bachelor, father, and so forth.  I project myself into 
one, choosing it (even if not fully consciously) and identifying myself with it, even before 
I can say that I've achieved or become it.
This way of explaining projection falsely minimizes Heidegger's claims about 
possibility.  Projection becomes our means of actualizing one possibility.  It reasserts, 
25 Indeed, Dreyfus thinks Heidegger's discussion of the self is fundamentally confused (see 144 and 241f).  
I'll return to this point in chapter eight.
26 On the relation between freedom and projection, which is beyond the scope of the argument here, see 
the last section of “On the Essence of Ground” in Heidegger 1998.  See too Sartre 1992.
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against Heidegger, the primacy of actuality over possibility.  Existentially, can one 
coherently speak of a possibility?  Must not any possibility at a bare minimum include 
one other possibility, that it might fail?  Heidegger's treatment of projection entails that 
we understand ourselves against an entire range of possibilities.  To understand a 
hammer, it is not sufficient to understand one possibility that might result from its use.  
Successfully using it would then be a result of mere luck.  To understand it is to be able to 
cope with an entire range of possibilities.  I don't just rain blows on a nail—I adjust to 
compensate for previous blows, I tap the nail sideways to correct its angle, I pull it out 
and start again if things get bad enough, I discard the nail altogether if it gets bent.  Many 
possibilities are involved.  And hammering, in isolation, is a falsely abstracted example—
really these possibilities, already multiple, reside in a larger structure of significance.
To honor possibilities as possibilities, they must remain plural.  This is the form 
our expectations familiarly take.  I hope that I'll be left alone in my office this afternoon 
and get some writing finished.  I might even plan and conspire to make this happen, 
closing my door and turning off my phone.  But I still understand, based on my projected 
expectations, that someone might come by and knock incessantly.  Or the power might go 
out, or I might get a crippling headache.  Such contingencies will result in disappointment 
or annoyance, not confusion.  I haven't explicitly considered or planned for them, but 
they too are part of my projection of possibilities.  Such is also the case on a larger scale, 
where various careers and familial roles mesh more comfortably with Heidegger's talk of 
a “for-the-sake-of-which” and “taking a stand on one's being.”  Even as I identify myself 
as a student, I understand other roles as possible.  I could drop out; I could finish my 
Ph.D.  To think that I'm yoked or fated to one role would be mistaken.  Even a seemingly 
binding role, like fatherhood, is only factually, not factically, so.  That is, even if it 
remains a fact that someone is a father, he can stop existing as one, by abnegating his 
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responsibilities.27  Projection is not what one does on the basis of one's understanding of 
possibilities.  Projection is the structure of understanding, throwing forward possibilities 
as possibilities.  Here Heidegger's account is markedly different from MacIntyre's and 
Taylor's.  Whereas they suggest that our desires and intentions nest neatly underneath one
highest good, a hyper-good, the telos of a quest, Heideggerian projection claims that we 
are oriented toward a range of multiple possibilities.
 To close this section, consider an image of projection.  In one of Borges's most 
famous stories, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” a book (of the same title) is described:
'In all fictions, each time a man meets diverse alternatives, he chooses one and eliminates the 
others; in the work of the virtually impossible-to-disentangle Ts'ui Pen, the character chooses—
simultaneously—all of them.  He creates, thereby, 'several futures,' several times, which 
themselves proliferate and fork. […] I do not believe that [Pen] played at idle variations.  I cannot 
think it probable that he would sacrifice thirteen years to the infinite performance of a rhetorical 
exercise. […] Philosophical debate consumes a good part of his novel.  I know that of all the 
problems, none disturbed him, none gnawed at him like the unfathomable problem of time.  How 
strange, then, that that problem should be the only one that does not figure in the pages of his 
Garden.  He never even uses the word.  How do you explain that wilful omission? […] In a riddle 
whose answer is chess, what is the only word that must not be used?'
I thought for a moment.  'The word “chess,”' I replied. […]
'I have translated the entire work; and I know that not once does the word 'time' appear.  
The explanation is obvious: The Garden of Forking Paths is an incomplete, but not false, image of 
the universe as conceived by Ts'ui Pen.  Unlike Newton and Schopenhauer, [he] did not believe in 
a uniform and absolute time; he believed in an infinite series of times, a growing, dizzying web of 
divergent, convergent, and parallel times.  That fabric of times that approach one another, fork, are 
snipped off, or are simply unknown for centuries, contains all possibilities.' (125-127)
Borges's story is sometimes taken as an image of the many-worlds interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, but this seems to me among the least interesting ways of 
understanding it.28  So long as a consciousness can't move between the worlds of a 
multiverse, the notion that we might live in a multi- rather than universe has no 
27 “[H]e who begets is not yet a father; a father is he who begets and proves worthy of it.  Oh, of course, 
there is another meaning, another interpretation of the word 'father,' which insists that my father, though 
a monster, though a villain to his children, is still my father simply because he begot me.  But this 
meaning is, so to speak, a mystical one, which I do not understand with my reason [….] But in that case 
let it remain outside the sphere of real life.  While within the sphere of real life, which not only has its 
rights, but itself imposes great obligations—within this sphere, if we wish to be humane […] it is our 
duty and obligation to foster only those convictions that are justified by reason and experience, that 
have passed through the crucible of analysis, in a word, to act sensibly and not senselessly as in dreams 
or delirium [….]” (Dostoevsky, 744f).  Compare Dostoevsky's “sphere of life” and “sensible” with 
Heidegger's “being-in-the-world” and “significance.”  For bother thinkers fatherhood as a thick concept 
is basic, whereas the notion of “father” reduced to a logical relation (one who has a child) is derivative.
28 A number of films take up a similar idea: Sliding Doors, The Butterfly Effect (neither of which I can 
recommend), Blind Chance, Run Lola Run, and Mr. Nobody.  I'll discuss Mr. Nobody in the next chapter 
as an example of an “interpretation” of possibilities.  See Bordwell 2002 for discussion.
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existential consequences.  As an image of the phenomenology of possibility, Borges's 
story is much more provocative.  It is, of course, exaggerated, and I offer it only as a 
heuristic, not as a realistic image of projection, much less a possible model for lived 
experience.  Like so many of Borges's artifacts, The Garden of Forking Paths—Ts'ui 
Pen's book, that is—fascinates because it is impossible, an object that could never be 
made, even though it can be described in words.  Unlike the book's protagonist, we do 
eventually act and close off possibilities.  But in any given moment, many possible 
worlds stand open before us.  To understand one's situation, if Heidegger is right, is to 
project such a multiplicity of possible worlds, of possible futures.
II. Thrownness
The extended quotation from Hermann Hesse's Demian which I used as an 
epigraph for chapter one contains the following lines: “Each [of us] represents a gamble 
on the part of nature in creation of the human.  We all share the same origin, our mothers; 
all of us came in at the same door.  But each of us—experiments of the depths—strives 
toward his own destiny.”  Both “gamble” and “experiments” translate “Wurf.”  Ein Wurf 
is a throw, and though Hesse's expressions have literary precedents, they aren't 
idiomatic.29  More literal translations would be “Each is a throw by nature after the 
human” and “Each, an experiment and throw out of the depths, strives after his own 
goals.”  Hesse added this preface to Demian only in 1960, but it echos a use of Wurf at a 
key moment within the (1919) novel itself, where the narrator describes himself as “an 
experiment on the part of Nature, a gamble within the unknown” and as a “game on the 
part of primeval depths” (132).  Here again, “gamble” and the introduction of games into 
the image domesticate Hesse's poetic, not idiomatic, language: “I was a throw of nature, a
29 Werfen can mean “to give birth to,” especially in reference to animals, perhaps the closest idiom to 
Hesse's usage.  Phrases like “Natur warf,” “Geschichte [history] warf,” and “Gott [god] warf” are 
uncommon but not without precedent, though what is thrown is not us as people.
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throw into uncertainty.”  I think that it is possible that Heidegger was influenced by this 
poetic use of Wurf as a description of the human condition, prefiguring as it does his 
concept of Geworfenheit, or thrownness.30  Indeed the wider passage in Hesse's novel is 
rich with Heideggerian themes (or, given Demian's earlier publication date, vice versa):
Each man had only one genuine vocation—to find the way to himself.  He might end up as poet or 
madman, as prophet or criminal—that was not his affair, ultimately it was of no concern.  His task 
was to discover his own destiny—not an arbitrary one—and live it out wholly and resolutely 
within himself.  Everything else was only a would-be existence, an attempt at evasion, a flight 
back to the ideals of the masses, conformity and fear of one's own inwardness.  The new vision 
rose up before me, glimpsed a hundred times, possibly even expressed before but now experienced 
for the first time by me.  I was a throw of Nature, a throw into uncertainty, perhaps for a new 
purpose, perhaps for nothing, and my only task was to let this throw from the primordial depths 
take effect, to feel its will within me and make it wholly mine.  That or nothing!
I had already felt much loneliness.  Now there was a deeper loneliness still which was 
inescapable. (132, translation modified)
In addition to the overriding concern with authenticity, we see here the temptation of 
“evasion,” the “flight back to the ideals of the masses,” which is thematized by Heidegger 
as falling and das Man31; the notion of a “deeper loneliness” that is “inescapable” rings of 
of Angst (as does the “new image”); even the roles of poet and prophet find places in his 
work.  Later in the novel, the Ruf of Schicksal, or call of fate, becomes central and might 
be compared to Heidegger's call of conscience.32  Here I just want to focus on Hesse's 
exceptional characterization of the human condition as one of being a “throw,” however.
30 Ferber quotes this passage and writes: “Wenn ich richtig sehe, könnte Heidegger unter dem Einfluss von 
Hermann Hesse's Demian gestanden haben” (If I see things correctly, Heidegger could have been under 
the influence of Hermann Hesse's Demian) (216).  Newton characterizes Hesse's use of Wurf as “a kind 
of free-falling Gerworfenheit predating Heidegger” (530).  See too Jaeger, 676.  Theodore Kisiel notes 
(335-336, 498) that Heidegger does not use the language of thrownness until Being and Time, not even 
in his works from 1924 and 1925, which served as early drafts of the book.  The closest is in the very 
last pages of his lectures from the summer of 1925, “History of the Concept of Time,” where he writes 
that Dasein “is purely and simply thrown back [zürckgeworfen] on itself” (439/318).  A similar phrase 
in “The Concept of Time” makes use of the verb züruckstellen rather than züruckwerfen (43/53).  These 
passages perhaps echo Kierkegaard in “The Present Age” (34).
31 Earlier, as part of his reinterpretation of the story of Cain and Abel (which owes much to Nietzsche's 
Genealogy of Morals), Demian says of Cain's mark: “One could explain it however one wanted.  And 
'one' always wants what is comfortable and makes one right” (29, translation modified). 
32 Sinclair describes Demian “as though he followed something darkly calling out of the unknown” just 
after Pistorius has said that “the majority's path is an easy one, ours is difficult” (117).  One can easily 
make too much of such coincidences when they are merely thematic, but allow me to cite one more.  
Demian says “Wir reden zuviel.  Das kluge Reden hat gar keinen Wert” (87).  (“We talk too much.  
Clever talk is absolutely worthless”; 46.)  One can almost read this as “Das kluge Reden hat gar keine 
Wörter”: smart talk has no words.  In his analysis of Rede, discourse or talk, Heidegger writes, “talking 
extensively about something covers it up and brings what is understood to sham clarity [….] To be able 
to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say” (SZ, 164-165).  See too Kierkegaard 2010, 43.
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Hesse's 1919 novel is one of the more famous Bildungsromane pitched as a quest 
for authenticity, especially before authenticity devolves to meaning little more than “not 
phony.”  Though I can find no direct evidence that Heidegger read Demian, it was 
massively popular in Germany, going through some seventeen printings in its first year of
publication.  Only at that point was Hesse revealed to be the author; it originally appeared 
under the name of Emil Sinclair, the story's protagonist (Hesse said he feared his account 
of coming of age would not have been taken seriously by younger readers if they knew 
the author was forty-two).  The novel tells the story of Sinclair's youthful ennui and 
search for an authentic way of living, one which springs from his own self.  After quasi-
apprenticing himself to a number of potential role models, he comes to realize two things.  
On the one hand, he can't simply model his life after someone else's, because each of us 
has a different set of interests, desires, and dispositions.  These can't be easily repressed 
or modified as one tries to fit oneself to a given mold.  On the other hand, the notion that 
each of us has a unique destiny, even if not taken literally, speaks to his realization that 
there's nothing authentic about giving oneself over to every whim.  These are given, but 
not necessarily self-given.  Furthermore, we're thrown a particular fate in part by being 
thrown into a world and situation with which we have to come to terms.  Sinclair thus 
realizes that he cannot just craft “new gods” anymore than he can give himself over to 
existing ones.
As became clear above, projection—except in its most derivative form as mere 
confabulation—is not a matter of imagining oneself however one will.  The possibilities 
that we project, that we throw ahead of ourselves, are grounded in and limited by the 
possibilities in which we already find ourselves cast, into which we are always already 
thrown.  Projection is only part of the structure by which Heidegger characterizes the “in” 
of being-in-the-world, the “da” or “there” of Dasein.  Its complement is thrownness.  
Whereas projection is the form of our understanding of possibilities, thrownness is the 
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form of our facticity, the way our existence is given over to us without our say or 
choosing (between the two lies “falling,” which I leave aside until chapter eight).  In the 
last chapter, I criticized Sartre in passing for seemingly constantly overstating how free 
we are to make of ourselves what we will.  The same cannot be said of Heidegger, given 
the centrality of thrownness in his thought.  Indeed, readers sometimes have the opposite 
worry.  If Heidegger's trope of us as thrown does originate with Hesse, it is not a lineage 
with which Hesse would have been happy: he writes in a 1952 letter of his dissatisfaction 
with “Geworfensein as the philosophy of our day.”33
Regardless of whether Heidegger was influenced by Demian, we can see in Being 
and Time a thoroughgoing response to the question which Hesse extracts from the novel 
and uses as an epigraph: “I wanted only to try to live in accord with the promptings 
which came from my true self.  Why was that so very difficult?” (originally 126/99).  For 
starters, if one thinks that a form of life wells up out of oneself, unsullied by the world, 
and that realizing such a life is what authenticity consists in—then, by Heidegger's 
account at least, one is confused.  One's self doesn't have its own content in isolation 
from the world and culture and situation into which one is born, into which one is thrown.  
So trying to manifest this notion of authenticity will be endlessly frustrating, indeed 
impossible.  At best it will end in the illusion of authenticity, based on a deluded or 
sanctimonious repression of one's dependence on the world.
A rubric, like Dreyfus's, of the various ways in which our possibilities are 
constrained belongs here, in the analysis of thrownness.  Recall the way in which he 
glossed Spielraum: it is “a space of possibilities that constrains Dasein's range of possible 
actions without in any way determining what Dasein does” (189).  As an account of 
projection, this is mis-emphasized.  It is thrownness that will already have closed off 
33 1967, 335; quoted in Stelzig, 335n106.  Hesse would also later deride, or parody, Heidegger's prose 
style (see, e.g., Michels 1987, 307-308 and 1986, 110; Hesse 1986, 403).
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certain ways of acting as impossible, without necessitating one way forward.  Heidegger 
doesn't enumerate or even begin to schematize the different ways in which we are 
thrown.  Michael Inwood cites another useful precursor of Heidegger's use of geworfen, 
however, one which corresponds to the way we are thrown into a culture.  Schiller writes 
to Goethe, in a letter from August 23rd, 1794: “Now that you have been born a German, 
now that your Grecian spirit has been thrown [geworfen] into this northern world, you 
had but two alternatives, either to become a northern artist, or […] to produce your 
Greece as it were from within, by an intellectual process” (quoted in Inwood, 218).  
Again, it's not hard to imagine that Heidegger might have been aware of this passage.  
The notion of thrownness is minimized, however, if one can really overcome one's 
cultural heritage by intellectually crafting a new identity.  This would reduce thrownness 
to a starting line, one's unchosen initial place in the world.  Heidegger insists that our 
thrownness is more radical than this, that it is always ongoing: “Thrownness is neither a 
'fact that is finished' nor a Fact that is settled.  Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it 
is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw” (SZ, 179).  We are thrown, not just once at 
birth into a given culture, but over and over again into new situations which that culture 
will play a role in shaping.  As noted before, it is only later in his career that Heidegger 
will more substantially take up the idea of variance between cultures and historical 
epochs.  Indeed, Heidegger's chief ontic evidence here for our ontological condition as 
thrown is seemingly the least historical and most transitory of phenomena, and thus one 
that we have to deal with over and over again, all of the time: moods.
“What we indicate ontologically by the term 'disposedness' is ontically the most 
familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned” (SZ, 134).  The 
general, existential condition of disposedness, of finding oneself in a given state, is 
realized in the phenomenon of having a mood.  Remember Heidegger's formulation, 
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somewhat echoing Kant's famous slogan,34 concerning the fact that understanding and 
disposedness are equiprimordial: “A disposedness always has its understanding” and 
“Understanding always has its mood” (SZ, 142).  As moods are ontic realizations of 
disposedness, one could repeat these claims in exactly mirrored terms.35  It's also the case 
that we always have both (the above formulation, alone, leaves open the possibility that 
we sometimes have neither).  The implicit argument for the claim that we always have an 
understanding (in Heidegger's sense) is that a structure of orienting expectations is basic 
to our way of being in the world.  Even when I misunderstand (in the normal sense of the 
word) my situation, it is in reference to some already-made projection of possibilities.
The basis for Heidegger's claim that we always have a mood is rather more 
straightforward.  He describes Dasein's affected condition and expects that we will 
recognize it as both familiar and universal.  We are not blank subjects of experience, but 
find ourselves always in one state or another.  Our moods filter and shape our reception of 
the world; shifts in mood entail shifts in our dispositions and affect, an alteration of our 
attunement.  Still, the ubiquity of moods is plausible only because Heidegger insists that 
the state that we might be inclined to describe as lacking a mood is itself a mood of a 
particular sort: “in every case Dasein always has some mood.  The pallid, evenly 
balanced lack of mood, which is often persistent and which is not to be mistaken for a 
bad mood, is far from nothing at all” (SZ, 134).  Heidegger's term for the ontological 
basis of moods, “Befindlichkeit,” relates to a normal German greeting: “Wie befinden Sie 
sich?”  “How are you?”  “How are you feeling?”  “How's it going?”  Literally: “How do 
you find yourself?”  Heidegger explains: “A mood makes manifest how one is, and how 
one is faring” (SZ, 134)  When one answers “fine,” “eh,” or merely shrugs one's 
34 “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (The Critique of Pure 
Reason, A51/B76).
35 Heidegger uses “mood” and “disposedness” as synonyms a bit liberally, given that they are supposed to 
exist on opposite sides of the ontic/ontological divide.  This is perhaps because there is no good name 
for one instance of disposedness when the type isn't specified, forcing Heidegger to say “a mode of 
disposedness” or, much more easily but misleadingly, “a mood.”
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shoulders to the question of how it's going, it is not that one is moodless or finds oneself 
nowhere at all.  There is simply nothing remarkable about one's state, which is normal, as 
to be expected, average and everyday.  Such an unremarkable situation is where one is: 
“In this 'how one is', having a mood brings Being to its 'there'” (SZ, 134).  In the order of 
our experience, moods are that by which we most familiarly encounter our existence as 
given to us, without our say or choosing: “In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed 
moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; as in this way it 
has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be” (SZ, 134).  In the 
order of Heidegger's argument, moods provide evidence of our existential condition as 
the kind of beings whose existence is in some measure thrown.  We should avoid 
overstating the importance of moods in Heidegger's analysis, however.  They are only the 
specific ontic evidence he presents for the ontological condition of disposedness.  
Heidegger does not set himself the task of offering a complete philosophical 
anthropology.  He's careful to remind us that he is not elaborating a full taxonomy of 
moods, focusing as he does on only fear and anxiety.36  Because one mood—anxiety—
has such an important place in Being and Time (as that which first lets us come face to 
face with ourselves, not lost to the world; SZ, §40), moods generally take on an over-
prominent role as exemplary of disposedness.  Thus his warning should be extended: 
moods are only one instance of our disposedness and thus our condition as thrown.
Consider another familiar phenomenon: taste.  Just as “A mood assails us” (SZ, 
136), I just find that I like certain things and not others.  Sometimes, I can reconstruct 
why this is the case, recalling the influence of what I was offered or (more fatefully) 
forced to eat as a child, for example.  This is analogous to the way in which I can 
sometimes reconstruct why I am in this or that mood.  In both cases, I can eventually 
36 “The different modes of disposedness and the ways in which they are interconnected in their 
foundations cannot be Interpreted within the problematic of the present investigation” (SZ, 138).
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overcome what is given to me, though not easily.  “Dasein can, should, and must, through 
knowledge and will, become master of its moods,” Heidegger writes (SZ, 136).  As one 
matures, one comes to recognize the signs that a certain mood is descending.  Perhaps 
one knows to put on certain music, or to go for a walk, to stave off a growing feeling of 
despair.  Teenagers, no less than two-year olds, sometimes seem like beasts ruled by the 
whims of their hormones, as they often don't have even the first inklings of how to 
manipulate themselves in these ways.  Yet even if we were to fully master our moods, we 
would never conquer our condition as thrown.  One would still feel a mood coming on 
and know how to respond; one could not halt the givenness of moods altogether.  And of 
course none of us actually does fully master our moods and assume full responsibility for 
them.  “Sorry, I'm just in a bad mood” remains a nearly universally understood excuse.
The general condition to which moods, taste, and habits testify is that of 
thrownness.  In an ever more general and structural set of terms, our “there” or 
situatedness is explained by our understanding, which is in turn explained by projection.  
This half of the structure of the “there” explains our existence in possibilities, the fact that 
we are never finished.  The mirror side of this is a set of terms which explain our 
existence in actualities, by givens, explains the fact that we're always already started.  
Our situation in a particular place is attested to by our mood, which is explained by our 
disposedness, which in turn has the form of thrownness:
This characteristic of Dasein's Being—this 'that it is'—is veiled in its “whence” and “whither”, yet 
disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it the “thrownness” of this entity into its “there”.  
The expression “thrownness” is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over. (SZ, 135)
We can't make ourselves as we will because we are given over to an existing culture, 
situation, and even personal state of affect.  We don't choose or control these, and they 
determine our range of possibilities, what makes sense and what we can do.
Even allowing for the central role of anxiety, something like taste—and habits and 
dispositions in general—actually seems better than moods as an illustration of 
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thrownness.  The appeal of moods as an example is that they are so brutely given.  The 
danger of habits as an example is that, at least in some cases, they are chosen.  That is, 
they were chosen, on the basis of past willed behavior, repeated until it became ingrained.  
(There are, of course, habits that aren't chosen as well.)  Once one is in a given situation, 
though, one's dispositions are just as brutely given as one's mood.  And once Heidegger 
progresses to his interpretation of being-in-the-world in terms of temporality, moods 
become less useful as examples, exactly because they are so transitory.  Whereas 
understanding and our projection of possibilities relate to the future, disposedness and our 
thrownness relate to the past.  Heidegger writes:
Dasein's Being, by its very meaning, constantly is as having been. […] [T]he ecstasis of the 
“been” is what first makes it possible to find oneself in the way of having a disposedness.  
Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; one's disposedness, however, temporalizes 
itself primarily as having been. (SZ, 340)
“Gewesenheit,” “having been,” might also be translated as “wasness.”  It is a 
nominalization of the past participle (“gewesen”) of “to be.”  Moods are thus, by 
Heidegger's account, not merely “fleeting Experiences which 'colour' one's whole 
'psychical condition'” (SZ, 340).  Such a familiar description doesn't allow us to 
recognize “their primordial existential function” (SZ, 340).  Rather than seeing moods as 
fleeting, Heidegger claims that “except on the basis of temporality, moods are not 
possible” (SZ, 341).  His argument that moods are primarily based in “having been” 
seems strained, however: the two moods that he proffers as examples—fear and anxiety
—tend to be thought of in futural terms.  “Has not 'fear' been rightly defined as 'the 
expectation of some oncoming evil'?” (SZ, 341).  “[D]oes not anxiety get constituted by a 
future?” (SZ, 343).  Heidegger doesn't deny these claims.  Rather, he suggests that one 
can only fear something oncoming because one is already “there,” open to a set of 
concerns.  In this way, even hope, seemingly the most future-oriented of moods, is said to 
be based in “having been” (SZ, 345).  Somewhat more convincingly, he argues that 
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anxiety brings us back to our thrownness, our being already “there”: “Anxiety is anxious 
about naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into uncanniness” (SZ, 343).  In 
anxiety we're cut off from our normal concerns in the world and our normal resources for 
justifying what we do and who we are.  Our thrownness—our being given over to a state 
without our choosing—thus becomes apparent.
Nonetheless, the primacy of “having been” with respect to moods is hard to see.  
Consider some reasons for this, however.  First, we shouldn't confuse the phenomenon of 
having a mood with what a particular mood is about.  In his discussion of fear and 
anxiety, Heidegger seems to lose this distinction, focusing on the object of fear or lack of 
object of anxiety, but it is the general phenomenon of having moods which speaks to our 
disposedness.  Second, his dependence on moods specifically, rather than other possible 
ontic forms which testify to our disposedness and thrownness, is here particularly 
obvious.  I am disposed, as I find myself now, to act in certain ways on the basis of 
having been in past, habituating circumstances.  In such an example, the primacy of 
“having been” is clearer.  Third, projection and possibilities just are more important in the 
existential analysis of Dasein, so they tend to intrude on other concerns.  Finally, 
Heidegger is on his way toward arguing for the unity of temporality, so the ecstases of 
past and future, thrownness and projection, are already being revealed as intertwined.
My favorite image of thrownness, though accidental and exaggerated (like “The 
Garden of Forking Paths” is in relation to projection), comes from an essay by the pop 
culture critic Chuck Klosterman.  He describes his six-year-old niece teaching him to 
play The Sims, a computer game in which one pilots an avatar through the banalities of 
everyday life: eating, going to work, buying things, even sleeping and going to the 
bathroom.  From a Heideggerian perspective, the game represents something like a 
complete breakdown of everyday life, which therefore makes conspicuous our normal 
assumptions.  One has to think ahead and explicitly plan time to go to the bathroom, for 
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example, in order to make it to work on time.  Thus Klosterman writes:
Young Katie couldn't help but notice my ineptitude and immediately tried to show me how the 
game was played (and—inadvertently—how existence works, although I doubt she would have 
explained it that way).  Katie displayed an amazing dexterity at The Sims, effortlessly building a 
home and furnishing it with a cornucopia of household goods she could never operate in reality.  
She then instructed me to find a job and make friends with other Sim citizens.  However, I 
immediately had dozens of questions for young Katie about my new life: If I don't yet have a job, 
how could I afford this residence?  Who put all of that food in my fridge?  Elves, perhaps?  Can I 
trust them?  Why don't I need a car?  Where did I go to college?  Don't I have any old friends I 
could call for moral support? [...]  “You just live here,” she said.  “That's the way it is.”  But where 
did I come from?  “Nobody knows.  You're just here.” (2004, 15-16)
What the image exaggerates, of course, is our relationship to our pasts.  Unlike his avatar, 
Klosterman knows how he got where he is.  He doesn't have to reconstruct his past at 
every moment.  We don't just appear where we are, we are thrown there, thus seemingly 
by something and from somewhere.  Explicitly reconstructing such a path to where we  
are now and telling a story of our past is a way of coming to terms with our thrownness.  
Yet considering such a process makes clear that separating thrownness and projection, 
assigning one to the past and one to the future, is artificial.  In taking over my past with 
respect to a given situation, I don't remember and consider everything.  There is a sense 
in which we do reconstruct our pasts every time we call on them.  Considering the 
relation of my memories to where I am now, I either leave in place my understanding of 
their meaning or—usually due to some new event—reinterpret my past in terms of it.  I 
tell one possible story among many in emphasizing certain events and leaving others 
aside.  This sounds like a kind of backward-oriented projection.37  On the other hand, the 
further I get myself into a certain situation, the more certain possibilities are foreclosed, 
such that consequences become determined and thrown, not possible and projected.
In their most fundamental terms—thrownness and projection—the two sides of 
our situated-being come together as two parts of a whole.  Geworfenheit and Entwurf, 
thrownness and throwing forward, both play on the same root, the verb werfen.  I am 
always in the middle of an arc, according to the compound image, thrown into the world 
37 Heidegger only takes up such a theme with respect to “repetition” and an authentic engagement with 
one's past, which is why I leave the details aside.
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and now projecting where I'm going.  Yet given, as always, the more important place of 
projection and possibility in Heidegger's account, the notion that I enact one story (as 
MacIntyre would have it) is implausible.  Rather, each of us finds ourselves amidst a 
whole network of possible narratives.  These stories aren't merely possible, various 
optional accounts we might offer of our situations.  Rather, by Heidegger's analysis of 
thrown projection, we necessarily find ourselves on an arc from givens to possibilities.  
The similarity between this image and that of plot arc is, I suggest, not coincidental.
III. Thrown Projection
Writing recently (2010), Tony Fisher divides Heidegger's interpreters into 
narrative and anti-narrative camps.  Taylor and Guignon represent the narrative camp.  
Fisher describes them as holding the “final configuration view,” in reference to a 
quotation from Guignon: “in taking a stand on its own life, Dasein takes over some range 
of possibilities as definitive of its identity—some set of personality traits, life-styles, 
roles, or attitudes—and exists as 'being-toward' the realization of a final configuration of 
possibilities for its life overall” (Fisher, 248; Guignon 1993, 225).  The idea here is that, 
in order to take responsibility for who we are, each of has to commit to an identity.  It's 
not simply given to us, and we may not successfully achieve it, but we're oriented toward 
it and by it, and it thus shapes our particular actions and the overall shape of our lives.  
On the other side, Dreyfus, Taylor Carman, and William Blattner represent the anti-
narrative camp.  Fisher (248) describes them as holding the “unattainability view,”: if 
Dasein is a nullity, defined always by open-ended possibilities, then it can never be “a 
finished or in principle finishable self, an integrated whole” (“unattainability” is from 
Blattner, 82; the quotation is from Carman, 266).  Or, as Fisher puts it himself, “Ecstatic 
temporality prohibits the traditional ontic characterisation of the person, and it is 
precisely this which the narrative view appears to tacitly sanction” (248).  The idea here 
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is that in stressing the way that a person is “ecstatic”—stretched out in time, especially 
toward the as yet undecided future—Heidegger has no notion of a whole or finished 
person, whose life is unified like a well-wrought story.  A characterization of a person as 
honest, for example, or successful, or happy, or a characterization of someone's life as 
tragic or picaresque, is strictly speaking impossible if she remains unfinished, such that 
she could still betray any pattern of behavior so far established.
Fisher attempts to offer a “middle course” between these two views.  His 
discussion, like all treatments of Heidegger and narrativity so far, focuses on historicality, 
authenticity, and the second division of Being of Time.38  My own interpretation of 
Heidegger in narrativist terms operates at a level underlying such concerns.  I've deferred 
any discussion of the narrative unity of life as a whole as beyond the scope of this project.  
We might call my target fundamental narrativity (mimicking Heidegger's fundamental 
ontology), as my goal is to show that the very structure of being-in-the-world is narrative 
in form.  Existing narrative interpretations of Heidegger like Taylor's and Guignon's thus 
occur at a level above and which escapes my terms here.  And Carman's emphasis on the 
unfinished nature of Dasein's being as always ahead of itself, rather than prohibiting 
narrative self-understanding, is exactly what I take to be responsible for this fundamental 
level of narrativity, from which any higher-order configuration would have to grow: the 
unfinished parts of ourselves are filled in by projected narrative.  Where Guignon writes 
of Dasein “tak[ing] over some range of possibilities as definitive of its identity” and 
existing toward this “final configuration,” I suggest instead that Heidegger's analysis 
holds us as, by our very comportment and thus aside from conscious identity-making, 
orienting ourselves provisionally (not definitively or finally) against a multiplicity (not 
one configuration) of possibilities for our existence.  This set of possibilities is constantly 
38 See too Kevin Vanhoozer's “Philosophical Antecedents to Ricoeur's Time and Narrative” on projection 
and narrative (in Wood, ed., 1991, 34-54), as well as Bordwell 1985, 29-47.
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evolving.  Nonetheless, I argue, it constitutes a network of narratives, possible arcs of 
plot we might play out in our existence.  The self is to be found where these various 
plotlines intersect.  MacIntyre's basic image of a life is too simple:
According to Heidegger's conception of thrown projection, even one moment is far more 
complicated:
According to MacIntyre's ideal conception, the arc of a quest oriented toward the good 
captures an entire life.  In contrast, my revised image represents the competing narrative 
arcs that even one moment is constituted by.  Our understanding of the possibilities of our 
existence, through Heideggerian projection, involves many implicit futures, and none are 
certain (hence the dashed lines).  Meanwhile, when we look back on our pasts, we don't 
always see the same fixed arc, even though we're already thrown.  Depending on where 
we are now, and what we're considering, we'll see different parts of our pasts (and thus 
different arcs) as relevant.  We don't experience our pasts as contingent, however (hence 
the solid lines), even as we can interpret them in various ways.  The range interpretations 
available is narrower than it is for our futures, which remain open (hence the varying size 
past (thrownness) present            future (projection)
 Figure 4: thrown projection as competing narrative arcs
narrative arc of a quest
the good
  Figure 3: a life as one narrative arc, stretching from birth to death
birth death
227
of the cones, past versus future).  Carman is right that a “traditional characterization” of 
Dasein is precluded—if this means a final and stable identification of the self with a set of 
traits, or the mapping of a life as one unified arc.  But “traditional characterization” need 
not to be central to any narrative conception of the self.  By my revised narrativist view, 
we understand ourselves by provisionally projecting the possibilities of our existence.  
Properly thematizing such an understanding (understanding self-understanding) will 
involve reconstructing and making explicit a whole network of narratives, as well as 
tracking their evolution as one's comportment and expectations change.
I can now return to and rebut Christman's deflation of narrativity.  In opposition to 
his claim that there is nothing distinctively narrative about the form of our self-
understanding, I argue that the place of Dasein amidst its thrown projections and the 
place of a reader mid-story are structurally isomorphic.  My account is one of self-
interpretation, to be sure.  Against Christman, however, these structures are not merely 
ones of self-interpretation.  They are specifically narratively structured forms of self-
interpretation.  Consider Julio Cortázar's story “Continuity of Parks”:
He had begun to read the novel a few days before.  He had put it down because of some 
urgent business conferences, opened it again on his way back to the estate by train; he permitted 
himself a slowly growing interest in the plot, in the characterizations.  That afternoon, after writing 
a letter giving his power of attorney and discussing a matter of joint ownership with the manager 
of his estate, he returned to the book in the tranquility of his study which looked out upon the park 
with its oaks.  Sprawled in his favorite armchair, its back toward the door—even the possibility of 
an intrusion would have irritated him, had he thought of it—he let his left hand caress repeatedly 
the green velvet upholstery and set to reading the final chapters.  He remembered effortlessly the 
names and his mental image of the characters; the novel spread its glamour over him almost at 
once.  He tasted the almost perverse pleasure of disengaging himself line by line from the things 
around him, and at the same time feeling his head rest comfortably on the green velvet of the chair 
with its high back, sensing that the cigarettes rested within reach of his hand, that beyond the great 
windows the air of afternoon danced under the oak trees in the park.  Word by word, licked up by 
the sordid dilemma of the hero and heroine, letting himself be absorbed to the point where the 
images settled down and took on color and movement, he was witness to the final encounter in the 
mountain cabin.  The woman arrived first, apprehensive; now the lover came in, his face cut by the 
backlash of a branch. [...] Nothing had been forgotten: alibis, unforeseen hazards, possible 
mistakes.  From this hour on, each instant had its use minutely assigned.  The cold-blooded, twice-
gone-over reexamination of the details was barely broken off so that a hand could caress a cheek.  
It was beginning to get dark.
Not looking at one another now, rigidly fixed upon the task which awaited them, they 
separated at the cabin door.  She was to follow the trail that led north.  On the path leading in the 
opposite direction, he turned for a moment to watch her running, her hair loosened and flying.  He 
ran in turn, crouching among the trees and hedges until, in the yellowish fog of dusk, he could 
distinguish the avenue of trees which led up to the house.  The dogs were not supposed to bark, 
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they did not bark.  The estate manager would not be there at this hour, and he was not there.  He 
went up the three porch steps and entered.  The woman's words reached him over the thudding of 
blood in his ears: first a blue chamber, then a hall, then a carpeted stairway.  At the top, two doors.  
No one in the first room, no one in the second.  The door of the salon, and then, the knife in hand, 
the light from the great windows, the high back of an armchair covered in green velvet, the head of 
the man in the chair reading a novel. (63-65)
Cortázar's story is an elegant allegory for the way in which we are trapped within 
reading.  The text read reveals itself to be the story of the reader's own life and fate.  
“Continuity of Parks” also offers itself up as a formal example of the way in which our 
interpretive expectations are structured by thrownness and projection.  As readers, we are 
thrown into its plot.  Initial details are given to us and structure our expectations of what 
is to come.  But we can begin to make sense of those given details only by positing—by 
projecting—a set of hypotheses about how they will find a place in a finished story-arc.  
Cortázar's story moves through three sections, in a way that makes unusually transparent 
how our projected expectations structure our understanding of the progressing story.  
First, we are given the situation of the estate owner and the contrast between his business 
and readerly life.  Perhaps we expect this to be a story of thwarted artistic ambitions.  Or 
of the consolations of aesthetic consumption.  Early on in any story, the possibilities still 
open are many.  Second, we are thrown into a new story as the frame of the estate owner 
is revealed to be merely a frame.  As he gives himself over to the novel he is reading, so 
too do we.  Now we follow the developing plot of a man and woman's secret rendezvous 
at a mountain cabin.  Here our expectations sharpen dramatically.  In not only its plot, but 
its very language, this new story quickly establishes its genre, foreclosing many 
possibilities from our expectational apparatus.  We understand that they are planning a 
murder, and the story, of necessity, moves toward the deed.  But, third, just as it seems 
only one possibility remains—the scene of the murder—Cortázar marvelously upsets our 
expectations.  The frame of the estate owner, all but forgotten, returns.  In a metafictional 
strange loop, Cortázar's reader is reading the account of his own murder.  By upsetting 
our expectations, Cortázar make them conspicuous.  We realize, in a way we rarely attend 
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to, how our expectations about where a story is going structure our understanding of 
where, at any moment in the middle, a story is.  The twist of the thriller (Kevin Spacey is 
Keyser Söze; Bruce Willis has been dead the whole time) only highlights the manner in 
which our expectations are always, though usually unnoticed, the basis for our 
understanding of a developing narrative.
We can now notice a few things about such interpretive expectations.  For starters, 
they are uncertain.  Mid-novel, or sitting in a darkened movie theater, one does not know 
how the story will play out.  (This obviously changes in rereading, which I will discuss 
momentarily.)  One has only beliefs, opinions, assumptions.  Further, such expectations 
need not be conscious—we “read” in this way all the time without our doing so needing 
to rise above the pre-theoretical level.  I don't need to formulate the thought “the action 
hero will prevail” or “they'll get together in the end” to be surprised if these or other 
conventions are transgressed.  Additionally, such expectations are multifaceted.  Even if I 
become wedded to a particular hypothesis, I'm equipped to rank the implausibility of 
competing theories.  Should my favored hypothesis prove incorrect, I'll be more or less 
surprised by other possibilities, depending on how they had fit into my expectational 
apparatus.39  In Heideggerian projection, we see the same structure.  Just as we 
understand an ongoing narrative on the basis of a hypothetical completed plot, so too do 
we understand our lives now on the basis of projected future possibilities for our 
existence.
The parallel can be extended to thrownness.  Lives begin, as MacIntyre puts in, 
“in media res”: “We enter upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves 
part of an action that was not of our making” (AV, 215, 213).  By the time a child is 
equipped to understand (or misunderstand) his or her life, countless things about that life 
will have been determined.  One is always already in the middle of an interpretive 
39 See too Carroll 2001, 130-133.
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situation.  One cannot stand prior to one's experience, ready to chose every aspect of it.  It 
might seem that the analogy to aesthetic experience breaks down here.  Is not the moment 
one first cracks open a novel, or the moment the house lights go down, one of pure 
possibility?  Projection without thrownness?  It is not.  Consider all the rituals of pre-
reading most of us observe.  Backs of books are read, blurbs consulted, commitments 
quantified by flipping forward to see just how many pages we're talking about anyway.40  
Occasionally we might even consider introductions, prefaces, and criticism to facilitate 
our approach to a daunting tome.  The very fact that we feel the need—that we can 
characterize an unread book as daunting—demonstrates expectations preceding even our 
pre-reading.  Just to take a novel as a novel, a film as a film, is to embrace a host of 
assumptions and expectations.41  In the same way, Richard Wollheim suggests that our 
answer to the question “What is it to lead the life of a person?” will underly most of our 
assumptions about identity (20).
The hermeneutic standpoint I'm considering here privileges middles, reading over 
having read, to say nothing of rereading.  A standard approach to narrative texts will find 
it natural to privilege endings.  After all, the story of King Lear or Hamlet would be quite 
different if their respective protagonists did not die in the end.  Bernard Williams writes  
of fictional characters that “their wholeness is already there” while it is “essential to ours 
that it is not” (2007, 311).  Peter Goldie extends this thought, writing that even a 
character like Nausea's Roquentin, mired in contingency, is essentially whole (MI, 165).  
From the standpoint of reading, rather than having read, I think these claims are false.  
Halfway through a novel, or a least novel that avoids foreshadowing, a character remains 
unfinished, just as we remain unfinished halfway through life.42  That we should 
40 Calvino's If on a Winter's Night a Traveler: “[Y]ou open the book to page one, no, to the last page, first 
you want to see how long it is. […] You turn the book over in your hands, you scan the sentences on the 
back of the jacket, generic phrases that don't say a great deal. […] Of course, this circling of the book, 
too, this reading around it before reading inside it, is part of the pleasure in a new book” (8).
41 Kendall Walton: “Even the ability to see paintings as paintings had to be acquired” (366).
42 Once one stops taking literature seminars, opportunities for discussing a novel with someone when both 
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downplay endings in our literary hermeneutics is a thesis to be defended another time.43  
It is enough here to note that such an approach can't be extended to self-interpretation.  
As Williams writes, “the idea of a completed, unified, or coherent narration is of no help 
in leading a life” (2007, 312).  Lives can't be reread, at least by those who led them.  
Neither can I finish reading my own life even once.  As Heidegger famously notes, I can 
never stand outside of my life and grasp it as a whole:
But as soon as Dasein 'exists' in such a way that absolutely nothing more is still outstanding in it, 
then it has already for this very reason become “no-longer-Being-there”.  Its Being is annihilated 
when what is still outstanding in its Being has been liquidated.  As long as Dasein is as an entity, it 
has never reached its 'wholeness'.  But if it gains such 'wholeness', this gain becomes the utter loss 
of Being-in-the-world.  In such a case, it can never again be experienced as an entity. (SZ, 236).
As Epicurus put it for quite other reasons, “when we exist, death is not yet present, and 
when death is present, then we do not exist” (4.125).  My life will be whole only at death, 
when I can no longer look back over it, like I look back over a book I've finished reading.  
None of this means that narrative is irrelevant to lived experience, however.  Peter Brooks 
offers the “anticipation of retrospection” as a model for how we interpret narrative, from 
the middle.  Questioning (rightly, I think) whether we imagine novelistic events, 
conventionally narrated in the past tense, as past, he writes:
If on the one hand we realize the action progressively, segment by segment, as a kind of present in 
terms of our experience of it […] do we not do so precisely in anticipation of its larger 
hermeneutic structuring by conclusions?  We are frustrated by narrative interminable [….] If the 
past is to be read as present, it is a curious present that we know to be past in relation to a future 
we know to be already in place, already in wait for us to reach it.  Perhaps we would do best to 
speak of the anticipation of retrospection as our chief tool in making sense of narrative, the master 
trope of its strange logic. (22-23)
We provisionally project wholes of meaning, even when we know they will eventually be 
revealed to us.44  Reading, rather than having read, models lived experience.
of you are in the middle largely disappear.  Remind yourself of how these conversations play out, and 
the role in them for questions of where a character might be going.  Goldie writes that when we engage 
with a story, “we not only grasp the narrative, but we also often envisage alternative narratives—
branching possibilities—of how events might unfold” (MI, 92).  This is most obviously the case when 
we're in the middle of a story, though I think we do so even when finished as well.
43 If one thinks the value of literature is not in whatever messages or morals it might encode, but in its 
ability to focus and direct attention, then how a story unfurls—and the experience of following it do so
—is far more important than how it happens to end.
44 See too Josh Landy's use of the future perfect in reconstructing Proust's conception of the self (123ff).
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The case for lives is rather more straightforward, though structurally similar, 
assuming one doesn't believe in fate.  MacIntyre makes the same point:
But it is crucial that at any given point in an enacted dramatic narrative we do not know what will 
happen next. [...] This unpredictability coexists with a second crucial characteristic of all lived 
narrative, a certain teleological character.  We live out our lives, both individually and in our 
relationships with each other, in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a 
future in which certain possibilities beckon us forward and others repel us, some seem already 
foreclosed and others perhaps inevitable. (AV, 215)
Here MacIntyre comes close, in his own way, to Heidegger's concept of projection: “our 
lives have a certain form which projects itself towards our future” (AV, 216).  We should 
notice, however, if Heidegger is right concerning the centrality of possibility to our 
existence, that projected possibilities are not merely replaced by actualities.  My self-
understanding is always constituted by a range of future possibilities.  It is thus 
inadequate to look back at merely the choices I actualized to understand where I've been.  
Rather, Brooks's structure will have to be reversed and the retrospection of anticipation 
will be central to understanding one's past.  Consider again my earlier example: should I 
finish my Ph.D. and find a teaching job, to tell the story “he got his Ph.D., then found a 
teaching job” would be woefully inadequate.45  Rather, to recover my self-understanding, 
one would have to recover the structure of assumptions, expectations, and alternative 
possibilities that guide me now—and these exist aside from whatever explicit worries, 
insecurities, hopes, dreams, and fears I have.  They are present, if Heidegger's treatment 
of projection is right, in one's very existential posture.  The arc that any of our lives 
happens to actualize is criss-crossed at every point by competing possibilities, now lost, 
that have to be understood in order to truly trace where a person has been.
In his The Act of Reading, Wolfgang Iser introduces the concept of the “wandering 
viewpoint” (108).  Ricoeur explains: “It expresses the twofold fact that the whole of the 
45 “Autobiographical discourse tends to promote an illusion of disarming simplicity when it comes to self 
and self-experience” (Eakin, ix).  “[N]arratives, which often turn earlier presents into mere pasts, tend 
to create a single line of development out of a multiplicity.  Alternatives once visible disappear from 
view and an anachronistic sense of the past surreptitiously infects our understanding” (Morson, 6); we'll 
see, in the next chapter, that certain kinds of narratives resist these tendencies.
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text can never be perceived at once and that, placing ourselves within the literary text, we 
travel with it as our reading progresses” (TNIII, 168).  Unlike some other forms of art, a 
narrative text is never fully present to us.  Rather, to experience such a text, we must give 
ourselves over to it and move through it.  Furthermore, our path through a text is 
carefully, though not completely, controlled by the text itself.  “The relation between the 
text and reader,” Iser writes, “is therefore quite different from that between an object and 
observer: instead of a subject-object relationship, there is a moving viewpoint which 
travels along inside that which it has to apprehend” (109).  One can see the parallels 
between Iser's literary-theoretical approach to narrative and Heidegger's to Dasein's 
being.  The relation of an individual to his or her life is not that of a subject to an object.  
Neither can a life be made fully present to the person who lives it.  Rather, we move 
along or through our lives, and our mode of apprehending them is structured in regular 
ways.  Iser references Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness and takes 
over its vocabulary: “The reader's position in the text is at the point of intersection 
between retention and protention. […] Each new correlate, then, will answer expectations 
(either positively or negatively) and, at the same time, will arouse new expectations” 
(111).  Husserl's explanation of the structure of time consciousness obviously influences 
Heidegger's conception of temporality—for which thrown projection is the underlying 
existential basis.  From Heidegger's perspective, the terminology of retention and 
protention makes too many psychological assumptions, however.  Substituting in 
Heidegger's vocabulary, the reader's position in the text is at the point of intersection 
between thrownness and projection.
Iser concludes that “This mode of grasping an object is unique to literature” (109).  
This claim is made against the wrong background taxonomy, however.  An object does 
not require the wandering viewpoint because it is a work of literature rather than a 
painting, sculpture, or piece of architecture (nor because it is literary rather than 
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lowbrow).  Rather it is the narrative quality of a text, inextricably temporal, that requires 
the wandering viewpoint.46  Reading, by its very nature, is a temporal experience, which 
might seem to suggest that any form of writing will require Iser's approach.  We don't 
read textbooks by projecting larger structures of plot, however.  We don't necessarily read 
poetry this way either, even when it's about life or lived experience.47  Only narrative 
requires the projection of larger temporal patterns of events.  Narrativity, as I argued in 
chapter three, escapes the confines of a formalist typology.  It is typical of fiction, film, 
and a kind of history.  But most aesthetic forms, especially when hybridized, can realize 
some version of it.  The wandering viewpoint is not unique to grasping literature rather 
than painting, film, architecture, etc.  It is unique to grasping narrative, whether it be in a 
novelistic, cinematic, dramatic, or other form, rather than non-narrative.  On the basis of 
what I've argued here, we can see that Iser's wandering viewpoint applies to our grasp of 
our lives as well.  We move through our lives in the same way that we move through 
narratives, according to the structures of thrownness and projection, hypothesizing larger 
temporal patterns of events.  This is the first piece of my revised conception of the 
narrative self.  
Argumentatively, existing versions of the narrative self tend to be motivated by a 
master metaphor.  We are the authors or narrators of our lives, or our lives are stories, or 
we are characters within them.  Such an approach is hampered by the limitations of 
metaphor: two things are alike in some respects, but not others, not all.  A metaphor 
succeeds only insofar as the similarities are especially revealing.  If it doesn't strike 
someone as revealing, it has little argumentative weight.  It makes no claim on them; that 
I find a metaphor revealing doesn't necessitate that you should.  You can always insist that 
the dissimilarities between lives and stories, or authors and selves, outweigh the 
46 “Non-narrative text types do not have an internal time sequence, even though, obviously, they take time 
to read, view, or hear.  Their underlying structures are static or atemporal” (Chatman 1990, 9).
47 Other forms or reading require interpretation and the hermeneutic circle, but not the same version 
relevant to narrative, by which we cycle between understanding an event and its place in a larger plot.
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similarities, and thus that talk of a narrative self remains unjustified.  Theories of the 
self's narrativity can thus appear as so much preaching to the choir.  If one already finds 
the proffered master metaphor compelling, or at least intriguing, then further elaboration 
of its details might yield new insights.  It is unclear how, proceeding in such a manner, 
one could convince a skeptic, however.  My own argumentative approach has sought to 
avoid these difficulties.  I have claimed not just that there are similarities between the 
way we read narratives and our lives, but that the essential structure is the same.  The 
hermeneutic stance that Iser names “the wandering viewpoint” is brought to bear on both 
lives and stories (and nothing else).  As a result, there is indeed an important metaphor, 
and one which differs from those on offer: selves are readers.  But my argument is not 
grounded in it as a metaphor.  So whereas skeptics, if unmoved, can merely shrug off 
existing conceptions of the self as narrative, my revised conception attempts to make a 
clearer claim on them.  To falsify it, skeptics would need to demonstrate that the 
hermeneutic stance brought to bear on lives and stories is not in fact the same.
Some lingering worries: if the metaphor of selves as authors overstates how free 
we are to “write” our lives as we will, does the claim that we are the readers of our lives 
overstate our passivity?  Reading is, I would respond, an active process.  When we read, 
we don't merely absorb new information, bit by bit.  Rather, as the example of “The 
Continuity of Parks” makes especially clear, reading involves constant imagination and 
work, the casting of larger hypothetical structures of events and meaning (even if we do 
so automatically).  Still, readers don't get to decide what characters do, how a story 
develops.  In living our lives, we do, at least to a certain extent.  In addition to 
interpreting our lives, we live them, making choices and acting on them.  Choice and 
action are dependent on the interpretive structure of our way of being, but not vice versa, 
so reading looks like a better foundation for an account of the self's narrativity.  But it's 
important to admit that our status as readers doesn't exhaust what we are.  It is meant to 
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account for the most important parts of Heidegger's analysis, and other parts of the 
structure of being-in-the-world are consistent with it.  I should emphasize again, however, 
that projection is a matter of reading, not of authoring or free choice (as I argued against 
Mulhall above).  Even unchosen behavior demonstrates a projection of possibilities.  
Projecting sounds active, but in the most important sense it is not.  We have always 
already projected an understanding of possibilities as part of our reading of our existence.  
On that basis, we can daydream (project in a derivative sense) or we can make choices 
and author our lives.  I have bracketed questions of action and authorship in the hopes of 
establishing firmer grounds for work on narrative and the self.
By interpreting being-in-the-world as a structure of the self nested in competing 
thrown and projected plot arcs, I am claiming that we as readers and what's read are 
mutually interdependent.  To conceive of the self such that it is first capable of 
interpretation, and then turns its abilities on an object, the world, would be to fall back 
into conceiving of the self as independent and self-standing.  For Heidegger, there's no 
getting underneath the structure of being-in-the-world as a whole.  As he writes, “Care 
does not need to be founded in a Self” (SZ, 323).  That is, the self shouldn't be understood 
in a Cartesian manner as immediately given, then used as the foundations upon which we 
build back out to the world.  Rather, “When fully conceived, the care-structure includes 
the phenomenon of Selfhood” (SZ, 323).  That reading and what's read are revealed 
“equiprimodially” might seem paradoxical.  This is so only if one expects to find one 
point of certainty which can ground everything else.  For Heidegger, as well as for Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and others in the phenomenological tradition, no such point 
exists, so philosophical analyses are instead to be grounded in a rich description of our 
everyday being-in-the-world.  Being-in-the-world serves as our philosophical 
foundations, even as it remains ungrounded.
Another worry: if we read our lives, does that mean that our lives are texts?  To 
237
my ear, the word “read” no more implies a textual object than the word “interpret” does.  
One can read—that is, interpret—a painting, for example.  It might be thought that this 
begs the question, however, that to speak of “interpreting” a painting similarly treats a 
painting as a textual object: it begins to “mean” something only when we start to talk and 
write about it.  There's a deep question here, both generally speaking, and specifically 
within Heidegger scholarship.  Is our experience always structured by language?  If it 
isn't, is applying terms like “reading” and “narrative” to experience misguided?  
Commentators like Dreyfus, as we saw above, stress Dasein's pre-linguistic coping 
activity.  Heidegger's claim that “Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with 
disposedness and understanding” would seem a challenge to Dreyfus (SZ, 161).  
Discourse and language aren't the same thing, however; rather, “The ontological 
foundation of language is discourse” (SZ, 160).  Just as we always have a mood and are 
always projecting, we always exist in discourse, for Heidegger.  But does this mean that 
we always exist in language, that language is “a medium in which man dwells” (Guignon 
1983, 118)?  (As we'll see in the next chapter, certain uses of language—making 
assertions—are clearly derivative, for Heidegger.)  Because my characterization of 
narrative is not a linguistic one, but encompasses film and drama, for example (see 
chapter three), I don't think my account requires me to take a stand on this issue.  Even if 
the most immediate layer of our self-experience isn't structured by language, it is still 
ordered by thrownness and projection, and thus narrative in form, according to my 
account.  According to my account, the narrativity of our self-experience is itself pre-
thematic, not necessarily realized explicitly in language.  I can't defend an account of 
discourse here, but it seems to me that the best way to understand Heidegger's claims is to 
say that even our pre-linguistic experiences are structured by language, in the sense that 
the ability to have such experiences, where language doesn't hold our attention, is 
dependent on other habituating circumstances where it did.  So, when a shortstop expertly 
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fields a ground ball and throws to first, his experience seems non-linguistic (and certainly 
non-theoretical), but that is possible only on the basis of extensive training, which 
included explicitly linguistic structures.48
Issues related to these concerns come to the fore in the next chapter, where I 
interrogate Heidegger's concepts of understanding and interpretation.  Narrative is among 
the forms of “interpretation” in which we make explicit our understanding of the 
possibilities of our existence.  Indeed, I'll claim that it is the form closest to our actual 
experience, preserving as it does the structure of thrown projection.  The thought that 
narrative plays a central role in our self-understanding will be made more concrete in this 
next chapter as language and textual narratives become explicitly involved.
48 See Dahlstrom 2012 for an overview of these issues.
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Chapter Seven
“In Interpretation, Understanding Becomes Itself”:
Narratability and Narration, Sideshadowing and Possibility
Sideshadowing restores the possibility of possibility.  Its most fundamental lesson is: to understand 
a moment is to grasp not only what did happen but also what else might have happened.  
Hypothetical histories shadow actual ones.  Some nonactual events enjoy their own kind of reality: 
the temporal world consists not just of actualities and impossibilities but also of real though 
unactualized possibilities.  Sideshadowing invites us into this peculiar middle realm.
Gary Saul Morson, Narrative and Freedom (119)
In his Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Jerome Bruner reports an intriguing 
difference between narrative and expositional discourse.  Comparing James Joyce's story 
“Clay” to a piece of professional anthropology, Bruner finds that Joyce's writing contains 
four times as many “Todorovian transformations” (31).  The literary theorist Tzvetan 
Todorov enumerates various ways in which a straightforward assertion such as “x 
commits a crime” can be transformed, rendering it more complex.1  The main verb can be 
supplemented by a modal, for example: “x could commit a crime.”  Or another verb 
might shift the emphasis from what happens to the manner in which it does, or to an 
intention to make it so (Bruner 1986, 29-31).  No doubt the details of Todorov's or any 
such list of transformations would prove controversial.  And Bruner is quick to admit that 
his observation, based as it is on the empirical comparison of but two texts, yields only a 
hypothesis, though an intuitively plausible one.  Narrative discourse, he proposes, 
“subjunctiviz[es] reality” (26).2  The subjunctive designates “a mood the forms of which 
are employed to denote an action or state as conceived (and not as a fact) and therefore 
used to express a wish, command, exhortation, or a contingent, hypothetical, or 
prospective event” (26, quoting the OED).  Thus, Bruner writes, “To be in the subjective 
1 “Narrative Transformations,” 218-33 in 1977.
2 When asked to retell Joyce's story, a reader maintains this high number of transformations and, for the 
most part, their relative rank.  For example, among Todorov's six “simple transformations,” Joyce's 
story has more of manner than any other; so too does the reader's retelling (31f).  No one has, so far as I 
know, followed up on Bruner's initial findings with a fuller research program (a job for Franco Moretti 
and the Stanford Literary Lab, perhaps).  Are the works of certain writers particularly rich (Calvino?) or 
barren (Hemingway?) of transformations?  Is a writer's style in part determined by a consistent ranking, 
from work to work, of certain transformations over others?  With respect to my concerns, does the way 
we tell stories about our everyday lives (rather than retell literary stories) bear closer resemblance to 
literary narrative or expositional discourse?  See too Bruner 1990, 53f.
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mode is […] to be trafficking in human possibilities rather than settled certainties” (26).  
“The artist,” then, “creates possible worlds through the metaphoric transformation of the 
ordinary and the conventionally given” (49).
It might seem that the conclusion to be drawn is that literature is valued for a 
complexity, contingency, and ambiguity that it, unlike the real world, has.  Bruner's 
phrasings—narrative subjunctivizes reality, the artist transforms the ordinary—sometimes 
suggest as much.  He writes expansively at the end of the book:
I have tried to make the case that the function of literature as art is to open us to dilemmas, to the 
hypothetical, to the range of possible worlds that a text can refer to.  I have used the term “to 
subjunctivize,” to render the world less fixed, less banal, more susceptible to recreation.  Literature 
subjunctivizes, makes strange, renders the obvious less so, the unknowable less so as well, matters 
of value more open to reason and intuition.  Literature, in this spirit, is an instrument of freedom, 
lightness, imagination, and yes, reason.  It is our only hope against the long gray night. (159)
Elsewhere, however, Bruner resists this apparent conclusion, which would compare 
literature to the real world.  “For my central ontological conviction,” he writes, “is that 
there is no 'aboriginal' reality against which one can compare a possible world in order to 
establish some form of correspondence between it and the real world” (46).  This 
ontological thought remains underdeveloped in Bruner's book, and I'll try to push it 
further in my conclusion.  His central thesis is not really that narrative subjunctivizes 
reality, but rather that it subjunctivizes the more straightforward way we present “reality” 
in expositional discourse.  If Bruner is on the right track, and if the elaboration of thrown 
projection that I presented in the previous chapter is right—especially in its claim that we 
are oriented provisionally against multiple possible futures—then it would follow that 
literary narrative preserves the basic structure of our being better than other ways we tend 
to talk about our selves and world.  Bruner writes that the “intention [of literary narrative] 
is to initiate and guide a search for meanings among a spectrum of possible meanings” 
(25).  This isn't something that literature alone does, however.  Rather, our ordinary 
experience consists already of “a spectrum of possible meanings,” even if our ways of 
describing experience retrospectively minimize this fact.  The banal discourse of  
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biographical summary (“He was born in 1981 in St. Louis.  He went to school at....”) de-
subjunctivizes the complexity which is already part of our way of being.  I develop this 
thought by proceeding to Heidegger's thematization of understanding and interpretation.  
Using Robert Coover's story “The Babysitter,” among a number of other narrative 
examples, and the concept of “sideshadowing,” as developed by the literary critics Gary 
Saul Morson and Michael Bernstein, I'll argue that a certain kind of literary narrative 
constitutes the form of “interpretation,” as we put our lives into words, which best 
preserves the core structure of thrown projection.  This further solidifies the claim that 
narrative is central to the self.  I end the chapter with a comparison between the view I'm 
developing and the narrative view of the self put forward by Paul Ricoeur.
I. Sideshadowing
No one came to Mme. Diderot and said, “Unto you an encyclopaedist is born.”
Michael Bernstein (1994, 19) misquoting3 Arthur Danto (12)
Danto's comment succinctly ironizes the temptation to apply foreshadowing to 
historical events.  Michael Bernstein's Foregone Conclusions and Gary Saul Morson's 
Narrative and Freedom explore the implications of such a temptation in wonderful 
detail.4  As Bernstein points out, no one, angelic or otherwise, could have appeared to 
Diderot's mother to reveal her son's eventual fate.  Foreshadowing implies backward 
causation: a later, more significant event causes earlier signs of its coming.  In real life, as 
opposed to in a carefully constructed story, later events remain indeterminate, so 
foreshadowing is impossible (there are, of course, instances where events are sufficiently 
3 Danto, with what seems to me excessive care, actually writes that “One might, of course, predict that 
Mme Diderot would give birth to an author, even an encyclopaedist […] on the grounds that males in 
the Diderot family had been literary men for generations.”  He attacks instead the line “The author of 
Rameau's Nephew is just born,” writing that “to refer, by title, to the potential author's unwritten works 
goes beyond prediction: it involves speaking in a prophetic vein, i.e. describing the present in the light 
of things which have not as yet happened.”  It seems to me (and Bernstein, I assume) that “Unto you an 
encyclopaedist is born” is already prophetic, not merely predictive, as well as much pithier.
4 These two books began as two parts of one collaborative effort.  See Bernstein, xi; Morson, 283n4.
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determined that one can reasonably predict the future).  Yet historians regularly make use 
of foreshadowing in its inverted form, what Bernstein names “backshadowing”: 
“Backshadowing is a kind of retroactive foreshadowing in which the shared knowledge 
of the outcome of a series of events by narrator and listener is used to judge the 
participants in those events as though they too should have known what was to come” 
(16).  Throughout Foregone Conclusions, which argues against the use of backshadowing 
in historical narratives, Bernstein raises the stakes dramatically (perhaps excessively) by 
using examples of Holocaust narratives.  He quotes an instance of backshadowing from a 
political history: “The other event of special significance to the Vienna Jews which 
occurred in 1889 passed unremarked by almost everyone, Jew and Gentile alike. […] [I]n 
the border village of Braunau, a son was born to Aloïs and Klara Hitler” (18).  Why does 
Danto's example make us smile knowingly, while the invocation of Hitler's birth might 
make us shudder?  They imply the same misunderstanding of time, Bernstein argues, but 
in the latter “there is a general freezing up of normal intellectual discriminations” (19).  
Unless the Holocaust, unlike the Encyclopédie, was fated to occur, Hitler's birth had no 
great significance at the time it occurred—any number of contingencies could have 
derailed the causal chain that led from Hitler's birth to the Holocaust.  The quoted 
sentence has portentous weight only because of what we know now.  Hitler's birth didn't 
portend the Holocaust, and narrating history as if it did is rhetorically dishonest.  Taken 
yet further, backshadowing becomes moralizing and self-righteous, Bernstein argues: 
“Thus, our knowledge of the Shoah is used to condemn the 'blindness' and 'self-
deceptions' of Austro-German Jewry for their unwillingness to save themselves from a 
doom that supposedly was clear to see” (16).
Even if we lower the stakes and move away from Bernstein's focus on Holocaust 
narratives, the general problem remains (moving forward, I focus on Morson's account, 
based largely in examples from Russian literature).  How applicable can narrative 
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discourse be to real life, given the temptations of foreshadowing and backshadowing and 
the need to see stories in their greater structure—all of which depends on a perspective 
unavailable to us, situated as we necessarily are, in the middle of our lives?  In the 
previous chapter, I argued that we should pay more attention to the situation of the reader 
mid-story.  Similarly, Bernstein asks “why it should be exclusively the end of the story 
that determines how one interprets everything that went before. […] A constituent part of 
our sense of the present moment is an imaginative investment in some of the futures that 
might come out of it” (29).  This, I've argued, is what Heidegger thematizes under the 
name of “projection.”  Bernstein and Morson defend a number of techniques that resist 
fore- and backshadowing's false view of time, techniques of “sideshadowing.”  An 
examination of sideshadowing will begin to show us what sorts of narratives would 
concretize, without falsification, our projective understanding.
Morson defines sideshadowing:
In contrast to foreshadowing, which projects onto the present a shadow from the future, 
sideshadowing projects—from the “side”—the shadow of an alternative present.  It allows us to 
see what might have been and therefore changes our view of what is.  In this way, sideshadowing 
restores our sense of the middle realm of possibility, for time itself becomes a succession not just 
of points of actuality but also of fields of possibility. (11-12)
It thus connects up to Bruner's characterization of literature as “subjunctivizing”: 
“sideshadowing leads to the subjunctive and the contrary-to-fact conditional: what if, if 
only, had it not been, were it not for—what would have taken place then?” (Morson, 
118).  Consider some of the specific techniques of sideshadowing that Morson discusses.
A speculative narrator: Perhaps not even a “technique” in the proper sense of the 
word, a narrator can destabilize the fatedness of his or her story by directing the reader's 
attention to other possibilities: “More often than not, Dostoevsky's chronicler [in The 
Possessed] tells us what might have happened or what could have happened” (120).
An excess of information: We are accustomed to narrators who filter events for us, 
telling us only what is relevant to understanding the main thread of the story.  Thus a 
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narrator who doesn't filter events sufficiently or correctly will destabilize our sense of 
where a story is headed: “Too many facts, presented with no clear explanation and an air 
of mystery, lead us to construct or intimate many possible stories” (121).
Unreliable information: “Stories also multiply if the facts may not be facts at all 
or if other 'facts' lie behind the ostensible ones, with ever-receding layers of possibility 
and orders of suspicion” (121).  A narrator can give us information of uncertain status.  
This can be done by relating contradictory rumors and hearsay, some but not all of which 
prove false.  Once again, we are left less sure where the story is headed.
Pseudo-foreshadowing: Morson argues that Dostoevsky's narrators make use of 
the rhetorical tropes of foreshadowing without actually revealing anything about the 
future—thus achieving an effect opposite from foreshadowing's closed time.  For 
example, “the chronicler often begins a sequence of events by saying that they 
contributed to a later catastrophe, but just what the nature of that catastrophe was—and 
how it affected the major characters—is left obscure” (134)  The meaning of current 
events thus isn't determined by what is to come.  Such meaning is heightened because of 
“the potential for catastrophe,” but “anything may happen” (134).
Ironized foreshadowing: Near the beginning of Anna Karenina, Anna learns that a 
man has died on the train tracks.  She takes this as a bad omen, one eventually fulfilled 
when she commits suicide by throwing herself in front of a train.  What might seem to be 
a classic instance of foreshadowing is actually ironized, however: “Tolstoy has told a 
different story—not of a fated heroine, but of a woman who imagines that she is one” 
(72).  The bookended structure of Anna Karenina is possible not because time is so 
structured, but because Anna, the free author of her own life, mistakenly sees it this way.5
Processual intentionality: Morson reconstructs Dostoevsky's fascinating views of 
5 Actually, these two events don't bookend the novel, as hundreds of pages follow Anna's death.  That 
readers frequently remember the novel in this way suggests how inclined we are to see larger structure.
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intentionality as an ongoing process: “He was particularly concerned with discrediting 
what he called 'linear' accounts [of intentionality], in which an ironclad chain of events 
leads (in principle) directly from intention to action.  Dostoevsky objected that in such 
accounts intention is understood simplistically because it is closed off, made immune to 
the effects of changing circumstances, and, above all, insulated from the process of 
ongoing choice” (142).  If intentionality is a process, then minor, contingent differences 
at any point might divert a person's impulses into other actions.  Describing such a 
process, as Dostoevsky does so well in the case of Dmitri in The Brothers Karamazov, 
reminds us that time is open and events might have transpired otherwise.
The heightened present: Morson celebrates Tolstoy's ability to convey the weight 
of prosaic moments: “Tolstoy envisaged each ordinary moment as having a small 
measure of freedom” (157).  Tolstoy shows moments in great detail, even as some are 
central to the main thread of the story, others marginal.  Detailing prosaic moments 
allows us to imagine how the story could have been redirected had even one moment 
been realized differently.  Along these lines, it is worth pointing out that any sufficiently 
rich psychological description should tend toward sideshadowing.  We experience 
ourselves as making free choices, whatever the true metaphysics of the will are.  A writer 
succeeds in capturing on the page a character making a choice only when we, as readers, 
are left with the sense that the character could have chosen otherwise, against the 
illusions of determination inherent to structured plot.
Alternate histories: As Morson points out, It's a Wonderful Life relies on 
sideshadowing (148).  Jimmy Stewart's character is shown how the town would have 
fared without him, if he had “never been born.”  On a larger scale, a novel like Philip K. 
Dick's The Man in the High Castle explores what might have happened had the Allies lost 
World War Two.  Alternate histories remind us that events could have happened 
otherwise.  Morson is skeptical of such “hypothetical time,” however, writing that in such
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stories “Unactualized possibilities are translated into possible actualities” (148).  That is 
to say that alternate histories tend to read like different, but no less determinate, accounts 
of the course of history.  If that is so, then they fail to capture the weight of alternate 
possibilities.  (Dick's novel cleverly adds another level of sideshadowing: a science 
fiction writer in the alternative world of the novel himself pens a novel built on the 
conceit that the Allies won World War Two.) 
These are only some of the techniques of sideshadowing Morson analyzes, 
abstracted from his rich discussions of Russian literature.  I very much recommend his 
fuller treatments (as well as Bernstein's, though they are sometimes too polemical).  
Bernstein and Morson's task might seem a strange one, however.  If time is “open,” the 
future undetermined, but the conventions of narrative make it extremely difficult to honor 
this fact, why not abandon narrative and seek out other forms of discourse to talk about 
time and our place in it?  Morson acknowledges such a skeptical line, and over the course 
of his project, beneath his literary-critical concerns, one can reconstruct the dialogical 
back and forth concerning narrativity's relevance to real life.  He writes:
Life as it is lived is not storylike [….] Lives include all sorts of extraneous details leading 
nowhere, but good stories do not.  Narratives are more successful if they display a structure, which 
it is hard to find in life.  We can stand outside the narratives we read but not outside the lives we 
live.  And stories have real closure, in which all loose ends are tied up; but there is no privileged 
point in life comparable to the ending of a novel.  Very frequently, narratives and lives are 
anisomorphic. (19-20; see too 38-40)
I've tried to cast doubt on some of these supposed dis-analogies.  Perhaps lives are less 
well-structured than successful narratives.  This doesn't preclude lives being unsuccessful 
narratives (by the standards of art), but narratives nonetheless (chapter three).  I discussed 
the problem of extraneous details (chapter four) and will return to the issue (conclusion).  
Morson's formulation allows that our lives are bad stories, lacking structure and full of 
details leading nowhere.  And with respect to closure, I argued in the last chapter that the 
important isomorphism is not between lives and narratives, but our lived perspective and 
the perspective of a reader, mid-story.  We project fuller arcs for our lives just as we 
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hypothesize fuller arcs of plot while reading.
Morson works toward something of the same view.  Some novelists are able to 
avoid the feeling of pat contrivance: “Reading George Eliot, Jane Austen, and Turgenev, 
we sense, as we do in life, the presentness of the present and the multiplicity of possible 
futures” (42).  The anti-narrativist will push back: talented novelists achieve the feeling 
of openness through artifice, by preying on readers' habits: “though readers do not know 
the character's fate, they know that it is already known” (44).  So, for example, “When at 
the beginning of Great Expectations, Pip gives a pie to a convict, the reader knows that 
this event will mean something or it would not have been narrated” (159).  Writers make 
use of the fact that “Readers of literary narrative have a double experience: they both 
identify with characters and contemplate structure.  Alternating between internal and 
external views, they not only project themselves into the character's horizon but also view 
the character's entire world as a completed aesthetic artifact” (43).  Lives aren't 
completed aesthetic structures, so such a double perspective is unavailable with respect to 
them.  Tolstoy, and especially Dostoevsky, through the techniques of sideshadowing, 
surmount these difficulties: “the anisomorphism that we have seen in some other novels
—the contradiction between their assertion of freedom and the planned whole of the 
work—is overcome” (100).  I think that this is largely right, but a stranger conclusion 
than Morson supposes.  It is to say, really, that Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are writers of 
wonderful and innovative artifice, more talented within the framework of a certain set of 
goals than even Eliot, Austen, and Turgenev.  Yet, taking a view wider than literary 
criticism, we might still ask: why bother?  That is, if it takes the artistic talents of two of 
history's greatest writers to truly present human freedom in narrative form, if narrative is 
so formally resistant to this goal, why not discuss human freedom through other forms?  
Even Tolstoy and Dostoevsky barely succeed, it seems, as Morson is forced to 
continually confront misinterpretations of the functioning of their work.  To take just one 
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example, Morson reads Anna Karenina as ironizing foreshadowing—yet countless 
readers take it as a masterpiece of foreshadowing, with Anna's death fulfilling the omen 
of the trainman's death.  The techniques of sideshadowing are too subtle for many, it 
would seem.  Within Morson framing, the conflict between narrative structure and the 
portrayal of human freedom remains a literary problem, one perhaps wholly avoidable if 
we can talk about freedom and open time more truthfully in other forms of discourse.
I want to build on Morson's (and Bernstein's) excellent work in the following 
ways.  First, Morson's initial, motivating attack on narrativity is too strong.  As self-
conscious beings we can take a double-perspective on our own lives while living them, 
seeing them from both the inside and from the outside, seeing ongoing actual events as 
part of larger hypothesized structures of possibility.  The danger is in being falsely certain 
that one's life is of this or that particular kind or genre, or to think that one's life will add 
up to a good or edifying story.  Tolstoy's and Dostoevsky's great achievement is that they 
craft open yet eventually well-structured—aesthetically pleasing—stories.  For narrativity 
as I see it, it is enough for our open lives to move toward the status of bad—less well-
crafted—stories.6  Widening the scope of narrativity is consistent not only with applying 
it to real life, but with the formal diversification of fiction in the twentieth century.  The 
techniques of sideshadowing may strike a reader of modern and contemporary fiction as 
utterly familiar.  This is perhaps due in large measure to the influence of Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky.  It also due to the fact that contemporary novelists are often much less 
concerned with crafting complete structures of plot.  Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, at their 
best, create complete yet open plot structures.  Contemporary novelists have less trouble 
creating open worlds, inasmuch as they give up on (or intentionally resist) symmetrical or 
otherwise well-ordered plots.  Morson's initial attack is too strong in its assumption that 
6 Carr: “this is not to say that […] lives are not like stories.  It may be that they are just dull stories” (in 
Wood, ed., 1991, 166).
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narrativity doesn't apply to lived experience.
Thus, second, Morson's project risks looking like a narrow matter of literary 
aesthetics, of how to craft open but structured stories, how to present human freedom in 
narrative form, despite the form's resistance.  Such concerns are transformed into larger 
ones within the frame of my project.  Narrative is the exemplary form for representing the 
temporality of our lives.  The question is what form of narrative does so best.  This line of 
thinking remains marginal, for Morson.  “Some writers,” he says, “went further and 
argued that the time we experience—cultural, historical, and psychological time—is 
genuinely open and that novels offer a truer picture of social life than determinist science 
or philosophy” (42).  Bernard Harrison puts it in phenomenological terms: “what 
literature can do, [and] factual discourse by its nature cannot, is to show us what it feels 
like to inhabit a Lebenswelt constituted by an unfamiliar set of practices.”7  One might 
add that literature can make even our familiar practices more apparent to us: exactly 
because they are so close to us, we can fail to see them.  These are claims that I wish to 
endorse emphatically, and Morson's caveats, though important, can have the effect of 
presenting such an ideal of “novelistic truth” as ultimately illusory.
Third and finally, Bernstein's and Morson's examples of sideshadowing are not, I 
think, strong enough.  Bernstein puts forward Philip Roth's The Counterlife and most 
especially Musil's The Man Without Qualities as exemplary narratives of sideshadowing.  
Morson, as we've seen, focuses on Tolstoy and Dostoevsky.  In all of these cases (except 
perhaps The Counterlife, which is much more briefly championed) the weight of 
sideshadowing remains epistemological where it needs to be ontological.  Let me explain.  
The weight of possibilities in the examples we've seen remains fairly weak.  Things could 
have happened otherwise, but they didn't: “The lives of Tolstoy's heros and heroines seem 
7 In Gibson, ed., 74.  Harrison dismisses Bernstein's discussion of the problems of Holocaust literature 
(84), though it seems to me that he fails to grasp Bernstein's points about sideshadowing.
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(as our own do) but one marvelous actualization out of an immense number of 
possibilities” (Morson, 160).  If Heidegger is right, it is not merely the case that, at any 
moment, numerous possibilities exist before me, waiting for one to be chosen and 
actualized.  If this were so, we would indeed need constantly to remember that what was 
actualized wasn't fated, that something else might have happened.  But according to 
Heidegger, what I am now is in large part constituted by that field of possibilities, 
including those possibilities that are never actualized.  It is not merely the case that time 
is open, the future undetermined.  Rather, because of our way of existing temporally, we 
are constituted by unactualized possibilities.  We are not actual, but “nothing,” in the 
difficult language of “What Is Metaphysics?” picked up by Sartre.  If narratives of 
sideshadowing are to honor the weight of these claims, it is not enough for them to direct 
the reader's attention to possibilities that could have but didn't occur.  Rather, their 
characters need to be constituted by these unrealized possibilities.  Sideshadowing must 
become ontological.  I turn now to Heidegger's treatment of understanding and 
interpretation.  Once that analysis is in place, I'll present a number of narrative examples, 
more radical than Morson's and Bernstein's, in which sideshadowing becomes 
ontological.
II. From Understanding to Interpretation
In his “What Novels Can Do That Films Can't (and Vice Versa),” Seymour 
Chatman discusses the peculiar place of descriptive assertions in narrative discourse.  He 
compares “The cart was tiny; it came onto the bridge,” for example, to “The green cart 
came onto the bridge” (ON, 124).  The first clause of the first sentence pauses the 
ongoing story to assert what the cart looks like.  It doesn't contribute to the narrative 
presentation of events.  By contrast, in the second sentence it isn't grammatically asserted 
that the cart is green, “but slipped in without syntactic fuss”; “It is only named” (ON, 
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124).  While his larger aim is to compare the way linguistic and cinematic narratives 
encode such information, his discussion suggests that assertion, though it plays a role in 
narrative, is in some way foreign to the essence of narrative discourse.  It describes the 
players and asserts their existence; narrative proper is concerned with what they do.  
Heidegger's analysis of discourse in Being and Time provides a framework through which 
we can see why and in what way assertion is foreign to narrative.  And in seeing what 
Heidegger means when he claims that assertion is a “derivative” mode of discourse, we 
can see why, in contrast, narrative is true to our way of being-in-the-world.
As discussed in the previous chapter, what Heidegger names “understanding” 
differs from that which we usually describe with the term.  Normally, to say that I 
understand something is to say that I understand it correctly: that I grasp its essence, that 
I can explain or give an account of it.  According to Heidegger's analysis, a more basic 
sense of understanding underlies and allows not only such successes, but also failures, 
what we would normally call misunderstandings.  To understand something, in the 
Heideggerian sense, is to project its possibilities.  Since he is interested in Dasein's 
understanding of itself, it is the projection of our own existential possibilities that is 
ultimately Heidegger's focus, that which is to be interpreted.  Dasein has always already 
projected possibilities for itself, demonstrating a sense of where it is headed or might be 
going.  This understanding is necessarily realized in the context of a culture and a specific 
situation, both of which limit the scope of what is intelligible and possible.  Importantly, 
such understanding is not usually explicit.  My comportment encodes my understanding 
of what I take to be possible, aside from whatever speculations concerning my future rise 
to the level of conscious imagination and planning.
How, according to Heidegger, do we make explicit our normally implicit self-
understanding?  Such a process does not transform, much less pervert, our understanding, 
imposing order where there was none.  Rather, as we put our always already projected 
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possibilities into language, we maintain the order—narrative order, I claim—of that 
primordial understanding.  Again invoking a special sense of a word, Heidegger calls this 
process “interpretation”: “In interpretation, understanding does not become something 
different.  It become itself” (SZ, 148).  I have argued that the hermeneutic stance we take 
toward our lives is the same as that which we take mid-narrative: we are the readers of 
our ongoing lives.  This claim will become more concrete and plausible as we see that 
narrative accounts of our lives are structurally truer than other forms of description.
In one of the few references to narrative8 in Being and Time, Heidegger writes:
Between the kind of interpretation which is still wholly wrapped up in concernful understanding 
and the extreme opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand, there are 
many intermediate gradations: assertions about the happenings in the environment, accounts of the 
the ready-to-hand, 'reports on the Situation', the recording and fixing of the 'facts of the case', the 
description of a state of affairs, the narration of something that has befallen.  We cannot trace back 
these 'sentences' to theoretical statements without essentially perverting their meaning.  Like the 
theoretical statements themselves, they have their 'source' in circumspective interpretation. (SZ, 
158)
His main point is that theoretical assertions, whether made in everyday discourse or 
formalized in a scientific arena, are derivative of our own existential understanding of our 
situation in a world.  To say that theoretical statements offer an “objective” account of the 
world is right only inasmuch as this means that they make an object of part (and merely 
part) of our understanding.  In his run up to this claim, Heidegger establishes two limits.  
On one side he posits the most immediate form of interpretation: being “still wholly 
wrapped up in concernful understanding.”  On the other side he posits “the extreme 
opposite case of a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand.”  He then lists a 
number of intermediary cases, narrative among them.  Unhelpfully, they do not appear to 
be ordered hierarchically.  That is, “assertions about the happenings in the environment” 
(listed first) doesn't seem closer to concernful understanding, nor “the narration of 
something that has befallen” (listed last) closer to theoretical assertion.  For my purposes, 




our explicit ways of working out our understanding.  I'll now argue that, as we move into 
language (from concernful understanding to theoretical assertion), narrative best 
preserves the structure of the understanding, best represents our way of being.
What does it mean to say that “In interpretation, understanding […] becomes 
itself” (SZ, 148)?  For starters, Heidegger claims that “the latter [understanding] does not 
arise from the former [interpretation]” (SZ, 148).  That would be a normal way of using 
the terms: one might think that I understand The Brothers Karamazov only once I've 
interpreted it.  According to Heidegger, though, understanding is primary.  First, “As 
understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities.”  Interpretation, in turn, is 
“the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding” (SZ, 148).  Our 
understanding is usually implicit; interpretation makes it explicit.  In interpretation, “The 
ready-to-hand comes explicitly into the sight which understands” (SZ, 148).
It is difficult to proceed with any brevity and explain Heidegger's case without 
arduously presenting his entire project and vocabulary.  In an attempt to keep things 
succinct, I provide four snapshots of understanding and interpretation, located at key 
points on the hierarchy mentioned above.  On one side, “being wholly wrapped up in 
concernful understanding.”  On the other, “theoretical assertion about something present-
at-hand.”  Between these, two versions of narrative interpretation: a well-formed, 
retrospective anecdote and, in what is ultimately my focus, a more open-ended grasp of 
one's temporal possibilities.
Concernful Understanding: At one extreme of understanding lies that which 
Heidegger is most famous for, his account of tools in use as ready-to-hand.  As I argued 
in the last chapter, the way this aspect of his thought has been received, through Hubert 
Dreyfus's commentary in particular, overstates the extent to which we operate on 
autopilot, in absence of any sense of self.  Setting aside the question of how heavily one's 
sense of self impinges on awareness during purposeful activity, let us sketch the form of 
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concernful understanding, our way of being when we're caught up in activity.  Consider 
again the standard example of what it means to understand a hammer: to know how to 
use it, what is and is not possible to do with it, how to cope with different contingencies 
that might arise while using it.  When one hammers, one needn't (and perhaps shouldn't) 
explicitly consider these possibilities.  Yet one can hammer because one does so in a pre-
given structure of significance.  Hammers relate to nails and boards, nails and boards to 
the possibilities of shelter, etc.  When one understands a hammer as a carpenter does, 
these connections are second nature, and one can move between them without explicit 
thought.  By taking up a purpose—the goal of building a house, for example—the 
carpenter projects possible pathways through this structure of significance, connecting 
her activity to her goal.  When things are going well, a tool such as a hammer is ready for 
her use, not present to her consideration.9
Theoretical Assertion: Let us now jump to the opposite extreme.  There is a coffee 
cup on the table in front of me.  I assert, truthfully, that the cup is white, with a red lid.  It 
seems natural to think that such an assertion at least approaches our most basic way of 
describing the world.  We'll want to avoid perspectival tags like “in front of me,” and we 
could translate color language into primary qualities.  Given a theoretical apparatus, we 
could even get rid of words like “cup” and “lid,” and offer a purely mathematical 
description of the thing's shape and material.  Heidegger claims, however, that assertion 
is possible only against the background of our normal being-in-the-world.  To mistake an 
assertion like “The cup is white, with a red lid” as fundamental is to repress this 
background: “Assertion is not a free-floating kind of behaviour which, in its own right, 
might be capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: on the contrary it 
9 A famous part of Heidegger's account is that it is moments of breakdown that make this structure 
apparent to us.  While hammering successfully, the hammer is not present to my concern.  Should the 
hammer prove inappropriate to what I'm doing, I notice the component parts of my activity, and see 
exactly how the hammer fails my needs—its weight and shape, for example, becoming explicit objects 
of my consideration.  As this part of his analysis doesn't bear on my argument, I pass over the details.
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always maintains itself on the basis of Being-in-the-world” (SZ, 156).  It is easy to 
repress this background when making an assertion because most situations we find 
ourselves in have well-established conventions.  One knows what sorts of terms to use 
when asked to describe something in a chemistry lab, versus what sorts of terms to use 
when asked to describe something in a poetry workshop.  If, as part of a scientific field 
report, one were to describe the sea as “snot green and scrotumtightening” (Joyce), the 
conventions of one's setting, and one's mis-grasp of them, would be all-too-quickly 
revealed.  “When an assertion is made, some fore-conception is always implied; but it 
remains for the most part inconspicuous, because language already hides in itself a 
developed way of conceiving” (SZ, 157).  Certain language uses are appropriate or 
inappropriate in certain contexts.  Indeed, Heidegger's point is even stronger.  Any use of 
language already encodes fore-conceptions: words like “cup” and “lid” encode 
assumptions about practical use, and words like “white” and “red” encode assumptions 
about a certain kind of observer.  The familiarity of such words makes them seem free-
standing, and in turn makes an assertion such as “the cup is white, with a red lid” seem 
basic, independent of observer, situation, and context.  But assertion is derivative, 
Heidegger claims, of our being-in-the-world, where this whole is realized.
Recall my claim, in the introduction, that the various terms of self-description we 
have at our disposal each establish, implicitly, competing conceptions of what we are.  As 
a subject, it is assumed that I am a site of experience, set against an object.  As an animal, 
it is assumed that I am more than a plant or mineral, less than an angel or god, perhaps 
other than a spirit or ghost.  As a person (plural: persons), it is assumed that I am a bearer 
of certain rights and responsibilities, answerable to the law and state.  Heidegger's 
discussion of the derivative nature of assertion, and examples like hammering or the 
appearance of coffee cups, steer attention away from any discussion of the self.  Once 
again, we need to remember the larger shape and project of Being and Time.  Why, in the 
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middle of Heidegger's philosophical anthropology, does he thematize interpretation?  
Most immediately, because what we are, according to his conception, is interpreting 
beings.  But remember that the reason why Heidegger offers a (partial) philosophical 
anthropology is that Dasein has, as part of its way of being in the world, an implicit 
understanding of what it means to be.  Thus by thematizing Dasein's way of being, 
Heidegger might be able to recover the question of what it means to be at all.  Given this 
frame, it is not, finally, our interpretation of hammering or coffee cups that matters.  In 
the larger stream of the argument, it is our interpretation of ourselves that matters.  
Moving forward we should focus on Dasein as it makes explicit its interpretation of itself.
A Well-Formed Anecdote: At one extreme of interpretation is concernful 
understanding.  We can only talk around such experience in our attempt to describe it, 
since the very act of fully-formed linguistic description takes us in some measure out of 
immediate activity.  At the other extreme is theoretical assertion, where a conceptual 
context, either merely assumed or more fully worked out, allows us to derive apparently 
independent claims about the state of something in the world.  In between, I offer two 
gradations of narrative interpretation.  First, a well-formed, retrospective case of the sort 
narrativists discuss, at least when they're focused on shorter-term experiences.
A funny thing happened to me today.  I was working outside at a cafe across from South 
Kensington station.  A cup of coffee in front of me, computer on the table, Being and Time open on 
my lap.  Canopy above me in case the changeable weather changed, just the right level of white 
noise, conversations buzzing, but not distinctly enough to distract.  I had settled into that 
wonderful rhythm of writing, staring into space, taking a sip of coffee, flipping through the book 
looking for the right quotation, observing passersby.  Quite a bit of time must have passed, 
because paragraphs—indeed, pages—were accumulating.  But then, after a long pause of looking 
over the square, searching for the right phrase, I brought the coffee cup to my lips and … nothing.  
I must have been lost in concentration, because I hadn't even noticed the cup lightening, emptying, 
as one normally does.  And of course it meant that the spell was broken, that I wouldn't get any 
more good writing done at that spot.  I fumbled on for a few minutes, turning increasingly 
awkward phrases, then gave up.  I packed it in and headed towards the Victoria and Albert, the 
next spot in my rotation.  And on my way, the sun actually came out....
The above is no literary accomplishment.  It is just an anecdote, of the kind that we tell 
all the time.  It at least tries to capture, however, the fragile web of conditions that has to 
come together for my best writing to occur.  Even in such a brief bit of narrative, there is 
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identifiable structuring.  “A funny thing happened to me today”: a stock opening such as 
this alerts the listener that the speaker is switching into narrative mode.  The phrase begs 
leave to speak for a while, uninterrupted, asks the listener to pause whatever he or she is 
doing and pay attention.  This opening signals in particular that what follows is an 
anecdote and not, for example, a fairy tale (“Once upon a time...”) or bit of gossip (“You 
won't believe what I heard today...”) or piece of trivia (“Did you know...?”).  The first few 
sentences, in miniature, set the scene.  Then the story, such as it is, gets going.  But, as 
those skeptical of the relevance of narrative to real-time experience and understanding 
will point out, there's a criterion of selection at work, guided by my, the narrator's, 
knowledge of where the story is going: toward the “funny thing” that happened.  
Extraneous details are omitted.  I might have mentioned that a creepily demeanored, 
middle-aged man had vacated the table just as I got my coffee and was looking for a 
place to sit.  Or that Brits seem undecided about whether they should bus their own tables 
in counter-service cafes.  Those details in fact briefly held my attention, but they aren't 
relevant here.  Instead, the description of events gathers around a single theme, the 
rhythm of writing.  And then the anecdote comes to a miniature climax, the empty coffee 
cup.  This is briefly interpreted for meaning (“it meant that the spell was broken”), an 
interpretation the listener might accept or challenge.  Does the empty coffee cup really 
mean no more writing will get done, or does it show that I was grasping for an excuse to 
take a break?  Quickly, the anecdote moves to resolution.
This kind of narrative interpretation—that is, the anecdote itself, not my pedantic 
explanation of it (“interpretation” in Heidegger's sense, the working out of possibilities)
—might seem distant from lived experience.  It tries to capture a facet of lived 
experience, but it does so through artifice, after the fact.  I, as author and as narrator, have 
put some deliberation into organizing the anecdote, concocting it not only to make a point 
about the fragile experience of writing, but also, at a higher level, concocting it to make a 
258
point about the way typical narrative discourse filters and reorganizes our experience.  
“Life as it is lived is not storylike,” Morson claims (19).  If the kind of organization 
present even in this brief anecdote is what we mean by “storylike,” this is perhaps true.  
But a more implicit notion of story-structure is available.
A Narrative of Possibilities: I present one last level of interpretation, closer than 
the above to immediate “concernful understanding.”  It is this sort of example which best 
gets at the narrative structure of lived experience.
'Yes, of course, if it’s fine tomorrow,' said Mrs. Ramsay.  'But you’ll have to be up with the lark,' 
she added.
To her son these words conveyed an extraordinary joy, as if it were settled, the expedition 
were bound to take place, and the wonder to which he had looked forward, for years and years it 
seemed, was, after a night’s darkness and a day’s sail, within touch.  Since he belonged, even at 
the age of six, to that great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but must let 
future prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand, since to such people 
even in earliest childhood any turn in the wheel of sensation has the power to crystallise and 
transfix the moment upon which its gloom or radiance rests, James Ramsay, sitting on the floor 
cutting out pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy stores, endowed the 
picture of a refrigerator, as his mother spoke, with heavenly bliss.  It was fringed with joy.  The 
wheelbarrow, the lawnmower, the sound of poplar trees, leaves whitening before rain, rooks 
cawing, brooms knocking, dresses rustling—all these were so coloured and distinguished in his 
mind that he had already his private code, his secret language, though he appeared the image of 
stark and uncompromising severity, with his high forehead and his fierce blue eyes, impeccably 
candid and pure, frowning slightly at the sight of human frailty, so that his mother, watching him 
guide his scissors neatly round the refrigerator, imagined him all red and ermine on the Bench or 
directing a stern and momentous enterprise in some crisis of public affairs.
'But,' said his father, stopping in front of the drawing-room window, 'it won’t be fine.' 
Had there been an axe handy, a poker, or any weapon that would have gashed a hole in his father’s 
breast and killed him, there and then, James would have seized it.  Such were the extremes of 
emotion that Mr. Ramsay excited in his children’s breasts by his mere presence; standing, as now, 
lean as a knife, narrow as the blade of one, grinning sarcastically, not only with the pleasure of 
disillusioning his son and casting ridicule upon his wife, who was ten thousand times better in 
every way than he was (James thought), but also with some secret conceit at his own accuracy of 
judgement.  What he said was true.  It was always true.  He was incapable of untruth; never 
tampered with a fact; never altered a disagreeable word to suit the pleasure or convenience of any 
mortal being, least of all of his own children, who, sprung from his loins, should be aware from 
childhood that life is difficult; facts uncompromising; and the passage to that fabled land where 
our brightest hopes are extinguished, our frail barks founder in darkness (here Mr. Ramsay would 
straighten his back and narrow his little blue eyes upon the horizon), one that needs, above all, 
courage, truth, and the power to endure.
'But it may be fine—I expect it will be fine,' said Mrs. Ramsay, making some little twist 
of the reddish brown stocking she was knitting, impatiently.  If she finished it tonight, if they did 
go to the Lighthouse after all, it was to be given to the Lighthouse keeper for his little boy, who 
was threatened with a tuberculous hip; together with a pile of old magazines, and some tobacco, 
indeed, whatever she could find lying about, not really wanted, but only littering the room, to give 
those poor fellows, who must be bored to death sitting all day with nothing to do but polish the 
lamp and trim the wick and rake about on their scrap of garden, something to amuse them.  For 
how would you like to be shut up for a whole month at a time, and possibly more in stormy 
weather, upon a rock the size of a tennis lawn? she would ask; and to have no letters or 
newspapers, and to see nobody; if you were married, not to see your wife, not to know how your 
children were—if they were ill, if they had fallen down and broken their legs or arms; to see the 
same dreary waves breaking week after week, and then a dreadful storm coming, and the windows 
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covered with spray, and birds dashed against the lamp, and the whole place rocking, and not be 
able to put your nose out of doors for fear of being swept into the sea?  How would you like that?  
she asked, addressing herself particularly to her daughters.  So she added, rather differently, one 
must take them whatever comforts one can.
This, of course, is a literary accomplishment: the opening of Virginia Woolf's To the 
Lighthouse.  The passage is not organized according to knowledge of whether the 
Ramsays will or won't make it to the lighthouse, but rather by both possibilities.  The 
events are focalized initially through James Ramsay, whose expectations flit back and 
forth according to his mother's and father's contrary weather predictions.  The “great 
clan” to which James belongs, for whom “future prospects […] cloud what is actually at 
hand” is one to which we all belong, to at least some degree, as I've argued against 
Strawson.  The present makes sense only in light of an understanding of the future, 
though some of us are better than James in keeping such a futural orientation from 
dictating our mood.  Mr. Ramsay, though he thinks of himself as sober and clear-sighted 
(he “never tampered with a fact”) is no less futurally oriented: he needs to speak the 
unvarnished truth to his children so they'll be prepared for life's difficulties.  Mrs. 
Ramsay's knitting is guided as well by uncertain predictions about the future: “If she 
finished it tonight, if they did go to the Lighthouse after all....”  Extraneous details 
populate the passage: “the wheelbarrow, the lawnmower, the sound of poplar trees,” for 
example.  They are part of the moment, not filtered out by “a sense of the ending.”  Yet 
the presentation remains recognizably narrative, even in the absence of much in the way 
of action or events beyond a few exchanged words and interior impressions.
The literariness of Woolf's prose isn't what orients it toward an indeterminate 
future; that's just what allows her to capture it so well.  We can imagine a ham-fisted 
attempt at rewriting my example of a retrospective anecdote in modernist style:
As a human being.  As an animal, it is assumed that I am more than a plant or mineral, less than 
an angel or god.  Should I move the Morson section?  Coffee.  What is that guy doing?  Are those 
women speaking French or Italian?  Why can I never tell the difference?  Other than a ghost or 
spirit.  Are these particulars distracting?  Repeating too much?  Coffee.  What?  Gone.  Should I 
stay here or go somewhere else?  I should finish this paragraph.  If I stay, maybe I can write the 
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anecdote example at the V&A.  But if I move now, maybe I can actually figure out what I'm doing 
in this section.  Why don't these people throw their cups away?  Forget it, I give up.
Lived experience is incredibly dense in information.  This example only touches on part 
of what, presented in another form above, was already a brief anecdote.  Even narratives 
of sideshadowing restrain possibilities, focusing on a narrower swath of the structure of 
reference than that which our projective understanding discloses.  Crouched, though 
unskillfully, in the conventions of literary modernism, it might seem that it is even more 
distant from lived experience than an ordinary anecdote, but I would suggest that this is 
exactly not the case.  What modernists like Joyce and Woolf were trying to capture in the 
then radical form of interior monologue was the shape of our actual stream of 
consciousness.10  In revising the standards of written discourse, they move back toward 
the actual structure of lived experience, not farther from it.  In a way that a well-formed 
anecdote does not, the example from Woolf, as well as my briefer one, show our 
orientation toward multiple future possibilities.  Yet these examples are still narrative, 
different possibilities pointing toward different plotlines: one in which the Ramsays go to 
the lighthouse and one in which they don't; one in which I keep working and another in 
which I move on.  The point is not that interior monologue is exemplary of narrative, but 
rather that the structure of lived experience, isomorphic with a reader's orientation mid-
story, is in the first stages of being put into fully explicit language in such examples.  
Merely asserting that James is unsure whether they will go to the lighthouse or not 
doesn't capture his experience.  Merely asserting that I might or might not stay at the cafe 
doesn't show the way in which these possibilities constitute my current state of being.
10 In her essay “Modern Fiction,” Woolf asks of conventional novels: “Is life like this?  Must novels be 
like this?  Look within and life, it seems, is very far from being 'like this.'”  See Goldie 2004, 106-9 for 
discussion.  Strawson makes the very nice point that the lack of punctuation in, for example, Molly 
Bloom's famous monologue in the last chapter of Ulysses rings false (1997, 17).  Indeed the metaphor 
of the “stream of consciousness” suggests as much, since streams are not themselves homogenous, 
uninterrupted flows.  My stream of consciousness at least is distinctively punctuated.  A thought colon, 
for example, has a phenomenology all its own, a particular pause similar to but weaker and tonally 
different than that between a rhetorical question and its answer: “The colon arouses the expectation that 
it will be followed by a statement” (Heidegger 1982, 141-142).
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It might seem that a long enough list of descriptive assertions could capture the 
full shape of one's understanding just as truly as this kind of narrative account.  Even if it 
could, however, Heidegger would respond that such a list is arrived at by a circuitous and 
derivative route.  In everyday experience it is (banal) narrative discourse that we use to 
explain “what's going on,” “how we are,” “what we're up to.”  We do so easily by moving 
from wholly engaged understanding to narrative, the most natural way of capturing that 
understanding's temporal form and centeredness on our worries and activities.  We might 
capture the same information in a dense description of objects, relationships, and states of 
affairs.  To do so would not be to slip easily from concernful understanding to explicit 
interpretation.  Rather, it would be to move from concernful understanding all the way to 
the opposite of a theoretical understanding of the objective ordering of things, and only 
then to move back toward the middle, offering a description tailored to our perspective.
In his “Narrative Explanation in Psychotherapy,” Charles Guignon contrasts two 
approaches to biography in psychoanalysis.  The first, which he calls “the naturalist 
method,” “aims at providing causal explanations of human phenomena.”  Importantly, 
this model “assumes that explanations can be based entirely on objectively specifiable 
facts—that is, on data or evidence discernible by all researchers who share a particular 
scientific paradigm” (559).  To this he contrasts the narrative approach of Roy Schafer: 
“the self is a kind of telling,” it is “a telling rather than a teller” (quoted on 562).  I am, as 
you might guess, sympathetic to Schafer's approach, especially according to Guignon's 
gloss: “If the self is an ongoing process of telling, it follows that there is no object with 
determinate characteristics that is simply 'there' prior to various sorts of tellings and 
retellings through which we give shape to our lives” (561).  Schafer's “constructionist 
view” takes things farther, however: “the stories we tell are free creations that swing free 
of any facts we might be able to find” (Guignon, 560).  The problematic word here is 
“any.”  There are all kinds of facts about the world that constrain the stories we can 
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truthfully tell about ourselves, including, as Schechtman would put it, verifiable facts 
about each of us as a human being.  The self emerges in telling, constrained but not 
determined by such facts.  Guignon briefly sketches “a narrativist viewpoint that draws 
on the ideas of ontological hermeneutics” (558, 567-571).  The account that I'm 
developing is much in line with his, though I think Guignon overstates the importance of 
the shape of a life as a whole, whereas I've focused on the readerly structure of lived 
experience.  In motivating his approach, Guignon explains how both “naturalist” and 
“constructionist” approaches mis-frame the relation between self and world.  His 
explanation sums up what it means to take our being-in-the-world as fundamental:
[D]espite their explicit rejection of naturalism, [constructionists] still cling to some of the core 
assumptions of the naturalist outlook.  Constructionists maintain that there is an unbridgeable gap 
between our meaning-laden stories on the one hand and prenarrativized reality on the other.  But it 
seems that they can draw this sharp distinction between story and fact only because they assume 
from the outset that reality as it is in itself—the flow of actual life—cannot possibly consist of 
anything other than inherently meaningless events that only retrospectively come to be emplotted 
and endowed with meaning. (566)
Heidegger's analysis invites us to reject this framing assumption, which guides the kind 
of naturalism which would see assertion as our most basic form of discourse and guides 
as well narrativity as it is so often caricatured by critics, according to which one can tell 
any story one wants about oneself and claim it as true.  Rejecting this whole frame of 
thinking, Heidegger allows us to see our understanding, narrative in form, as that through 
which we first encounter ourselves and the world.
Critics of narrativity are often motivated by the worry that it suggests meaning is 
everywhere, that it finds significance in material reality when in fact only we provide it—
in short, that narrativity is an attempt to re-enchant the world.11  These worries are 
misplaced.  Recall David Carr's excellent point: “what stories and histories represent or 
depict is not purely physical events but human experiences, actions, and sufferings, 
including the human activity of projecting meaning onto or finding meaning in physical 
11 See MI, 172-173 for some brief comments on this matter.
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and other events” (20).  The naturalist who thinks human experiences and meanings need 
to be reduced to scientific explanation will be unmoved by such a claim.  But we can at 
least see how phenomenology offers a different approach, beginning from a different set 
of assumptions.  Heidegger, in his discussion of the central place that interpretation plays 
in the structure of Dasein, provides underpinnings for Guignon's and Carr's reframing: 
“When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein—that is, 
when they have come to be understood—we say that they have meaning” (SZ, 151).12  As 
with any set of abstract terms, the connotations of “meaning,” “meaningful,” “has 
meaning” will vary from person to person.  I don't wish to suggest that we always 
experience our lives and selves as important, purposeful, redemptive, as contributing to 
some higher purpose, inured from doubt and directionlessness.  “Meaningful” seems to 
me to carry such connotations, and thus should be avoided.  Much more simply, I'm 
suggesting that our lives are candidates for such meaningfulness or, the opposite, 
meaninglessness.  They “have meaning” in a way that natural phenomena don't.  To 
describe a tree, or the course of river, as meaningful would be not just wrong, but 
confused.  Natural things are not even candidates for meaning.13  If we begin by taking 
ourselves as objects, we too will be unmeaning, and then we will have to explain how 
meaning enters our lives.  By beginning from our being-in-the-world, phenomenology 
begins by taking us as situated within a structure of significance.
12 “Meaning” translates “Sinn.”  I'm glossing over Heidegger's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, as 
well as debates in Heidegger scholarship.  “Sense,” the most straightforward translation of “Sinn,” 
doesn't carry quite the right connotations in English for my concerns.
13 Natural phenomena, so amendable to objective treatment, are different than us in these terms: “all 
entities whose kind of Being is of a character other than Dasein's must be conceived as unmeaning, 
essentially devoid of any meaning at all.  Here 'unmeaning' does not signify that we are saying anything 
about the value of such entities, but it gives expression to an ontological characteristic.  And only that 
which is unmeaning can be absurd” (SZ, 151).  This is a passage Sartre picks up on, but, as I argued in 
chapter five, Roquentin makes a category mistake in conflating the way he and natural objects exist in 
the world, in not distinguishing between what would count as a justifiable life versus justification of an 
object's existence, between what would count as an absurd life versus the absurdity of material objects.  
By Heidegger's usage, Dasein has or doesn't have meaning [Sinn], but mere objects are unmeaning and 
thus potentially absurd.  (I would question this use of the word “absurdity,” a translation of widersinnig, 
as normally we describe only human situations as absurd.  To describe a situation as absurd is typically 
to say that it is rich in meaning, but paradoxical, contradictory, or misplaced meaning.  The important 
thing to stress here is the fundamental difference between our and mere objects way of being.)
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Heidegger writes that “Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property 
attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate 
domain'” (SZ, 151).  This is to say that meaning, like the existentiales discussed in the 
previous chapter, disposedness and understanding (which account for our always being 
thrown and projecting), is a fundamental mode of our way of being in the world.  This of 
course can't be taken to suggest that our experience is always meaningful, as the 
possibilities of nonsense and confusion attest.  Again, Heidegger is trying to point to a 
condition underlying both successes and failures.  “Understanding” as an existentiale 
accounts for both understanding and misunderstanding.  Similarly, “only Dasein can be 
meaningful or meaningless” (SZ, 151).  The self is not experienced immediately or in 
isolation; rather, we experience ourselves as part of the holistic structure of being-in-the-
world.  But as part of this structure, the self is not a “what” set against objects, other 
“whats.”  It is a “who,” part of a larger structure of meaning: “Dasein only 'has' meaning, 
so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be 'filled-in' by the entities 
discoverable in that disclosedness” (SZ, 151).  Taken as an abstraction—as a bare subject, 
for example, as per Strawson—the self doesn't appear as a candidate for meaning.  And 
we can, of course, achieve such a level of abstraction.  But except at the extreme of 
theoretical assertion, the self is experienced as part of a way of being-in-the-world, where 
in our concern, in our understanding, and through our projection of future possibilities, 
we take experience as having meaning, if not necessarily achieving meaningfulness.  
Narrative discourse, especially of the sort in my last examples, captures this shape.  It is 
lost in purely descriptive discourse, organized as a list of assertions.
Heidegger's analysis of understanding and interpretation is, I would suggest, akin 
to various Anglo-American philosophers' treatment of the paired concepts of narratability 
and narration.  Heidegger reverses the order of conceptual priority between the terms, 
however.  As the suffix in “narratable” suggests, narratability is conceptually dependent 
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on narration.  As we've seen (chapter two), the claim that we necessarily or always 
narrate our lives is implausible to the point of easy caricature: “Now I'm reaching for the 
doorknob.  Now I'm turning it.  Now I'm opening the door and walking through.”  We 
don't explicitly maintain such a running narration of our lives.  In response, narrativists 
have proposed that lived experience is not necessarily narrated, but narratable.  We can 
narrate our lives.  So abstractly stated, this is a weak claim.  Anything, one might think, 
can be made part of a story.  The notion of narratability can be deployed more precisely 
than this, however.  Something is narratable if narration respects the structures it already 
displays; something is not narratable merely because narrative structure can be imposed 
on it.  The baseline characterization of narrative I offered in chapter three focused on two 
core features.  First, narrative concerns temporal objects.  All discourse is temporal in a 
formal sense, as words are said in a certain order, not all at once.  Narrative discourse is 
distinctive in that its content, the objects which it is about, are temporal.  A landscape isn't 
narratable.  Put someone in that landscape, doing things in time, and everything changes.  
Thus the second core feature: narrative concerns human, or at least anthropomorphizable, 
agents.  A description of a chemical reaction, though temporal, isn't yet a narrative.  
Described in a peculiar way, such that the reactants are (falsely) imagined to have 
perspectives and experiences, sufficiently human-like that we can project ourselves into 
them, and again everything changes.  This baseline characterization of narrative allows us 
to employ the notion of narratability in a non-trivial manner, as it specifies what has 
narrative structure.  Heidegger's treatment of understanding and interpretation reveals that 
the structure of our lived experience—temporal and organized by our human concerns—
is not perverted but maintained and worked out explicitly in narrative discourse.
 Existing narrativist accounts are weakened by the order of conceptual 
dependence, narratability (implicit) on narration (explicit).  If someone doesn't often, 
characteristically, or indeed ever narrate his or her life, what is illuminated by saying that 
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he or she could?  According to Heidegger's account, understanding, usually implicit, is 
fundamental, and interpretation is defined in relation to it.  Bernard Williams writes: “If a 
particular and significant narrative structure can plausibly be applied to a life 
retrospectively and from outside, and yet the person whose life it was could not, typically, 
have lived it with the aim of its embodying that structure, where does the plausibility, the 
fit, come from?  It seems like magic” (2007, 312).  Narrative, I've argued, needn't be 
retrospective or well-formed.  Our self-experience is already implicitly ordered in a 
narrative manner, due to thrown projection and the preexisting structure of significance 
that we are acculturated into.  Narrative “fits” life because it merely makes these 
structures explicit—it doesn't impose them on life, nor do they arise only later by magic.
We can see the superiority of Heidegger's terms to recent Anglo-American 
thinkers' by using them to gloss my earlier criticisms of Strawson's episodic.  Someone 
like Schechtman, who employs a notion of narratability, might say to Strawson: granted, 
you (or the full episodic) never narrate your life.  Nonetheless, you could.  Thus we are 
justified in talking of the universality of narrative self-understanding.  Uncompelling, 
perhaps.  Better, the Heideggerian can say to Strawson: regardless of whether you narrate 
your life or not, you understand yourself, in the sense that you project possibilities for 
your future.  Even a full episodic understands himself temporally, otherwise he couldn't 
display basic prudence and self-interest (see my arguments at the end of chapter two).  
Even if the episodic resists self-interpretation, never pauses to make his assumptions 
explicit, that understanding is there and analogous to the situation of a reader mid-story.  
Therefore, talk of the universality of narrative self-understanding is justified.  By 
Heidegger's analysis, understanding is not dependent, conceptually or practically, on 
interpretation.  Rather, “Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding” 
(SZ, 148).  Put in other terms: we are always reading our lives.  Because this is the case, 
we can interpret, discuss, and debate them, brood in self-contemplation, daydream, or 
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plan our futures.  An absence of such higher-order activities doesn't call the occurrence of 
reading at the pre-theoretical level into question, however.
III. Reified Projection: Narrative Examples
I now offer a number of fuller narrative examples, examples which move beyond 
projection as an implicit phenomenon and sideshadowing as an epistemological 
technique.  In his Postmodernist Fiction, Brian McHale characterizes the shift from 
modernist to postmodernist fiction as a shift of “the dominant”:
the dominant of modernist fiction is epistemological.  That is, modernist fiction deploys strategies 
which engage and foreground questions such as […]: 'How can I interpret this world of which I 
am a part?  And what am I in it?' [...] What is there to be known?; Who knows it?; How do they 
know it, and with what degree of certainty?; How is knowledge transmitted from one knower to 
another, and with what degree of reliability?; How does the object of knowledge change as it 
passes from knower to knower?; What are the limits of the knowable? (9)
McHale writes that the detective story is “the epistemological genre par excellence” and 
that its logic guides modernist fiction: characters in the works of Faulkner, or Conrad, or 
James “sift through the evidence of witnesses of different degrees of reliability in order to 
reconstruct and solve a 'crime'” (9).  We might add, with high-modernists like Joyce and 
Woolf in mind, that our perceptual apparatus, fractured into its various senses, often 
stands as an example of such “witnesses of different degrees of reliability.”  Modernist 
fiction is dominated by concerns of how we come to believe and know what we do.
Epistemological concerns are not absent from postmodernist fiction, but the focus 
or dominant concern shifts, according to McHale's thesis:
the dominant of postmodernist fiction is ontological.  That is, postmodernist fiction deploys 
strategies which engage and foreground questions like […]: 'Which world is this? What is to be 
done in it? Which of my selves is to do it?'  Other typical postmodernist questions bear either on 
the ontology of the literary text itself or on the ontology of the world which it projects, for 
instance: What is a world?; What kinds of world are there, how are they constituted, and how do 
they differ?; What happens when different kinds of world are placed in confrontation, or when 
boundaries between worlds are violated?; What is the mode of existence of a text, and what is the 
mode of existence of the world (or worlds) it projects?; How is a projected world structured? (10)
Science fiction is the “ontological genre par excellence” (16, 59ff).  I had McHale's 
distinction in the back of my mind when I proposed the shift, in chapter five, to an 
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ontological conception of the narrative self.  On the basis of his distinction, we can see 
now that such a shift involves turning away from questions such as “How does the story 
(or stories) I tell about myself give me self-knowledge?  Indeed, is it even knowledge at 
all?” to ones like “How does my narrativizing open up the world(s) within which I 
understand myself?  Is it possible to conceive of myself apart from such worldmaking?”  
Primary to my concerns is McHale's final question: “How is a projected world 
structured?”  The examples that follow are a sub-species of postmodernist fiction in 
which ontological questions and possibilities dominate: forking-path narratives.14
In the transition from his discussion of the understanding to that of interpretation, 
Heidegger writes: “We must work out these existentialia [understanding and 
disposedness] concretely” (SZ, 148).  I propose a way to take this injunction, and 
especially the word “concretely” (konkreten), quite literally.  Some narratives, I suggest, 
reify mental states or, if we accept Heidegger's avoidance of such terminology, states of 
being.  The examples I present here are reifications of our projected understanding of 
possibilities.  The notion of reification—in which a relationship, or a process, or a person, 
to take the most common occurrences, is transformed into an object—is closely 
associated with Marxist thought.15  My usage has little to do with this background.  
Reification is normally thought to be a damaging process, facilitating the treatment of 
persons as mere means, and a falsifying one, presenting relationships and processes as 
objects when they in fact aren't.  Here, however, I suggest that in concretizing mental 
states and processes, reifying them as aesthetic objects, narrative serves useful heuristic 
purposes.  I will explain by way of a progressive series of examples.
First, consider a brief example from Tom McCarthy's novel Remainder, an 
example of reification that takes place entirely within the world of the story.  The novel's 
!" #$$%!&'(!!!%)*+%,-./0$12%342-5224*67%2$$%,89%:'(:;%)*+%/6%$<$+=3/=%$>/?@0$A
15 See Marx, 322ff; Lukács, 83ff.
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unnamed protagonist has suffered a head trauma and receives a large financial settlement.  
At the crucial moment of the novel, he experiences a (probably false) feeling of déjà vu, 
recalling a time, living in an apartment building, when he felt genuine and happy.  He 
uses his new resources to seek out and purchase an appropriately similar building, to 
renovate it into alignment with his memory, and to hire a team of “re-enactors” to 
populate it, recreating the full atmosphere: a musician who regularly runs though piano 
exercises, a woman at the stove putting the smell of fried liver fat into the air, a man who 
tinkers with his motorcycle in the courtyard.  The building and its inhabitants transform 
the protagonist's memory into an actual object.  Most interesting, however, are the ways 
in which the recreated apartment building differs from an actual one.  Because the sound 
of the piano player's exercises is so central to the protagonist's memory, the re-enactor 
must practice, unrealistically, almost constantly.  Similarly, an unrealistic mass of fat 
must be fried to fill the air with its smell in a way that would match the narrator's 
exaggerated memory.  The narrator remembers encountering a concierge in the front hall 
but is never able to recall her face.  The actual facial features of any re-enactor whom he 
might cast would intrude upon his recreation.  The problem is solved by having the 
concierge wear the blank white mask of a hockey goalie.  Similarly, the building itself is 
best recreated not by making an actual building in its most likely particulars.  Rather, the 
narrator's memory dictates specific materials, colors, and textures in some places, but 
nothing specific in others.  Specificity in such vague places, though more realistic, would 
break the illusion.  Parts of the building are thus left blank: “I'd decided that these parts 
should be blank in reality, with doorways papered and cemented over, strips of wall left 
bare and so on.  Neutral space” (155).
The building is not a remembered object, but a memory made into an object.  It is 
a reification of the protagonist's memory.  It is obviously an incorrect representation of 
the building and episodes within it from the narrator's past—concierges don't wear 
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hockey masks, and no one fries mountains of liver fat every day.  The past if actually 
recovered would feel false, however, because it would not match his imperfect memory.  
Yet the apartment building gives us better access to the protagonist's “memory,” exactly 
because it is false.  In memory, parts of the building are impossibly heightened in detail, 
others blank.  Inhabitants are reduced to a limited range of defining attributes and actions.  
What could have been passing aspects of the atmosphere become crucially meaningful.  
Making the memory into an object makes memory's distortions literally tangible.
All this happens within the fictional world of Remainder.  The effects are 
achieved not as a result of McCarthy's mode of telling, but by the behavior, realistically 
possible though certainly eccentric, of one of his characters.  Someone in our world, 
given sufficient resources (and mania) could take up such a project as his or her own.  
This initial example is not yet one of narrative's reifying ability, then, but only an 
example, within a narrative, of one way of reifying a mental state.  The protagonist's 
memory is reified primarily in space: as the recreated apartment building.  There is an 
important temporal element to this recreation as well, however, as the re-enactors must 
perform certain behaviors.  Against this background, I now proceed to more complicated 
examples, where narrative itself, rather than an apartment building, is the reification of 
our way of being.  Though texts are of course in some sense spatial objects, the thought 
that a narrative is primarily a temporal object is familiar.  A story itself, as opposed to the 
media used to tell it, consists essentially in events temporally arranged, each event 
happening before some and after others.  Thus these narratives are, as temporal objects, 
reifications of temporal patterns of being.  And just as McCarthy's apartment house is 
most revealing where it is least like a real apartment block, these narratives are most 
revealing where they differ from what we might think of as the normal shape of a life.  As
we'll see, these examples follow Borges's “The Garden of Forking Paths,” which I 
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invoked in the last chapter as an initial and exaggerated image of projection.16
Consider Keven Brockmeier's “The Human Soul as a Rube Goldberg Device: A 
Choose-Your-Own-Adventure Story.”  As the subtitle makes clear, Brockmeier here 
attempts to claim for literature one of the most maligned of genre exercises.17  According 
to convention, choose-your-own-adventure stories are narrated in the second person, 
making the reader the protagonist: “You are returning the milk to the refrigerator when 
your head begins to swim” (110).  Every few pages, the reader is asked what he or she 
would do, indeed “does”: each choice directs the reader to continue on different pages, 
thus causing the story to fork into different possibilities.  Brockmeier's story differs in 
three ways from the young adult novels, however.  First, whereas the original novels are 
exotic adventures,18 Brockmeier's story offers possible plotlines through an apparently 
banal day.  So, second, instead of finding a briefcase full of money in the bushes and 
having to decide whether to “visit your friend at summer camp” (turn to page 32) or “go 
on a shopping spree” (turn to page 7), Brockmeier presents the reader with choices more 
banal (Do you go for a walk or spend a quiet morning at home?) or introspective (Is your 
adult life anything like you thought it would be?).  Finally, whereas the forking paths of a 
normal choose-your-own-adventure lead to different outcomes—you might end up 
entombed by bandits in the Great Pyramid, or you might lose the money but learn that 
friendship is the real reward19—the forking paths of Brockmeier's story all reconverge at 
16 Compare Morson's critical reading of the story (227-232).  If all possibilities are actualized in a 
branching multiverse, then choice again becomes illusory, time closed.  It becomes crucial, with respect 
to Ts'ui Pen's novel, whether “all outcomes in fact occur” or whether “He creates […] 'several futures,' 
several times,” and the novel is an “incomplete […] image of the universe” (Borges, 125, emphases 
mine).  However we interpret Borges's story, my remaining examples are less exaggerated.
17 Created by Edward Packard in the 1970s, there are now hundreds of titles and numerous series spin-
offs.  Brockmeier is not the first to write a more literary version.  Borges offers perhaps the most famous 
precursor.  Also well known are Julio Cortazar's Hopscotch, which offers multiple paths through the 
text, and John Fowles's The French Lieutenant's Woman, which offers multiple endings.  See Landow 
215-271 and Douglas, 89-122 for an overview of the related form of hypertext fiction.
18 Titles in the series included The Cave of Time, Journey Under the Sea, and By Balloon to the Sahara.  I 
have particularly vivid memories of #98, You Are a Millionaire, published when I was nine.
19 If you are like this reader, you kept your last few choices marked with fingers so you could quickly 
backtrack and work your way toward a more satisfactory outcome.
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the same ending: you suffer a stroke and die (146-147).
From a Heideggerian point of view, there's much to like about “The Human Soul 
as a Rube Goldberg Device”: its focus on the everyday, cut through with occasional 
moments of anxiety; its reminder that we're all headed toward death; even its second-
person injunction to experience the story as your own.  In other ways, formal elements of 
the story run afoul of Heidegger, however.20  Choose-your-own-adventure stories 
misconstrue the nature of choice, presenting condensed moments (choose now) based in 
discrete alternatives (this or that), whereas the workings of the will are much more 
complicated and choices often smeared out over longer expanses of time.21  Further, 
choose-your-own-adventure stories suggest that a small number of choices have a 
decisive impact on the direction of one's life, which may or may not be true.  
20 To be clear, I'm not suggesting Brockmeier did or should have had Heidegger in mind.
21 Morson's account of “processual intentionality” in Dostoevsky is particularly relevant here (142ff).
Figure 5: Diagram of “The Human Soul as a Rube Goldberg Device”


































Brockmeier's story initially has the same effect, as different choices direct you down 
different paths.  Ultimately, it makes the opposite claim: since all the paths of the story 
reconverge in one ending, it suggests that “you” have had a particular fate waiting for you 
all along (not just death, but this death), perhaps an even more objectionable view.
It might seem that any choose-your-own-adventure story is really many stories.  A 
diagram of Brockmeier's story reveals that there are sixteen paths through it.  One can 
imagine a more complicated, truer-to-life variant where forks were not wholly discrete, 
where the same scene reoccured on different branches to different (or the same) effect, or 
where multiple paths reconverged along the way, revealing initial choices as ultimately 
insignificant.  However accurate they are or aren't in their structural details, I would 
suggest that we should see choose-your-own-adventure stories as narrative reifications of 
the way we project our being forward in time.  We are not oriented toward one actual 
future, but many possible futures.  The one story that we each eventually live out exists 
first as open, as we project before us multiple possibilities.  What would seem to be the 
truest presentation of a life—a biography detailing its subject's life from birth to death—
loses the effect that projection has on the shape of lived experience.  The form of a story 
like Brockmeier's begins to encode it.  The core of such an idea is easier to introduce by 
way of the rigid form of the choose-your-own-adventure story, evan as the fetishization 
of discrete choice is misleading.  I now progress to a more sophisticated example.
 Robert Coover's “The Babysitter” is among the most famous and anthologized 
stories of American postmodernism.  Divided into 107 paragraph-length sections,22 it tells 
the story—or stories—of a babysitter's night, usually gone horribly wrong.  The sections 
(“narremes,” in the jargon of narratology), though all written in the third person, are 
focalized through one or another character's consciousness: the babysitter; Jack, her 
boyfriend; Jimmy, one of the children; Harry, the father; Dolly, the mother (additionally, 
22 Though not numbered in the text, I'll cite the story by section number, according to the order of telling.
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sections 8, 27, and 56 each describe television sequences, divorced from the perspective 
of any particular viewer).  The sections jump in time and perspective, leaving the reader 
to reconstruct the relationships between them.  Much of the (abundant, though often 
black, and sometimes passing over into misogynistic) humor of the story comes from the 
juxtapositions allowed by these quick jumps.  Initially, it might seem that the work of 
reading the story is just this: to discern whose perspective each section encodes, and to 
reshuffle them from their confused order of telling into correct chronology.  The first 
twenty-five or so sections of the story follow this pattern.  We are introduced to the 
babysitter as she arrives for the night and gives Bitsy a bath (1, 4, 7, 19, 24); to Jimmy's 
childish sexuality (5); to Harry, reminded by the babysitter of more exciting times (2, 10, 
15, 25); to Dolly, already fed-up with her husband (11, 18, 21); and to Jack, killing time 
with his friend Mark and thinking about dropping in on his girlfriend (3, 6, 9, 13, 17, 23).  
We see how characters' plotlines might combine (section 12 and 23 show the babysitter 
and the children wrestling, from the babysitter's and then Jimmy's perspective), and we 
are given two impressionistic flashforwards (14, 16) that we can't yet fit into place.
These initial sections are only an introduction, it turns out, and don't really prepare 
the reader for the formal complexity that follows.  The path of events begins to fork.  
After Bitsy's bath (19, 24), it's Jimmy's turn.  In one version, the babysitter tries to get 
Jimmy to bathe (41, 45), then either gives up (48) or forces him into the tub (53).  But in 
another, contradictory version, she leaves Jimmy to watch TV, while herself getting into 
the bathtub, only to be interrupted by Jimmy needing to use the toilet (34, 30, 37, 43).  
Contrary to this version, yet another exists in which Jimmy tries to hold it, but eventually 
pees himself (62, 68, 76).  Whereas a choose-your-own-adventure offers explicit and 
discrete choices and then shields the reader from alternative possibilities (available only 
by rereading, or cheating), Coover offers all of these possibilities simultaneously, forcing 
the reader to sort them into distinct plotlines.  Further, he rarely presents a moment of 
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explicit choice in full, such that we see the actual moment where plotlines fork.  Instead, 
he presents later events, but with telling details that allow the reader to reconstruct how 
the story arrived there.  Jack's night gets going with one of the few exceptions to this rule.  
In 23 we see him calling the babysitter to ask if he (and Mark) can stop by.  Then in 28 
we see one version of the resulting conversation, in which she says “yes,” while in 36 we 
see another, in which she says “no.”  These two forks then ramify to much greater 
complexity.  For a while, Harry's and Dolly's stories develop independently of the action 
at the house.  Harry, increasingly drunk, fantasizes about returning home and walking in 
on the babysitter in the bath (29, 35, 38, 44, 50, 54, 57, 60); eventually he does go home, 
and in some cases his various fantasies have leaked, distorted, into reality.  Meanwhile, 
Dolly is left at the party, unable to get back into her overly tight girdle (66, 74, 80, 88).  
Eventually, she will be pulled back to the house as well, looking for her husband or called 
by the police.  One can begin to graphically model the various plotlines through “The 
Babysitter” as I have in figure 6.  Compare this figure to the clean geometry of 
Brockmeier's story (figure 5).  I should emphasize that this diagram, despite its 
complexity, fails to capture all the possibilities of the story.  And lest it become even 
more jumbled, I leave aside glosses, of the sort I've included in the other diagrams in this 
chapter, of each section's events.  The diagram suggests that one can trace various 
coherent possible lines through the story.  After the introductory sections, one might 
follow the diagram through sections 62, 68, 92, and 95: Jimmy pees himself waiting for 
the babysitter to get out of the bathroom; she drags him to the tub to clean him up; the 
ruckus wakes the baby; the babysitter accidentally kills the baby while trying to quiet it; 
and finally Dolly, at the party, gets a call from the police.  Or one might follow the story 
through sections 36, 14, 40, 42, 46, 55, 47, and 51: when Jack calls, the babysitter tells 


































































































































































Especially at the end of the story, it is impossible to maintain distinct plotlines.  
Connections become more oblique, thematic or linguistic rather than causal.  Because 
Coover doesn't shield the reader from alternative possibilities, various plotlines don't 
remain separate—they leak into each other.  Contradictory events combine to absurd 
effect.  For example:
Jimmy gets up to the bathroom and gets his face slapped and smeared with baby poop.  Then she 
hauls him off to the bathroom, yanks off his pajamas, and throws him in the tub.  That's okay, but 
next she gets naked and acts like she's gonna get in the tub, too.  The baby's screaming and the 
phone's ringing like crazy and in walks his dad.  Saved! he thinks, but, no, his dad grabs him right 
back out of the tub and whales the dickens out of him no questions asked, while she watches, then 
sends him—whack!— back to bed.  So he's lying there, wet and dirty and naked and sore, and he 
still has to go to the bathroom, and outside his window he hears two older guys talking.  'Listen, 
you know where to do it if we get her pinned?'  'No! Don't you?' (87)
Or the final section of the story:
'What can I say, Dolly?' the host says with a sigh, twisting the buttered strands of her ripped girdle 
between his fingers.  'Your children are murdered, your husband is gone, a corpse in your bathtub, 
and your house is wrecked.  I'm sorry.  But what can I say?'  On the TV, the news is over, and 
they're selling aspirin.  'Hell, I don't know,' she says.  'Let's see what's on the late late movie.' (107)
If one were to take the story as a rigid map of possible futures, such recombinations 
wouldn't make any sense.  The possibilities can't be understood as possible actualities, 
because if one fork's possibilities were actualized, it would exclude another fork's 
possibilities from occurrence and relevance.  But if our futures were rigidly mappable, we 
would not need narrative to make sense of them.  The shape of Brockmeier's story, for 
example, can perhaps be encapsulated by a series of conditionals.  If you go for a walk 
(rather than stay home), and if you choose to go to the coffeehouse (rather than 
McDonald's), then this will happen.  Coover's form of narration allows him to capture 
contradictory possibilities that a counterfactual analysis would be forced to domesticate.
Recall my discussion of MacIntyre and Taylor in chapter one: perhaps it is the 
case that we should see our futures as coherently mappable, with each of our intermediate 
goals subsumable ultimately to one highest end.  It is not, however, the case that we 
necessarily do, and we want to be able to make sense of the actual form of our projective 
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understanding.23  Suppose I sometimes daydream of becoming a tenured professor of 
philosophy.  Suppose at other times I daydream of being discovered by the St. Louis 
Cardinals and becoming an all-star starting pitcher.  These two futures are (almost 
certainly) incompatible.  Yet in my daydreams they might leak together, such that I find 
myself answering questions from a doting press corps about how I find time to both 
prepare for my Heidegger seminar and maintain that knee-buckling curveball.  Such 
daydreaming is unproductive and probably best avoided.  Indeed, the failure of 
daydreaming to contribute to one's goals shows why it is our existential comportment, not 
our explicit thoughts, which best reveals who we are.  Daydreaming about becoming a 
professional pitcher doesn't lead to becoming one.  Someone who laments “I always 
wanted to play baseball” is using the word “want” in an abstract and empty way.  Activity 
that reveals someone to be projecting, as a live possibility, becoming a professional 
baseball player demonstrates real desire more that what is merely said, thought, or 
dreamed.  Yet if daydreaming is something that we can and do take part in, then its 
structure needs to be explained by our account of the projective understanding.
“The Babysitter” offers, within the text itself, flipping between TV channels as a 
model of the form of the story.  The babysitter flips between a western, a murder mystery, 
and a spy thriller.  Coover's story offers snippets of slapstick, erotic fantasy, and violence.  
Such pop-cultural concerns are dear to Coover's interests and the most obvious way of 
pursuing a reading of the story.  I'm suggesting that, additionally, it offers an extremely 
sophisticated model of the way we project our futures.  We don't imagine straightforward 
binary choices, which lead down different, isolated paths.  Or at most sometimes we do, 
sometimes we don't.  But we are capable of projecting numerous possibilities 
simultaneously, and they can all too easily blur into one another.  Coover offers a model 
23 Richard Wollheim: “switches in mode of imagination, shifts in point of view, changes of protagonist, all 
of which are possibilities intrinsic to narrative, allow one and the same phantasised event to exemplify 
competing desires at one and the same moment” (150; see too 177ff).
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of branching time arrayed not into narrative lines or threads, but fields, we might say.  A 
field of possibility is contrasted to a point of actuality or, thinking in terms of plot, a line 
of actual events.  A field opens up more dimensions.  The initial configuration of the story 
(sections 1-25) establishes certain parameters.  What follows is then an investigation into 
that field of narrative possibilities.  In Heidegger's vocabulary, what follows is an 
interpretation of an understanding of that initial situation, in which its possibilities are 
worked out.  What will happen is neither determined, nor wholly open.  Possibilities are 
limited according to the genre conventions in play.  Analogously, we've seen that 
Heidegger describes the “structure of significance,” the referential network of a culture 
which determines what is intelligible and possible in real life.  Within a given culture and, 
even more so, a particular situation, only certain possibilities are alive.
One final example, which brings together the narrative forks of choose-your-own-
adventure and the narrative fields of possibility of “The Babysitter” (modes of 
sideshadowing more pronounced than any for which Bernstein and Morson advocate) 
with a more fully biographical story.  Mr. Nobody, written and directed by the Belgian 
filmmaker Jaco Van Dormael, seems to tell the life story of one Nemo Nobody (Jared 
Leto).  Actually, it tells at least three different life stories, in which he ends up married to 
either Elise (Sarah Polley24), Anna (Diane Kruger), or Jean (Linh-Dan Pham), alongside 
additional possibilities, more briefly told.  The film presents these possible lives as 
emerging from a number of key choices Nemo makes.  Further complicating matters, 
Nemo, now 118 years old, is occasionally shown in a science-fictional future in which he 
is the last living mortal, born just too early to take advantage of developing medical 
technology (“quasi-immortality, telemorization, endless renewal of cells”).25  A fascinated 
journalist sneaks into the hospital to interview the old man, but this Nemo, recollecting 
24 Polley recently wrote and directed Stories We Tell, about the role of narrative in autobiography.
25 Nemo insists that he is 34 years old, even as he is confronted with his wrinkled appearance, the day's 
date, and a newspaper announcing his 118th birthday; the scene perfectly represents Schechtman's 
account of someone making an “error of fact” and the way we confront such errors (see chapter four).
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his past, doesn't seem to be any one of the three (or more) possible Nemos.  Rather, he 
slips between all of their memories (journalist: “Did Elise die, or didn't she?  I don't get it.  
You can't have had children and not have had them.”).  Nemo's most important choice 
occurs when he is nine years old and his parents divorce.  He stands with his father on a 
train platform (at a station named “Chance”) as his mother departs.  Nemo is asked to 
choose between them; the camera zooms in on his troubled, indecisive face.  In one 
version he runs after the train and joins his mother.  In the other he runs after the train, 
but loses his shoe, fails to catch up, and goes back to his father.
From this initial fork, many more occur.  If Nemo stays with his father in 
England, he gets entangled with Elise.  When he confesses his love to her, she tries to 
rebuff him, saying she loves another, Stephano.  If Nemo persists and wins her over, then 
he spends much of his life with the depressed Elise, only for her to leave him decades 
later in search of Stephano.  If Nemo gives up, then he ends up with Jean.  In yet another 
alternative, Nemo crashes his moped and ends up fully paralyzed but conscious, 
occupying his time by narrating a science fiction story to himself (in which he goes to 
Mars to spread Elise's ashes and meets Anna).  On the other side of the initial fork, Nemo 
moves to Montreal with his mother.  She remarries, and Nemo's step-sister is Anna, 
whom he had known as a child.  She asks him to go swimming.  In one possibility, 
ashamed he can't swim, he says he doesn't “swim with idiots,” her friends.  He ends up 
alone, and we see him awkwardly run into her years later.  In the other possibility, he 
admits he doesn't know how to swim, she covers for him, and they fall in love.26  These 
are only some of the narrative lines in the film, more fully diagramed below.
26 The film suggests that Nemo is meant to end up with Anna, that the other alternatives are mistakes 
(even as the 118-year-old Nemo rails against the notion of “wrong lives”).  In its grab-bag invocation of 
fate and freedom, multiple worlds, the butterfly effect, the role of contingency, and other ideas, the film 
inevitably becomes theoretically muddled.  This muddle itself functions as a technique of 















































































































































































































































































































































































Even more than “The Babysitter,” Mr. Nobody is told radically out of chronology, and no 
attempt has been made to encode its order of telling in the diagram.  Additionally, there is 
some leakage between the different possibilities, as there is in “The Babysitter.”  Dreams, 
TV shots, and postcards violate the separation between possibilities.  The Nemo who 
ends up with Jean, for example, sees footage on TV of an explosion on a bridge, an event 
from one of his lives with Elise.  One of the Nemos who ends up with Elise waits in his 
car for a train to pass, a train that holds the Nemo who ends up with Anna.  Yet another of 
the Nemos who ends with Elise, only to lose her in that explosion on a bridge, builds a 
shrine around her ashes.27  Years later, he (his face is scarred by the explosion) seems to 
replace the (unscarred) Nemo in the paralyzed Nemo's imagined science fiction story, 
spreading her ashes on Mars.  Some of these leakages are perhaps explainable as 
transition effects: Nemo doesn't literally wait for a train to pass which holds an alternative 
version of himself, the effect just allows the film to hop from one plotline to another.  
Others seem to blur previously separate narrative lines back into one another.
Late in the film it is revealed that almost all of these events (excluding the initial 
childhood scenes28) have taken place during the “real time” that it takes the camera to 
zoom in on Nemo trying to decide between his mother and father.  The 118-year-old 
Nemo refers to “the architect, the child running after the train” and tells the journalist that 
“We only live in the imagination of a nine-year-old child […] faced with an impossible 
choice.”  All of the future possibilities are projected by Nemo.  They are the 
instantaneous and less-than conscious imaginings of the consequences of his choice 
27 This Nemo has a job narrating science documentaries, the same job the Nemo who ends up with Anna 
has.  (Scenes from these documentaries allow the film to sneak in ruminations on the nature of time, 
string theory, etc.)  These two Nemos become yet more confused.  One dies when his Jeep runs off the 
road, widowing Anna.  In the story of the other, it is his coworker who is married to Anna and succumbs 
to this fate.  Nemo meets Anna at the funeral and is sure that they somehow already know each other.
28 Complicating matters yet more, the film includes a myth in which “those who are not yet born” already 
exist, outside of time and knowing “everything that will happen,” waiting to choose their parents.  As 
he's delivered to the world, the “angels of oblivion” fail to touch Nemo's mouth and mark his lip, which 
is what normally causes children to fall into innocence.  Nemo is left with certain abilities of foresight, 
which is seemingly irreconcilable with the open, indeterminate future the film otherwise presents.
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between his father and mother.29  Mr. Nobody thus finds an intriguing middle-ground 
between the rigid fetishization of choice in choose-your-own-adventure stories and the 
free-for-all of Coover's fields of narrative possibility.  Choose-your-own-adventure stories 
present discrete choices as that which actually determines the various possible courses of 
a life.  Coover's postmodernism probably goes too far in blurring all possibilities together. 
Mr. Nobody presents some choices (father or mother) as apparently crucial.  It ironizes 
the weight of many other events, showing them to be dependent not on choice, but a 
contingency on the other side of the world.  The garden of forking paths that opens up 
before Nemo is ultimately subjective.  These various paths are not different possible 
worlds, but the different possible worlds that Nemo projects.  At times, choices appear to 
be discrete.  At others, competing plotlines leak back into one another.  Perhaps most 
interestingly for my purposes, Mr. Nobody presents a novel form of autobiography as 
essentially futurally oriented.  The film is not, as it might appear, the story of the elderly 
Nemo, looking back on his life.  It is rather the story of the young Nemo, projecting 
forward to such a moment of traditional autobiographical recollection, where he looks 
back over different possible lives, which are actually still before him.  Mr. Nobody can 
thus be read as modeling Brooks's “the anticipation of retrospection” while allowing us to 
perform an exercise, from the perspective of the elderly Nemo, in what I've called the 
retrospection of anticipation (see chapter six).
The kind of narratives I've discussed in this section, which foster radical forms of 
sideshadowing, falsify the oft-repeated claim that narrative is necessarily retrospective.30  
29 The savvy viewer has perhaps already guessed as much.  The three women Nemo goes on to marry in 
the various versions of his life are three girls he knows as a child.  An earlier scene shows them on a 
bench, coyly greeting him in turn as he walks by.  The end of the film revisits this scene, reinforcing the 
connection.  Additionally, various scenes from the film are presented on screen or stage, to a theater 
empty except for the nine-year-old Nemo: the stage is obviously that of his imagination.
30 Morson: “The most important way in which novels are unlike our lives is that novels are over” (174).  
Robert Scholes: “narrative is past, always past […] to speak of the future is to prophesy or predict or 
speculate—never to narrate” (ON, 206).  As recently as 1966, Scholes and Kellogg wrote that “The 
whole idea of projecting a narrative into the future is a terribly daring one, and is one of the latest 
narrative possibilities to be discovered and exploited in Western literature” (227).  They are at least 
open to the possibility of future-oriented narratives, even if they understate their (increasing) familiarity.
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Most stories are told in the past tense.  Present-tense narration is fairly common, 
however, and stories told in the future tense are not unheard of.  It would no doubt be too 
quick to conclude that the verbal past tense of most narrative discourse is merely a 
convention.  Most stories are built on retrospection—even stories narrated in the present 
tense, which may merely be a device for heightening suspense.  Usually, a narrator knows 
where the story is going, and doles out information on the way to this known end such 
that the path is more interesting, indeed choosing what information to share on the basis 
of what is relevant to understanding that end and thus the story as a whole.  These 
dynamics of narrative are well-explored by, among others, critics and philosophers I've 
invoked earlier like Frank Kermode and Peter Goldie.  But, as Ricoeur writes, we don't 
experience narrative events as straightforwardly past: “narrative is retrospective only in a 
very particular sense: it is simply in the eyes of the narrator that the events recounted 
appear to have occurred in the past.  The past of narration is but the quasi past of the 
narrative voice” (OA, 163).  Even stronger, anyone who has ever complained of a novel 
that “the author seems to be making it up as he or she goes”31 is likely to sense that some 
stories are essentially present-tense in character, whatever their verbal tense.  A story 
need not include a narrator with privileged knowledge of where things are going.  Many 
writers don't know where they are going and have difficulty creating such a narrator.  A 
reader's sense that things are being made up on the fly suggests that a larger aesthetic 
structure, formed on the basis of some coherent criterion of inclusion filtering events, is 
unseen.  Such present-tense narratives are perhaps rarely anything but failures.  They are 
narratives nonetheless.  Stories like “The Human Soul as a Rube Goldberg Device,” “The 
Babysitter,” and Mr. Nobody push yet further against retrospection, it seems to me.  They 
are, again despite their verbal tense (the present tense), best characterized as essentially 
31 This complaint is most frequently leveled at contemporary fiction.  Practically any “innovation” that is 
associated with postmodern fiction can be found much earlier, however, in Don Quixote, Tristram 
Shandy, or One Thousand and One Nights, for example.
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future-tense stories.  They traffic in possibilities, still to come and undecided, rather than 
what is past and actual.  If Heidegger is right that “Possibility […] is the most primordial 
and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized,” it is these kind of formally 
experimental stories that offer the best model of our mode of being (SZ, 143-144).
IV. cf. Ricoeur
I see in the plots we invent the privileged means by which we re-configure our confused, 
unformed, and at the limit mute temporal experience.
Paul Ricoeur (TNI, xi)
No philosopher's name is more closely associated with narrative than Paul 
Ricoeur's.  As I signaled in chapter four, I have deferred a fuller treatment until now, 
when a comparison between his claims and my own can be used to clarify the revised 
theory of the narrative self that I am developing.  Ricoeur takes up much of Heidegger's 
lineage, yet turns his attention in a way that Heidegger does not, to narrative.  While this 
is much the same task I've set for myself, Ricoeur's project is less relevant to my purposes 
than one might expect.  This is true for a number of reasons.
First, Ricoeur takes a different part of Being and Time as his foundation.  
Numerous narrativists cite Heidegger as an influence, but their treatment of his work is 
brief and based on the analyses, from the second division of Being and Time, of being-
towards-death and historicality.  Ricoeur's commentary on Heidegger is more extensive32 
(though never systematic), but based on division two as well.  He writes: “In the 
Heideggerian analysis of temporality, in Being and Time, Augustine's breakthrough [the 
analysis of time in Book 11 of the Confessions] is exploited in the most decisive way, 
even though this occurs […] beginning from Heidegger's meditation on being-towards-
death and not, as in Augustine, from the structure of the threefold present” (TNI, 85).  
This is not so, I think.  Heidegger's analysis of being-towards-death and authenticity is 
32 See especially TNI, 60-64 and TNIII, 60-96.
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optional, based on one normative ideal among many (I'll say more about this in the next 
chapter); I've started from his analysis of thrown projection instead (two thirds of the 
threefold present), arguing that it provides a foundation for narrativity (and temporality), 
even leaving being-towards-death aside.  Ricoeur writes further: “At first glance, the 
relation between this analysis of within-time-ness and narrative seems quite distant.  
Heidegger's text […] even seems to leave no place for it, inasmuch as the tie between 
history and time occurs, in Being and Time, at the level of historicality, not at that of 
within-time-ness” (TNI, 63).  With this too I disagree.  It may be true that the tie between 
history, in a broader sense, and time occurs later in Being and Time.  But the tie between 
the self's banal personal history and time—Dasein as something which exists only 
temporally, and which is uniquely oriented toward its future—is rooted already in the 
early moves of the book, where I've grounded my analysis.  So Ricoeur, like Taylor and 
Guignon, begins his discussion already above the level of my concerns.
Second, Ricoeur, no less than those thinkers whom I criticized in chapter three, is 
guided by an excessively restrictive notion of narrative.  Plot, Ricoeur claims, requires an 
intelligible order, a “thought” uniting it, a “point, theme” (TNI, 67).  Even a novel like 
The Magic Mountain requires one real question, one theme, according to Ricoeur (TNII, 
116).  It should be clear that I disagree.  I have agreed instead with Walter Benjamin that 
we are drawn to narrative because it is “inexhaustible.”33  Narratives like the forking-path 
stories discussed in the previous section present multiple possibilities—and it is these that 
best get at the projecting nature of our way of being in the world.  The invocation of one 
theme—time, for example—or one question—How are “the experience of time, deadly 
sickness, and the great debate over the destiny of culture” integrated through the lens of 
Hans Castorp? (TNII, 116)—might indeed guide one's investigation of a work like 
33 Ricoeur uses this same term, “inexhaustible,” to describe narrative: “Every text [...] is revealed to be 
inexhaustible in terms of reading (TNIII, 169; see too TNI, 75).  I see no way to reconcile this 
characterization with Ricoeur's emphasis on singular unifying themes.
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Mann's.  But I simply don't know what it could mean to say that one theme or question 
unifies every last strand of a work as vast, rich, and inexhaustible as The Magic 
Mountain.  I'll say more about this difference between Ricoeur's account and my own 
under the heading of mimesis2.  But Ricoeur requires much more unity of narrative than I 
think we should.
Third, and following closely from the previous point, Ricoeur views the 
relationship between lived experience and narrative as more heavily mediated than I do.34 
He refers to the “prenarrative structure of experience” (TNI, 59, 60, 74), but experience 
remains prior to narrative, only a candidate for it.  Narrative is characterized, for him, by 
its unifying function because, on the other side, experience is first so fractured.  As in the 
epigraph to this section, for Ricoeur experience is first “confused” and “unformed,” then 
we “re-configure” it.  My reading of Heidegger has suggested that, on the contrary, 
confusion is an exceptional state.  Normally, we experience our being temporally, as 
already formed by the structure of thrown projection, directed by our concern, and as 
having meaning in a way that the merely natural does not.  Plot does not normally “re-
configure” our experience, but merely makes explicit in language the structure our 
experience already has.  We can build on this initial level of organization, re-organizing 
our experience according to artistic, aesthetically pleasing forms.  But whether or not we 
do, our experience is already organized in a way that I've argued is deserving of the name 
“narrative.”  Ricoeur writes at one point that he “shall not linger” on narrative in ordinary 
life (TNII, 156).  This is just what I've tried to do, below even the level of “narrative as it 
is already practiced in the transactions of ordinary discourse” (TNII, 156).
With these framing differences in mind, I turn more substantively to Ricoeur's 
claims.  It is not quite accurate to say, I think, that Ricoeur has a theory of the narrative 
34 In “Existence and Hermeneutics,” Ricoeur distinguishes between Heidegger's “short route” to ontology, 
which examines Dasein's existence directly, and his own “long route” which examines human existence 
via language and hermeneutics (2004, 6ff).
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self, at least not in the way that, for example, Marya Schechtman does.  As we saw in 
chapter four, Schechtman offers a clear schema of the narrative activity a human being 
must (at least be able to) undertake in order to achieve full personhood.  Ricoeur's vast 
learnedness and erudition can have the unfortunate effect, for this reader at least, of 
obscuring his own central theses.35  Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another (as well 
as Ricoeur's other works) offer rich reflections on temporality, narrative, history, and the 
self.  But they don't do anything like lay out a set of conditions (such as Schechtman's 
articulation and reality constraints) that define personhood.  As others have pointed out, 
Ricoeur's tone (despite his erudition) is admirably humble: philosophy is hard work, and 
few universal claims can be ventured without hubris.36  Where one sort of philosophical 
sensibility finds it most fruitful to offer bold theories, baldly stated, in full knowledge that 
they are likely to be proved inadequate and in need of revision, another moves forward 
probingly, always contextualizing its path, unsure that the vast storehouse of historical 
sources has yet been adequately examined.  Ricoeur follows the latter path.  I proceed by 
outlining two of Ricoeur's key notions: that of threefold mimesis from Time and 
Narrative and that of the dialectic between idem and ipse identity in Oneself as Another.  
The influence of Ricoeur's work on my own is great—it's almost certainly the case that I 
see so much of narrativity in Heidegger only because I have read Ricoeur—but has 
remained largely in the background.  Here I bring it to the forefront while at the same 
time highlighting how my project differs from his.
Threefold Mimesis: How exactly we should understand the ancient Greek concept 
of mimesis—usually translated as imitation or representation—is a matter of great 
scholarly dispute, but a dispute I will not enter into here (see Halliwell for an overview 
35 David Carr notes that, after having read the first volume of Time and Narrative, he remained unsure 
where Ricoeur stood on the relation between narrative and real life (in Wood, ed., 1991, 162).
36 “Ricoeur's work is wide-ranging and difficult, but includes a welcome stress on the humility necessary 
to the pursuit of truth” (Blackburn, 330).  Critchley refers to Ricoeur as “the great and gentle 
hermeneutician” (2009, 230).
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and particular take).  I aim only to present Ricoeur's version of the concept, and then 
show how his view of the arc from the world, through text, back to the world, differs 
from my own.  Ricoeur's master thesis in the three volumes of Time and Narrative is: 
“time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of narrative; 
narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal 
experience” (TNI, 3; see too 52).  This vast, non-vicious (Ricoeur argues) circle between 
time and narrative, in which time is humanized and narrative explores temporality, is 
based in particular moments of mimesis, where the reciprocal relationship between text 
and world is realized.  In his view of mimesis, Ricoeur follows Aristotle, rather than Plato 
(or, at least, the view of mimesis associated with the critique of poetry in the Republic): 
“if we translate mimesis by 'representation' […], we must not understand by this word 
some redoubling of presence, as we could still do for Platonic mimesis, but rather the 
break that opens the space for fiction” (TNI, 45).  Indeed, for Ricoeur, in order to 
understand mimesis we must expand the scope of the discussion, examining not just a 
text's mimetic relationship to the (or a) world, but situating the text between its maker on 
one side and its reader on the other.  Mimesis is thus divided into three movements: 
mimesis1, mimesis2, and mimesis3.
Mimesis1: “Whatever the innovative force of poetic composition within the field of 
our temporal experience may be, the composition of the plot is grounded in a pre-
understanding of the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic resources, 
and its temporal character” (TNI, 54).  MacIntyre sees the logic of action and narrative as 
the same, such that we can talk about the narrative structure of our behavior, enacted but 
unnarrated.  Ricoeur is unwilling to go quite so far, placing as he does much more 
emphasis on the mediation that cultural types play in bringing this (near) isomorphism 
about: “a logic of possible narrative units is still only a logic of action.  To become a logic 
of narrative it has to turn toward recognized cultural configurations, toward the 
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schematism of narrative constituted by the plot-types handed down by tradition” (TNII, 
43).37  The circle between time and narrative functions as it does only because any act of 
mimesis has been proceeded by many others.  “I would rather speak [not of a 
hermeneutic circle, but instead] of an endless spiral that would carry the meditation past 
the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes,” he writes (TNI, 72).  No 
attempt is made to recover the first, pre-historical movement from temporal experience to 
narrative, because we find ourselves already in the middle, with our previous experience 
of narrative mediating our experience of time.  Thus Ricoeur refers to “a prenarrative 
quality of experience” (TNI, 74).  Our experience of others' and our own behavior is not 
formless: “If, in fact, human action can be narrated, it is because it is always already 
articulated by signs, rules, and norms” (TNI, 57).  The relevant signs are not separable 
from narrative structures and terms, because human action is understood by 
contextualizing behavior within larger temporal arcs: “narrative understanding is not 
limited to presupposing a familiarity with the conceptual network constitutive of the 
semantics of action.  It further requires a familiarity with the rules of composition that 
govern the diachronic order of a story” (TNI, 56).  MacIntyre makes the same point much 
more slowly through his analysis of the gardener (see chapter one).
Yet Ricoeur hesitates: “the equation between narrative and time remains implicit. 
[…] I shall not push my analysis of the temporal elements of action to the point where we 
could rightfully speak of a narrative structure, or at least a prenarrative structure of 
temporal experience” (TNI, 59).  I have always found it surprising the extent to which 
Ricoeur cuts off discussion of our implicit, everyday narrative understanding.  He is 
interested instead in a dialectic that plays out more slowly and elaborately, between our 
understanding of time, our reading of literary works, and then our revised, humanized 
understanding of time.  The following passages help make sense of his lack of interest in 
37 For Ricoeur on MacIntyre, see OA, 158-159.
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a more immediate narrative understanding: “Thanks to writing, man and only man has a 
world and not just a situation. […] In the same manner that the text frees its meaning 
from the tutelage of the mental intention, it frees its reference from the limits of 
situational reference” (1976, 36).  Only with writing, Ricoeur claims, are we freed from 
the immediate here and now.  So absent an engagement with literature, our situational 
understanding can't be robustly extended in time and therefore in narrative, it would 
seem.  (A naïve objection: does an illiterate person, possessing spoken but not written 
language, really not have a world, according to Ricoeur's claim?)  He writes, quite 
movingly, “for me, the world is the whole set of references opened by every sort of 
descriptive or poetic text I have read, interpreted, or loved.  To understand these texts is 
to interpolate among the predicates of our situation all those meanings that, from a simple 
environment (Umwelt), make a world (Welt).  Indeed, we owe a large part of the 
enlarging of our horizon of experience to poetic works” (TNI, 80; 1976, 37).  He goes on:
In this sense, Heidegger rightly says, in his analysis of Verstehen in Being and Time, that what we 
understand first in a discourse is not another person, but a 'pro-ject,' that is, the outline of a new 
way of being in the world.  Only writing […,] in freeing itself, not only from its author and from 
its originary audience, but from the narrowness of the dialogical situation, reveals this destination 
of discourse as projecting a world. (1976, 37)
For Heidegger, it seems to me, it is our possession not of writing but of discourse—a 
possession which infiltrates back into even our seemingly non-linguistic activities—
which allows for projection.  Ricoeur seems to want to say that because we write, we can 
exist in possibilities beyond our immediate situation, can exist in a world rather than a 
mere environment.  Heidegger would reverse this claim, I think: because we exist in 
possibilities, because we always have a world, we are able to write, and even finally 
develop literary means of capturing the place of possibility over actuality.
The disagreement comes down to how structured our initial level of experience is.  
Ricoeur begins his analysis with a discussion of Augustine's Confessions: “Augustine 
groaned under the existential burden of discordance” (TNI, 31).  He turns then to 
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Aristotle's Poetics: “Aristotle discerns in the poetic act par excellence—the composing of
the tragic poem—the triumph of concordance over discordance” (TNI, 31).  I fear that 
Ricoeur overplays this dichotomy: temporal experience isn't as discordant, and narrative 
needn't be as unifying, as the Augustinian and Aristotelian models suppose.  But if 
temporal experience is indeed initially discordant, then mimesis1, the pre-understanding 
we have of the world, can no more than verge on narrative form.  Given the dichotomy, 
Ricoeur writes that narrative is “an eminently verbal experience where concordance 
mends discordance” (TNI, 31).  This takes us into mimesis2, in which the (for Ricoeur) at 
best prenarrative structure of the understanding becomes textual.  “What makes a story 
(or stories) of action?” he asks (TNI, 44).
Mimesis2: “A story […] must be more than just an enumeration of events in serial 
order; it must organize them into an intelligible whole, of a sort that we can always ask 
what is the 'thought' of this story” (TNI, 65).  Ricoeur writes that: “A narrative that fails 
to explain is less than a narrative” (TNI, 148).  I have challenged this standard, 
suggesting that the qualities various thinkers claim as that which unifies disparate events 
into a narrative merely track their own, ultimately arbitrary, tastes (chapter three).  
Velleman argues that events must enact a typical emotional arc in order to rise to 
narrative, but this merely demonstrates that he (like many readers) thinks good narratives 
play out typical emotional arcs.  Ricoeur doesn't identify a specific standard, but he 
agrees that there is a gap between merely serial events and narrative proper: “emplotment 
is the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succession”; “narrative time 
grafts its configurations [onto temporal elements]”; “It is the work of the configurating 
activity”; “narrative gives form to what is unformed” (TNI, 65, 59, 66, 72).
Ricoeur compares plot's unifying function to that of judgment:
This configurational act consists of “grasping together” the detailed actions or what I have called 
the story's incidents.  It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one temporal whole.  I 
cannot overemphasize the kinship between this “grasping together,” proper to the configurational 
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act, and what Kant has to say about the operation of judging. (TNI, 66)
Such formative operations are the result of the artist's compositional intelligence, at the 
heart of mimesis2.  The analogy to Kant is misleading until clarified, since, for Ricoeur, 
the emplotment of events is not an automatic operation of our form of mindedness:
The kinship is greater still with the reflective judgment which Kant opposes to the determining 
one, in the sense that it reflects upon the work of thinking at work in the aesthetic judgment of 
taste and in the teleological judgment applied to organic wholes.  The act of emplotment has a 
similar function inasmuch as it extracts a configuration from a succession. (TNI, 66)
If emplotment were automatic, as our determining application of the table of categories 
is, then Ricoeur would have no reason to hesitate over the prenarrative understanding 
discussed under the heading of mimesis1.  If automatic, then our implicit, pre-textual 
understanding would already be truly narrative in form.  This is the view I have been 
defending, but for Ricoeur, full emplotment occurs only through the work of the artist.
Thus Ricoeur emphasizes the unity of well-ordered plot: “Thanks to this reflective 
act, the entire plot can be translated into one 'thought,' which is nothing other than its 
'point' or 'theme'” (TNI, 67).  Throughout his discussion, Ricoeur takes his definitional 
cues from Aristotle's Poetics.  As has often been pointed out (not without controversy and 
disagreement), however, the Poetics is not (merely) a definitional text, but (at least to 
some extent) a prescriptive one; it can be read as a how-to manual for ancient tragedy.  A 
play shouldn't be too long, since audiences can only sit at attention for a certain length of 
time.  The improbable should be avoided, lest the audience's suspension of their disbelief 
fail (to put it in modern terms).  But an overly long play, or one featuring an improbable 
plot, doesn't, due to those qualities, cease to be a play.  Aristotle's method of inquiring 
into the best of some type in order to establish its essence is here especially misleading.
Ricoeur seeks to move beyond Aristotle, seeks “to disengage this configuring 
activity from the limiting constraints the paradigm of tragedy imposes upon the concept 
of emplotment” (TNI, 64).  I would suggest that he is unable to free himself of certain 
key restraints, the same which ultimately hold back MacIntyre's and Taylor's analyses.  
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Just as there is no reason to think that a person's desires and goals do (or perhaps even 
should) unite into one hierarchy, organized by a highest hyper-good, the object of his or 
her life quest (chapter one), there is no reason to think that a narrative must find unified 
order simply to be a narrative.38  Like others, Ricoeur has to dismiss much of recent 
fiction from his discussion.  “[T]he contemporary novel, in large part, may be defined as 
an antinovel,” he writes (TNI, 70).  “By means of the frustrations engendered by their 
ironic mistrust of any paradigm, and thanks to the more or less perverse pleasure the 
reader takes in being excited and gulled by them, these works satisfy both the tradition 
they leave behind and the disorganized experiences they finally end up imitating by dint 
of not imitating the received paradigms” (TNI, 73).  Ricoeur turns his attention, at length, 
to the modernist novel, discussing Proust, The Magic Mountain, and Mrs. Dalloway 
(TNII).  But he is drawn to these masterpieces because they explicitly thematize time.  
That is, he is drawn first and foremost to their content.  I have argued that some of the 
works he would label “antinovels” best represent, not just in their content but in their 
formal innovations, the narrative form of our experience: as oriented provisionally toward 
a multiplicity of future possibilities.  They are able to do so because they aren't as wedded 
to unity as Ricoeur requires.
Mimesis3: Antinovels shift the burden of emplotment from the artist to the reader: 
“the written work is a sketch for reading.  Indeed, it consists of holes, lacunae, zones of 
indetermination, which, as in Joyce's Ulysses, challenge the reader's capacity to configure 
what the author seems to take malign delight in defiguring.  In such an extreme case, it is 
the reader, almost abandoned by the work, who carries the burden of emplotment” (TNI, 
77).  The example of antinovels moves us from mimesis2, in which the artist creates a 
text, to mimesis3, in which the text is received by the reader.  “Structuration is an oriented
38 In fact, I would argue that the narratives that come closest to achieving this ideal of order are bad.  
Stories that relentlessly pursue one theme inevitably feel didactic.  They also abandon the great pleasure 
to be found in perfectly tossed off observations, which are sprinkled liberally throughout most fiction.
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activity that is only completed in the spectator or the reader,” Ricoeur writes (TNI, 48).  
“[I]t is in the hearer or the reader that the traversal of mimesis reaches its fulfillment” 
(TNI, 71).  Whereas mimises1 thematizes the pre-understanding of the artist, in which 
action is understood in a prenarrative form, prior to the artist's act of configuring events 
into a fully emplotted text, mimesis3, on the other side, thematizes the way in which the 
reader brings the text back to practical activity and the logic of action: “mimesis3 marks 
the intersection […] of the world configured by the poem and the world wherein real 
action occurs and unfolds its specific temporality” (TNI, 71).  In mimesis3 the 
hermeneutic circle is closed—from action to text, back to action—or, as Ricoeur prefers, 
one pass on the hermeneutic spiral is completed.  In a text, the reader is given a model for 
how to understand time's organization.  This understanding might return in a later 
moment of mimesis1, as the reader, now confronted by action in the world, will have a 
revised prenarrative understanding through which experience is filtered.
The fear of vicious circularity keeps Ricoeur from making more, as I would like 
to, of the (pre)narrative form of our understanding: “Whether we consider the semantic 
structure of action, its resources for symbolization, or its temporal character, the end 
point seems to lead back to the starting point or, worse, the end point seems anticipated in 
the starting point.  If such were the case, the hermeneutic circle of mimesis and 
temporality would resolve into the vicious circle of mimesis alone” (TNI, 71-72).  
Ricoeur argues that such a charge arises only given one of two misunderstandings: “the 
violence of interpretation” or, alternatively, “its redundance” (TNI, 72).  If interpretation 
violently reforms experience, “puts consonance where there was only dissonance,” then 
the hermeneutic circle becomes vicious because its result—humanized, organized time—
is merely read back, falsely, into temporal experience.  To this Ricoeur responds by 
softening the dichotomy between Augustine and Aristotle, suggesting that both temporal 
and narrative experience involve a play between concordance and discordance.  Such a 
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response invites the second objection, however, that interpretation is “redundant”: “If 
there is no human experience that is not already mediated by symbolic systems and, 
among them, by narratives, it seems vain to say, as I have, that action is in quest of 
narrative” (TNI, 74).  To this Ricoeur responds by insisting that temporal experience is 
merely prenarrative in quality, appealing to the intuitive weight of expressions like an 
“(as yet) untold story.”  It seems to me that Heidegger's views, as presented above, offer a 
clearer way forward.  Not all experience is narrativized, which gives us a telling contrast 
between our experience of ourselves—as beings that exist only temporally—and other 
experiences.  But we can identify in our self-experience a narrative structure, usually 
implicit, that can be made explicit and fully textual.
With the three moments of mimesis now before us, we can turn to Ricoeur's 
summary of their interrelation: “I take it as established that mimesis2 constitutes the pivot 
of this analysis” (TNI, 53).  Mimesis2 is the activity of the artist, by which events are 
organized textually into a whole and unified plot.  The extent to which mimesis2 is 
understandable in isolation depends on the framework of one's approach:
a science of the text can be established only upon the abstraction of mimesis2, and may consider 
only the internal laws of a work of literature, without any regard for the two sides of the text.  It is 
the task of hermeneutics, in return, to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work lifts itself 
above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering, to be given by an author to readers who 
receive it and thereby change their acting.  For a semiotic theory, the only operative concept is that 
of the literary text.  Hermeneutics, however, is concerned with reconstructing the entire arc of 
operations by which practical experience provides itself with works, authors, and readers.  It does 
not confine itself to setting mimesis2 between mimesis1 and mimesis3.  It wants to characterize 
mimesis2 by its mediating function.  What is at stake, therefore, is the concrete process by which 
the textural configuration mediates between the prefiguration of the practical field and its 
reconfiguration through the reception of the work. (TNI, 53)
Following structuralist literary criticism, a pure science of the text as text would ignore 
the role of the author in making it and the role of the reader in consuming it.  Yet a full 
understanding of the process by which texts are written and read, which Ricoeur here 
calls “hermeneutics,” would integrate both of these movements as well.
Ricoeur's notion of threefold mimesis can be modeled as follows:
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Ricoeur glosses the movement from mimesis1, through mimesis2, to mimesis3 as one of 
“describing, narrating, prescribing” (OA, 140).  By contrast, my own claim is that our 
ordinary understanding of ourselves is already implicitly narrative in structure, whether 
or not this gives rise to an explicit text.  We can traverse the full arc from “the opaque 
depths of living, acting, suffering” to “chang[ing] [our] acting” without the intervention 
of an explicit text.
mimesis1
prefi guration of the 





confi guration of 




reconfi guration of 
the practical fi eld 
in the reader's 
reception of the 
work
non-vicious cycling back, in 
which culturally familiar plots 
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in everyday experience
















sense of who one 
is and where one is 
going
non-vicious cycling back, in 
which culturally familiar 
plots, explicit or implied, limit 
our sense of live possibilities
Figure 9: Ricoeur's Structure, Revised
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Our understanding is still characterized as narrative in form because it is structured in the 
same way as the readerly reception of a text and because, were we called upon to make 
our understanding explicit, narrative discourse would best allow us to do so.
How might Ricoeur object to such a revision?  As quoted above, he writes that “a 
logic of possible narrative units is still only a logic of action.  To become a logic of 
narrative it has to turn toward recognized cultural configurations, toward the schematism 
of narrative constituted by the plot-types handed down by tradition” (TNII, 43).  This 
would seem to suggest that the kinds of narratives I've identified as most closely 
modeling the form of our projective understanding aren't, for Ricoeur, properly narratives 
at all.  They operate, whether through the modernist mechanism of internal monologue or 
the postmodernist mechanism of forking paths, according to “a logic of possible narrative 
units.”  But what happens when, with Woolf's or Joyce's prose, or with a story like 
Coover's “The Babysitter,” a logic of narrative units becomes a recognized cultural 
configuration?  And, if it is the case that such forms better represent the way that we exist 
not merely in actualities, but in possibilities, isn't it crucial that such forms achieve 
recognition?  If they don't, then doesn't narrative risk playing a simplifying and merely 
consoling function, domesticating our manner of existence by erasing possibilities in the 
name of one actual plot line?  If, as Ricoeur claims, narrative involves the play between 
concordance and discordance, this is just why it, unlike more straightforward forms of 
description and assertion, might allows us to put our form of existing into words.
At stake is the question of how to understand the process of enculturation.  In an 
hypothesized state of nature, where Ricoeur's hermeneutic spiral would have begun its 
ascending course, we might imagine beings who, as yet unexposed to narrative's forms of 
organization, might have experienced time as truly discordant.  Myths and other early 
forms of storytelling emerge, according to the implicit genealogy, in order to make time 
bearable.  And as particular forms were regularized, beings acculturated according to 
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them would find their experience of time revised, no longer wholly chaotic, but softened 
instead by the filtering of mythical forms in their now prenarrative understanding.  The 
same process plays out in miniature in each child, as he or she is acculturated into a set of 
ways of organizing temporal experience.  But at both scales, it seems to me, the innocent
—whether inhabiting the state of nature or childhood—is never us.  If Heidegger is right 
that “our” way of being has at its center our thrown and projecting experience of time, 
than “we” are not there until higher up on Ricoeur's spiral, where temporality's 
discordance has already been mended.
The Dialectic of Idem and Ipse Identity: In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur narrows 
his focus from our narrative experience of time to the theme of the self: “I propose to 
reconstruct here a theory of narrative, no longer considered from the perspective of its 
relation to the constitution of human time, as I did in Time and Narrative, but from that of 
its contribution to the constitution of the self” (OA, 114).  Like Heidegger, whose 
example I've also followed, Ricoeur analyzes and interprets the self against the horizon of 
temporality: “the person of whom we are speaking and the agent on whom the action 
depends have a history, are their own history” (OA, 113).  Approaches “from the 
perspective of identifying reference,” as well as those based on “the agent in the 
framework of the semantics of action,” fail: “What has been omitted in this way is not 
just one important dimension among others, but an entire problematic, namely that of 
personal identity, which can be articulated only in the temporal dimension of human 
existence” (OA, 113-114).  “Identity” is a poly-vocal concept and, absent recognition of 
the dimension of temporality, philosophy can speak to only one version of it.
Ricoeur distinguishes between two senses of identity: “on one side, identity as 
sameness (Latin idem); on the other, identity as selfhood (Latin ipse)” (OA, 116).  Idem 
identity is that which we apply to objects in the world: “To this first component of the 
notion of identity corresponds the notion of identification, understood in the sense of the 
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reidentification of the same […]: the same thing twice, n times” (OA, 116).  Idem identity 
applies as well to the identification of the same type, rather than token, with “same” in 
such a case meaning “qualitative” rather than “numerical” identity (OA, 116).  In yet a 
third case, when dealing with objects across greater expanses of time, “we appeal to 
another criterion […], namely the uninterrupted continuity between the first and the last 
stage in the development of what we consider to be the same individual (OA, 116).  Yet 
this is still a matter of idem identity, identity as sameness.  The oak tree is the same as the 
acorn from which it grew, an animal is the same one over the course of its life, and “so, 
too, we speak of a man or of a woman—I am not saying of a person—as a simple token 
of a species” (OA, 117).  Ricoeur's interjection, and his distinction between a man or 
woman and a person, follows Heidegger.  “[T]he sameness of one's body conceals its 
selfhood,” he writes (OA, 33).  “[U]nderstanding the way in which our own body is at 
once a body like any other (situated among other bodies) and an aspect of the self (its 
manner of being in the world) is a problem of vast proportions” (OA, 33).  As “In 
Heidegger, the investigation of 'who?' belongs to the same ontological sphere as that of 
the self (Selbstheit)” (OA, 58).39
Thus Ricoeur turns to ipse identity.  Ipse identity, identity as selfhood, concerns 
“the question 'who?' inasmuch as it is irreducible to any question of 'what?'” (OA, 118).  
What makes me who I am?  (As we saw, Schechtman begins from the same distinction: 
idem identity is an answer to the “reidentification question,” ipse identity is an answer to 
the “characterization question.”)  Crucially, “identity in the sense of ipse implies no 
assertion concerning some unchanging core of personality” (OA, 2).  Yet the question of 
the continuity of the self—as a self—in time doesn't disappear.  “Does the selfhood of the 
self imply a form of permanence in time which is not reducible to the determination of a 
39 Ricoeur sanctions as a “major distinction” that which I've made so much of, that Dasein is available 
only to existential, not categorical, analysis (see OA, 123, especially note 9).
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substratum?” (OA, 118).  What is sought is a way to understand our continuity through 
time, without an appeal to an unchanging substrate, of whatever kind.  Ricoeur concludes 
his motivating comments: “It is therefore in the sphere of temporality that the mediation 
is to be sought” (OA, 124).
Ricoeur offers two analyses underlying his notion of narrative identity, which will 
mediate between idem and ipse identity: character and the keeping of promises.  
Character helps to explain the self's sameness, while the keeping of promises helps to 
understand this sameness through time.  He describes character as “the set of distinctive 
marks which permit the reidentification of a human individual as being the same,” and as 
“the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized” (OA, 119, 121).  Yet the 
notion of character goes beyond idem identity, and how, for example, we reidentify an 
object as of the same token, type, or individual across large expanses of time.  “[T]he 
permanence of character with respect to persons results from the fact that the permanence 
of character expresses the almost complete mutual overlapping of the problematic of 
idem and ipse,” Ricoeur writes (OA, 118).  Character, so long as it remains constant, 
allows us to reidentify someone as the same person despite other changes, serving as a 
criterion of idem identity.  Yet we might also plausibly take our character as that which 
makes us who we are, extending character into the realm of ipse identity.  Other potential 
criteria for reidentification—bodily continuity, but also psychological continuity, 
inasmuch as it is mere continuity that is important, not the specifics of psychological 
makeup—seem irrelevant to ipse identity.  Yet character, taken as fixed, becomes just 
another substratum, unchanging and not distinctively temporal.
In promise keeping, temporality comes to the fore, but idem and ipse identity pull 
apart: “faithfulness to oneself in keeping one's word marks the extreme gap between the 
permanence of the self and that of the same” (OA, 118).  Promise keeping enacts a 
miniature plot.  The steadfastness of the self is not simply given, as one might fail to keep 
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one's word, causing a rupture between the person who makes a promise and the person 
who breaks it.  Instead, in upholding one's word, one asserts, one reaffirms oneself—now
—as he or she who made the promise.  Sameness in promise keeping is distinctively 
temporal, realized only when the plot arc of the promise is fulfilled in its multiple events.
Further reflection—and here we can see Ricoeur's dialectic playing out—suggests 
that in keeping a promise, one asserts as well who one is, asserts one's ipse identity.  
Furthermore, who one is in such an instance is a matter of character.  We can thus begin 
to see character as more that an unchanging substratum: “characters, we will say, are 
themselves plots”; “character is therefore a narrative category as well” (OA, 143).  Just as 
the plot of a promise made and kept reveals constancy of character, reveals one person as 
an ongoing who, other familiar plots do as well.  A substratum of unchanging dispositions 
need not exist.  Rather, plots usually turn on certain transformations of character.  A 
person begins with a certain character (c1 at t1), then suffers certain events, emerging with 
a changed character (c2 at t2).  If that change of character is what we expect to be brought 
about by those events, then such a familiar plot allows us both to understand who that 
person is—at t1, at t2, and across time—and to identify him or her as one person over the 
course of that plot.
Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity will not, at least not without a great deal of 
elaboration, serve as a technical criterion of personal identity.  If I promise to drive my 
friend to the airport tomorrow and, because I fall sick overnight, you uphold that promise, 
you aren't me.  Indeed, these ways of talking, in their application of “I” and “you,” 
already assume we know how to identify and reidentify the agents involved.  I don't think 
that Ricoeur harbors any illusions that his work bears on the technical metaphysics of 
personal identity, however.40  Rather, he seeks to offer a bit of philosophical therapy 
40 “I have the gravest doubt concerning the use of the term 'criterion' in the framework of the present 
discussion [….] In the case of sameness, the term 'criterion' has a very precise sense [….] Is the same 
thing true with respect to selfhood? […] Does it not come instead within the province of attestation?” 
(OA, 129).
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which would diffuse worries about personal identity, worries motivated by science 
fictionalized puzzle cases such as those presented by Derek Parfit.
In his “Personal Identity,”41 and at much greater length in Reasons and Persons, 
Parfit famously argues that there are instances in which the question of personal identity 
has no answer and, further, that “the question about identity has no importance” (199).  I 
wish only to suggest a reframing of Parfit's claims, and Ricoeur's grappling with them, so 
a review of the full details of his examples is unnecessary.  Briefly: Parfit imagines cases 
in which persons might split or fuse.  If we assume that “the question of identity must 
have an answer” (199), then, after an instance of fission, we have to decide whether the 
original person is identical with both, one, or neither of the resulting persons.  None of 
these answers seems satisfactory, however (200ff).  Parfit acknowledges that such cases 
are often dismissed because it is thought that “they could never occur” (199).  The 
splitting and fusing of persons is, he thinks, coherently imaginable, however, and thus 
they need to be dealt with.  He uses an analysis of fission and fusion to argue that what 
actually matters in such instances is survival, and that survival can be “prized” apart from 
identity.  The larger form of Parfit's argument, not quite articulated by him in this way, is 
that coherently imagined puzzle cases, thought through, allow us to clarify our concept of 
personal identity, such that we see that it is not what matters—it just happens to track 
most of the time with survival, which is what we should attend to.  Ricoeur writes of 
Parfit:
What presupposition grounds the construction of this puzzling case and a good many others, each 
more ingenious than the next?  First of all, these are imaginary cases which remain conceivable, 
even when they may not be technically realizable.  It is enough that they be neither logically nor 
physically impossible.  The question will be whether they do not violate a constraint of another 
order, concerning human rootedness on this earth. (OA, 135)
Here Ricoeur suddenly shifts vocabulary and tradition:
in virtue of the mediating function of the body as one's own in the structure of being in the world, 
the feature of selfhood belonging to corporeality is extended to that of the world as it is inhabited 
corporeally.  This feature defines the terrestrial condition as such and gives to the Earth the 
41 In Perry, ed., 199-223.
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existential significance attributed to it in various ways in Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger.  The 
Earth is something different, and something more, than a planet: it is the mythical name of our 
corporeal anchoring in the world. (OA, 150)
In effect, Ricoeur is saying that the “persons” at the heart of Parfit's thought experiments 
are not sufficiently like us to tell us about ourselves, but instead “entities of a manipulable 
nature from which the question of selfhood has been eliminated as a matter of principle” 
(OA, 135).  This is not to say that Ricoeur is unmoved by puzzle cases, only that he 
thinks we need to look to more fully imagined cases closer to home: “Literary fictions 
differ fundamentally from technological fictions in that they remain imaginative 
variations on an invariant, our corporeal condition experienced as the existential 
mediation between the self and the world” (OA, 150).
Rather than bracket, or perhaps even dismiss, science-fictional cases like Parfit's, 
as Ricoeur does, I think we can offer a reframing of them (though perhaps what follows is 
just an attempt to translate Ricoeur's claims back into something more like Parfit's 
vocabulary and tradition).  Suppose we grant that the fission and fusion of persons, as 
well as brain transplants and teleportation, are coherently imaginable.  This does not, I 
would suggest, force us to clarify our current concept of personal identity so that it can 
deal with them (or, if it can't, to abandon it in favor of a neighboring concept like 
survival).  Rather, we should admit that our concept of personal identity is a historically 
contingent construction, liable to further development.  If one or another of Parfit's 
imagined technologies were to come about, it would be accompanied by great cultural 
change.  Part of this cultural change would be an evolution of our concept of personal 
identity.  Parfit refers to the possibilities of “new ways of talking” and/or “changing the 
concept of a person” (203).  But philosophers don't, now, need to do these things in 
response to imagined new technologies.  Were these technologies to actually develop, 
philosophers might play a role in the evolution of the concept of personal identity—but 
surely (if our intellectual history thus far is any guide) would novelists, artists, journalists, 
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clergy, politicians, jurists, and the wider citizenry as well.  If the fission of persons 
becomes possible, certain ways of talking about the status of the resulting beings will 
become conventionally accepted, in ways that we, now, probably can't predict.  Certainly 
Parfit's quick and thin presentation of the psychology of fusion (212) is inadequate in 
helping us to do so (much as Strawson's presentation of the psychology of the episodic is 
inadequate), bettered at least by the science-fiction writers who inspire such thought 
experiments.  We do not, as Parfit writes, “need a sense in which one person can survive 
as two” (206).  Rather, if and when the splitting of persons becomes possible, we will 
need such a sense.  Or perhaps we won't, but will find instead a completely different way 
of culturally responding to such a technology (by banning it, for example, or by 
demonizing it and declaring the resulting beings “non-persons”).  So in place of Parfit's 
“identity is not what matters,” we might say instead that identity still matters, even if it is 
possible that, given a sufficiently strange technological/cultural future, it will come to 
matter less, perhaps eventually not at all.
Finally, it seems to me that Ricoeur's analyses point to a stronger set of 
conclusions.  The relationship between idem and ipse identity doesn't need to be 
“mediated,” by a dialectic or otherwise (OA, 124).  Rather, if Heidegger is correct that 
Dasein exists only temporally (and I think Ricoeur agrees that this is correct), then idem 
identity will prove not merely inadequate to an analysis of the self, but irrelevant.  When 
we ask the reidentification question of an object (other than Dasein), we ask whether an 
object at time t2 is the same as the one at time t1.  We can ask this question of ourselves as 
bodies and as people.  But if Dasein exists only across times t1 and t2 (and beyond), then 
it is nonsense to ask whether it is the same at these two different moments.  It is what it is
—indeed, it is at all (as Dasein and as a self, rather than as a body or human being)—only 
because of its existence across time.  If Heidegger is right that Dasein's temporal nature is 
unique, then it is hard to find an analogy to explain this claim.  Perhaps the following 
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helps, however.  Consider a performance of a symphony.  Someone asks, during the first 
movement, what piece of music it is.  “Beethoven's Fifth.”  Then, during the fourth 
movement, he asks again: “what piece of music is this?”  “Beethoven's Fifth,” comes the 
reply.  “Oh, so this is the same piece of music as before.”  Or worse: “Oh, like before.”  
Were someone to say this, he wouldn't be incorrect, exactly, but it seems to me that he 
would be subtly misspeaking.  What he should say is that “this is still the same piece of 
music.”  Beethoven's Fifth exists across a 30-minute performance of it.  It does not exist 
at the five-minute mark, then exist again at the 25-minute mark.  One can recognize 
Beethoven's Fifth on the basis of hearing a few bars from the first movement, and one can 
again recognize Beethoven’s Fifth on the basis of hearing a few bars from the fourth 
movement.  But one can't reidentify what is heard during the fourth with what is heard 
during the first—not because those specific bars are different (or even potentially the 
same), but because in each case the specific bars only point to the larger whole.  The 
symphony exists only across the span of its full performance, including these two 
moments.  Within the frame of a performance of the symphony, reidentification doesn't 
have any meaning.  (By contrast, one could reidentify two different performances of it as 
two tokens of the same type.)  In the same way, if Dasein exists only across the span of 
its full life, then reidentification has no meaning with respect to it.  We can reidentify a 




Living in Received Possibilities:
Das Man, Falling, and Bad Faith
[O]ur first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception 
to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions.
Heidegger, Being and Time (SZ, 153)
Most stories never really get heard, we're so certain of what we know.
Matthew Stadler, The Dissolution of Nicholas Dee (169)
There's a self-conscious space, a sense of formal play that is a sort of arrested panic, and maybe 
you show it in a forced gesture or a ritual clearing of the throat.  Something out of childhood 
whistles through this space, a sense of games and half-made selves, but it's not that you're 
pretending to be something else.  You're pretending to be exactly who you are.  That's the curious 
thing.
Don DeLillo, Underworld (103)
Hannah Arendt is most famous for her phrase “the banality of evil,” which she 
uses in assessment of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann, one of the chief implementers of the 
Holocaust.  Reading Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, a book very much preceded by its 
reputation and, especially, this phrase, one is surprised by the extent to which it is a book 
of reportage, not philosophy and ethics, or even reflections and meditations (as Arendt 
herself would later try to emphasize; 280, 287).  Controversially, Arendt describes 
Eichmann not as “an abnormal monster,” but instead rather ordinary, thoughtless, and 
unimaginative: “The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, 
and that many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly 
and terrifyingly normal” (276).  Some took this as a defense of Eichmann, whereas 
Arendt's aim is obviously not to exculpate him, but to understand how someone who was 
“not Iago and not MacBeth” could have so centrally helped bring about the Holocaust 
(287).  The phrase “the banality of evil” does not occur in the book until the last line of 
the last chapter (252), however, and for the most part Arendt's broader reflections are 
reserved for the Epilogue and subsequently written Postscript (see 287).  And, indeed, if 
one were to point to a larger theme in Arendt's reportage it would not be the banality of 
evil exactly, but rather its bureaucracy.
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“[T]he essence of totalitarian government, and perhaps the nature of every 
bureaucracy, is to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery out 
of men, and thus to dehumanize them,” Arendt writes (289).  That Eichmann was 
transformed into a cog does not, as he himself would have had it, exonerate him—but 
Arendt wants to understand this process.  Even more controversially, she discusses, as 
another facet of the bureaucracy related to the Holocaust, the role of the Jewish Councils 
and police forces who cooperated with the Nazis in registering and rounding up Jews for 
deportation (see 115ff especially).  Arendt's analysis holds the Jewish Councils guilty of 
an unwitting failure of utilitarian calculation: they “had cooperated because they thought 
they could 'avert consequences more serious than those which resulted'” (91).1  This 
cooperation consistently troubles Arendt, and as more than a miscalculation: “I have 
dwelt on this chapter of the story […] because it offers the most striking insight into the 
totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused in respectable European society—not only 
in Germany but in almost all countries, not only among the persecutors but also among 
the victims” (125-126).  Her thought is that the Nazis succeeded in making the Jewish 
population of Europe part of the very bureaucracy of their own destruction, that they did 
what was expected of them, due not just to miscalculation, but sometimes because no 
alternative was even imagined.  Arendt describes the testimony during Eichmann's trial of 
Pinchas Freudiger, a member of the Jewish Council in Budapest, who was berated by the 
audience in Hungarian and Yiddish.  “There are people here who say they were not told 
to escape,” he says.  “What could we have done?  What could we have done?” (124).
Arendt is thus interested in the way the bureaucracy of the Holocaust brought 
about various kinds of bad faith, according to which people did what was expected of 
them, what others were doing, “what one does,” rather than asking what they should do.2 
1 She writes that “The whole truth was that if the Jewish people had really been unorganized and 
leaderless, there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims would 
hardly have been between four and a half and six million people” (125).  
2 The theme carries over to Arendt's characterization of the court in Jerusalem as well.  Words like 
309
Or, perhaps even better than Sartre's notion of bad faith, we might invoke here 
Heidegger's of das Man, the way in which, normally, our selves are not individuated, but 
caught up in “what one does.”  Heidegger is—understandably—absent from Arendt's 
book.  Yet she describes Eichmann in recognizably Heideggerian language:
His conscience was indeed set to rest when he saw the zeal and eagerness with which “good 
society” everywhere reacted as he did.  He did not need to “close his ears to the voice of 
conscience,” […] not because he had none, but because his conscience spoke with a “respectable 
voice,” with the voice of respectable society around him. (126)
Eichmann's actions were not opposed, but validated by his conscience.  “Obedience is 
praised as a virtue,” he said in his last statement before hanging (247).  Disobedience 
was, again in his own words, “impossible.  Nobody acted that way.”  Acting otherwise 
was “unthinkable” (92).  “He could see no one, no one at all, who actually was against 
the Final Solution,” Arendt writes (116).3  Eichmann, in her portrait, is the most extreme 
example possible of the insidiousness of the phrase “I'm just doing my job.”  Insidious 
exactly because no inner motivation of radical evil is thereby revealed, because evil can 
be carried out, if she's right, banally, in the absence of any thought or motivation, by 
means of the structures of bureaucracy, bad faith, and das Man.
Arendt is also, though rather less famously, a thinker of narrative.  In The Human 
Condition, she writes that “The chief characteristic of this specifically human life [...] is 
that it is itself always full of events which ultimately can be told as a story, establish a 
biography [….] For action and speech […] are indeed the two activities whose end result 
will always be a story with enough coherence to be told, no matter how accidental or 
haphazard the single events and their causation may appear to be” (97).  Like many 
“theatrical,” “stage,” “show trial,” “showmanship,” and “stage manager” pepper her initial description 
of the court and the prosecution especially (4-5).  Not because Eichmann is not guilty, but because, 
according to Arendt, the trial was mistakenly concerned with too much other than justice: “Justice 
demands that the accused be prosecuted, defended, and judged, and that all the other questions of 
seemingly greater import […] be left in abeyance” (5).  See too 253.
3 Relatedly, Arendt argues that “Eichmann's great susceptibility to catch words and stock phrases” meant 
that the Nazi's euphemistic “language rules” (“evacuation” instead of “deportation to killing,” e.g.) were 
especially effective with him.  He still knew what he was doing, but this language helped him and 
others to “prevent them from equating it with their old, 'normal' knowledge of murder and lies” (86).
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others, Arendt stresses the supposedly retrospective nature of narrative: “Action reveals 
itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian [….] 
What the storyteller narrates must necessarily be hidden from the actor himself, at least as 
long as he is in the act or caught in its consequences” (192).  I would suggest that these 
two aspects of Arendt's thought—the bad faith of bureaucracy and the narrative structure 
of human action—are more closely related than it might seem.  Because human action is 
narratively structured, we are constantly tempted to understand events according to 
simplistic, familiar storylines, rather than attending to them in all their complexity.  
Understanding the narrative structure of action made in bad faith contradicts the claim 
that narrative understanding is necessarily retrospective.  It will, instead, reveal the 
desirability of coming to understand the narrative structure of one's present.
My Heideggerian account of the narrativity of the self has stressed the place of 
multiple possibilities in our understanding of who we are and where we are going.  I have 
argued that we are the readers of our ongoing existences, and—like readers mid-story—
we project multiple possible plotlines ahead of ourselves (chapter six).  We understand 
where we are now by projecting where we might be going.  I have presented forking path 
narratives as the best models for this understanding (chapter seven).  I now turn to an 
analysis of what happens when we deny the place of possibilities—in bad faith according 
to Sartre, by way of das Man and “falling” according to Heidegger.  This will allow me to 
treat another essential part of being-in-the world—the self as it is normally encountered, 
as das Man-self—and also to acknowledge the critical worry that using narrative to 
understand real life is reductive.  Narrative offers the best explicit working out of the 
structure of our lived experience.  But because lived experience is narratively structured, 
we can fall into a reductive version of it.
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I. Das Man and Falling: The Rule of “What One Does,” the Rule of the World
In justifying the notion that the self is indeed central to Heidegger's conception of 
Dasein, I quoted his claim that “The question of the 'who' answers itself in terms of the 'I' 
itself, the 'subject,' the 'Self'” (SZ, 114).4  The scare-quotes indicate that Heidegger is 
dissatisfied with traditional treatments of our reflexive self-understanding.  His own 
account begins against the background of these traditional approaches, even as it will 
reject large parts of them.  Traditionally, it is thought that “The 'who' is what maintains 
itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behavior, 
and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing” (SZ, 114).  Attempts to 
move beyond this thought tend to fail: “Even if one rejects the 'soul substance' and the 
Thinghood of consciousness, or denies that a person is an object, ontologically one is still 
positing something whose Being retains the meaning of present-at-hand, whether it does 
so explicitly or not” (SZ, 114).  As I've noted repeatedly, one of Heidegger's framing 
concerns in Being and Time is to reject presence-at-hand as an adequate account of what 
it means to be.  Even if one rejects, with respect to the self, the most obvious 
instantiations of such a conception of being—a continuously present soul, or body, or 
consciousness—Heidegger claims that this fundamental error likely remains.
It is thus not obvious how we should understand Dasein's “mineness,” what it 
means when we say, or try to conceptualize, “I.”  Nor is it obvious, should we wish to 
attend carefully to the phenomenon, how to do so.  Introspection could lead us astray: “It 
could be that the 'who' of everyday Dasein is not the 'I myself'” (SZ, 115).  How so?  
“[W]hat,” Heidegger asks in voice of an interlocutor, “is more indubitable than the 
givenness of the 'I'?” (SZ, 115).  The foregoing analyses of Being and Time have rejected 
givenness, however: “In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject 
4 That Heidegger's intermediary target, Dasein's understanding of its own being, is Dasein's self is, as I 
signaled initially, the most controversial aspect of my reading of him.  His account of das Man-selbst, 
along with ¶64, is his most sustained discussion of the self where it is clearly not a mere reflexive.
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without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given” (SZ, 116).  To understand 
Dasein's “mineness,” Dasein as a “who,” we must, as always, proceed by way of an 
understanding of Dasein's manner of existing: “Dasein is its Self only in existing” (SZ, 
117).  That is to say that even the “I” of Dasein must be understood temporally.  He 
acknowledges that “this seems tantamount to volatilizing the real 'core' of Dasein” (SZ, 
117).  One can imagine Strawson, for example, objecting that Heidegger begs the very 
question of whether the self needs to be understood temporally.  Heidegger has moved 
beyond the familiar framing thought that the self is that which remains steady throughout 
change.  The self is not a constant, grounding Dasein's otherwise dynamic being.  Rather, 
he reverses the burden of proof.  The weight of tradition, of even our ordinary ways of 
speaking, leads us to conceive of the self as a thing.  “The perverse assumption” is “that 
the entity in question has at bottom the kind of Being which belongs to something 
present-at-hand, even if one is far from attributing to it the solidity of an occurrent 
corporeal Thing” (SZ, 117).  Heidegger proceeds by way of the contrary hypothesis that 
“man's 'substance' is not spirit as synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence” (SZ, 
117).
In considering the possibility that taking the self as immediately given might lead 
us astray from the true phenomenon, Heidegger wrote that “It could be that the 'who' of 
everyday Dasein is not the 'I myself'” (SZ, 115).  This is just what he goes on to assert.  
“Assert” rather than “argue” is, unfortunately, the right word: the section is brief and, 
even more than elsewhere, if one's sensibility differs from Heidegger's, it will seem that 
he says little to convince the reader that his characterization is accurate.  He writes that 
“The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic 
Self—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way.  As they-self, the 
particular Dasein has been dispersed into the 'they', and must first find itself” (SZ, 129).  
How Dasein finds its authentic self will concern Heidegger in the second division of 
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Being and Time.  At the end of this chapter, I'll explain why I won't follow him there.  
First, we must understand his account of Dasein's everyday self as lost and dispersed into 
das Man, the everyday background against which authenticity might be possible.
Macquarrie and Robinson translate “das Man” as “the They.”  In German, “man” 
is the indefinite singular pronoun.  In English, we say, in varying contexts, “one” or 
“you” or use the passive voice: “That is what one does.”  “You should hold your knife in 
your right hand.”  “It is appropriate here to....”  “Das Man” creates an abstraction of such 
cases.  “The One,” without explanation, gives the wrong idea, inasmuch as it suggests 
someone singled out as chosen (like Neo in The Matrix).  “The They” gives the wrong 
idea as well, inasmuch as “they” is taken to exclude the speaker.  “That is what one 
does,” one says—and oneself is thereby included.5  Heidegger claims that in the normal 
course of its everyday life, Dasein's self isn't uniquely individuated.  Rather, I am just like 
any other (unspecific) person, believing as they believe, doing what one does.  One is 
undistinguished even to oneself, dispersed instead into the crowd: “[Dasein] itself is not; 
its Being has been taken away by the Others [….] These Others, moreover, are not 
definite others” (SZ, 126).  Consider a completely ordinary occurrence.  Going into a 
store, you hold the door open behind you, allowing the person behind you to catch it 
more easily.  To let it slam in his or her face would be distinguished (if only so slightly) 
by its rudeness.  To actually open the door, stand aside, and allow the person following 
you to enter first would be distinguished (again, only ever so slightly), by its old-
fashionedness.  To hold the door momentarily ajar is undistinguished.  One hasn't really 
done anything by momentarily holding the door; one has merely done what one does.6  If 
Heidegger is right, we would perhaps expect a vague but unmeaning politeness to rule 
society.  The phrase “what one does,” indeed the very pronoun “one,” carries something 
5 The similarity between “das Man” in German and “the Man” in English isn't a wholly false friend, at 
least for anyone (that is, most everyone) who more or less follows the dictates of society.
6 These are socials norms, Dreyfus writes, not “the maxims of morality [or] prudence” (152).
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of these connotations in English.  Structurally, this needn't be the case, however.  The 
expectation of vague politeness says more about the contexts in which I, writing this, and 
you, reading it, tend to move.  What one does when someone spits in your face, or pours 
a beer over your head, is other than polite.  To react calmly, with unmeaning politeness, 
in such a situation would distinguish oneself from “the they.”
Despite the possibility for a great deal of cultural and subcultural variance, it 
seems hard to deny that Heidegger is driven by an anti-bourgeois sensibility in his 
analysis.  “Das Man” leads to averageness: “In this averageness with which it prescribes 
what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts 
itself to the fore [….] This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of 
Dasein which we call the 'leveling down' of all possibilities of Being” (SZ, 127).  Given 
my emphasis on the multiple possibilities Dasein projects before it in its narrative self-
understanding, this point will return.  Dasein's averageness dictates not only how we 
behave, but how our behavior is understood: “Publicness proximally controls every way 
in which the world and Dasein gets interpreted and it is always right” (SZ, 127).  Even 
when “one” really does have the right idea, publicness saps it of its weight: “Overnight, 
everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well-
known [….] Every secret loses its force” (SZ, 127).  Suppose that Christianity's 
imperatives really are at the core of a true ethics: Love one another.  Do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you.  Should someone invoke these imperatives, one reacts 
as one does: by muttering “obviously” perhaps, or by rolling one's eyes at the clicheness 
of it all.  Or perhaps to think that love and the golden rule are really the heart of 
Christianity's teachings is already to level anything radical in them.
The rule of das Man spares us from thinking for ourselves: “We take pleasure and 
enjoy as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see 
and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 
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'shocking' what they find shocking” (SZ, 126-127).  Readers of philosophy, partakers of 
high culture, intellectuals, and literati should not think themselves here exempt from 
Heidegger's admonishments.  What are The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker's 
“Talk of the Town,” Leiter Reports, et. al. but Page Sixes for different layers of society, 
contemporary feuilletons?  All tell one what to think, depending on one's exact 
subcultural position, and one finds oneself repeating their line, however freethinking one 
holds oneself to be.  Spared from thought, Dasein is spared as well from responsibility in 
its everyday life: “because the 'they' presents every judgement and decision as its own, it 
deprives Dasein of its answerability.  […] Thus the particular Dasein in its everydayness 
is disburdened by the 'they'” (SZ, 127).
It should be stressed that this analysis is not supposed to be a critique of society.7  
It is supposed to be an answer to the question of “who” Dasein normally is.  It is an 
analysis of the self, and of how the self is presented to itself: “In terms of the 'they' and as 
the 'they' I am 'given' proximally to 'myself'” (SZ, 129).  Hubert Dreyfus make the 
compelling case that Heidegger runs together two issues here:
In many ways Heidegger's chapter on [das Man] is not only one of the most basic in the book, it is 
also the most confused. […] Heidegger takes up and extends the Diltheyan insight that 
intelligibility and truth arise only in the context of public, historical practices, but he is also deeply 
influenced by the Kierkegaardian view that “the truth is never in the crowd.”  If Heidegger had 
explicitly distinguished these opposed views and then integrated them, this could have been a rich 
and coherent chapter. […] Unfortunately, Heidegger does not distinguish this constitutive 
conformity from the evils of conformism. (143, 152)
Dreyfus distinguishes between the question of who it is that everyday Dasein understands 
itself as within the structure of being-in-the-world, which includes others, and the 
separate question of how, because of this place of others, Dasein fails to come to an 
authentic understanding of itself.  In response to the first concern, Heidegger offers a 
positive structural account of how Dasein can understand itself: only given the 
background of the world into which it has been socialized, by and along with others.  In 
7 “[O]ur own Interpretation is purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing 
critique of everyday Dasein, and from the aspirations of a 'philosophy of culture'” (SZ, 167).
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response to the second concern, Heidegger offers a negative account of how Dasein fails 
to understand itself: because that structure leads to a merely average understanding, 
Dasein will be led astray from understanding itself in its specificity, as distinguished from 
others.  Dreyfus is right that, for explanatory purposes, these issues would be clearer if 
thematized separately.  But running them together as Heidegger does is perhaps 
phenomenologically more accurate if these issues are as intertwined as he suggests.
Heidegger returns to these concerns and stresses the connection between das Man 
and averageness in his account of “falling,” which, between thrownness and projection, 
completes the threefold structure of “being-in as such.”  Recall the compound image, 
discussed in chapter six, of thrown projection.  Each of us is thrown into the world and, 
mid-flight, projects before us the arc of where we are going.  Whereas thrownness relates 
primarily to the past, and projection to the future, falling relates primarily to the present, 
between the two.  I suggested that the similarity between Heidegger's image of the arc of 
thrown projection and the image of a plot arc, which maps a character's story, is not 
coincidental.  More speculatively, we can now add falling to this analogy.  Thrown into 
the world, we project where we are going.  But we tend to become enraptured not by 
what is ahead of us, but where we are now.  Mid-flight, we become distracted by the 
fascinating scenery passing below rather than paying attention to where we are going.  At 
an extreme, this might lead us to fall from flight, rather than continuing forward.
Having thematized thrownness/disposedness and projection/understanding, 
Heidegger turns to “the Falling of Dasein.”  He motivates the transition by asking 
whether, in attending to Dasein's moods and possibilities, we haven't lost sight of the 
target: Dasein's average everydayness.  My moods and possibilities are mine, but 
normally I experience myself as merely average, as das Man-self.  Heidegger thus asks: 
“Does the 'they' have a disposedness which is specific to it, a special way of 
understanding, talking, and interpreting?” (SZ, 167).  He isolates three phenomena, forms
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of Dasein's falling, in answer to this question: idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.
Idle Talk: Discourse (Rede) is a basic facet of Dasein's way of being in the world 
(SZ, ¶34).  In its everydayness Dasein takes part in idle talk (Gerede) specifically.  Idle 
talk “constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein's understanding and interpreting” 
(SZ, 167).  Our grasp of our possibilities and the way we work them out in language are 
carried out in terms of the normal, shallow, uninterrogated ways of the world: “In 
language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken out, there is hidden a way in 
which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted” (SZ, 167).  Here again, 
Heidegger claims that this is not meant to be “disparaging” (SZ, 167).  If this seems 
implausible, consider how difficult it would be to navigate life if all conversation had the 
depth of a great philosophy seminar.  Sometimes (before having a first cup of coffee, after 
a long day), one would prefer to merely discuss the weather, or last night's game, and not 
unreasonably so.  If we paused over every word to pedantically ask what it meant and 
whether it was exactly the best choice, we wouldn't be able to fit much into our days.  But 
our ordinary language already interprets the world in certain ways, ways that are handed 
down to us and that we don't normally notice.
Heidegger suggests that we normally understand one another successfully not so 
much because ordinary language discloses the world in its fullness, but because we have 
been acculturated into the same forms of idle talk: “We have the same thing in view, 
because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is 
said” (SZ, 168).  Idiomatic language speaks to such a claim.  What matters, in using an 
idiom, is not the mutual language of two conversation partners, exactly.  Talking to 
another American who also speaks German, I can make myself understood by saying 
“Topf Kessel schwarz,” by literally translating an English idiom (“pot kettle black”) 
word-for-word into German.  A German who doesn't also speak English would never 
understand, however, because he or she hasn't grown up with this cliché.  Instead, he or 
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she will have grown up with “Ein Esel schilt den anderen Langohr,” perhaps, and “A 
donkey berates the other jackass” won't make any sense to us Americans.  Normally we 
don't interrogate such idle language, but simply use it to successfully bring about the 
intended general idea, “And because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship-of-
Being toward the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it 
does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial 
manner, but communicates rather by following the route of gossiping and passing the 
word along” (SZ, 168).8  We understand each other, but perhaps only because we exist in 
a mutual language that hovers above the world, having lost contact with it.
By this analysis, our ordinary existence in language is not a matter of our using 
language to make clear our own ideas.  Instead, it suggests that we are mere conduits in 
the circulation of idle talk, repeating received phrases and passing opinions on to others, 
who recirculate them in turn.  “What is said-in-the-talk as such, spreads in wider circles 
and takes on an authoritative character.  Things are so because one says so,” Heidegger 
writes (SZ, 168).  It is easy to recognize this pattern in the whims of popular culture: a 
certain celebrity's profile is on the rise because the chattering classes say it is, such and 
such a film wins the Oscar for best picture because it was declared the de facto front 
runner six months ago, thus saving Academy members the trouble of really watching it 
and its competitors.  Again, no group should think themselves here spared.  A thinker like 
Pierre Bourdieu suggests that these patterns guide those of distinguished cultural taste as 
well in the way that they internalize handed-over markers of class and standing.
At the extreme, discourse or talk as idle loses its apparent object, the world: “lack 
of grounds to stand on become aggravated to complete groundlessness” (SZ, 168).  An 
opinion about a film is no longer really about that film, but an opinion situated against 
8 On the appropriateness of the word “idle,” Wrathall writes: “the content articulated in Gerede—the 
meanings that are 'parsed' and lifted into salience by it—cannot be put to work” (110).
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other opinions.  One could imagine, as a bit of satire, a film critic who achieved 
prominence without ever watching any films, but only by carefully observing other 
reviews and reviewers and savvily situating his or her own reviews in the received stream 
of opinion.  Idle Talk “feeds upon superficial reading” and “it understands everything” 
(SZ, 169).9  “Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously 
making the things one's own” (SZ, 169).  Normally, it does so without any intent to 
deceive, just by the very structure of idle talk.  Thus in idle talk, discourse, which is our 
means of opening the world, instead closes it down: “The fact that something has been 
said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting 
the act of disclosing into an act of closing off” (SZ, 169).
Curiosity: The inevitability of idle talk lies in language's dispersion among the 
many members of a language community.  It comes about when these parts of the 
structure of being-in-the-world (others and discourse) become some prominent as to 
cover over other parts (things in the world).  Curiosity comes about when things 
encountered in the world get all of Dasein's attention.  Normally, the word “curious” has 
positive connotations.  A curious person wants to see and understand the world, rather 
than letting it pass by with a shrug.  In Heidegger's usage, “curiosity” takes on a 
decidedly negative sense, even if it is supposed to remain descriptive: “it concerns itself 
with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen […] but just in order to see.  It seeks 
novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty” (SZ, 172).  Dreyfus and 
Sean Kelly provide a timely example in the way that internet procrastination begets 
addiction.  It's easy to cycle endlessly through even a small number of websites, as 
regular updates will dole out new information, bit by bit.10  “The craving for something 
9 I referred to Bourdieu's Distinction in the last paragraph.  I've never read a page of it, but I've heard 
plenty of people talk about it.  I've planted this scholarly sin as a point of evidence.
10 Cultural commentary websites like Slate and Salon originally modeled themselves on print publications.  
Each night, the content of the front page would be updated, all at once.  At some point (in the early 
2000s?), most sites realized that, by spacing new content out hour by hour they could entice readers to 
revisit the site throughout the day (thus generating more pages views and advertising revenue).
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new is constant and unceasing,” they write, sounding not un-Schopenhauerian, “and the 
latest post only serves to make you desire more” (7).  “Consequently,” Heidegger himself 
writes, “it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness 
and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters.  In not tarrying, 
curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction” (SZ, 172).  In curiosity, 
Dasein distracts itself from itself, losing itself in the ever-changing world.11 
Ambiguity: “ambiguity presents Dasein's possibilities so that they will already be 
stifled in their power,” Heidegger writes, describing another form of falling (SZ, 173).  
Dasein always has multiple possibilities, and it understands itself in them.  In ambiguity, 
we might say, possibilities are taken as mere possibilities, never to be actualized.  As 
ambiguous, something is ever interpretable, infinitely debatable, and thus can never be 
fully grasped.  Again, part of the holistic structure of being-in-the-world is covered over.
In each of the forms of falling that Heidegger discusses, Dasein is ungenuine 
(different than inauthentic; SZ, 146) because one part or another of the structure of being-
in-the-world rises to such prominence that the other parts, though in fact always also 
there, are suppressed.  In idle talk, discourse loses its grip on things in the world.  In 
curiosity, the self is lost to those things in the world.  In ambiguity, Dasein's possibilities 
suppress its co-constitutive thrownness.  Taken together, idle talk, curiosity, and 
ambiguity amount to Dasein's “basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness”: 
falling (SZ, 175).  Again, Heidegger claims that Dasein's “fallenness” is not meant as a 
normative assessment.  Rather, it “is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the 
most part in the 'world' of its concern” (SZ, 175).12  Normally, Dasein is not itself: “Not-
11 Heidegger makes a nice point about the interrelationship between idle talk and curiosity as well: “Idle 
talk controls even the ways in which one may be curious.  It says what one 'must' have read or seen” 
(SZ, 173).  All subcultures have their standard ports of gossip.  One keeps up with them in no small part 
to avoid someone saying that they “can't believe you haven't heard,” or so that (and this is even pettier) 
one can have opportunities to level that accusation oneself.
12 Macquarrie and Robinson have “alongside” rather than “in” for “bei,” but “alongside” doesn't capture 
the way that Dasein disappears into the world, into its concerns.
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Being-its-self functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its essential 
concern, is absorbed in a world” (SZ, 176).  It is not merely the case that, normally, I am 
not myself.  Rather, I am positively “not-myself”; I have fallen into das Man-self.  This 
state of fallenness is self-perpetuating, Heidegger suggests, making it all the harder to 
break out of.  Part of being absolutely up to date on the new is being constantly told that 
being up to date on the new is the right way to be.  Part of doing what one does is 
acquiring an ever more refined (or quibbling) sense of what one should do.  “The 
supposition of the 'they' that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine 'life', brings 
Dasein a tranquility, for which everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open” 
(SZ, 177).  The very “hustle” of everyday life is “tranquilizing,” that is, self-sustaining, in 
that it quiets the worry that one should, perhaps, be living one's life differently (SZ, 177).  
One ends up “alienated” from oneself without normally knowing it (SZ, 178).
Heidegger ends his discussion of falling with a brief disparaging comment on 
“characterologies.”  In the forms of falling discussed above, Dasein loses itself by 
becoming absorbed into the world, or in the ways of the world (which themselves might 
be severed from the world).  Heidegger suggests that another form of falling is possible, a 
paradigmatically modern one.  Dasein loses itself by becoming absorbed in itself:
this alienation drives it into a kind of Being which borders on the most exaggerated 'self-
dissection', tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that the very 'characterologies' 
and 'typologies' which it has brought about are themselves already becoming something that 
cannot be surveyed at a glance. […] The alienation of falling—at once tempting and tranquilizing
—leads by its own movement, to Dasein's getting entangled in itself. (SZ, 178)13
That is to say that introspection, the search for oneself, is now an entire industry unto 
itself.  One can lose oneself in the world, but in seeking oneself, one can not only fail, but
lose oneself anew in the now established and elaborate tools of the search.  Dasein can 
lose itself in an attempt at self-understanding when it attempts to find fit between its 
actions and received, pre-interpreted taxonomies of character.  This last form of falling 
13 Commentators (e.g., Dreyfus, 193) tend to find a dismissal of Jungian archetypes here, further 
distinguishing Heidegger from the notion of authenticity in Hesse's Demian (see chapter 6).
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will carry us forward into Sartre's notion of bad faith.
II. Bad Faith: The Rule of Scripts
In his famous analysis of bad faith in Being and Nothingness, Sartre treats many 
of the same phenomena that Heidegger does under the names of “das Man” and “falling.”  
Sartre's analysis brings us closer to a particularly narrative interpretation of them.  
Having introduced the notion that our human way of being is defined by negativity, Sartre 
considers negation in its self-reflected form: “The human being is not only the being by 
whom négetités14 are disclosed in the world; he is also the one who can take negative 
attitudes with respect to himself” (47).  Rocks, plants, and animals merely—positively—
are, whereas we can take a negative attitude toward things, and indeed toward ourselves.  
He quickly cites a few examples.  To prohibit something “is to “den[y] a future 
transcendence.”  “Caretakers, overseers, gaolers” are, in their social roles, defined by “the 
Not” of such prohibitions.  “The man of resentment” defines himself against others, as 
not like them.  And “In irony a man annihilates what he posits within one and the same 
act” (47).  Because such examples are “too diverse,” Sartre limits his analysis of our self-
directed negativity to one revealing form: bad faith.
Bad faith, we might provisionally begin, is a form of self-deception.  It is different 
than mere lying, however.  When someone intends to deceive, that intention “is played, 
imitated, it is the intention of the character which he plays in the eyes of his questioner, 
but this character, precisely because he does not exist, is a transcendent” (48).  The 
performed character—what the liar projects as real—is merely a performance and doesn't 
exist.  Sartre is interested in bad faith in order to get at what is distinctive about our 
existence, so mere lying isn't revealing.  “What changes everything is the fact that in bad 
14 “Sartre's word for types of human activity which while not obviously involving a negative judgement 
nevertheless contain negativity as an integral part of their structure; e.g., experiences involving absence, 
change, interrogation, destruction” (from Barnes's glossary, 632).
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faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth,” he writes (49).  To deceive myself, mere 
performance won't suffice, since I would know the performed character doesn't exist, and 
thus fail to deceive myself.  Bad faith turns on the distinctively double nature of human 
being: “The basic concept which is thus engendered, utilizes the double property of the 
human being, who is at once a facticity and a transcendence” (56).  In Sartre's first 
example we quickly see the two forms of self deception which are made possible.  Out on 
a date, a man says to a woman such things as “I find you so attractive!”  Sartre writes that 
“she disarms this phrase of its sexual background; she attaches to the conversation and to 
the behavior of the speaker, the immediate meanings, which she imagines as objective 
qualities” (55).  She thus denies the transcendent side of her, and his, double nature: “she 
has disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing them to being only what they are; 
that is, to exactly in the mode of the in-itself” (56).  The man's phrases are part of an 
ongoing script, “the first approach,” as Sartre calls it, but she denies the transcendent 
“temporal development which his conduct presents” (55).  She denies it by supposing that 
he is merely, and innocently, describing his attraction to her, as if such attraction, and its 
articulation, had no further ramifications.
Now, in Sartre's example, the man takes things a step further: “But suppose he 
takes her hand” (55).  This would seem to force the issue “by calling for an immediate 
decision” (55).  By sliding into the other form of bad faith, however, the woman “can 
postpone the moment of decision” (55).  The switch is immediate: “we may slide at any 
moment from naturalistic present to transcendence and vice versa” (57).  “We know what 
happens next,” Sartre writes.  She doesn't move her hand, “but she does not notice that 
she is leaving it” (55-56).  In doing so, she again denies her, and his, double nature, only 
now in the other way.  “[S]he is at this moment all intellect,” Sartre writes (56).  She 
ignores the fact of his hand and posits him and herself as wholly transcendent: “She 
realizes herself as not being her own body” (56).
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“We know what happens next”: this phrase suggests, it seems to me, that the real 
weight of Sartre's analysis is not in his dual ontology of the human being as facticity and 
transcendence, but rather in the familiar script of the situation he presents—so familiar 
that its (en)actors can follow it without thinking, and without necessarily realizing what it 
means or entails.  The dual concept of “transcendence-facticity” is but one way to analyze 
bad faith; Sartre offers another in terms of “being-for-itself/being-for-others”: “upon any 
one of my conducts it is always possible to converge two looks, mine and that of the 
Other” (57).  His next example brings out the scripted form of bad faith:
Let us consider this waiter in the café.  His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a 
little too rapid.  He comes toward the patrons with a step a little too quick.  He bends forward a 
little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the 
customer.  Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some 
kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tight-ropewalker by putting it 
in a perpetually unstable, perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually reestablishes by a 
light movement of the arm and hand.  All his behavior seems to us a game.  He applies himself to 
chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and 
even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of 
things.  He is playing, he is amusing himself.  But what is he playing?  We need not watch long 
before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.  There is nothing there to 
surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation.  [...T]he waiter in the café plays 
with his condition in order to realize it. (59)
The waiter is playing a role, that of the waiter.  He moves quickly not because he has 
many duties to attend to, and he chooses to do so, but because that is what one does when 
one is a waiter.  He gestures and speaks as he does not because these are his gestures and 
voice, but because they display his waiter-ness.  Sartre generalizes, writing that the same 
kind of performance applies to our treatment and expectation of all tradespeople:
This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is 
wholly one of ceremony.  The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony; there is 
the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavor to persuade their 
clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor.  A grocer who dreams is 
offensive to the buyer, because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer.  Society demands that he limit 
himself to his function as a grocer, just as the soldier at attention makes himself into a soldier-
thing with a direct regard which does not see at all, which is no longer meant to see, since it is the 
rule and not the interest of the moment which determines the point he must fix his eyes on (the 
sight "fixed at ten paces").  There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what he is, as 
if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly 
elude his condition. (59)
Sartre should really add: there is a dance of the philosopher, the professor, the cafe-
frequenting novelist.  As with Heidegger's analysis, there is no reason to think that 
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anyone is spared by these admonishments.  Any sort of role one might take up is defined 
by certain ways of acting.  Remember that, according to Heidegger's analysis of 
projection and the way that we exist toward something, for the sake of something, our 
behavior is intelligible only because it occurs within a structure articulated according to 
certain ways of being.  Hammering makes sense in reference to the practice of erecting 
structures, which makes sense in reference to the role of carpentry.  A certain Socratic 
exchange between two people makes sense in reference to their roles as teacher and 
student.  If one's understanding terminates in such roles, rather than connecting to the  
“for-the-sake-of-which” of one's very being, then one is inauthentic.  Roles are a matter 
of mere social status, not something of one's own.15  That is, something is missing if one 
does something for the sake of being a carpenter or a teacher, but has no understanding of 
why one is a carpenter or a teacher.  Roles, taken up merely as roles, are taken up in bad 
faith.  The waiter tries to make it such that he is a waiter, just as the soldier transforms 
himself into a “soldier-thing.”  He is not acting, but deceiving himself: “in bad faith it is 
from myself that I am hiding the truth” (49).  But human beings are not, because they are 
not fixed: “the waiter in the café cannot be immediately a café waiter in the sense that this 
inkwell is an inkwell, or the glass is a glass” (59).  Roles like “waiter” and “teacher” don't 
exist, as objects do, according to Sartre, but are instead transcendent patterns of meaning.  
And even if we freely take them up, they can in turn take us over:
It is by no means that he cannot form reflective judgments or concepts concerning his condition. 
He knows well what it "means:" the obligation of getting up at five o'clock, of sweeping the floor 
of the shop before the restaurant opens, of starting the coffee pot going, etc.  He knows the rights 
which it allows: the right to the tips, the right to belong to a union, etc.  But all these concepts, all 
these judgments refer to the transcendent.  It is a matter of abstract possibilities, of rights and 
duties conferred on a "person possessing rights."  And it is precisely this person who I have to be 
(if I am the waiter in question) and who I am not.  It is not that I do not wish to be this person or 
that I want this person to be different.  But rather there is no common measure between his being 
and mine.  It is a "representation" for others and for myself, which means that I can be he only in 
representation.  But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the 
object from the subject, separated by nothing, but this nothing isolates me from him.  I cannot be 
he, I can only play at being him; that is, imagine to myself that I am he.  And thereby I affect him 
with nothingness.  In vain do I fulfill the functions of a café waiter.  I can be he only in the 
!" #$$%&'())*$+,%-./
326
neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the typical gestures of my state 
and by aiming at myself as an imaginary café waiter through those gestures taken as an 
"analogue."  What I attempt to realize is a being-in-itself of the café waiter, as if it were not just in 
my power to confer their value and their urgency upon my duties and the rights of my position, as 
if it were not my free choice to get up each morning at five o'clock or to remain in bed, even 
though it meant getting fired.  As if from the very fact that I sustain this role in existence I did not 
transcend it on every side, as if I did not constitute myself as one beyond my condition.  Yet there 
is no doubt that I am in a sense a café waiter—otherwise could I not just as well call myself a 
diplomat or a reporter?  But if I am one, this cannot be in the mode of being in-itself.  I am a 
waiter in the mode of being what I am not. (59-60)
In bad faith we short circuit freedom and responsibility, deceiving ourselves into thinking 
we are one role or another.  We do what one does, according to familiar scripts.
Sartre's entire analysis is motivated by the question “What must be the being of 
man if he is capable of bad faith?” (55).  His answer is that a person never corresponds to 
what he or she is.  “The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in 
its most immediate being […] must be what it is not and not be what it is” (67).  And 
also: “consciousness is not what it is” (62)  As in Heidegger, the aim of this analysis is 
not, at least primarily, to criticize the inauthenticity of our normal existence, not to 
suggest that we should stop acting in bad faith, or stop falling into the world, or stop 
being dispersed into the self of das Man, opting instead to draw sincerely on some kind 
of inner, authentic selves.  Bad faith is “a permanent risk” (70).  Sincerity, Sartre argues, 
is impossible, and the attempt to be sincere is another form of bad faith, since in it one 
attempts to be who one is, when one is and is not: “Under the conditions what can be the 
significance of sincerity except as a task impossible to achieve” (62).  The genuine 
response to the structure of bad faith is instead to understand that we are and are not, that 
we are not fixed, that we exist in possibilities.
III. Living in Received Possibilities
Bovaryism becomes possible....
Mikhail Bakhtin, “Epic and Novel” (32)
In his comparison of the literary forms of the epic and the novel, the Russian 
literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin describes the way in which the novel is closer to us.  
327
Epics, he argues, are in their very form past, completed, part of the history of a people.  
We've seen that theorists routinely claim the pastness of narrative generally, but Bakhtin 
argues that in the novel, the action is present to us: “We can experience these adventures 
and identify with these heroes” (32).  One can't relate to, or aspire to be, Achilles or 
Odysseus, but one can relate to and aspire to be the characters of a novel.  This leads to a 
distinctive problem: “we ourselves may actually enter the novel (whereas we could never 
enter an epic or other distanced genre).  It follows that we might substitute for our own 
life an obsessive reading of novels, or dreams based on novelistic models” (32).  
“Bovaryism becomes possible,” Bakhtin writes in a wonderful turn of phrase, “the real-
life appearance of fashionable heroes taken from novels—disillusioned, demonic, and so 
forth” (32-33).  To try to live as Achilles or Odysseus is ridiculous.  To live as the heroine 
of a romance (as Emma Bovary does) is altogether possible.  (Perhaps to live as a knight 
errant, as Don Quixote tries to do, is right on the line, both possible and ridiculous.)  
Recall here as well Charles Taylor's description, which I recounted and extended in 
chapter one, of the increasing everydayness of the novel.  We are constantly provided 
with more everyday, and thus more enactable, models of character in the fictions we read 
and watch.  This enables ever new roles for bad faith, roles that haven't even necessarily 
be sanctioned by a culture through time (as, for example, the roles of “waiter” and 
“teacher” have).16  Now, a role spun out of one artist's imagination can become a model 
for our behavior: copycats of Goethe's Werther and A Clockwork Orange's Alex (due 
more to Stanley Kubrick's film adaptation than Anthony Burgess's original novel) were 
disillusioned and demonic indeed.
It might be thought that narrative self-understanding amounts to Bovaryism, of 
seeing one's life as organized along the lines of a traditional narrative, of one genre or 
another.  Or, turning on the master metaphor of person-as-character rather than life-as-
16 See too MacIntyre's discussion of tradition (AV, 220ff).
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story, it might seem that self-understanding is distinctively narrative only if one views 
oneself as akin to a particular character, or, at the very least, as possessing a coherent and 
stable “character”—behavioral dispositions, moral inclinations, beliefs, desires, life plans
—in the same way that the protagonists of nineteenth-century novels are said to.  As we 
saw in chapter four, both claims are sometimes suggested by Marya Schechtman, for 
example, even if her account proves to be more subtle on close inspection.
More defensibly, it might be thought that narrativity does not rely on a person 
seeing his or her life as organized like a story, or seeing his or her (moral) character as 
(fictional) character-like, but only their being so, Strawson's protests aside (“objective 
narrativity requires subjective narrativity”; see chapter two).  Someone's life might 
resemble a story, or he might resemble a character, whether he realizes it or not.  Even 
such weaker cases might result in Bovaryism, however.  Indeed, unwitting Bovaryism 
appears all the worse since it isn't chosen—for whatever reasons, perhaps problematic—
but merely fallen into.  Someone's life become a tragedy not because he purposefully 
shapes it into one (maybe for the purposes of political or religious martyrdom), but 
because he adheres to certain patterns of behavior without realizing that he needn't, that 
other possibilities are available.
A currently commonplace way of using the word “narrative” falls prey to these 
worries.  “There is an emerging narrative that the Governor of New Jersey is a bully.”  
What do political pundits mean when they say something like this?  They mean that the 
Governor's true character has been revealed, that we know where this story is going.  
Such a use of the word “narrative” is doubly misleading.  First, to say someone is a bully 
is not, really, to tell a story.  It is to offer a characterization, most likely an extremely 
reductive one.  Whether that characterization is accurate or not depends on whether it is 
abstracted from repeated patterns of behavior in time—narratives.  Articulated in the 
shorthand, as above, such work is usually evaded.  We will, all too likely, ask instead 
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whether he looks like a bully, or is reported by those close to him as being one, rather 
than investigating his actual behavior.  Second, “There is an emerging narrative that the 
Governor of New Jersey is a bully,” articulated as it is in the passive voice, as such 
descriptions often are, evades both the question of who is making this charge and the 
question of whether it is true.  “Narratives” of this sort are excellent examples of “idle 
talk” in Heidegger's sense, gossip floating free from reference, and they tend to become 
self-fulfilling.  Media discussions, once initiated, feed on themselves, reporting the report 
that someone is said to be a bully.
Another example: a successful college football player, projected to be drafted into 
the National Football League in a few months time, announces publicly that he is gay.  
Lazy journalists churn out stories, quoting always and only anonymous sources—scouts, 
coaches, general managers—who say that his draft stock will plummet, “due to concerns 
about how he would affect the chemistry of the locker room.”  Critics take the journalists 
to task, rightfully pointing out that they, no less than their anonymous sources, are 
recycling a hackneyed plot.  Again, it is less a plot than a talking point: that though 
America, and even the NFL's executives and front offices, might be ready for an openly 
gay football player, its players—and the mythical locker room—are not.  Thereby these 
journalists and their anonymous sources displace their own anxieties and prejudices on 
others.  The real, ongoing narrative of events—in which it is yet to be seen how 
teammates react—is ignored.  Worse still, cover is now granted to players to be 
unwelcoming, because such behavior was predicted.
Critics of narrativity often have these kind of examples in mind, it seems to me, 
when they reject the use of narrative in understanding real life.  To the extent that these 
examples are narrative in form, the problem with them is not that they involve narrative 
as such, but that they are so simplistic and reductive.  The grounding for the self's 
narrativity that I have offered avoids the conceptual criticism that narrative is necessarily 
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simplifying and reductive, since my characterization of narrative includes all 
representations of temporal human events, not just ones the conform, or are forced to 
conform, to familiar plots.  There is a related practical problem, however, and we have to 
remain ever vigilant in order to avoid it.  Because human events have narrative structure, 
the temptation arises to lazily reduce them to the most simple, familiar stories, rather than 
paying attention to the details.  When we criticize someone for being caught up in a story, 
we are criticizing the tendency to see only a “good” story—where “good” means 
compelling, memorable, or even merely typical—rather than seeing what is really 
occurring.  The more attention we pay to narrative and its conventions, the easier it is to 
diagnose this tendency, and the easier it is to see that there are alternative and more 
nuanced—yet still narrative—ways of organizing events in time.  I have argued that it is 
“experimental” forms of narrative—stream of consciousness narratives (paradigmatically 
associated with modernism) and forking path ones (paradigmatically associated with 
post-modernism) that best capture the form of our self-experience.  Against the 
background of Heidegger's accounts of das Man and falling, and Sartre's of bad faith, we 
can see that narrativity in its caricatured form relies on perverting and domesticating the 
fundamental layer of the self's narrativity.  We interpret ourselves amidst a multiplicity of 
possibilities; only by domesticating that structure is life reduced to one unified narrative 
arc, and one so familiar that it doesn't appear to require interpretation.  I'll proceed by 
considering some of the ways in which our always multiple possibilities, and the way we 
read them in time, can be domesticated.17  I first examine the way we domesticate our 
futures, then our pasts in traditional biography, and finally our presents. 
The Future: “I can't.  I wish I could, but I can't.”  Almost always this means “I 
won't” or “I don't want to” or “I choose not to, I'm not going to.”  “It's hopeless.”  Almost
17 Much more could be said about this word “domesticate,” were my account expanded to reckon with 
authenticity.  We are “at home” in das Man-self and falling.  In angst we are unheimlich, “not at home.” 
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always, this really means “The situation is bad.”  “It's decided.  It's a foregone 
conclusion.”  Almost always, this means merely that the speaker has tired of hearing 
alternative proposals.  Such idioms are commonplace ways in which we construe the 
future as determined, even though it very rarely is.  Almost always, the future consists of 
still open, yet-to-be-determined possibilities, but it is easier to suppress them.
If Heidegger's notion of projection is right, then we always have an 
understanding, or a misunderstanding, of our possibilities.  Our normal condition is one 
of orientation, not confusion, and we are oriented according to some sense of where we 
are going, whether or not this sense rises to full awareness.  As we move through time, 
this structure moves with us.  Some possibilities disappear, others we foreclose, while, 
simultaneously, new possibilities arise.  Our orientation is constantly renewed according 
to our evolving understanding of possibilities.  The structure remains the same, even as 
different specific possibilities fill it.  Narrative, according to the account I've offered, 
grounded in the primacy of reading rather than, retrospectively, having read, is an open 
structure, open to the future and open to possibilities.  A genuine narrative sense of self-
understanding will likewise be open to multiple possibilities.  Ways of using the term 
“narrative” which suggest that the future is determined are not just derivative of this basic 
structure, but, at an extreme, pervert it into contradicting these most basic claims.
Heidegger's notion of das Man offers an account of one way in which we ignore, 
or suppress, possibilities.  Doing what one does, one suppresses that which one doesn't 
do, but in fact could.  What one doesn't do is possible, but if our everyday self is das 
Man-self, then we don't see these further possibilities.  They are leveled.  Such leveling 
can go so far as to transform what is in fact quite complicated terrain—I could go up, I 
could go down, I could take this path, I could take that one, according to the metaphor—
into a featureless plain, where there is no differentiation, and only one thing for one to do.  
When I merely act as one does, possibilities are foreclosed by being falsely construed as 
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impossibilities.  By doing what one does as das Man, new possibilities don't appear to 
open up (even though they do) because my further actions are construed as already 
scripted for me.
Sartre's notion of bad faith offers a similar account, but attends more closely to the 
way in which such leveling can be sorted into types and patterns.  By taking up the role 
of the waiter, a person levels his or her possibilities to that which a waiter conventionally 
does.  In fact, it is possible for someone who takes orders, serves food, and so forth to act 
in other ways, but these possibilities are suppressed, closed down, when one identifies 
oneself as being “a waiter,” or “just doing my job.”  It could be that what a waiter 
conventionally does is not the best way to achieve even the specific aims of that role.  
Conventionally, a waiter is impersonal (if otherwise, the waiter is not “wholly” a waiter, 
doesn't “limit himself to his function,” as Sartre puts it), or at most, in restaurants that 
brand themselves according to a certain casualness, the waiter performs a fake 
personality.  Yet if the role of the waiter is defined by certain ends—serving food, making 
diners comfortable—then there are situations where those ends would be better served by 
transgressing convention.  In a near empty restaurant, the presence of a lone regular calls 
for a certain dropping of the mask of “waiter,” even within the ends of being one.
Both Heidegger's and Sartre's analyses suggest the desirability of coming to 
understand the narrative contours of one's situation, even while one is in it.  As das Man-
self, or living in bad faith, it is not the case that other options are unavailable.  Rather, 
one has been blinded to them.  Neither is it the case as das Man-self, or living in bad 
faith, that one isn't oriented by one's interpretative understanding of possibilities.  Rather, 
one has accepted one way of reading the situation without reflection.  All too easily, it can
appear that in doing so one is simply grasping the facts, which don't require 
interpretation.  By making clear that one is interpreting, one can see how one is doing so, 
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and that other options have been suppressed.18  Inasmuch as bad faith is a problem, it is a 
problem not because roles are taken up, but because they are taken up unwittingly.  
Traditions arise, at least in part, for good reasons.  Certain situations regularly occur, and 
certain patterns of behavior have been crafted and codified to respond to them.  Sartre's 
critique of bad faith can sometimes make it sound as if the proper way to comport oneself 
is an impossibly heightened sense of choice.  That, at every moment, one should ask 
whether this is really what one should do, and then choose, in one's freedom, to do.  But 
vaguely monitoring one's situation and whether it has deviated from its normal contours, 
thus calling for a heightening of one's awareness, seems to answer the dangers of bad 
faith.  Given the proliferation of stories and characters, it is hard to imagine patterns of 
behavior that haven't been enacted before, that aren't identifiable, that aren't namable.
The Past: Sartre writes that “in his fall into the past, the being of man is 
constituted as a being-in-itself” (65).  Thus, he suggests, understanding oneself as being 
someone—fixed and finished—is to act in bad faith, but understanding oneself as having 
been someone is unproblematic, as the past is fixed and finished.  Similarly, we saw Saul 
Morson describe Tolstoy's literary style by way of the same claim: “The lives of Tolstoy's 
heros and heroines seem (as our own do) but one marvelous actualization out of an 
immense number of possibilities” (160).  This thought is misleading, I would suggest, 
and leads to the form of understanding our pasts which is conventionalized in biography.  
Biographies are organized by the conceit that a person's past makes her who she is, 
explains who she is.  Biographies are of interest only if someone has accomplished, has 
become, something remarkable, and what she has become is to be understood by 
understanding how she got there.  Conceiving of a person's past as a fixed line leading to 
18 Bernard Williams: “Positivism—in the sense, roughly speaking, of thinking that not much more is 
needed than to establish the concrete facts and set them down—cannot be seen as a minimalist or 
default position.  Any story is a story, and positivism […] implies the double falsehood that no 
interpretation is needed, and that it is not needed because the story which the positivist writer tells, such 
as it is, is obvious.  The story he or she tells is usually a bad one, and its being obvious only means that 
it is familiar” (2002, 12).
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her present is yet another way of domesticating the place of possibilities.  Peter Goldie 
invokes such a view when he writes that “Factual autobiographical narratives presuppose 
what John Campbell has called 'the transparent unity of the self in memory,'” grounded in 
“'the conception of the self as spatio-temporally continuous'” (MI, 123).  Goldie goes on: 
“This then excludes the possibility of a branching autobiographical past with two or more 
narrative threads not temporally related to each other” (MI, 124).  It could, however, be 
that a person became who she is exactly because of unrealized possibilities in her past.  
These unrealized possibilities run parallel to those actualized (they are thus not before or 
after, not “temporally related”), yet still exerting influence.  Someone becomes a literary 
critic because of the proximity of that career to that which she's always actually aspired, 
of writing novels, and the constant hope that, remaining in proximity to this dream, it 
might one day be revived.  Reconstructing a genuine biographical understanding of this 
person's past will require us to track the way projected, yet unrealized, possibilities 
structured her existence.  Just as any “realistic” literature will push toward side-
shadowing, biography that captures that a person was more than one actuality will as 
well.  But more radical forms, which, like forking path narratives, push beyond 
psychological depth to more fully capture the constitutive place of unrealized 
possibilities, would be an even more accurate way of representing our biographies.
The Present: I can now restate the overall thesis, which began as a guiding 
hypothesis, of this dissertation.  Our pre-thematic self-understanding is narrative in form 
because whenever my self is revealed to me, it is revealed not as something simply 
present, but as part of inextricably temporal human events (narratives, by my baseline 
characterization of the term), stretching back into the past and forward into the future.  In 
Heidegger's language: “The question of the 'who' of Dasein has been answered with the 
expression 'Self'.  Dasein's Selfhood has been defined formally as a way of existing, and 
therefore not as an entity present-at-hand” (SZ, 267).  “The self” is not a thing, but rather 
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a shorthand name for a pattern and process of reflexive interpretation.  Taken as a thing, it 
is an abstraction posited as a result of that interpretive process.  The self is not an object 
already there upon which we level our interpretive gaze.  This claim is consistent with the 
self not always being revealed to us.  It also stops far short of claiming that all of our 
experience is narrative in form.  Mine is a limited claim, made about the self, when the 
self is disclosed.  This analysis is grounded in a notion of what the self is: different from 
what a human being is, different from what a subject is, different from what a legal 
person is.  The self is the centerpiece of inextricably temporal human events.
That there is no purely present self is consistent with there being something that at 
least feels like purely present experience.  Heidegger's analysis of falling provides a 
supplementary rebuttal to Strawson's attack on the universality of narrativity.  I suggested 
in chapter two that, in order to behave in the way that people do, we must have temporal 
commitments.  Strawson's episodic—a human being who doesn't experience his self as 
persisting for more than the transitory present—wouldn't appear to us as a person.  But 
that isn't to deny that, for stretches of time, we can lose sight of these temporal 
commitments.  The experiences of losing oneself in a book, or athletic activity, or 
creative endeavors are familiar ones.  It seems to me that we should take the phrase 
“losing oneself” literally here, if we gloss it right.  I myself don't disappear, since as a 
mere reflexive, “myself” points back to me without specifying any sense of “me,” and I 
as a human being persist even in the absence of self-awareness, self-understanding, and 
self-interpretation.  When my attention is fully caught up in what I am doing, I, as a self, 
am not there, however.  I have, in Heidegger's language, fallen fully into the world, 
become enraptured and fascinated by what I am doing.  Here we can see again why 
“falling” isn't necessarily a derogatory term.  But it is possible only because of the full 
structure of being-in-the-world, even if it suppresses, momentarily, part of it.
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IV. Bracketing Authenticity
What is so haunting about [Heidegger's thinking on angst and authenticity] is how entirely he 
turned his back on the most promising directions his own work had initially opened up.  Being and 
Time contains a critique of the objectivization (Vergegenständlichung) of our ordinary lived 
experience that is unparalleled in any other philosopher of the twentieth century.  Heidegger shows 
how the rejection of the everyday world and the insistence on a transcendental foundation for one's 
beliefs “de-experiences” experience and “de-worlds” the world as we actually encounter it.  In the 
hands of someone less enthralled by the revelatory power of the extreme, these arguments might 
have led to a philosophically rich comprehension of the value of the prosaic.
Michael Bernstein, Five Portraits (2000, 70)
“Has our investigation up to this point ever brought Dasein into view as a 
whole?” (SZ, 230).  Heidegger ends the first division of Being and Time with this 
question, which motivates the move to the second division and its discussions of being-
towards-death, authenticity, temporality, and historicality.  Throughout division one, this 
word, “whole” (“ganz,” “Ganze”), has been used in reference to the structure of being-in-
the-world: “Being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordially and constantly whole” 
(SZ, 180).  That is, Dasein is always thrown and projecting, a self and in the world and 
with others.  More precisely, “Dasein's 'average everydayness' can be defined as 'Being-
in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world' and in 
its Being-with Others'” (SZ, 181).  I quoted this definition in turning from my treatment 
of recent Anglo-American work on narrativity to my interpretation of Heidegger.  My 
claim has been that this structure, which he names “care”—what it is, according to 
Heidegger, to be an individual human person—can be more helpfully understood as 
articulating the self's underlying narrativity.  In saying that the being-in-the-world of 
Dasein is always whole, Heidegger is saying that all of these parts always obtain.  As 
we've just seen, a person can suppress one part or another of this structure, thereby failing 
to achieve genuine understanding.  One can become enraptured by the world, losing 
oneself in the objects of one's attention and activity, thus suppressing the place of the self.  
Or one can turn inward in excessive self-examination, thus suppressing the place of the 
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world.  In neither case is the self, or the world, really lost.  Both of these ungenuine ways 
of being (as well as any other) are possible only against the background of being-in-the-
world as a whole, even when part of that whole is ignored.  In asking whether we have 
yet gotten Dasein as a whole into view, Heidegger is using the word “whole” in a new 
sense.  In its old sense—the whole of Dasein as the whole of being-in-the-world—the 
answer to this question would be affirmative.  Getting Dasein as a whole into view is just 
what Heidegger has done (or at least tried to do) in introducing the name “care.”  Yet the 
second division of Being and Time is necessary because Dasein's wholeness—in a new 
sense—has remained elusive.  Why, and in what sense?
Heidegger reasserts that his goal is “an answer to the question about the meaning 
of Being in general” (SZ, 231).  The (partial) philosophical anthropology of division one 
is but a means to an end.  I won't follow Heidegger farther in large part because my own 
target is less grand: the being of a person rather than being in general.  But even within 
the frame of Heidegger's larger project, his next argumentative move is very quick, and 
dissatisfying.  “If, however, the ontological Interpretation is to be a primordial one,” and 
therefore keep us on the path to the meaning of being in general, he writes, then “it also 
requires explicit assurance that the whole of the entity which has been taken as a theme 
has been brought in the fore-having” (SZ, 232).  “Whole” means something new here: 
quite suddenly, authenticity, which has so far been mentioned only in passing, comes to 
prominence.  “In starting from average everydayness, our Interpretation has heretofore 
been confined to the analysis of such existing as is either undifferentiated or inauthentic,” 
Heidegger writes (SZ, 232).  But why should authenticity and wholeness necessarily have 
anything to do with each other?  And if an authentic understanding of Dasein is necessary 
to remain on the path to the meaning of being in general (and if that is the target), then 
what was the point of Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein in its everydayness?  At the 
beginning of Being and Time, it was possible to formulate only a provisional 
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understanding of Dasein—as inauthentic and less than whole—because that is how we 
familiarly encounter ourselves.  This provisional understanding (a “fore-having”) enabled 
the explicit thematization of everyday Dasein.  With that thematization complete, we can 
now formulate a provisional understanding of authentic Dasein, which will guide our 
explicit thematization of it.  The path to the meaning of being is long indeed.
Whereas the wholeness of Dasein until now was structural, it now becomes 
temporal: Heidegger glosses “the whole of Dasein” as “this entity from its 'beginning' to 
its 'end'” (SZ, 233).  Count no man happy until he is dead, Solon famously enjoins.  By 
Heidegger's initial analysis, no one can grasp his or her life as this kind of whole: “if its 
essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being, then, as long as Dasein exists, it 
must in each case, as such a potentiality, not yet be something” (SZ, 233).  “Everydayness 
is precisely that Being which is 'between' birth and death,” but, in our everydayness, we 
can't bring these margins, in full, into our understanding (SZ, 233).  These points are 
well-taken, but inadequate to motivate the turn to division two, which seems less a 
refining than a changing of the topic.  If, so far, the question has been (approximately) 
how Dasein understands itself, or even how it lives, the question now seems to be how it 
understands its life.  If it has been how Dasein does understand itself, it now seems closer 
to how it should.
It is tempting to see the move from the first to the second division of Being and 
Time, as well as the move from the structural whole of being-in-the-world to the temporal 
whole of a life from birth to death, as a move from a synchronic to a diachronic analysis 
of Dasein.  This isn't quite correct, but perhaps noting why it isn't is itself illuminating.  
The analysis of everyday Dasein as being-in-the-world isn't synchronic because that 
structure can't be understood as a mere snapshot in time.  Rather, being-in-the-world, 
according to Heidegger's analysis, is revealed as “ecstatic,” as reaching beyond itself into 
the past and future.  My situation in the present includes, structurally, being thrown from 
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somewhere (the past) and projecting my possibilities somewhere else (the future).  So 
Heidegger's initial analysis is already diachronic.
Division two's analysis is, well, more diachronic, however.  A person can't grasp 
her life as a whole because it will be finished only upon her death, when she is no longer 
there to understand it.  But by existing in anticipation of the future and death, Dasein can 
at least provisionally grasp its life as a whole.  Looking in the other direction, Dasein can, 
through “repetition,” take over and take responsibility for its past, fitting it together with 
where it is now and projects to be going.  I don't have space here to even begin to grapple 
with these further Heideggerian analyses.  They too have much to do with contemporary 
discussions of narrativity and the self, however.  Neither do I want to suggest that they 
are necessarily wrongheaded.  But I don't think that they are fully continuous with or 
entailed by Heidegger's earlier analysis.  They are one way, if the description of being-in-
the-world is correct, that we might think we should respond.  But they are only one way.  
Rather than rejecting them, I wish only to bracket them, leaving open the possibility that 
other, more compelling normative ideals might be built on the foundation of Dasein's 
everydayness.  But I do think that Dasein's everyday narrative situatedness—merely 
described, without normative content—is a promising foundation for further work on 
narrativity and the self.  Whether one can unify one's whole life—whether one should, 
whether doing so would rely on traditional narrative models: I've deferred such questions 
in the hopes of showing that, even before we get to them, our self-understanding can be 
shown to be fundamentally narrative in form.
One last note, along these lines.  Some way into the second division, Heidegger 
writes: “Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a 
factical ideal of Dasein, underlying our ontological Interpretation of Dasein's existence?  
There is so indeed” (SZ, 310).  Here Heidegger admits that, seemingly in tension with his 
earlier protests (that describing Dasein as falling isn't meant as disparaging, for example), 
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that a particular ideal has implicitly guided his analysis.19  That, though his analysis has 
supposedly been descriptive, it was possible only given an implicit conception of how a 
person should exist: namely, as authentic, whatever that finally might mean.  One might 
worry that, with this admission, the larger architecture of Being and Time is destabilized.  
What if one disagrees with Heidegger over what is the best “definite ontical way of 
taking authentic existence”?  What if one thinks that staring into the abyss of one's 
anxiety is not authentic at all?
This late admission of Heidegger's doesn't worry me.  In fact, it seems to me that 
the parts of the care-structure that I have made my focus—thrown projection, 
understanding and interpretation—don't rely on any ideal of authenticity.20  Even 
Heidegger's analyses of das Man-self and falling, supplemented by the kinds of everyday 
examples I've provided here, can be treated as descriptive rather than prescriptive.  This is 
perhaps less true of other parts of Heidegger's analysis—his treatment of angst, for 
example.  But those parts are less necessary to understanding Dasein in its everydayness, 
and thus less necessary to my project than they are to Heidegger's larger one of 
understanding the meaning of being in general.  As Michael Bernstein suggests, 
Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in its everydayness offers a foundation for a prosaics of 
everyday human life.  I've lingered there, rather than following Heidegger, “enthralled by 
the revelatory power of the extreme,” farther (Bernstein 2000, 70).
19 If the guiding ontical ideal is not a moral ideal, then he can still consistently (though subtly) maintain 
that his criticisms of falling and das Man aren't moralizing ones, so while there seems to be tension 
here, there is no contradiction.  Why he doesn't flag the role of this ideal earlier is another question.
20 Within Heidegger's terminology, we can talk about these parts of the care structure with reference to 
Dasein's being as “undifferentiated,” rather than authentic or inauthentic.  I'm sympathetic to the claim, 
made by cultural commentators high-, low-, and middlebrow, that “authenticity” is a problematic term 
(see, e.g., Adorno 2003; Klosterman 2006, 22-32; Critchley 2010, 102-122).  At the same time, I think 
that “inauthenticity” remains useful, that one can see something as inauthentic without being attached 
to, or even having a definition of, the authentic.  In the same way that “nonplussed,” “inane,” and 
“feckless” look like privatives but have no contrasting positives, I would suggest that the word 
“inauthentic,” as it is usually now used, does not suppose a conception of its opposite.
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Conclusion
Heideggerian Disclosing as Telling
[Hayden] White, it seems, wants to confront [historians] with a dilemma.  Either historical 
narratives are copies in the relevant sense or they are fictional.  The way to deal with this dilemma 
is to reject it—to maintain that historical narratives are not and, in fact, should not be copies in the 
mirror sense while also maintaining that this does not make them fictional.  The notion that only 
copies in the mirror sense would not be fictional presupposes something like a narrowly 
empiricist, correspondence criterion of truth.
Noël Carroll, “Interpretation, History, and Narrative” (2001, 145)
At the end of the first part of the dissertation (in chapter four), I confronted 
existing theories of the narrative self with an argumentative dilemma.  Either the 
narratives of our lives include every last detail of our experience, or they don't.  If they 
do, then they would appear to be so overflowing in detail and lacking in structure that we 
couldn't count them as narratives.  If, according to the other branch of the dilemma, the 
narratives of our lives don't include every last detail of our experience, then it would 
appear that these narratives can't make us what we are.  Rather, they must be dependent 
on some pre-existing and non-narrative ontological layer, which layer would instead be 
what we are made of, so to speak.  Under Marya Schechtman's revised theory, as we saw, 
we are one sort of thing—biological bodies—and constitute ourselves as another sort of 
thing—persons—by organizing our experience along the lines of a traditional narrative.  I 
argued that, by such theory, we are constituted by narrative activity only in a derivative 
way.  I held open the possibility that who we are is more robustly dependent on narrative 
than this—but only if the argumentative dilemma could be reframed and thus rejected.
Hayden White, by Noël Carroll's gloss, confronts narratively-minded historians 
with a related but slightly different dilemma.  Either narrative histories are copies of 
events, or they are fictions.  Since historical events can't be perfectly mirrored in 
historical writing, but must select some details while leaving others aside, White's 
dilemma concludes that narrative history is fictional—merely fictional, that is.  Carroll 
argues that one can reject White's dilemma as having mis-framed the problem, however.  
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White juxtaposes truth and fiction, taking “true” to mean “mirror” or “correspond” and 
“fictional” to mean “false.”  But we often speak of fictions as being true: not on the basis 
of whether they correspond to reality, but on the basis of whether they reveal to us 
something essential about the world.  Thus, Carroll suggests, we can reject White's 
dilemma by reframing it.  Narrative histories can be true even if they don't perfectly 
correspond to reality.  Narrative histories are true if, perhaps, they reveal something 
essential about events, even if—or indeed because—they are selective in their telling.
I argued (in chapter five) that David Carr's reframing of narrativity—the 
narratives we're interested in concern specifically human activities and therefore don't 
target the same thing as the natural sciences—goes a long way toward rejecting my 
related argumentative dilemma.  If, however, narrative plays a central role in making us 
who we are, rather than merely representing us or, even, allowing us to understand 
ourselves, then the necessary reframing is somewhat more difficult.  For me at least, 
much of the appeal of narrative theories of the self is their apparent status as ontological: 
narrative makes us who we are.  For that to even potentially be the case, the issue of 
selectivity has to be dealt with, and Carroll's rebuttal to White is insufficient.  Narrative 
histories might revealingly represent actual historical events without exhaustively 
mirroring them.  But how could the narratives of our lives make us who we are without 
including all the events of our lives?  When I revisited Carr's reframing and the issue of 
meaning (in chapter seven), I noted that the naturalist will likely be unmoved by it.  
Naturalism will grant that there is a level at which we talk about our lives as having 
meaning.  But that level isn't and shouldn't be part of our most basic account of reality.  
The requirements of ontology are more stringent than representation or understanding.
I conclude this project by providing a speculative reframing of these issues, one 
that might allow us to reject the argumentative dilemma with which I have confronted 
existing theories of the narrative self.  Once again, I will proceed by way of Heidegger.  
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First, I'll examine Peter Goldie's response to these issues: there is no such thing as a 
narrative self, yet having a narrative sense of oneself is important.  Goldie, in a 
commonsensical manner, makes narrativity cohere with a naturalistic worldview.  Using 
Goldie's view as a foil, I'll argue that Heidegger's notion of truth as disclosing gives us a 
frame within which we can see narrative as more central to our mode of being, making us 
who we are.
I. Peter Goldie: The Narrative Self Is Otiose
In his The Mess Inside, Peter Goldie argues that “narrative thinking plays a central 
part in our engagement with our own past and future” (MI, 117).  As we saw briefly in 
chapter two, he, like Marya Schechtman, makes use of the concept of “narratability,” 
extending narrative to thinking which needn't necessarily manifest itself in textual 
products, or even explicit linguistic narration.  Despite this, he holds that the notion of the 
narrative self is “otiose,” that is, that there is no such thing, nothing in reality to which 
this notion refers to or corresponds (MI, 117).1  What we have instead is only a narrative 
sense of the self—“the sense that one has of oneself in narrative thinking, as having a 
past, a present, and a future”—and this “is not the same as having a sense of a narrative 
self” (MI, 118).  Goldie highlights some of the traditional facets of the idea of personal 
identity and rejects any strong connection between them and the narrative sense of self.  
The narrative sense of self and the “metaphysical question of one's identity over time” 
have “no direct connection”; the narrative sense of self does not “have any direct 
implications for the question of what constitutes survival”; and the relation between the 
narrative sense of self and “the idea of a stable self, whose defining traits remain 
relatively stable” is “highly oblique” (MI, 117).  Goldie is thus skeptical that narrative 
1 Earlier, Goldie was more sympathetic to stronger claims.  He sided with Velleman against Dennett, e.g., 
writing that “it is, I think, tendentious to say that the narrative self is a fiction” (2003B, 315n21).
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has any constitutive role to play.  It helps us understand ourselves, but what or who we 
are is not constituted by that understanding.  Narrative gives us knowledge of ourselves, 
and a sense of ourselves.  But the self precedes this sense, and narrative has no 
metaphysical or ontological role to play: it doesn't make us who we are.  I'll briefly 
present Goldie's views here, before going on to suggest that Heidegger might allow us to 
grant an ontological role to narrative (and why we should want to do so).
Goldie's work relies on his broadening of the notion of narrative beyond written 
and spoken texts to include narrative thinking.  He describes most theorists as holding 
narratives to be “necessarily public, involving written, or spoken, or signed, language, or 
some other product” (MI, 3).  At the end of chapter three, I briefly considered the 
widening use of the word narrative.  Goldie's extension of narrative to include narrative 
thinking is not as contentious as he makes it sound—more and more theorists accept this, 
it seems to me.  It is very clear that Goldie would reject my further broadening of the 
term, however, in which the term narrative applies to sequences of events themselves, 
rather than a representation of them.  As we saw at the beginning of chapter four, he 
holds narratives to be representational, even if only in the way that thoughts are 
representational, so narrative must be different from what is represented, events 
themselves (see too MI, 6).  In my own attempt to characterize narrative (chapter three), 
however, I argued that what is distinctive about narrative is not to be found in any of its 
formal qualities, and thus on the side of representations treated as representations, but 
rather in what they are about—events in time.  Such a characterization of narrative is 
more easily extended to our understanding of events themselves.  More importantly, I've 
sought to leave behind the fraught question of whether our lives are narratives, claiming 
instead that we read our lives and narratives according to the same hermeneutic 
structures.
Furthermore, Goldie's holding apart of representation and represented is less clear 
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in his own practice than it is in his explicit statements concerning the matter.  In writing 
“someone can suddenly come to see certain things that happened to him as having a 
narrative structure,” Goldie comes very close to the same sort of language that he 
criticizes MacIntyre for using (MI, 10, emphasis mine).  He quotes MacIntyre's claim that 
“What I have called history is an enacted dramatic narrative in which the characters are 
also the authors,” saying that this is “to elide or identify the narrative and the life that is 
narrated” (MI, 162).  As I showed in chapter four, MacIntyre in fact favors the same 
language that we see Goldie use here: life has narrative structure.  Worries about 
conflating narratives and events themselves are pressing only within the frame of 
comparing art and life as two objects.2  Within that frame (as also discussed in chapter 
four), it is hard to see what the claim “my life is a narrative” even means exactly.  But if 
what is characteristic about narrative is on the side of content, rather than any formal 
qualities of the text (or other object, artistic or otherwise), then this worry is weakened.  
And if, as I've argued in chapter six, the narrativity of the self is not grounded in an 
analogy between two objects, but in the isomorphism of the hermeneutic stance brought 
to bear on narrative (as opposed to other non-narrative aesthetic objects) and the lived 
self (as opposed to oneself as a subject or human being, and also as opposed to 
experience generally), then Goldie's worries about conflating life and art don't arise at all.  
Rather, overstating those worries leads us to a notion of narrative unnecessarily distanced 
from real life.
Goldie's emphasis on narrative as a representational product is due, in large part,  
to his limited model of actual literary narratives and their variety.  Like the critic James 
Wood (whom Goldie cites approvingly; MI, 34ff), Goldie sees narrative as combining an 
internal and external perspective on events, most elegantly in free indirect discourse.  
2 The “life is a text” confusions that concern Goldie can just as well be avoided by maintaing the 
distinction between enacted and textual narratives, even as they are both narrative in form.
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Unlike Wood, however, who as a critic has championed the nineteenth-century novel and 
its latter-day imitators while criticizing more formally innovative works,3 Goldie rarely 
acknowledges that other kinds of works are out there.4  Wisely, Goldie makes no attempt 
to offer necessary and sufficient conditions of what it is “for something to have narrative 
structure” (MI, 13).  Yet the “characteristic features of a narrative” he isolates, and the 
kind of examples he uses, demonstrate that he, like Velleman, in effect normatively 
defines narrative as pursuing certain goals.5  Narratives are characteristically coherent, 
revealing connections between events (MI, 14).  They are also meaningful, in the internal 
sense that we can grasp characters' mental states, dispositions, behavior, and the 
connection between these and events (MI, 18-21), as well as in the external sense, that we 
can grasp narrators' relation to the events they describe (more on this below).  Finally, 
they display “evaluative and emotional import,” again in both an internal sense—we 
grasp characters' evaluations—and an external one—we grasp narrators' evaluations (MI, 
23).  Goldie's characterization seems reasonable in that it fits most of the novels we read, 
for example.  But we can easily ask: would a narrative that failed, or didn't even try, to 
achieve coherence, meaningfulness, and evaluative import really cease to be a narrative?  
Or would it, most likely, just be a bad narrative?  In chapter three, I argued that it is in 
being about human events in time that narratives are characteristically narratives.  But 
this is possible even contrary to Goldie's characterization.
Goldie is wedded to the model of traditional fiction most associated with the 
nineteenth-century realist novel.  Tolstoy, for example, gives us a richly realized world of 
round characters acting in meaningful ways, related by narrators who subtly steer our 
assessment of their actions.  Goldie writes that narrative “essentially involves—and this 
3 Wood is infamous for negatively reviewing novels by, for example, Don DeLillo and Thomas Pynchon, 
novels widely considered to be among the best of the twentieth century.  See his reviews in 1999.
4 Nabokov's Lolita (MI, 30) and Joyce's Ulysses are the most experimental works to which he refers, and 
he describes the stream-of-consciousness sections of Ulysses as non-narrative (2003B, 311).
5 In 2003B, an earlier version of these arguments, Goldie was clearer that his target was what is 
characteristic of a “successful narrative” (302).  “Successful” disappears in the 2012 version.
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has been rightly emphasized—the narrator's external perspective” (2003B, 302).  In The 
Mess Inside he writes of “the external perspective which is essential for narrative” (MI, 
43).  This seems to be a definitional claim: without a narrator's external perspective, 
something is not a narrative.  This is consistent with Goldie's emphasis on narratives' 
representational distance from events themselves.  While it is certainly true that most, 
especially literary, narratives involve divergence between internal and external 
perspectives, and the ability to interpret literature relies on being able to distinguish them 
(MI, 30ff), Goldie's claim, as a definition, is falsified by a novel like The Maltese 
Falcon.6  As is typical of noir, the novel is narrated in a flatly descriptive way.  It gives no 
access to its characters' internal states.7  This, Goldie acknowledges, is possible, though 
such narratives don't interest him (2003A, section II).  But neither does it encode any sort 
of sense, not even in the subtle manner of free indirect discourse, of what the narrator 
thinks of the events—to the extent that it is natural to think of the novel as lacking a 
narrator in anything but a purely formal sense, the sense in which films are sometimes 
said to have narrators.8  Goldie uses examples of narrators who explicitly evaluate events 
or ones (this one from Wood) like “Ted watched the orchestra through stupid tears,” in 
which, through free indirect discourse, the word “stupid” is both the character's and the 
6 Notice that this counterexample to Goldie's definition of narrative is not an obscure postmodern 
experiment, but one of the most popular mystery novels of all time.  Coincidently, the so-called 
“Flitcraft Episode” from The Maltese Falcon (59ff), in which a falling beam narrowly misses Flitcraft, 
whose response to this wholly random event is to abandon his family and start a new one, is an 
interesting companion piece to the story of Mitys (see chapter three).
7 Genette calls this “external focalization”: “the hero performs in front of us without our ever being 
allowed to know his thoughts or feelings” (190).
8 Bal, for example, writes of a narrator as a “function” rather than a storyteller (see chapter three).  To the 
objection that The Maltese Falcon has an external perspective since it is narrated in the past tense: this 
is merely a matter of grammatical tense.  There is no sense that the narrator is looking back from the 
privileged position of knowing where things are going, and there is no fore-shadowing.  The only 
deviations in the novel's chronology (divergences between fabula and sju!et) are due to characters' 
verbal descriptions of past events.  Goldie is clear that it is not a purely formal sense of perspective that 
he's using, but rather a “more metaphorical, evaluative sense” (MI, 12).  Leaving the specifics of 
Goldie's account aside, one might argue that any narrative, just by relating some events and not others, 
encodes evaluations.  I think this is probably right, and will suggest below that Dasein's concern serves 
as such a filter.  Against Goldie, however, narrative need not include an external perspective.  If it does 
need to, it is hard to see how it could be relevant to our present-tense understanding or play a 
constitutive role.
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narrator's (MI, 34).  He writes that “the [narrator's] higher-level perspective is always 
there, always shaping and colouring the narrative, and thereby indicating the narrator's 
own evaluation of what happened, and his or her emotional response thereto, as well as 
inviting from the audience a similar sort of response” (2003A, section II).  This is not true 
of The Maltese Falcon.  It of course includes adjective and adverbs, but they are never 
evaluative, demonstrating the narrator's perspective.  “He shut his eyes and smiled 
complacently at an inner thought”: the narrator isn't evaluating The Fat Man's smile as 
complacent, nor describing such a reaction as appropriate or inappropriate, but merely 
describing the way things look (123).  A complacent smile is different from a joyous 
smile, not as a matter of evaluation, but appearance.  That noir is so flatly descriptive is, 
no doubt, one of the reasons why it is so easily adaptable into film.
Goldie's emphasis on the external perspective goes a long way toward explaining 
why he doesn't allow narrative to play any ontological role with respect to the self.  If my 
sense is distanced from its object, like a narrator looking back over a story, then it can't 
constitute that object.  Goldie makes a compelling case that traditional narrative, 
characterized by its coherence, meaningfulness, and mixing of internal and external 
evaluative perspectives, is deeply relevant to our emotional lives.  But the success of this 
one model blinds him to others which might be relevant to our very ontology.  With 
respect to the experimental, forking path narratives which I have proposed as a model for 
the structure of our narrative self-understanding, I would guess that Goldie would dismiss 
them as games, at most aesthetically interesting, but certainly not relevant to life.  Like 
Ricoeur, he would brand them “antinovels.”9
Goldie, like Strawson, emphasizes various false, “fictionalizing tendencies” that 
can arise when one understands one's life as a narrative (MI, 161-173).  He says we tend 
“to narrativize,” “to give our lives a kind of narrative structure that is appropriate to 
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traditional fiction but that is simply not appropriate to real life” (MI, 161).  Since 
“narrativize” would seem to mean only “to give or see as having narrative structure,” 
whereas “fictionalize” and “aestheticize” are better names for seeing inappropriate 
structure, Goldie's use of “narrativize” assumes an answer to just the questions we want 
to ask.  In response to MacIntyre, Goldie writes that “we do not need to know what story 
or stories we are a part of before we can make decisions about what to do” (MI, 170).  
Against the background of the previous chapter, I think the way of combating our 
fictionalizing tendencies is not to insist on holding life and narrative apart, but instead to 
become more aware of narrative's conventions and one's own interpretive habits, while 
also understanding that there's no reason to think of one's life as a good—that is 
aesthetically pleasing—narrative.  Ignoring the narrative patterns of life and our social 
roles, or being oblivious to them, is exactly what facilitates our becoming victims of 
them.  Goldie is right that “knowing about these tendencies and their dangers can 
mitigate their effect in our narrative thinking” (MI, 172).  Where he goes wrong (and 
Gregory Currie is another thinker who does this; see his 2011) is in suggesting that 
“knowing about these tendencies” is primarily a matter of knowing about research in 
empirical psychology rather than, just as importantly, knowing about narrative 
conventions and interpretive patterns.
Goldie writes that his “account of the narrative sense of self is not committed to 
any particular theory of personal identity” (MI, 125).  He puts a great deal of emphasis on 
memory, planning, and psychological continuity, but these are all at the level of one's 
sense of who one is.  He remains uncommitted to the view that they make one who one 
is, that personal identity “consists” in the ability to have such a sense (MI, 125).  On the 
issues of stability and survival, Goldie criticizes Schechtman's view that having a self-
constituting narrative requires that one can identify oneself with, and empathically 
reenter, the self of one's memories.  “Talk of a 'self' here, whose identity and survival can 
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be threatened, is, I think, a kind of exaggeration, as if loss of one trait is enough for the 
loss of one's self,” Goldie writes (MI, 145).  Of course it takes more than the loss of one 
trait to even apparently threaten the loss of self in most cases.  But Goldie is right to 
question the necessity of stable character in a narrative account of oneself.  Narrative—
our way of dealing with human meaning in time—is appealing as a possible manner of 
understanding ourselves exactly because we change through time.  Goldie considers 
Schechtman's invocation of Augustine's conversion as an example of a potentially 
“survival-threatening rift, rather than a continuing narrative […] of progress toward the 
good in the life of one particular person” (MI, 144).  He writes: “Whilst we can and 
should accept that we think of ourselves as having certain defining traits with which we 
identify, and that this kind of identification is important, Schechtman would surely agree 
that it is a mistake to take the continuation through someone's autobiographical narrative 
as literally a matter of life and death” (MI, 141).  I suspect Goldie is right that 
Schechtman would agree, given the increasing emphasis she puts on biology (see chapter 
four).  But I don't think that we should agree.  Rather, I think that this kind of apparently 
commonsensical comment reveals that Goldie, even if he isn't committed to a particular 
theory of personal identity, is committed to a particular kind of theory.  The idea that 
radical change might mean the literal death of a self seems exaggerated only because 
Goldie is thinking of the self as a thing like a body or human being—that is, as a thing, 
even if not a material one.  If, as we've seen Heidegger (and Arendt and Sartre) argue, this 
is categorically the wrong way to answer the question of “who I am,” if the self is not a 
thing but a name for a temporal unfolding, then it seems far less strange to think that the 
self can “die” under conditions different from those under which a human being does.10  
Much of the problem here is that the notion of death is intertwined with that of biological 
10 This isn't to deny that Heidegger (or Arendt or Sartre) don't or can't offer a rich account of our spatiality 
and even bodies.  But focusing too exclusively on our bodies, which any account centered of us as 
“human beings” will be tempted to do, causes us to lose sight of our distinctively temporal constitution. 
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life.  To say that, upon true religious or political conversion, someone's past life has 
ended, or she's left her old self behind, seem less exaggerated not because they change 
the claim exactly, but because they use more appropriate language.
Goldie's account of our narrative sense of ourselves is a commonsensical one, 
explicitly pitched at avoiding what he sees as the “excesses” of both narrativists and their 
critics (MI, 1-2).  I argued that Schechtman seems motivated by the desire to keep 
narrativity compatible with a naturalistic notion of what we are.  Goldie's account does 
just this.11  Our narrative sense of ourselves is ultimately a matter of psychology 
according to the framing of his account, and it is compatible with the claim that our 
psychology and psychological concepts are continuous with, and emerge from, our 
biology.  Goldie's account is “metaphysically light,” as he puts it, and so doesn't put 
forward any claim that might run afoul of our other descriptions of what we are (MI, 
117).
According to Schechtman's distinction, Goldie's account looks like an answer to 
the characterization question, not the reidentification question.  Whether one can finally 
hold these questions apart depends on how one conceives of the self.  Goldie writes that 
“it is no exaggeration to say that having this ability to think about our past and future is 
part of what it is to be human, for our lives would surely be bereft without it” (MI, 125).   
“Part of what it is to be human”: Taken within the frame of the characterization question, 
to say that having a narrative sense of oneself is “part of what it is to be human” is to say 
that part of knowing who I am is accomplished through my narrative sense of my past 
and future.  But this is very close to “what it is to be human”: only because I have this 
sense am I who I am, and only because of this sense am the same “who” through time.  
Taken in this way Goldie's phrase pushes toward metaphysics and the reidentification 
question.  Without narrative, I wouldn't be a “who” at all, so I couldn't be the same “who”
11 See Schechtman's very positive review of The Mess Inside for Memory Studies (2013).
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through time without narrative.  The reidentification question is itself polyphonic.  What 
makes me the same “who” or self through time might be different from what makes me 
the same body, human being, or even person.  The question(s) of metaphysical identity, 
so usefully bracketed by Schechtman to redirect the conversation into new terrain, 
ultimately return.  “What is an important ability as part of what it is to be a human being 
is one thing; the metaphysics of personhood is another,” Goldie writes (MI, 125).  This is, 
I think, unsatisfying.  Ultimately we want to be able to say how these matters relate to 
each other, how our character and metaphysical identity are intertwined.
Goldie's work is admirably precise and clear.  I fear that it achieves these qualities 
at the expense of not trying to articulate the more radical role narrative might play in 
making us who we are (all for the better, he might respond: there is no such role).  It also 
avoids difficult questions by ignoring the fact that narrative exists in many forms 
different from the nineteenth-century, realistic model of free indirect discourse he uses as 
a model.  Goldie describes his theory as “quite modest in many respects, with no 
pretension to offer an account of personal identity” (MI, 148).  I wonder if Goldie's 
theory doesn't quietly pretend that narrativity can't play such a role and isn't thus 
ambitious in its deflation: anyone who suggests such a larger role is misguided.  That 
claim, if indeed implicit, would require a great deal more defense.  I think that narrative 
does play a larger role, a role that we are not sure how to articulate, yet we shouldn't 
therefore give up on.  What follows is speculative (as is, I hope, more appropriate on the 
way out of a project), and perhaps best characterized as a promissory note on further 
attempts to do so.
II. Disclosing as (Selectively) Telling
Let me sketch an example, which I'll use to make these final considerations less 
abstract.  Suppose you describe me (the example needs to be conducted in the first 
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person) as ambitious.  A world like “ambitious” offers a characterization, for which there 
would seem to be a fact of the matter, though one that is not necessarily easy to settle.  
How you, from a third-person perspective, and I, from a first-person one, go about 
assessing the matter of my ambition, or lack thereof, differs in a way that teases apart our 
notions of person and self.  For you, the question is: What kind of person is he?  An 
ambitious one?  You will evaluate this question on the basis of public information: how I 
act, the facts of my biography, testimonials from others familiar with how I act and the 
facts of my biography.  You will perhaps ask me, straight-out, what ambitions I have, or 
whether I am ambitious, but, for you, my answer will not be decisive, but rather another 
point to be taken into consideration.  When you consider me, you consider me as a 
person.  (With respect to character.  With respect to my height, for example, you consider 
me as a human being or a body.)  Our notion of a person is a public one.  The facts of 
what kind of person someone is are objective, or based in judgements ultimately tracked 
back to and tested against objective facts.
Let's shift perspective now.  How do I evaluate the matter of my own ambition?  
Even if I articulate the question in the same terms as you do—What kind of person am I?  
An ambitious one?—I don't go about answering it in the same way.  I could, or I could at 
least try to, evaluate myself from the third-person perspective, based only on public 
information.  And if my ultimate concern is to understand how I am perceived by others, 
this might be well advised.  But evaluating myself in this way seems somewhat unnatural, 
requiring me to abstract away from my immediate first-person perspective on myself.  
From the first-person perspective, I have access to a great deal of information that you 
don't, at least not as readily: my thoughts and feelings, self-descriptions and evaluations.  
None of this information is inextricably private.  It could be made public.  Much of it, if 
you give my behavior enough attention and are equipped to interpret it correctly, is 
already public.  But it is much more apparent, transparent, conspicuous to me, 
354
considering myself.
From the first-person perspective, I consider myself as a self.  Our notion of the 
self is grounded in the first-person perspective and content which isn't private, but is 
initially opaque to others.  Unless I intentionally avoid considering myself as a self, any 
considerations of myself as a person will be routed through it.  So, asking myself whether 
I am ambitious or not, I will consider facts not immediately available to others.  Do I feel 
ambitious?  What plans do I have?  Where do I see myself in twenty years?  Do I expect 
to stay on the course I'm currently on?  Such information isn't necessarily inaccessible to 
you, but neither is it readily apparent.  It even seems plausible to say that our answers to 
the question of whether I am ambitious might differ (even if we share the same 
conception of ambition) yet not contradict each other.  A feeling of ambition, or a vow to 
accomplish certain things, might reasonably carry overriding weight for me, but little for 
you, just because of the way our notions of selves and persons pull apart.
Notice that, except as a theoretical matter, we don't talk of the self in anything but 
first-personal terms.  The question “Who am I?” translates to “How do I understand 
myself?”  The question “Who is she?” translates to something more like “What is her 
name?  Where is she from?  What does she do for a living?”  I don't speak of someone 
else's self—only mine (except, perhaps, in philosophical or psychotherapeutic settings).  I 
speak of someone else as a person.  Or I simply speak of someone else, the frame of my 
considerations unscrutinized.  I can speak of how someone else thinks of her self (not just 
herself), routing my perspective through her first-personal reports, but that's the only way 
of accessing a self other than my own.  So whereas my consideration of myself as a 
person is derivative of my consideration of my self as a self, my consideration of anyone 
else as a self is derivative of her own consideration of herself as a self (and, perhaps, also 
derivative of my consideration of her as a person).  Only as an awkward theoretical 
abstraction do we talk of someone else's self.  
355
My attempt to offer an account of the self's narrativity began with the claim that 
our description of ourselves as selves, rather than as such related concepts as subjects, 
persons, or human beings, is distinctive in the following way.  As I self, I understand 
myself in the first person, temporally.  And I understand my actions and the temporal 
situations in which they are nested as having meaning in a way that the merely natural 
does not.  My self-understanding is narrative in form because I interpret my ongoing life 
according to the same essential structures that a reader interprets a narrative when mid-
story.  Absent such ongoing, pre-theoretical interpretive situatedness, there would be no 
self.  That's not to say that I wouldn't be there.  Absent this distinctively first-person 
temporal interpretation, it would still make sense to describe me as a person or a human 
being—more public notions—but not as a self.
This is, then, a notion of self-constitution, though that phrase requires 
clarification.  According to my claims, I do not constitute myself as a person or human 
being by way of narrative self-understanding.  Rather, I am constituted as a self by my 
self-understanding, which even at the pre-theoretical level is narrative in form.  It's 
important to stress that understanding oneself as a self is distinctive from understanding 
oneself as a human being or person or according to any other notion.  It's also important 
to stress that such self-constitution isn't voluntary or deliberate (thus the passive 
construction: “I am constituted”).  As Richard Moran writes, “any genuinely transforming 
role for the interpretation of one's state depends precisely on an understanding of 
'interpretation' and the like which does not denote a voluntary capacity” (53).  
Heidegger's notions of thrownness and understanding allow us to see our self-constitution 
as un-voluntary, and all the more important and interesting because of that.
Charles Taylor explains how such a notion of constitutive self-understanding is 
familiar, with respect to some emotional states, for example:
Formulating how we feel, or coming to adopt a new formulation, can frequently change how we 
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feel.  When I come to see that my feeling of guilt was false, or my feeling of love self-deluded, the 
emotions themselves are different [….] We could say that for these emotions, our understanding of 
them or the interpretations we accept are constitutive of the emotion.  The understanding helps 
shape the emotion.  And that is why the latter cannot be considered a fully independent object. 
(1985, vol. 1, 100-101; quoted in Moran, 39)
Moran describes self-constitution in its stronger forms similarly: “at least for a certain 
range of cases, the person's own interpretation of his state suffices for its being that very 
way” (44).  My suggestion is that self-understanding plays this constitutive role not just 
for certain emotions, but generally speaking with respect to oneself as a self.  That will 
seem paradoxical initially.  If the self is not “a fully independent object,” but constituted 
by interpretation, what is doing the interpretation?  According to Heidegger, we find 
ourselves always already there.  In interpretation, we make ourselves explicit to ourselves
—both as what is interpreting and what is interpreted.12  So there's something there to 
begin with.  But it only deserves the name “self” once it acquires a sense of meaning as a 
“who.”  What is there initially is not a human being or person, however—those, I'll 
suggest, are more derivative notions.  What is there initially is the self not yet made 
explicit, still covered over (more on this below).  William Blattner describes what he 
names “the existentiality thesis” as being “at the heart of Heidegger's conception of 
human being” (that is, our human manner of being, not a human being as a thing): “If 
Dasein is A, then it is A because it understands itself as A” (32).  This is because Dasein 
is futurally oriented, unfinished, and projecting, because its being is at stake for it.  My 
self-understanding constitutes my self according to the way I understand it.  Self-
constitution isn't volunteeristic because self-understanding isn't.  I can't simply describe 
myself as I will and thus make it true.  I've always already projected the possibilities of 
my existence, and my pre-theoretical comportment reveals them.  Thus, what we want to 
understand is how my self is revealed to myself, how that frame differs from the public 
one of the person, how those frames relate to each other, and how truth claims differ with 
12 “Since Dasein is its disclosedness, existentials at once constitute-and-disclose existence as Dasein's 
being” (Dalstrom 2013, 70). 
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respect to each.  I finish by suggesting that Heidegger's discussions of truth and reality at 
the end of the first division of Being and Time give us a way of understanding these 
claims, and in particular that his notion of disclosing shows how our understanding, 
narrative in form, is selective but still constitutive.
Heidegger's most persistent enemy throughout Being and Time is the notion that 
what it means to be is adequately understood as being present-at-hand.  Yet our very 
notion of reality is grounded in such an understanding.  Taking things as present-at-hand, 
he writes, “'Being' acquires the meaning of 'Reality'” and “Substantiality becomes the 
basic characteristic of Being” (SZ, 201).13  We take things to exist if they have substance.  
This is true not only of other entities, but of ourselves as well: “Like any other entity, 
Dasein too is present-at-hand as Real” (SZ, 201).  We are thus directed off course from 
an adequate understanding of ourselves: “Entities with Dasein's kind of Being cannot be 
conceived in terms of Reality and substantiality; we have expressed this by the thesis that
the substance of man is existence” (SZ, 212).  We have seen—in the analyses of thrown 
projection, understanding and interpretation, and das Man and falling—much of 
Heidegger's attempt to reconceive of Dasein's existence as other than presence-at-hand.  
His discussion of the notion of reality reveals the full extent of his reframing of 
traditional philosophical concerns.  It is not merely the case that, within our conception of 
reality as consisting of substantial objects present at hand, we need to make an exception 
for ourselves, reconceiving of our being as temporal existence.  Rather, if we properly 
reconceive of our being as temporal existence, we have to revise our understanding of 
reality, and of truth.
The world is opened up only through Dasein: “Entities are uncovered only when 
Dasein is; and only so long as Dasein is, are they disclosed” (SZ, 226).  This in not a 
13 Our tendency to do this, Heidegger argues, is due to our everyday manner of being as falling, in which 
we are fascinated by objects before us (SZ, 206; see too my discussion in chapter eight).
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subjectivistic or idealist claim, Heidegger insists (SZ, 212, 227).  It is not the claim that 
we make entities by thinking them into being.  Rather, the world is articulated into 
entities of this or that kind only through our understanding.  Remember that Heidegger's 
primary notion of the world is of the referential network of tools, purposes, roles, and 
ways of being.  The notion of the world as bare things is abstracted from this primary 
notion; our use of tools and projecting of purposes is not grafted onto it.  In order to 
consider a bare entity, or the truth of an assertion made about one, that entity first has to 
be disclosed to us.  Heidegger calls this disclosure the “primordial phenomenon of truth,” 
and writes that it serves as the “ontological foundations” of our traditional conception of 
truth as correspondence (SZ, 214).  As Daniel Dahlstrom writes, “correspondence cannot 
be the end of the story; it presupposes the disclosure or discovery of that to which the true 
assertion is supposed to correspond” (2013, 224).  In my example, before we can ask 
whether it is true that I am ambitious (or not), whether that claim corresponds to the 
reality of the matter, I have to have been revealed.  The topic of Heidegger's notion of 
truth is an enormous one unto itself, and a controversial one.14  I only seek to tap into it 
enough here to reframe and reject the argumentative dilemma I have proposed.  Via 
Heidegger's notions of truth, Dasein's disclosiveness, and reality, we can see the 
progression from the self to the person to the human being in a disenchanted material 
world as a progression of derivations, moving ever further from our most immediate 
disclosure of our selves to ourselves in narrative.
I began, way back in my introduction, by noting the variety of self-descriptive 
terms we have at our disposal: selves, subjects, people, persons, human beings, etc.  
These terms overlap in some ways and compete in others.  Outside of a fully developed 
theoretical context, where such things can be stipulated, they elude strict definition (and 
when, in a theoretical context, one does stipulate definitions, one simultaneously risks 
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making one's terms irrelevant to ordinary discourse or to any other theoretical context).  I 
suggested that the meaning of our terms of self-description is best approached obliquely: 
what sorts of questions, assumptions, and other terms become appropriate when one says 
“self,” for example, rather than something else?  I have proceeded by way of the 
hypothesis that the self is found in a distinctively narrative context.  Against the 
background of my attempts to flesh out and defend that hypothesis, I now return to the 
issue of how to distinguish our notions of self, person, and human being.  (In chapter two, 
I distinguished our notion of the subject, as an epistemological abstraction, from these 
richer notions.)  Tracking the progression of derivations upon which these ever more 
objective notions depend will allow me as well to summarize how all of the parts of my 
revised conception of narrative's role in our self-understanding hang together.
Dasein's manner of being discloses the world to it.  Part of what is disclosed is 
Dasein itself.  Dasein's existence is disclosed to itself temporally, according to the 
structure of thrown projection.  My manner of being isn't “me,” however.  I don't choose 
it, rather it is part of my thrownness.  Also, my manner of being isn't anything like a 
unified site of agency or awareness.  I find myself existing, and with a certain mood and 
situation.  Even on the side of projection, I have always already projected possibilities 
and understood myself within them.  I don't choose my self-understanding, so I can't 
make myself as I will.  Despite that, Dasein's disclosiveness does serve as a filter, such 
that my understanding is selective: not every detail possibly related to my life is part of 
the way my life is revealed to me.  I have argued that any theory of the narrative self 
require such a filter in place.  A theory that conceives of us as authors, writing our stories, 
or narrators, telling them according to a selective criterion of relevance, can do this.  But 
those metaphors are much too volunteeristic and lead to insurmountable worries that such 
a self is a mere fiction.  According to my Heideggerian account, Dasein's disclosiveness 
serves as this filter.  But it is not “me” that tells (reveals, discloses) my story (my 
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narratively-structured temporal experience), rather it is my manner of being.
The full details of my life neither straightforwardly are or aren't part of the story 
of my life—that is, my ongoing, thrown and projecting, situated understanding, which I 
read like a story.  This is how the argumentative dilemma can be reframed and rejected.  
Depending on my activity, certain details become apparent to me, others don't.  Given 
certain conditions, however, any of them could impinge on my attention.  As Carr writes:
Narratives do select; and life is what they select from.  But it hardly follows that in life no 
selection takes place.  Our very capacity for attention, and for following through more or less 
long-term and complex endeavours, is our capacity for selection.  Extraneous details are not left 
out, but they are pushed into the background, saved for later, ranked in importance. (Carr in Wood, 
ed., 1991, 165)
Carr continues, but remains excessively guided by the metaphor of self as author and 
narrator, and thus needs to limit his analogy.  Guided by my metaphor, of reading, worries 
such as “Unlike the author of fiction, we do not create the materials we are to form” 
dissolve (166).  The disclosure of my self is not a matter of making myself fully present.  
It is a practical matter of my ongoing interpretive situatedness, and I can attend to some 
parts only when others are covered over.  As Heidegger puts it, “the proposition that 
'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth'” (SZ, 222).  
“Dasein is already both in the truth and in untruth” (SZ, 223).  Only so far as being is 
closed off is my being also disclosed.
Dasein has always understood itself according to its projection of possibilities.  At 
a pre-theoretical level, it reads its temporal existence.  The notion of reading invoked here 
is a simple one, but distinctively the kind of reading we do when we read narrative.  We 
“read for the plot,” to use Peter Brooks's phrase.  We understand what events transpire, in 
what order, and how they start to add up to a larger whole.  (More sophisticated senses of 
reading, more like literary interpretation, happen only later.)  All of this can take place 
pre-theoretically, just as our understanding of a story we're literally reading is guided by 
projected hypotheses about where it is headed even when those hypotheses don't rise to 
361
full consciousness.  When one walks down the street, one reads the terrain and changing 
set of possible obstacles.  When a soccer player reads the developing play, she reads the 
changing configuration on the field and its possibilities.  Reading in its lowest-level sense 
is a matter of understanding what is happening in its ongoing development.
As we saw in chapter six, Dasein's simultaneous projection of its being onto a for-
the-sake-of-which (a purpose, a task) and the structure of significance (what its culture 
and situation make possible and intelligible) account for Dasein's disclosiveness in 
general: “The character of the understanding as projection constitutes Being-in-the-world 
with regard to the disclosedness of its there as the there of a potentiality-for-Being (SZ, 
145, translation modified).  Dasein's thrown and projected manner of being is what opens 
up a world at all.  The world, in Heidegger's primary sense of the word, consists of the 
totality of the referential network.  In the standard example, a tool like a hammer relates 
to other equipment like nails and boards, which relate to purposes like erecting structures 
and creating shelter, and to roles like that of a carpenter.  Even all of these parts form but 
one narrow slice of the referential totality.  When I do something like take up a hammer, 
there is a telescoping set of for-the-sake-of-whiches, organized by my society's 
institutions and ways of being.  I hammer for the sake of connecting boards, for the sake 
of erecting a structure, for the sake of shelter, etc.  Since there are a variety of ways of 
realizing my larger purpose, this slice of the referential totality is not linear, leading 
directly from hammering to shelter.  Rather, my projection of possibilities widens to 
include alternative means.  Hammering successfully depends on being able to deal with 
any number of contingencies, and erecting a shelter even more.  From the first-person 
perspective, none of this will usually be present to me, nor need it be.  It can remain fully 
pre-theoretical.  I remain focused on what I am doing.  Should I encounter resistance, I 
will adjust, and the more capable I am the greater the range of contingencies I can deal 
with.  But I don't plan to adjust, or imagine doing so, or have an itemized list of coping 
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strategies.  Details of my work impinge on my attention only to the extent necessary for 
me to continue; otherwise they remain marginalized, or fully in the background.
Dasein can, but doesn't always and need not, make its understanding explicit.  
This is what Heidegger calls “interpretation.”  Interpretation, as we saw in chapter seven, 
encompasses a whole spectrum of forms, some closely preserving the thrown and 
projecting structure of our understanding, some derivative of and ever more distant from 
it.  When we make explicit our reading of our existence, putting it into language, I have 
argued that narrative, especially in the form of forking path narratives, is closest to our 
understanding.  Our pre-theoretical understanding is already narrative in form, so it can 
be made explicit as a narrative without doing violence to that form.  On top of this, a 
continuing spectrum of forms of interpretation is possible.  I could create a traditional 
narrative by selecting and emphasizing certain possibilities, what I intend, perhaps, or 
what I most expect to happen.  Doing so would hide the place that other possibilities play 
in constituting my understanding of my self, and thus, since my self depends on how I 
understand myself, who I am.  Yet more distantly and derivatively, I might describe my 
life as a tragedy.  That's to characterize my life as a particular kind of narrative, but that 
interpretation itself no longer has narrative form, but is instead a mere assertion.  I can 
describe my life as good, or fulfilling: these too are interpretations in the form assertions, 
and ones that have nothing to do with narrative.  Yet they too, according to my account, 
are derivative of the pre-theoretical narrative form of the understanding.  An account of 
our self-understanding that claims it is narrative in form doesn't require that we fixate on 
the story of our lives, because interpretation remains optional, an explicit putting into 
language our our pre-theoretical, but still narrative in form, understanding.  An account of 
our manner of being like Heidegger's that makes central the claim that we are self-
interpreting beings doesn't require that we constantly ask “what does it all mean?”  
Interpretation, in most of its forms, is not so distanced, broad, and summative as this.
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The spectrum of interpretation, from our implicit, pre-theoretical understanding to 
grand assertions about the meaning of our lives, finds another form in our various terms 
of self-description: selves, persons, human beings, human animals, etc.  Some of these 
terms are used at levels of interpretation that preserve the narrative structure of our 
experience.  Others are more distant, and are derivative of that basic disclosure.  Yet 
others erect specific theoretical contexts—sometimes very distant from, but still 
derivative of—our everyday manner of being.  “Self,” as I have used it—as a term of 
phenomenology rather than metaphysics—is closest to our most basic layer of 
understanding.  Person, by distancing itself from the first-person perspective and calling 
on objective data, is further away.  Human being, human animal, and homo sapiens erect 
progressively more specific biological frameworks through the casting of regional 
ontologies based in conceptions of what kinds of entities exist.  By doing so, they can 
make more detailed, rigorous claims about what we are.  Simultaneously, they lose a grip 
on who we are, however.
Assertions about things in the world, rather than Dasein itself and its self-
understanding are also derivative of the structure of Dasein's disclosiveness, according to 
Heidegger.  Remember my example of the assertion “the cup is white, with a red lid” 
(chapter seven).  The cup is only disclosed at all due to Dasein's encounter with it.  
Because of that disclosure, we can make abstract assertions about it, and even erect a 
theoretical context in which to study it.  In this way the progression of derivative levels of 
assertion circles back: we can finally practice philosophy, which allows us to assert things 
like “Dasein's manner of being discloses the world to it.”
In order to answer critics like Galen Strawson and provide firmer grounds for 
continuing work on narrative, self-understanding, and self-constitution, I have taken a 
narrow focus, considering the kind of self-understanding implicit in even one moment of 
Dasein's existence.  Even there, a whole diachronic dynamic opens up, because I can only 
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know where and who I am now against the background of an understanding of where I 
am going.  I have said nothing about what happens when we actual get going.  That is, I 
have said nothing about how we live, rather than understand our lives, how we act, rather 
than understand our situations.  On the basis of the account I have offered here, of the 
way we read our ongoing existences, what would a fuller account look like, of the way 
we live and organize our lives?  Even granting the limitations of our thrownness, do we 
author our existences?  This is a project for the future.
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